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A bstract
Price cap regulation has been used to control the monopoly behaviour of utility firms 
in the UK since 1984. The RPI-X regime currently in operation is very different to 
the regulatory mechanism originally proposed, and to the theory of pure price cap 
regulation. We therefore argue that it is necessary to examine how the mechanism 
is actually designed and implemented, if we are to determine its impact on economic 
welfare.
A detailed description of RPI-X regulation is presented here. This description 
is used to  examine the impact of the price cap mechanism on allocative efficiency, 
technical efficiency and the efficient delivery of quality of service. We also examine 
the impact of regulation on welfare by calculating the rate of growth in productivity 
in the water and electricity sectors since privatisation.
Our analysis of the efficiency properties of RPI-X regulation exposes flaws in the 
regime. There is, however, scope to change the regulatory contract and potentially 
increase welfare. First, the way in which the price cap is set can be altered. For 
example, a revised methodology can be used to share cost savings with consumers. 
Alternatively, the form of the contract can be changed so that more restriction, than a 
single cap, is placed on the firm’s price choice. We consider how the proposed changes 
may deliver a higher level of welfare given the constraints of the existing legal and 
institutional framework. The limited relevance and feasibility of the proposed changes, 
arising from the characteristics of demand and cost functions in the regulated sectors, 
are also emphasised.
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C hapter 1
Introduction
‘The case for reform rests on a critique of the existing regime, and on 
identifying ways in which it can be improved.’ (Helm, 2001)
RPI-X regulation was introduced in the UK utility sectors in 1984 when it was 
applied to  British Telecom. Under this regulatory mechanism the rate of change in 
prices is limited to be equal to the change in the retail price index (RPI) minus (or 
plus) the expected additional net change in the firm’s costs (the ‘X’ factor). Over 
the past twenty years the mechanism has been used to regulate prices in the airports, 
electricity distribution, electricity transmission, gas, rail, and water sectors in the UK. 
It has also recently been applied to National Air Traffic Control Services (NATS) and 
the Post Office (Consignia). This form of regulation has been adopted, and adapted, 
worldwide for a range of network industries in both the developed world (eg, Australia, 
Canada) and the developing world (eg, Latin America). It is therefore one of the most 
prominent forms of regulation for the utility sectors and, as such, it is important that 
we have a clear and complete understanding of its impact on economic welfare1.
A cursory glance at the literature on price cap regulation generally, and on RPI-X 
regulation specifically, would suggest that we already know what the welfare impact 
is. In particular, we expect that this regulatory regime will provide the firm with 
an incentive to reduce costs, by allowing it to retain the profit associated with the 
cost reduction. This will, in theory, improve technical efficiency and thereby increase 
welfare. The implications for allocative efficiency and quality of service delivery are 
less evident in the theoretical analysis of price cap regulation.
The primary motivation for this research is the belief that the RPI-X regime, as it 
currently operates in the UK utility sectors, is very different from the scheme originally
1 Arm strong, Cowan and Vickers (1 9 9 4 ) confirm  that ‘Alm ost fifty firms in  Britain are subject 
to R PI-X , and the system  has attracted considerable international interest’. Since this book was 
published the price cap regime has spread even further.
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proposed by Littlechild (1983), and from the theory of pure price cap regulation. For 
example, Littlechild (1983) envisioned a mechanism which was simple to design and 
implement, and which would only be required in the short-term until competition 
emerged. In practice, the process used to set the X-factor is complex and detailed. An 
analysis of operating costs, capital investment requirements, shareholder returns and 
output delivery is undertaken at each review. The regulator has also had to capture an 
increasing number of economic and political objectives in the regulatory contract2. In 
addition, price caps are expected to remain in the long-run for the natural monopoly 
businesses.
The theory of pure price cap regulation assumes that the price will be set in­
dependently from the firm’s costs, and that the firm will retain the benefits of any 
savings made forever. In practice, historical and current cost information is used to 
set the price cap, and savings made are shared with consumers at periodic reviews (or 
earlier)3.
We therefore argue that the practice of RPI-X regulation, and hence its impact 
on economic welfare, is different to what was originally envisioned. Given this, it 
is necessary to  review the actual properties of this regulatory regime by undertaking, 
with the benefit of twenty years of experience with the mechanism, a thorough analysis 
of its impact on welfare. This analysis should be grounded in economic theory but 
reflect the actual characteristics of the existing regime. We therefore first describe, 
in C h ap te r  2, how RPI-X regulation operates in practice. The regulatory regime is 
presented as a series of repeated games between the firm, the regulator, and other 
parties. The characteristics of the RPI-X game are described, and we explain how the 
regulator and the firm make their decisions within this game.
The description of the game is used to analyse the efficiency properties of the 
price cap mechanism in C h ap te r  3. We focus on the impact of RPI-X regulation on 
allocative efficiency, technical efficiency and the efficient delivery of quality of service. 
This approach is consistent with Baumol’s (1995) argument that ‘the public interest 
standard for economic regulation calls for it to adopt only rules and procedures that are 
consistent with economic efficiency’. We recognise that concerns also exist about the 
impact of the regime on equity, but we do not address this issue here4. The theoretical
2T his is em phasised by Bennett and Waddams Price (2002) who note that ‘Incentive contracts m ust 
be designed to take account o f several different dim ensions, and have becom e increasingly com plex’.
3 The difference between price cap regulation in practice and in  theory has been discussed in  the 
past, particularly in the articles from the 1989 RAND Symposium on Price Cap R egulation and in  
Braeutigam  and Panzar (1993). For exam ple, Braeutigam  and Panzar (1989) questioned ‘whether any 
of the efficiency properties earlier ascribed to price-cap regulation w ill be realized’.
4The reader is referred to  Markou and Waddams Price (1999), W addams Price (2000b and 1997b) 
and W addams Price and Hancock (1997) for an analysis o f distribution concerns in  the regulatory 
regime.
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analysis is supported by an empirical investigation into the impact of regulation on 
productivity in C h ap te r  4. Several productivity measures are used, including changes 
in real unit operating costs and total factor productivity indices. We find that welfare 
under the mechanism is affected by the characteristics of the game, and by the way in 
which the X-factor is set.
The critique of the efficiency properties of RPI-X regulation leads us to our second 
motivation for this research. We wish to determine whether the existing regime is 
in fact the best available. Littlechild (1983) proposed a price cap mechanism on the 
grounds that it was better than the other alternatives under consideration at the time. 
There was no sense in which the regime was claimed to be optimal or first best. In 
addition, as stressed above, the system has evolved significantly in the last twenty 
years and, hence, it is appropriate to reconsider the question of whether it continues 
to be the best option.
This question is considered at two levels. First we assume, in C h ap te r  3, that 
it is best to retain the RPI-X mechanism and we consider ways in which the price 
cap setting process might be altered with the objective of increasing welfare. This 
analysis builds directly from the identification of a number of characteristics of the 
regulatory environment, and the price cap setting process, which reduce the level of 
welfare delivered. The feasibility of the potential improvements is also considered, 
taking account of the regulator’s limited information set and the firm’s stochastic 
operating environment.
We then consider a more dramatic change, in C h ap te r  5, when we assume that 
an alternative regulatory contract could be implemented. This analysis is based on a 
number of limiting assumptions, including that demand is elastic and there is a wide 
interval of potential cost types (i.e. cost uncertainty). It is therefore not necessarily 
relevant for a number of industries, such as water, which generally have inelastic 
demand. We compare welfare under a range of contracts which vary from no restriction 
on the firm’s price choice, to full restriction (ie, a single price level is offered), to a 
single restriction (ie, the price cap), to multiple restrictions (ie, the price is constrained 
by the cap and one or more other restrictions). The comparisons are made under the 
assumption that the regulator is unable to pay a lump-sum transfer to the firm. The 
focus is on determining, in the first instance, whether the existing price cap contract 
always yields the highest level of welfare. If not, we wish to  identify conditions under 
which a contract with more, or less, restrictions yields a higher level of welfare.
This is, by no means, the first critique of RPI-X regulation. A large volume of 
literature exists which examines both price cap regulation generally, and the RPI-X 
mechanism in particular. Individual literature references are provided on a section 
by section basis throughout the thesis. Our approach is similar to that adopted by
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Vickers and Yarrow (1988a). They represent regulation as a repeated game between 
the regulator and the firm, and analyse the expected impact of a price cap regime in 
this context. The main difference is that we have the benefit of hindsight and can 
therefore assess how the regime actually affects decisions, and hence welfare, rather 
than solely relying on the predictions of economic theory. The logic of the analysis, 
and the economic arguments used are, otherwise, very similar.
We conclude this introduction by summarising our contribution to the literature 
on the economics of regulation.
•  We provide a detailed description of how the RPI-X mechanism is currently de­
signed and implemented. As far as we are aware, such a description has not 
been available in the academic literature before. We hope that it will provide a 
framework for future research into the operation and performance of this regula­
tory regime5. Our focus on the practice of regulation is in direct contrast to the 
theoretical literature which ‘has focused on the normative rather than positive 
aspects of regulatory behaviour: how regulators ought to behave, rather than 
how they actually behave’6.
•  We present a detailed analysis of the efficiency properties of the regulatory 
regime. Many of the conclusions which we reach have been made by others but 
we bring them together in a unified framework, and we emphasise which features 
of the RPI-X regime are driving the efficiency properties. We combine insights 
from regulation economics, contract economics and information economics with 
our understanding of the practice of regulation7. We also use empirical evidence 
to support our theoretical analysis.
•  We contribute to the literature on designing ‘better’ regulatory mechanisms. 
Several authors have focused on the institutional arrangements which need to 
be changed to improve welfare. This aspect has also been examined in detail 
by the Government in its recent review of utility regulation. We, in contrast,
6Laffont (1994) argued that the literature which critiqued rate o f return regulation lacked ‘a nor­
m ative framework’. The ‘new econom ics of regulation’, which has evolved in recent decades, provides 
us w ith such a framework. The theory is, however, based on a series of lim iting assum ptions and, 
hence, the results predicted by this framework, and the proposed optim al mechanisms, can not be 
applied in  practice. We therefore argue that Laffont’s ‘norm ative framework’ needs to be am ended to  
better reflect the actual environment w ithin which regulation operates.
6Helm (1995b)
7Our understanding o f the econom ic theory of optim al regulation is based on a detailed review of the 
research provided by Armstrong (1999), Armstrong and Sappington (2002), Armstrong and Vickers 
(2000), Baron (1989), Baron and Myerson (1982), Bennett and Waddams Price (2002), Caillaud, 
Guesnerie, R ey and T irole (1988), Cox and Isaac (1987), Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), Gasmi, Ivaldi 
and LafFont (1994), Laffont (1994), Laffont and Tirole (1986 and 1993), Lewis and Sappington (1988a 
and 1988b), Riordan (1984), Sibley (1989) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988a).
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focus on the contract itself. In particular, we present ideas on how the contract 
design process might be changed so as to increase welfare and we consider the 
feasibility of the potential improvements given the regulator’s information set 
and the characteristics of the regulated industry. We also address the previously 
unasked question of whether the price cap contract imposes sufficient restriction 
on the firm’s choice set in sectors where demand is elastic and there is significant 
cost uncertainty (i.e. a wide interval of potential cost types). This introduces a 
new dimension to the research on optimal price control contracts.
C hapter 2
The R PI-X  gam e
When price cap regulation was first proposed for British Telecom it was put forward 
as a simple mechanism which would only be required in the short-term. The regulator 
and the firm were expected to bargain over the size of the price cap, without the 
need to  examine inputs or outputs in any detail, and the agreed cap was to  be set 
in the firm’s licence until competition emerged in the sector1. The practice of RPI-X 
regulation has been very different to this original idea.
The regulatory regime has not ‘withered away’ and is expected to  remain in place 
indefinitely for the monopoly network utility sectors. Regulators have therefore had 
to develop a system for changing the price cap over time. The system used to revise 
the cap is complicated and involves, contrary to expectations, a detailed assessment 
of the firm’s inputs and outputs. The regulator balances the need to provide technical 
efficiency incentives with allocative efficiency and distributional concerns. The firm, 
and other parties, attempt to influence the information and judgement used by the 
regulator when revising the price cap. In addition, the decisions made by the regulated 
firm are based on an analysis of the regulator’s expected actions. In this way the 
regulatory regime has evolved into a series of strategic interactions, or games2. The 
decisions made by the firm and the regulator, and hence the level of efficiency under 
the mechanism, are influenced by the playing of these games, and by the information
1See Beesley and Littlechild (1983) for a discussion of the expected properties o f the RPI-X mech­
anism .
2Support for the idea that regulation operates as a game is provided by Bennett and W addams 
Price (2002) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988a). Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1994) also argue that ‘a large 
industry o f ‘regulatory gam es’ has emerged in which firms evaluate the objectives of the regulator and 
optim ise their behaviour conditional on the assumed response of the regulator’. Sim ilarly the energy 
regulator, Ofgem (1999d) noted that ‘The im portance for com panies of the proposals and their ability  
to influence the outcom e in  favour of their shareholders may have led to a disproportionate amount of 
management tim e and effort being devoted to management of the regulatory relationship. T his, and  
other aspects of the application of RPI-X regulation, has led to a form of regulatory game between 
the regulator and the regulated com panies’.
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restrictions which exist.
In line with this, we describe the practice of RPI-X regulation in the UK utility 
sectors as a game between the firm and the regulator. Section 2.1 presents a high- 
level overview of the entire game. The decisions made in each stage of the game 
are described in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. This is a high-level, and somewhat stylized, 
generalisation of how RPI-X regulation works. A number of limiting assumptions are 
made to  simplify the description, and to enable us to focus on the key features of 
the game which affect efficiency3. The description is, however, based on an in-depth 
review of the practice of RPI-X regulation in the utility sectors in England and Wales. 
It therefore captures the key features of the actual regulatory regime which affect 
welfare. We present, in Appendix A, examples of actual decisions made to justify our 
description of the RPI-X game.
When examining the practice of RPI-X regulation, researchers rely on the large 
volumes of sector-specific, and often disjointed, information produced by individual 
regulatory agencies. Alternatively, many academic articles simply take the price cap 
as a number which is given and do not explore how it is determined. This ‘black box’ 
approach means that several key features of the regime are not captured in the analysis. 
To overcome this gap in the literature we provide an overarching description of the 
way in which RPI-X regulation currently operates4. The game-theoretic framework 
allows us to bring together knowledge from the economics of game theory, information 
economics and regulation economics, with the practical realities of the RPI-X regime, 
when we analyse the welfare effects of the mechanism and when we consider ways in 
which the regulatory regime might be improved.
2.1 Overview of the RPI-X game
As discussed above, the RPI-X regime in the UK has evolved into a serious of repeated, 
and often detailed, interactions between the regulator and the firm. We present a 
stylised description of this RPI-X game here5. First we outline the moves in the
3 A number o f formulas are used to  describe particular aspects of the decision-m aking processes. 
These do not necessarily represent actual formulas used in practice. Indeed, as noted by Frontier 
Econom ics (2003a), ‘real regulators do not m echanically apply formulae to set price controls’.
4Armstrong et a l (1994) provide a useful high-level description of how RPI-X regulation operates. 
The inform ation is not very detailed, however, and more im portantly is currently out-of-date. In 
particular, th is book does not take account of the increased em phasis on output regulation, or the 
debate about how to share historical cost savings w ith customers.
5T his description is an abstract summary of experiences in the water and electricity sectors between 
1990 and 2000. A com plem entary description of how RPI-X regulation has evolved in  the u tility  sectors 
can be found in  P ollitt (1999). This includes an overview of the key decisions which the regulator 
has to make when determ ining both price and quality regulation. W eyman-Jones (2001b) provides a 
detailed description o f the price-cap setting process in the 1999 electricity distribution price review.
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game. Then we introduce the players. We conclude with a discussion of the main 
characteristics of the game which affect decision-making.
2.1.1 The two-stage game
Periodic review announced
Contract proposed by regulator 
1
Firm accepts Firm rejects
|  Appeal hearing
Contract implemented
\
Firm makes production decisions
>
1 I
Mid-period revision No change
Figure 2.1: The RPI-X Game
The RPI-X Game can be classified as a repeated two-stage game. The interval 
between games is determined by the length of the regulatory period. The players 
know when each stage of the game is to be played, and when the overall game is to be 
repeated next. There is no known end-date to this game. The players may therefore 
take account of expected play in future games when making decisions.
The two stages of the RPI-X Game are illustrated in Figure 2.1 and summarised 
here.
1. The regulator and the firm play a co n trac t agreem ent gam e6. The regulator 
offers the firm a take-it-or-leave-it regulatory contract7. The contract encom­
passes two elements - a cap on the annual rate of growth in prices, and a series
This is primarily focused on the way in which the regulator determined efficiency targets for each of 
the companies. D etails of the regulatory regime in the gas sector can be found in Waddams Price 
(1997a).
6This game was not played at privatisation. The regulatory contract was set by the government 
and had to be accepted by the firm. Since then the contract agreement game has taken place at each 
periodic review.
7This may be a simplying assumption as some element of ‘behind-the-scenes’ bargaining no doubt 
takes place dining the consultation period in the periodic review. This is noted by Bennett and 
Waddams Price (2002) who suggest that ‘because of the lack of transparency, the price review is often 
som ething of a bargaining process between the regulator and the firm’. There is, however, no known 
formal bargaining process and we choose to describe the game as a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ contracting
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of output targets which the firm must meet for the next regulatory period8. If 
the firm accepts the contract, it is implemented in the firm’s licence at the start 
of the next regulatory period. If the firm rejects the contract, the regulator refers 
the matter to an appeals body, the Competition Commission (henceforth The 
Commission), who issues a recommendation on how, if at all, the existing cap 
should be changed9. This alternative contract is then implemented in the firm’s 
licence. The contract is expected to remain in place until the end of the fixed 
period. This stage of the game starts 12-18 months before the existing contract 
is due to end, and is completed approximately 3 months before the new contract 
comes into play. It is repeated every five-years10.
2. The regulator and the firm play a co n tra c t im plem en ta tion  gam e. The firm 
makes its operating decisions for the regulatory period. The decision-making 
process is constrained by the parameters of the current regulatory contract, and 
by the expected impact of current decisions on the next contract agreement game. 
The regulator observes the firm’s performance at the end of each year during the 
regulatory period. If the firm’s decisions are different from those assumed in 
the contract, the regulator may choose to revise the contract early. Towards the 
end of the period, the regulator announces the next periodic review and a new 
contract agreement game begins11. This stage of the game is essentially on-going 
as it corresponds to the day-to-day operation of the regulatory firm. It is broken 
into five-year intervals, however, reflecting the regulatory periods to which the 
contracts apply.
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Competition
Commission
Other regulators 
Other firms 
Consumer Groups 
The regulated firm 
The government
Price cap set Regulator
Service standards 
set and regulated
Environmental standards 
set and regulated
Regulator
EU Directorates
The government
Consumer Groups
Environmental and safety regulators
Decision maker —  —  Consultation •••• .......... Investment driver
Figure 2.2: Players in the RPI-X Game
2.1.2 The Players
Figure 2.2 shows the players involved with the RPI-X game. The role of each player 
is discussed below. Justifications for our description of each player are presented in 
Appendix A. We focus on the primary decision-makers, namely the regulated firm, the 
economic regulator and the Commission. The other players do not make any direct 
decisions in the RPI-X game but their choices affect the operating environment within 
which the game is played.
game. We recognise, however, that the contract offer is affected by information and ideas presented 
by the firm, and other parties, during the consultation process.
8T he term ‘output targets’ is used to describe the quality of service, environmental, and health & 
safety standards which the firm is required to  meet on an ongoing basis. In addition, the firm must 
ensure that the size o f its operating capacity is always sufficient to  m eet demand.
9T he Com petition Commission was formerly known as the Monopolies and Mergers Commission  
(M M C). It became the Com petition Commission under the Com petition A ct 1998. T he body responsi­
ble for utility regulation references under the Enterprise A ct 2002 will be the C om petition Commission 
Reporting Panel. We use the term ‘The Commission’ to cover all the names o f this appeals body - 
past, present and future.
10The length o f the regulatory period has varied by sector and over time. B y the end o f the 1990s 
alm ost all regulators had converged to a period length o f five years.
11 There is a period o f overlap between the contract im plem entation game and the contract agreement 
game at the end o f the regulatory period. It is  unlikely that the regulator will make mid-period changes 
to the contract once the periodic review process begins. T he firm will continue to make strategic choices 
for the current regulatory period. In particular, the firm is likely to  make decisions a t the end o f the 
regulatory period which are focused on influencing the next contract.
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•  The regulated firm: the firm is a natural monopoly that provides a single product 
to consumers. It holds a licence which establishes it as the monopoly provider 
within a franchise area for an indefinite period. We assume that a number 
of regulated monopoly firms are licensed to provide the same service in other 
franchise areas.
The firm is required to defiver cost savings and a range of output targets under 
the regulatory contract. When delivering these multiple tasks the firm’s primary 
objective is to maximise long-run profits12. We assume that the firm is risk 
neutral and that it has a rolling two-period horizon when making decisions13. 
This reflects the idea that managers are unlikely to remain indefinitely in their 
jobs, and at any point in time will be most concerned about the short- to medium- 
term rather than the long-term. It also reflects the fact that the firm will have 
uncertainty about the operating environment, and the direction that regulation 
will take, and hence would find it difficult to make decisions for the more distant 
future.
We also assume that the firm knows demand and its own costs with certainty for 
the ten-year horizon of interest14. It does not know how its decisions will affect 
the regulator’s decisions in the next stage of the game however. Its expectations 
in this regard are based on what was observed in past games15. Expectations may 
be wrong ex-post because unexpected factors - such as increased pressure from 
the government or changes in the stock market - affect the regulator’s decision. 
In addition, the precise form of the regulator’s objective function is unknown 
and, hence, the firm cannot accurately forecast how decisions will be made.
•  The economic regulator: the regulatory agency is headed by a Director General 
(DG) who has the final say on all decisions and is, essentially, the ‘negotiating 
face’ of the agency. The economic regulator is responsible for implementing and
12W hile profit-m axim isation is the standard assum ption used for a private regulated firm we note 
that other factors affect decision-m aking w ithin the firm. E ssentially a whole set of principal-agent 
issues arise w ithin the firm, and between the firm and its shareholders, which may affect the firm’s 
objectives. W eyman-Jones (2001b) em phasises, in particular, that the incentives in  the RPI-X regime 
w ill be considered differently by the managers of the regulated firm and by the com pany owners. These 
alternative influences are not considered here but this is an area which warrants further research.
13In practice managers and shareholders are likely to be risk averse. We m ention, when exam ining 
the firm’s decisions and the im plied efficiency properties, how risk aversion m ight have an influence. 
Our description of the game focuses on the case of risk neutrality however.
14In practice, demand and the firm’s costs w ill be affected by unforeseen ‘noise’ during the ten-year 
period. A s w ith risk aversion, we note where this uncertainty m ay have an effect when considering the 
efficiency properties of the RPI-X mechanism, but we retain the sim plifying no uncertainty assum ption 
in th is description.
15W e stress that the firm does not attem pt to determine the regulator’s optim al decision given  
the firm’s choices. The decisions made may therefore not correspond to w hat we’d expect from the 
standard econom ic theory o f strategic interactions.
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revising the firm’s licence and for monitoring the firm’s compliance with the 
licence. He cannot make transfers or subsidies to the firm. In addition, the 
DG cannot, when setting the parameters of the regulatory contract, make any 
commitments beyond the current regulatory period.
The regulator is constrained by the duties set out in legislation. These require 
him to protect the consumer interest and to ensure that the firm is able to 
‘finance the proper carrying out of its functions’. We also assume that the DG is 
required to regulate the firm using the RPI-X mechanism16. The regulator has 
full discretion in deciding how to design the price cap itself17.
We assume that the regulator focuses on what Mayer and Vickers (1996) call the 
‘Three commonly distinguished components of welfare’18:
(1) Allocative efficiency - the maximisation of welfare which results in cost- 
reflective pricing and the firm earning zero rent;
(2) Technical efficiency - the minimisation of production costs arising from the 
efficient use of inputs; and
(3) Distributional concerns - the ‘curbing’ of excess profits, and the desire to put 
economic rents in the hands of consumers rather than the firm.
The regulator considers these three objectives when making decisions and is often 
required to trade them off against each other. Judgement is used to decide on 
which of these factors is considered most important at a given point in time. This 
arises because, in the regulatory regime in the UK, the regulator has discretion 
when interpreting the duties laid out for him in legislation. More specifically, as 
described by Vickers and Yarrow (1988a), the regulator is required to undertake 
his duties ‘in the manner in which he considers best calculated’. Helm and 
Yarrow (1988) also emphasise that the duties are ‘couched in rather general 
terms’ and, hence, there is significant scope to interpret them in different ways 
over time19.
16In practice, regulators have the freedom to change the regulatory mechanism if  they wish. This 
option has been discussed by a number of regulators but the RPI-X m echanism rem ains the regulatory 
tool of choice in all sectors.
17In contrast regulators in  Latin America and the US are often constrained by detailed legal rules 
about how the price cap is to be designed. For exam ple, in Chile the electricity regulator is provided 
w ith a precise set o f rules about how the firm’s cost inform ation should be used to set the price cap. 
T his is discussed in  more detail in  D i Tfella and Dyck (2002).
18We purposefully don’t assume that the regulator m aximises a weighted expected welfare function. 
T his assum ption, paramount in the literature on optim al contract design, is considered too m echanical, 
and does not reflect the more discretionary approach adopted by the regulator when faced w ith m ultiple 
objectives.
19Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1995) argue that the discretion ‘has created considerable uncertainty 
about the precise form of regulation and the way in which regulators can adjust the basis on which 
com panies are rewarded’. We identify the specific areas in  which this has occurred in  Chapter 3.
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The relative importance of the objectives is determined exogenously from the 
RPI-X Game, and may be influenced by pressures from other parties including 
the firm, consumer groups, financial institutions, and the Government20,21. In 
addition, as noted by Bennett and Waddams Price (2002), the choice of a ‘main 
goal’ from amongst the set of objectives will be influenced by the regulatory 
structure, as well as the regulator’s relationship with the government.
We assume that the regulator is only concerned about the impact of his decisions 
on the regulatory period in which the contract is implemented22. This limited 
foresight reflects the fact that the regulator operates on a five-year employment 
contract - corresponding to the regulatory period - and may not know whether 
that contract is to be renewed. It also reflects the constraint that the regulator 
is unable to make commitments beyond a single period. In addition, the short­
term horizon reflects the fact that the regulator does not know the firm’s cost 
function and is only willing to make forecasts for a relatively short period23.
The regulator makes his forecasts using historical information about the firm 
and, in some cases, benchmarking analysis. The regulator’s expectations are 
likely to be incorrect because of asymmetric information about the firm’s costs.
•  The Competition Commission: the Commission only plays in the RPI-X game 
if the firm rejects the regulator’s proposal in the contract agreement game24. 
The Commission has the same objectives and information limitations as the 
regulator, but may have different expectations about the firm’s decisions. It 
may also take a different stance on the appropriate trade-off between the three 
welfare objectives. The Commission considers the impact of the contract on the 
next regulatory period only.
20A richer m odel would be needed to capture the influence of all these interest groups.
21 The idea that the regulator’s decisions are affected by the political arena is not new, and it is 
not unique to the RPI-X regime. For exam ple, Kahn (1988) argued that ‘One inherent weakness of 
regulation is its inescapable involvem ent w ith the political process’.
22Regulators are required to consider the im pact of all decisions on current and future custom ers, 
and on the long-run sustainability of the firm’s finances. Many regulators do this by calculating the 
im pact o f the price cap on financial ratios and future price levels beyond the current period. They  
stress, however, that the circum stances underpinning these estim ates - including the cap in the next 
period - are likely to  be different ex-post. The primary focus of all reviews has therefore been on the 
im pact of the contract in the next regulatory period.
23 Jehiel (1998) provides a theoretical analysis of the im plication of lim ited foresight on the outcom e 
of a repeated game. In his analysis the players make correct predictions over the period o f their 
forecast horizon, but after that the predictions are vague and random. In the case of the RPI-X  
gam e we find that other factors, including random noise and the endogenous im pact o f the regulatory 
contract, lead to  a discrepancy between the forecasts and actual decisions made, even in  the horizon  
period. The short-run rationality assum ption o f this paper is therefore not applicable here.
24Liesner (1995) presents a useful description o f the role of the Commission in u tility  regulation for 
the interested reader.
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•  Non-economic regulators: the non-economic regulators operate separately from, 
and independent of, the economic regulator. They have two main roles in the 
regulated sectors: (1) they establish output targets relating to the health, safety 
and environm ental impacts of the firm. The economic regulator must include 
these outputs, and their associated costs, in the final contract proposal; and (2) 
they are responsible for monitoring each firm’s performance relative to the output 
targets. Where the non-economic regulator finds that the firm has breached 
established standards it has powers to penalise the firm with an enforcement 
order and/or financial penalties.
•  The government', the government establishes the players in, and the rules of, the 
RPI-X game through legislation and general policy. For example, environmental 
policy determines the firm’s output targets; the regulator’s duties and powers are 
established in sector-specific legislation; and, the initial contract conditions were 
set by the government at privatisation. In addition, the government may lobby 
the regulator, on behalf of voters, to reduce firm profits, and thereby increase 
the prominence of distributional concerns from amongst the regulator’s set of 
objectives. The government can also use taxation to share the firm’s profits with 
consumers outside of the RPI-X game.
•  Consumers: individual consumers are represented in the RPI-X game by national 
and local consumer organisations. These consumer groups play a consultative 
role in the regulatory game. Essentially they attempt to increase the importance 
of distributional concerns relative to the regulator’s other objectives. The regu­
lator has discretion about how, if at all, to reflect the consumer group’s demands 
in his final contract decision.
2 .1 .3  C h aracteristics o f th e  gam e
We conclude this overview by summarising a number of characteristics of the RPI-X 
Game. These factors affect decision-making and, hence, the efficiency properties of 
the RPI-X mechanism. The characteristics are determined by the institutional and 
legal framework which the firm and the regulator operate in. They are therefore 
considered to be a fixed element of the regulatory process. We assume that all of these 
characteristics are common knowledge in the game.
•  The game is repeated at known fixed intervals. There is no known end-date to 
the game.
•  The contract is revised every five years. The revised contract is proposed by 
the regulator but can only be implemented with the firm’s agreement or after a
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referral to the Commission. The regulator is able to propose a contract revision 
at an earlier date.
•  The regulator is unable to make commitments beyond the end of the regulatory 
period25. Only short-term contracts are feasible.
•  We assume that the regulator regulates the firm using the RPI-X mechanism26. 
No alternative mechanisms are considered at this stage27. The regulator is re­
quired to protect consumer interests and to ensure that the firm earns sufficient 
revenues to cover the efficient costs of its operations. Beyond these legal du­
ties the regulator has complete discretion about how to devise the regulatory 
contract.
•  The firm faces legal action - from the regulator or in extreme cases from the 
Secretary of State - if it breaches the price cap condition in the contract or if 
it does not deliver the required level of output to consumers. Beyond this the 
firm has discretion about how to operate its business given the constraints of the 
contract.
•  The regulator has multiple objectives and he makes a judgement about the appro­
priate trade-off across the often conflicting objectives. This judgement changes 
over time and may be affected by demands from the government, consumer 
groups, the regulated industry and other interest groups.
•  The firm has a number of ‘tasks’ to deliver under the regulatory contract. In 
particular, the firm is expected to reduce costs and deliver all output targets. 
The incentives to deliver these multiple tasks may conflict.
•  When making decisions the regulator has regard to the next regulatory period 
only. He knows demand for that period with certainty but does not know the 
firm’s costs. Historical information on observed total costs of the firm, and of 
comparator firms, is used to form expectations.
•  The firm has regard to a ten-year time horizon (two regulatory periods) when 
making decisions. The management know demand and costs with certainty for
25Laffont and Tirole (1993, C hl6) consider a number of reasons why the regulator’s ability to  com m it 
might, be lim ited by institutional arrangements.
26T his is consistent w ith the practice o f regulation, if  not the letter o f the law. The National A udit 
Office (2002) note that ‘W hile there is no statutory requirement to  set price controls, since privatisation  
the econom ic regulators have all used the licences to do so and have adopted a common m ethodology, 
RPI-X ’. Waddams Price (2000a) also notes that ‘the basic system  of periodic price reviews, w ith price 
levels dependent on achieved and potential efficiency in the system , look set to stay for network parts 
of the industries w ith remaining monopoly’.
27In Chapter 5 we consider the im pact on welfare of changing the form of the regulatory contract.
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that period. At the start of the ten-year period the firm does not know what 
the regulatory contract will be for the second five-year period. Information 
about the methodology adopted at the most recent periodic review is used to 
form expectations about how current decisions will affect the next regulatory 
contract.
In many cases these characteristics, and the decisions made by the regulator and 
the firm, do not correspond to what we expect in standard economic analysis. In 
particular, expectations and decisions may not correspond with ‘rational’ economic 
behaviour28,29. This is precisely why the detailed description of the game is needed. An 
analysis of the efficiency properties of the RPI-X mechanism, based on a presumption 
that the standard assumptions of economic theory hold, would not capture many of 
the problems which arise in practice30.
In the next two sections we present a detailed description of decision-making in 
the contract agreement and implementation games. Our description of the regula­
tor’s decision-making reflects decisions observed since privatisation rather than optimal 
decision-making (ie, how decisions have been made rather than how we as economists 
think they should be made). The description of the firm’s decision-making more 
closely resembles that expected in an economic analysis. This is because the firms do 
not publicise how they make their decisions and hence we are required to assume that 
profit-maximising behaviour is the norm.
2.2 The contract agreement game
The contract agreement game is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The main moves of the game 
can be summarised as follows.
1. The regulator announces the start of the periodic review about 18 months before
28Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that ‘Predictions about cost realizations m ust follow a m artingale 
in a rational-expectations world’. In this scenario, the regulator’s and the firm’s expectations would 
always be correct. In practice, however, the expectations are frequently incorrect and we m ust assum e 
that they are not rational.
29Gort and W all (1988) exam ine the im pact of the regulator’s decisions on shareholder expectations, 
and the subsequent im pact of these expectations on the decisions made. There is an assum ption that 
all players, including the regulator and the firm, have rational expectations. We argue that th is is 
not the case. Given this, Gort and W all (1988) stress that there is no clear rule about how the 
shareholders’, and presumably the firm’s, expectations w ill differ from the actual rules used. Both  
over- or under-estim ates can be made and other factors, including random noise, w ill mean that the 
expectations w ill be incorrect ex-post.
30Many of these characteristics are noted by Newbery (1999) who argues that ‘Regulation of network 
utilities has to  deal w ith asset specificity on the part o f the utility, bounded rationality on the part o f the 
regulator (incom plete and costly information about the options open to  the u tility), and opportunism  
by both parties’.
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Price review announced
Consultation period on 
methodology for price setting
Business plan submitted by firm 
and comparator data assembled
Consultation period on 
outputs and implications for prices
Consultation on draft price proposals
I
Regulator ofTers take-it-or-leave it contract to firm
I
Firm rejects 
Firm accepts ^
Competition Commission propose contract
I
Price cap and output targets implemented
1
i
Figure 2.3: The Contract Agreement Game
the current contract is due to expire. Consultation papers on the methodology 
which will be used to set the price cap, and on the output targets, are published. 
The firm, industry groups, consumer groups, non-economic regulators, environ­
mental organisations and other interested parties participate in this consultation 
process with the regulator31. The firm is also required to submit a business plan 
to the regulator. This plan incorporates the firm’s forecast of its costs for the 
next regulatory period. No decisions are made during this consultation and 
information-gathering phase.
2. The regulator offers the contract to the firm. The forward-looking price cap is set 
so that the revenue stream under the cap is sufficient to cover expected efficient 
costs for the period. The output targets are set jointly with the non-economic 
regulators.
3. The firm decides whether or not to accept the contract offer. To make this 
decision, the firm compares profits under the contract to expected profits from 
a Commission investigation. If the firm accepts the contract, the game is over 
and the contract is implemented in the firm’s licence.
31 We do not present a formal description o f this consultation phase here. We emphasise, however, 
that the ‘lobbying’ by different interest groups at this time can affect the regulator’s decisions. There 
is, however, no formal process by which these view points are encorporated into the final contract and  
hence we assume that the lobbying is an exogenous factor which affects the regulator’s judgem ents. 
A richer model, incorporating the im pact o f this lobbying on the regulator’s decision-making process, 
may prove useful in future research.
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4. If the firm rejects the contract, a further C o m p etitio n  C om m ission gam e 
is played. The Commission first decides whether or not the existing cap in the 
licence (not that recently proposed by the regulator) is in the public interest. 
If it is found to be in the public interest, the cap is simply retained for the 
next regulatory period. If the cap is found to  not be in the public interest, the 
Commission makes a recommendation on what changes should be made. The 
regulator implements a revised regulatory contract on the basis of these findings.
2 .2 .1  T h e regu la tor’s d ecision s
We explain here how the regulator make his price cap and output target decisions in 
this stage of the RPI-X game. The in-depth description o f the contract setting process 
is required because it is the minute details o f the contract that affect the firm ’s decisions 
and hence the efficiency properties of the RPI-X mechanism. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3. The description is based on an analysis of experiences in the 
water and electricity sectors between 1990 and 2000. Appendix A provides a number 
of examples of decisions made by utility regulators in the 1990s.
The regulator uses the RPI-X mechanism to regulate the firm’s price. Under this 
mechanism the price cannot increase, from one year to the next, by more than the 
rate of inflation, R P I, plus or minus a regulatory factor, X. For period j we have:
pP — pi 1 x R P P  - X 31 + 100
The price cap is set on a forward-looking basis and is fixed for the length of the 
regulatory period.
The X-factor is set so that the firm earns sufficient revenues to cover forecast 
efficient costs for the period32,33. This approach is driven by two of the regulator’s 
welfare objectives: first, the regulator attempts to  get dose to allocative efficiency by 
setting price equal to expected average costs; second, the regulator induces improved 
technical efficiency by requiring the firm to  reduce costs to  an efficient level, and by 
providing the firm with a profit-incentive, through the fixed price contract, to make 
additional cost savings34.
32 A different approach is used in US price cap schem es. Here, the X-factor is sim ply set equal to 
the historic growth rate in industry productivity, perhaps adjusted upwards by a ‘stretch factor* (see 
Sappington, 2000). Further details can be found in Bernstein and Sappington (1999).
33Beesley (1994) provides an early overview of the financial m odelling used to set the X -factor.
34 As network u tility  industries are characterised by high sunk costs and/or increasing returns to  
scale, m arginal cost pricing w ill not allow the firm to  break-even. T he regulator is therefore restricted  
to  the second-best level o f allocative efficiency at which price is equal to average cost.
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Allowed revenues are calculated for period j as35:
w = oc>+ccf
where:
•  R? is the allowed revenue in period j.
•  OCf is the regulator’s forecast of operating costs in period j.
•  CCf is the regulator’s forecast of capital costs in period j.
Operating costs are equal to the firm’s operating productivity level, 63, times the 
amount of output sold, gj36. We assume that the firm’s operating effort level, e-7 , is 
the only factor which changes the level of operating productivity37:
03 =  03-1 -  e*
The regulator’s forecast of operating costs is then calculated as:
off = §y
=  (p- 1 - e ' V
where fP is the level of productivity at the end of period j-1 and f? is the 
regulator’s forecast of the firm’s operating effort level for period j  .
Capital costs are equal to the sum of the firm’s depreciation charge and the financ­
ing cost of the asset base. The forecast depreciation charge, S3, is set equal to the 
expected annual cost of maintaining the asset base. The financing cost of the asset 
base is set equal to the allowed cost of capital, r 7, times the asset value. The regu­
lator’s current cost valuation of the asset base is called the regulatory capital value 
(RCV). It is calculated as the value of the asset base at the start of the period - the
35Throughout th is paper any variable w ith a (.) is the regulator’s forecast value for that variable. 
Any undecorated variable is the actual value, as chosen by the firm. Any variable w ith a (.) is the 
actual average value for the sector.
36We assume that the firm and the regulator know demand in the next period w ith certainty.
37 In reality, operating costs w ill also be affected by exogenous random variables, including tech­
nological developm ents. The firm and the regulator w ill not know when these factors w ill arise or 
how they w ill affect the level o f operating costs. Further research is required to determ ine how this 
uncertainty affects the efficiency properties of the RPI-X mechanism. We focus on the sim ple case of 
, ‘no noise’ for our description of the game.
^ T h e regulator sets the level of operating productivity at the end of period j-1 equal to  the level 
of unit operating costs. This variable is observed at the end of each year in the firm’s regulatory 
accounts.
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opening regulatory capital value - plus the regulator’s forecast of net new investment. 
The formula used to calculate this value is:
RCVi =  R&vipen + N N l \ v j , s>, nj ,Sj )
where:
•  RC V3open is the regulatory capital value at the start of period j;
•  N N f ( P , P  , n3, a3) is forecast net new investment for period j39;
•  a3 is the forecast of capital productivity. This is equal to estimated productivity 
in the previous period minus the expected level of capital effort (y7):
a3 =  a3~l — y 7
•  v3 is the forecast of required new capacity;
•  P  is the quality of service target; and
•  n3 is the vector of other output targets.
The allowed revenue formula can therefore be restated as:
Rj = Wqi + ?  + (r> x RCV*
The terms in this formula are called the ‘building blocks’ of the allowed revenue 
calculation40.
When setting operating and capital cost allowances the regulator passes on a pro­
portion of the historical cost savings made by the firm to  consumers. This results 
in a downward adjustment to allowed revenues. The proportion of savings which are 
shared, and the timing of the sharing, are determined exogenously by the regulator. 
These decisions are driven by distributional concerns.
As the price cap is forward-looking the regulator must make a forecast of the re­
quired costs. Here the regulator faces a problem of asymmetric information. He is 
not involved with the day-to-day running of the regulated firm and therefore does not
39W hen analysing the firm’s costs we assum e that all costs arising from quality o f service, health, 
safety and environm ental outputs are capital in nature. That is, there is no im pact from these 
required outputs on day-to-day operating costs. In practice, the m ajority of investm ent arising from 
these output requirements is capital in nature but there is also an effect on operating costs.
40The regulator’s assessm ent of the underlying cost requirements o f the firm are used purely as a 
guide for determ ining the allowed price cap. The firm is not constrained to  make cost or financing 
decisions which lie w ithin the assum ptions m ade by the regulator. It is this level of discretion which 
provides the firm w ith the incentive to  look for efficient operating, investm ent and financing options.
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know how the firm’s costs evolve over time. This is a direct implication of privatisa­
tion and ‘hands-off’ regulation. In these circumstances, as noted by Armstrong and 
Sappington (2002), ‘The regulator is forced to weigh the available evidence, however 
limited it might be, and make his best judgement about a reasonable value for the X 
factor’. Table A.5 in Appendix A shows the information which is used by the regulator 
for forecasting future cost levels. In general, the regulator uses historical information 
about the firm’s own cost and output levels; historical information about the perfor­
mance of other firms in the sector; historical information about comparator industries; 
and, the business plan information provided by the firms during the periodic review 
consultation process.
We explain in the following sections how historical savings are shared with con­
sumers and how each allowed revenue building block is calculated by the regulator. 
We then describe the way in which the economic and non-economic regulators choose 
the output targets for the regulatory contract.
Sharing past cost savings
The price cap incorporates the regulator’s forecast of the amount of operating and 
capital effort which the firm will undertake. Where extra cost savings have been made 
by the firm the regulator chooses how, if at all, to share these with consumers in the 
next period’s price cap41. It is in this way that the regulator uses the periodic review 
to improve the distribution of economic rents.
We explain below the particular sharing rules which are used by the regulator 
when determining operating and capital costs for the next regulatory contract. The 
regulator decides on the length of the regulatory lag42, and on whether to pass on 
efficiency savings in one go, or whether to have a phased sharing of savings over time. 
The regulator ensures, at a minimum, that the firm keeps any savings made dining 
period j until the end of period j. There is therefore always a positive return earned 
from making additional cost savings. If the regulator decides to revise the regulatory 
contract mid-period, so as to share savings with customers before the next periodic 
review, the proportion of the efficiency rent retained by the firm is reduced.
41 Under a pure price cap these efficiency rents would be retained by the firm forever. That is, the 
price cap would not be adjusted to reflect the difference between the regulator’s expectations and the 
actual observed efficiency levels.
42This is the length of tim e that the firm is allowed to retain the profits from any cost saving made. 
It is equal to the number o f rem ain ing  years in  the current regulatory period, plus any additional years 
in the next regulatory period in which the firm is allowed to  earn the efficiency rent.
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O p era tin g  cost savings The regulator shares historical operating cost savings by 
adjusting the forecast of base operating costs43. Forecast base operating costs are 
calculated as:
j - i
i=i
where 0° is the level of productivity at privatisation; e* is the firm’s level of op­
erating effort in period i (i < j); and A*J is the period j  sharing rule for operating 
savings made in period i. In this way a proportion of the reduction in operating costs 
is passed onto consumers over time. When A*J =  1 all of the savings are passed onto 
consumers. The length of the regulatory lag, and the decision on how sharing should 
be phased over time, determines the value of A*J.
If savings are never shared with consumers - ie, the lag is infinite - the regulator 
will incorporate forecast effort levels into the calculation of base operating costs giving 
us:
A? =  |  <  1 V i,i
In contrast if all savings are shared with consumers at each periodic review - ie, 
the lag is equal to the length of time remaining in the regulatory period - the regulator 
will use actual effort levels in the calculation of base operating costs giving us44:
K j =  1 Vz,i
We therefore have <  A*J < 1 and can conclude that a higher value of A*J implies 
that there is more sharing of operating cost savings with consumers.
The range of actual rules used are discussed in Appendix A. In the early years after 
privatisation, glidepath sharing rules were used. With these rules all savings made in 
period j are shared gradually with consumers along a path which ensures that they 
are all transferred by the end of period j-f-1. In recent periodic reviews regulators have 
transferred period j savings to customers at the start of period j+1.
It is important to note that the sharing rule is determined by the regulator after 
the firm has made its effort choices. In addition, the regulator makes no commitment, 
from one review to the next, as to what the operating cost sharing rule will be and, 
as has been observed in practice, the rule can change over time. This is because the 
regulator does not use a formal rule for determining the size of the sharing rule. The
43Base operating costs are the required day-to-day ru n n in g  costs o f the firm given the current level 
of productivity. The forecast level of operating costs is equal to the forecast level of base operating 
costs adjusted for expected improvement in productivity.
w W e assum e that the maximum value of the sharing rule is one. This reflects the situation in  
practice where profit claw-back does not occur. In principle the value could be greater than one. This 
would suggest that the regulator retrospectively ‘claws back’ the profit which the firm earns from 
efficiency savings and leaves the firm earning zero profits (at the extrem e).
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decision is based on the regulator’s judgement about the appropriate distribution of 
rents between the firm and consumers. This judgement varies over time and is affected 
by many factors including whether the regulator prioritises distribution concerns ahead 
of technical efficiency concerns, or vice versa; whether the regulator wants to develop 
a reputation for being ‘the consumers’ champion’; whether the regulator has been 
captured by the regulated industry; or whether the regulator is under pressure from 
other interest groups, notably the government, to reduce the profits earned by the 
regulated firm.
Capital cost savings The regulator shares capital cost savings with consumers by 
adjusting the size of the opening regulatory capital value45. The value in period j is 
calculated as:
i - i  ____  .
R C V ^  =  RC V° +  £  X ? N N l‘
i=l
where RCV° is the capital value at privatisation; N N I % is the forecast level of net 
new investment for period % (i <  j) , and A*-7 is the period j  sharing rule for capital 
savings made in period i.
If capital savings are never shared with consumers - ie, the regulatory lag is infinite
- the regulator will incorporate forecast investment levels into the calculation of the 
open regulatory capital value giving us:
=  1 Vi,j
In contrast, if all capital savings are shared with consumers at each periodic review
- ie, the regulatory lag is equal to the length of the regulator period - the regulator 
will use actual investment levels in the calculation of the opening regulatory capital 
value giving us46:
,y  N N P  .
N N I
We therefore have 3 3 < AV < 1 and can conclude that a higher value of XVNNI ~  c ~
implies that there is less sharing of capital cost savings with consumers. More sharing 
therefore implies a lower value of A*-7 but a higher value of A*-7, because of the way that 
the different sharing mechanisms operate.
45 The opening regulatory capital value is the current cost value of the firm’s asset base at the start 
of period j.
46The level o f actual investm ent considered in the sharing rule may be higher than the allowed 
level if  additional outputs were introduced during the regulatory period. It may also, however, be 
lower than the amount of investm ent undertaken if  the regulator determ ines that som e of the firm’s 
investm ent was inefficient.
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In practice there has been less variation here than with operating cost sharing rules. 
During the 1990s regulators adopted a standardised approach of replacing allowed 
investment with actual investment in the regulatory capital value at the start of each 
regulatory period. The regulator does, however, retain the ability to change the rule 
from one review to the next, and any changes will reflect the same factors which 
influence the operating cost sharing rule.
Forecast operating costs
As noted above, the regulator determines the price cap by setting allowed revenue equal 
to expected efficient costs. This enables the regulator to get close to the allocative 
efficiency principle that prices are equal to efficient average cost47. We describe here 
how the regulator determines expected efficient operating costs and in the next section 
we consider expected efficient capital costs.
Forecast operating costs are set equal to efficient forecast base operating costs 
adjusted for expected improvements in productivity. That is:
O S ’ = OCfB. -  e V
where OCfB. is the efficient level of forecast base operating costs at the start of 
period j ,  and e7 is the expected improvement in productivity during period j .
The efficient level of forecast base operating costs is calculated as:
o e L  = 0 ° - E A? ei
i=1
-  a  fo e s '-1 _  O C T 1)
where a(.) is an adjustment function which reflects the difference between the firm’s 
cost level in the previous period and the cost level of comparator firms which form 
the efficiency frontier (o C i-1^ . If the firm is deemed to have been on the efficiency 
frontier in period j-1 we have a(.) =  0. The regulator uses historical information about 
the level of operating costs across the industry to determine the ‘efficiency frontier’ 
for the sector at the start of the period48. The regulator will use his discretion when 
deciding on the size of the adjustment.
Once the regulator has forecast the efficient level of base operating costs, he decides 
how these costs might be expected to change during the period49. The expected
47First-best allocative efficiency is achieved when price is set equal to  marginal cost. W ith such a 
pricing rule network utility  firms, which have large sunk costs, would not break even. The second-best 
rule of average cost pricing is therefore the only feasible option in the absence o f subsidies.
48If costs are correlated across the firms, Frontier Economics (2003a) argue that th is ‘Benchmarking 
provides an external measure of controllable, efficient costs, in that common uncontrollable shocks are 
included in the benchmark but inefficiency specific to the firm is not1.
49 A more detailed description of the m ethodologies used by the regulators to  set efficiency targets 
can be found in W addams Price (2002 and 2000a) and Jamasb and P ollitt (2000).
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operating effort level is set equal to the target rate of change in the sectoral efficiency 
frontier (esector,J) plus an adjustment for the rate at which the firm is expected to 
catch-up with this frontier (e^irm,J). This gives us:
e 7 =  e®ec tor, j  _|_ g f ir m j
The elements of the operating effort forecast are determined as follows.
1. The sectoral element of the effort target is based on a detailed analysis of how 
productivity has changed over time in the sector, and how productivity has 
changed in other sectors in the economy in previous periods. The regulator may 
also examine productivity trends in the same sector in other countries to assess 
the potential for efficiency improvement.
2. The firm-specific element of the forecast effort level is determined by considering 
the firm’s current efficiency level relative to the industry efficiency frontier. This 
relative efficiency level is assessed using econometric analysis. The firms are 
ranked as being above-average efficiency, average efficiency and below-average 
efficiency. Above-average firms are already on the industry efficiency frontier 
and are set a target which is similar to  the expected change in the sectoral 
efficiency level. Average firms are close to the frontier and they are set a target 
that is only slightly higher than the sectoral target. Below-average firms operate 
well below the frontier and they are set the highest target. The high target 
incorporates the change needed to catch-up with other firms in the industry, and 
the change needed to keep up with any improvement in the sectoral frontier50.
Appendix A provides further details of the precise methodologies adopted by the 
sectoral regulators.
Regulatory capital value and forecast capital investm ent
The regulatory capital value is calculated as:
RCV3 =  RCV-jpen + NNI3(vJ,
j - i  __ . ___  .
= RCV° + Xj NNl '  + NNI3 (tP, F, nj , Bj )
i= i
50For exam ple, if  the efficiency frontier is expected to shift by 100 units we have e860 tor,J =  100. 
If the firm is 10 units behind the current frontier then its target would be 110 for 100% catch-up 
w ith the frontier (e^trm’^  =  10) or 107.5 for 75% catch-up w ith the frontier (e^trm,J =  7.5). If the 
firm is defined as above average it may be set a target equal to  100 =  0). Some regulators
have, however, allowed ‘frontier’ firms a lower target than that set for the industry. For example,
the regulator m ay set the firm an overall target o f 90 units (efvrTn^ =  —10). In this way the firm is
rewarded for past efficiency improvements.
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The regulatory capital value at privatisation, RCV°, is calculated using the market 
value of the company over the early period of trading. Adjustments may be made to 
this value for the specific characteristics of the sector, including differences between 
the market value of the firm’s assets and the current accounting value.
The firm provides the regulator with a business plan for the next regulatory period 
during the consultation phase of the periodic review. The capital investment forecasts 
in this plan are used by the regulator to set forecast net new investment. A number of 
adjustments are made to the forecasts to ensure that they reflect what the regulator 
believes would be required by an efficient firm. The main adjustments made are 
summarised below and particular examples are given in Appendix A.
•  Efficient investment: the regulator adjusts the firm’s forecasts downwards if the 
proposed per unit capital costs are higher than those expected for an efficient 
firm at the start of period j (ie, given the current productivity level). The 
regulator estimates the per unit capital costs of an efficient firm by examining 
the historical capital cost levels of all firms in the industry, and by considering 
the capital costs of similar firms in other sectors.
•  Improved productivity: the regulator compares his expected capital productivity 
target, 5^, with the capital productivity change built into the business plan 
forecasts. Changes are made to the level of forecast investment to reflect any 
significant differences between these values. The approach used for forecasting 
the capital effort level is the same as that used for operating effort. In particular, 
the regulator uses an assessment of historical industry efficiency levels, and the 
firm’s relative efficiency position, to set the capital effort target for period j.
The expected level of net new investment is therefore calculated as51:
N N I 3 =  N N I j  -  M N N l j  - N N l t 1) -  {32(aj  -  <r*)
where:
•  N N I j  is the firm’s business plan forecast of net new investment for period j;
•  /?i(.) is the adjustment for the difference between the firm’s cost forecast and 
the expected costs of an efficient firm at the start of the period (iViVT*-1); and
51 Regulators could also make explicit adjustm ents for differences between the outputs which the firm  
plans to deliver and those which the regulator considers are necessary. These are generally captured 
in  the differences between the firm’s investm ent forecast and the regulator’s prediction of the required 
efficient level and are therefore not discussed separately here.
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•  /?2(.) is the adjustment for the difference between the regulator’s capital produc­
tivity target for period j and the firm’s proposed improvement in productivity 
for the period.
The firm has an incentive to bias its forecasts upwards as this will, given the above 
approach to calculating the regulatory capital value, increase allowed revenues52. At 
the same time the firm knows that the downside risks from an inflated forecast are 
small. First, asymmetric information means that the regulator, and the independent 
external auditors who examine the plan, are not able to determine with any certainty 
whether the forecasts are honest ex-ante. Second, the firm knows that the regulator 
has never imposed an ex-post penalty on a firm when costs have turned out to be 
significantly lower than the firm’s forecast. This is because the regulator does not 
have complete information about the firm’s operations, or the technologies underlying 
the investment programme, and therefore cannot determine whether the firm’s actual 
costs are lower than those forecast for legitimate reasons - eg, improved productivity - 
or because of overforecasting. There is thus no real financial risk to providing inflated 
forecasts. This means that the regulator’s capital investment allowance is likely to be 
higher than required and, hence, ex-post inefficient.
C ost o f  capital
The regulator is required to ensure that the firm is able to raise the finance, from the 
debt and equity markets, to cover the costs of operating the business. He assumes 
that the firm will adopt the most efficient financing option to deliver the large-scale 
investment programmes. The rate of return which the firm’s shareholders and investors 
are allowed earn is then set equal to the calculated cost of capital. Financial models, 
and historical data on the cost of equity and the cost of debt, are used to forecast 
the allowed cost of capital. The different cost of capital ranges used by the sectoral 
regulators are presented in Appendix A.
Depreciation
The regulator must also ensure, as part of the ‘financing of functions’ duty, that the 
firm has sufficient revenue to cover the cost of maintaining the serviceability of its
52M arinoso, Hviid and Waddams Price (2002) exam ine, in a more theoretical framework, the im pact 
of the regulatory regime on the firm’s incentive to  lim it the quality of inform ation provided to the 
regulator. It would be interesting to incorporate a sim ilar m odel, alongside th is description, in  future 
research. This would enable us to determine the precise im pact o f the regulatory contract on the firm’s 
incentive to bias its forecast, and to analyse the im plication of the bias-incentive on the efficiency of 
the final contract.
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assets in the long-run. These long-term maintenance costs are financed through an 
annual depreciation charge.
The allowed depreciation charge is calculated as:
f  &  (*)  
ti
where:
•  Pis the average number of years over which the asset is to be maintained. The 
regulator uses information provided by the firm on average asset fives here; and
•  M*7 (P) is the forecast level of efficient maintenance expenditure, given the asset 
life P . The regulator assumes that, if there is no evidence of service problems, 
the level of allowed maintenance expenditure in period j should be no higher than 
the actual amount spent in period j-1. The allowed level may be lower if the 
regulator believes that the firm could undertake the required maintenance work 
more efficiently. Efficiency is determined by comparing the firm’s maintenance 
expenditure to its own historical levels and to the spend of other firms in the 
sector.
We assume that the regulator uses a straight-line methodology to determine the 
allowed depreciation charge. In practice, as discussed in Appendix A, this is the most 
common approach taken by the regulators.
Allowed revenue, service performance and th e  X-factor
When the forecast value of each of the building blocks has been calculated, the regu­
lator determines allowed revenue for each year of the period by slimming these com­
ponents together. Before finalising the price cap, the regulator makes one further 
adjustment to  revenue in the first year of the regulatory period. This adjustment is a 
financial reward/penalty for quality of service performance in the previous regulatory 
period. The allowed revenue calculation in the first year of period j is therefore:
Wl = eiq{ +35 +  f r f  x R C v { \
where A7 (s^~ 1, S7-1, 1) is the quality of service adjustment given:
•  sJ_1, the firm’s service level in period j-1,
•  tf7-1, the firm’s service target in period j-1, and
•  s-7-1, the average quality of service in the sector in period j-1.
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We describe how this adjustment operates in the water and electricity distribution 
sectors in Appendix A53. A firm is considered to  have a high quality of service perfor­
mance if it delivered a level of service which was greater than its target, and greater 
than the average level of service in the sector. A high quality firm is rewarded with an 
upward adjustment to the level of allowed revenue. A firm is considered to have a low 
quality of service performance if its level of service was below the target set. A low 
quality firm is penalised with a downward adjustment to the level of allowed revenue.
The regulator uses his judgement to determine the appropriate size of the adjust­
ment54. He does not have the information required to base the adjustment on the 
actual valuation which consumers place on quality of service. Instead, the size of 
the adjustment reflects the regulator’s confidence in the quality of the information 
collected on service performance; his high-level judgement about the importance of 
service improvement to  consumers; and the belief that he should proceed with caution 
until the impact of the mechanism is better understood. This latter point implies that 
over time, as the mechanism becomes more established in the RPI-X regime, the size 
of the adjustment may increase.
X-factors are set which ensure that the allowed prices deliver the required net 
present value of revenue55. Several different combinations of X-factors can deliver the 
same net present value of revenue and the regulator uses his judgement as to which 
one is considered most appropriate. This judgement generally reflects the regulator’s 
opinion on whether consumers would prefer price changes to be smoothed over time, 
or whether they prefer an immediate price reduction followed by stable or increasing 
prices. The regulator also considers the impact of different price profiles on the firm’s 
financial performance by forecasting a number of key financial ratios (eg, dividend 
cover and interest cover) under different X-factor scenarios. In this way the regulator 
ensures that the chosen price profile enables the firm to  finance its functions.
Output targets
The economic regulator sets standards for quality of service in the contract and in­
corporates the health, safety and environmental targets set by the non-economic reg­
53The adjustm ent was first used in the 1999 water and electricity distribution price reviews. The 
idea is not, however, new. For exam ple, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) suggested that a quality term  
should be included in  the X -factor formula. We presume that the proposal did not emerge in practice 
at that tim e because of a lack o f information on the quality of service provided by the firms.
54W addams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002) note that ‘For water, the overall performance 
measure has a maximum of half a percent im pact on revenue, w ith an increase likely in the future 
if  the data improve. In electricity, up to two percent of revenue is affected in the first two years 
w ith a subsequent increase to  four percent’. The authors do not explain how these revenue lim its are 
determ ined however.
55 Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, p l89-192) provide details of how financial m odels are used 
to  determ ine an appropriate range of X-factors.
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ulators. The quality of service target is set to ensure, at a minimum, no deterioration 
in service relative to the current level. This reflects an implicit presumption that con­
sumers always want affordable service improvements. The regulator may also decide 
to tighten the target. Indeed, Waddams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002) note 
that ‘Almost all target levels have been raised since they were introduced’ in the water 
sector and, in the electricity distribution sector, ‘Required levels (ie, those triggering 
compensation payments) have tightened considerably across the board, particularly 
recently’. Appendix A provides examples of cases where regulators have increased the 
quality of service targets at the periodic review.
The extent to which targets are tightened is affected by the pressure placed on 
the regulator by the government and/or by consumer groups. The firm’s productivity 
level will also affect the rate at which targets are changed. The regulator can choose 
to share historical cost savings with consumers as an improved level of quality (for 
a given price) rather than as a reduced price (for a given level of service). Again, 
this decision is made on the basis of the regulator’s judgement about the appropriate 
price-output trade-off.
We therefore have:
& =
where:
•  s3 is the quality of service target for period j;
•  P - 1 is the target in the previous period; and
•  £ (sJ-1 ,s^ector)is a possible adjustment on the previous period’s target, taking 
account of the firm’s own performance and the average performance in the sector.
The environmental and safety targets, nJ , are set by the non-economic regulators. 
The targets are established in primary legislation at EU and UK level. Revisions to 
targets are introduced when relevant legislation is changed. As these are minimum 
standards, required by law, there is very little flexibility in terms of deciding what 
needs to  be delivered. The government may, however, wish to implement output 
targets which exceed minimum legal standards. These discretionary improvements 
are driven by demands for improved safety or a better natural environment. We have:
=  n-f-1 -f £ (ALaw, APolicy)
where £ (A Law, A Policy) is a tightening of the standard to reflect changes in the 
law and/or changes in government policy. The size of this adjustment is affected by
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the political party which is in power, the impact of environmental lobby groups, and 
the increasing importance of environmental issues at national and EU level.
We stress that consumer willingness-to-pay information has not been used to date 
to set the output targets. This is because it is very costly to collect reliable estimates. 
The regulator therefore uses his own judgement about what the appropriate price- 
output trade-off is. This judgement will be affected by information provided by other 
regulators, the industry, consumer and environmental groups, and, in some cases, 
scientific experts. In addition, as noted by Markou and Waddams Price (1999), the 
regulators have not adopted a consistent approach to setting and regulating output 
targets because ‘the powers and obligations of the regulators are unspecified’.
2 .2 .2  T h e  firm ’s decision
When the regulator offers the contract, the firm decides whether or not to accept it. 
The firm will reject the contract if it expects to earn non-positive rent - ie, if it cannot 
‘finance its functions’. If the profits under the contract are positive, the firm will 
accept the contract if profit is higher than profit under the Commission’s expected 
contract56. The firm’s decision is therefore57:
Accept if E  (ircc) -  E  (Costcc) < 7TrBg 
Reject if <  0
Reject if E  (7rcc) — E  {Costcc) >  ftBjeg > 0
where 7treg is the firm’s profits under the regulator’s contract, E  {ircc) is the ex­
pected profit under the C om m ission’s contract, and E  (Costcc) is the expected cost of 
a Commission case.
We assume that the firm has all the information required to calculate 7Tfteff. The 
firm will not be able to  make a formal estimate of profits under the Commission’s 
contract however. This is because it will be unsure of the precise values that the Com­
mission will place on each of the ‘building blocks’ in the allowed revenue calculation.
The firm will instead form an expectation about whether the Commission’s contract 
will be more or less ‘generous’ than the regulator’s58. That is, the firm will calculate:
E  (trcc) =  g{it11) +  (1 -  g){ttl )
B6W e assum e that the m axim isation o f expected profit is the firm’s only objective. Clearly other 
factors, such as the m anagement’s  incentive to be viewed as ‘tough’ w ith the regulator, w ill affect 
actual decision-m aking in this area.
B7W e assum e that the firm is risk neutral. A risk averse firm would be likely to place more weight 
on the certain return under the regulator’s contract. The management is therefore less likely to  reject 
the regulator’s contract if  it  risk averse.
B8W e stress that this is a high-level interpretation of how the firm might analyse expected profits 
under the C om m ission  contract. We are unable to describe how th is expectation is actually formed 
as there is no public inform ation available on the firm’s decision-m aking process.
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where g is the probability that the Commission will provide a more generous con­
tract, tth  is the expected profit from a more generous contract, and ttl is the expected 
profit from a less generous contract. The probability is calculated by examining pre­
vious Commission cases to determine whether the firms involved benefited from the 
appeals body. Expected profit under the more generous (less generous) contract is de­
termined as a percentage increase (decrease) relative to the regulator’s contract. Again 
this percentage adjustment will reflect the actual difference between the regulator’s 
contract and the Commission’s contract in other cases. Appendix A provides examples 
of recent Commission decisions, and compares them with the regulator’s contract, to 
show the information which is available to  the firm when making these calculations.
Any expected profit gain, relative to the regulator’s contract, is considered net 
of the financial costs of a Commission investigation. These costs include legal fees, 
consultancy fees, the manpower and time required to put a case together, and the 
uncertainty surrounding the future price caps. The firm forecasts these costs by con­
sidering the in-house costs of undertaking a similar activity - for example the periodic 
review itself - and by analysing any published information about the costs incurred in 
previous cases. The firm will also consider whether the decision to reject the contract 
will have an impact on its future relations with the regulator. For example, it could 
get a reputation for being a ‘trouble maker’ and be treated more harshly at future 
reviews. This would be considered a long-term and indirect cost of the Commission 
investigation. Finally, the firm will consider whether a referral would have a detrimen­
tal impact on its share price, perhaps because of the uncertainty arising from a delay 
in agreeing a contract. If the costs are significant, the firm will be unlikely to seek a 
referral.
In Appendix A we find that in most periodic reviews the regulated firms have 
accepted the regulators’ contracts. Helm (1995a) argues, in this regard, that ‘Most 
utilities appear to have concluded that the MMC is more likely to be predisposed 
towards the regulator, and as a result have shied away from an MMC appeal’. In 
the few cases where the contract was rejected by the firm, a Competition Commission 
Game was played.
2 .2 .3  T h e  C o m p etitio n  C om m ission  G am e
If the firm rejects the regulator’s proposal, the case is referred to the Commission and 
the ‘Competition Commission Game’ is played. The main moves are as follows.
1. The Commission decides whether or not the current contract (ie, that set for 
period j-1) is in the public interest. If it is found to be in the public interest, the 
same contract is retained for period j and the game ends.
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2. If the current contract is found to  not be in the public interest, the Commission 
proposes an alternative contract for period j. This incorporates a price cap and 
details of the outputs which the firm is required to deliver.
3. The regulator designs a final contract for period j which is introduced into the 
firm’s licence. The regulator is legally obliged to take account of the Commis­
sion’s public interest finding. The regulator has discretion, however, to  alter 
the details of the Commission’s contract proposal, so long as the final contract 
rectifies the public interest concerns raised.
4. If the revised contract corresponds to the Commission’s proposals, the firm is 
required to accept it. If the revised contract is different from that proposed by 
the Commission, the firm can seek a judicial review on the grounds tha t the 
regulator has not followed due process when devising this alternative contract. 
This rarely occurs59.
The Commission’s decision
The Commission’s first task is to assess whether or not the existing price limit is in the 
public interest. There is no clear and formal definition of public interest, and we assume 
that the Commission uses the regulator’s objectives of allocative efficiency, technical 
efficiency and distribution when making this judgement. If the existing contract is 
found to be in the public interest, the contract remains in place for period j.
The existing contract is generally found to operate against the public interest. This 
is because the operating environment, output targets, and the firm’s costs have changed 
significantly since the last review and, hence, the assumptions on which the existing 
contract was originally based no longer apply. In this situation the Commission makes 
an independent assessment of what alternative contract should be introduced.
A detailed report is published outlining the assumptions used on each of the allowed 
revenue building blocks. The output and price cap recommendations in this report 
form the Commission’s proposed contract for the firm. Appendix A presents a number 
of examples of contracts proposed by the Commission and compares them to the 
contracts originally proposed by the regulators. We see that the contract can be 
different to that proposed by the regulator. In particular, the price cap is the same, 
higher or lower than the one proposed by the regulator. The required output targets 
can also be different.
The differences arise because the Commission forms its own judgement on the 
appropriate value of each of the building blocks and it has access to a more recent
59There has only been two judicial review cases to-date: the ScottishPower case and the Northern 
Ireland E lectricity case.
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information set than the regulator. As noted above, the Commission has the same 
high-level objectives as the regulator. It may have a different stance, however, on 
the appropriate trade-off between these objectives. For example, the Commission 
may have an interest in being viewed as a ‘consumer-friendly’ organisation, and may 
therefore place more weight on distributional concerns.
In addition, the Commission will want to ensure consistency in its treatment of 
firms across the regulated sectors. Its decisions may therefore be affected by precedent 
set in other cases. The Commission also has a different information set from the 
regulator. Evidence on each building block is submitted by the regulator, the firm, 
the non-economic regulators and other interested parties (notably consumer groups) 
in the form of written reports and formal oral hearings. The economic and non­
economic regulators can introduce new proposals to the Commission which were not 
discussed as part of the periodic review. The firm also provides an updated business 
plan incorporating new cost forecasts. The Commission may therefore form different 
expectations about the level of revenue required by the firm.
The regulator’s decision
The regulator uses the Commission’s published report to design a final contract for 
period j. If the Commission determined that the current price cap is not in the public 
interest, the regulator is required to change the current contract. The changes are 
expected to broadly reflect the Commission’s recommendations, but the regulator has 
discretion to make amendments where he deems alternative solutions to be more rea­
sonable. In most cases, as discussed in Appendix A, the regulator has introduced a 
contract which closely follows the recommendations of the Commission. The regula­
tor’s revised contract is automatically included in the licence. It can be altered at a 
later date, however, if the firm seeks a judicial review.
The firm’s decision
The firm has very little choice over the final contract which is introduced in its licence 
after a Commission appeal. If the Commission decides that the current contract 
is in the public interest, then the firm is required to accept that the licence will 
not be changed. Similarly, if the regulator’s final contract reflects the Commission’s 
recommendations, the firm must accept the licence change.
If, however, the regulator chooses not to implement the Commission’s contract 
proposal exactly, the firm can decide to take the case to the High Court for a Judicial 
Review. This legal review focuses on the question of whether the regulator followed 
due process when implementing the Commission’s recommendations. Appendix A
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describes the two price cap judicial review cases which have been held in the utility 
sectors. These cases take a long time and are expensive. There is therefore a significant 
cost involved and hence a low probability that the firm will take this course of action.
2.3 The implementation game
Price cap and output targets set in licence
Firm chooses outputs and costs
^  1 Changes in operating environment |
Regulator decides whether 
or not to revise contract during period
Implicit, explicit or no changes in regulatory contract 
1
Price review process begins 
18mths prior to end o f regulatory period
Figure 2.4: The Implementation Game
The contract implementation game is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The main moves of 
the game are as follows.
• The firm’s licence is modified to incorporate the new regulatory contract. The 
contract comes into force on April 1st of the first year of the regulatory period.
• The firm makes its operating decisions for the regulatory period. These decisions 
are constrained by the parameters of the contract. The firm also considers the 
implications of its choices on the next contract agreement game.
• The economic and non-economic regulators observe the costs, profits and outputs 
of all firms in the sector at the end of each year during the regulatory period.
• The economic and non-economic regulators decide whether output delivery is 
satisfactory. Action may be taken during the period if there is evidence that the 
firm is not meeting its output targets.
• The economic regulator decides whether or not to revise the contract before the 
next periodic review.
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• The regulator announces the start of the next periodic review about eighteen 
months before the end of the regulatory period, and a new contract agreement 
game begins.
2.3 .1  T h e  firm ’s decisions
At the start of regulatory period j the firm makes its operating decisions for the five- 
year period60. The decisions relate to the following factors: the price of the product 
sold (p7); the amount of additional network capacity to produce (u7); the amount of 
operating and capital effort to invest in (e7 and t7); the quality of service to provide 
(s-7); and the level of health, safety and environmental outputs to deliver (n7)61.
We assume, for simplicity, that the firm sets the price change to just satisfy the 
price cap, and that the firm produces the level of capacity required to  meet long-term 
demand62. The assumption that the constraints are just binding allows us to focus on 
the decisions which the firm has most discretion over - namely operating and capital 
effort, and output delivery.
The firm maximises the future stream of expected profits given the constraints 
imposed by the regulatory contract. We assume that the firm is only concerned about 
profits in this regulatory period and in the next regulatory period. The impact of 
current decisions on future periods is considered negligible or too difficult for the firm 
to assess with any certainty. The firm therefore has a rolling ten-year time horizon. The 
firm is always aware, when making decisions, that there is no end-date for regulation 
and hence the two-period analysis is valid in all periods.
The firm’s problem in period j, with a discount factor /?, can be expressed as:
{e>
subject to:
max E  ( tt7 +  /?7T7+1>)
s* > s? and n7 > n7
60In practice, the firm is likely to  have a medium-term plan for the next regulatory period and 
future periods. T his plan w ill be revised from one year to the next during the period as operating 
conditions change. We focus on the decisions made for a single period and assume that they apply, 
on average, across each year of the period.
61 We assum e that operating and capital effort are independent, one-dim ensional, variables. In 
practice, there m ay be many facets to each type o f effort. In addition, operating and capital effort 
are likely to be highly correlated and substitutable. A more detailed m odel, along the lines of those 
found in  th e m ulti-tasking literature, would be required to  capture the m ulti-dim ensional nature of 
effort, and the interdependence across each type o f effort. These issues are not considered here but do 
warrant further research.
62In practice the firm can operate below the cap and/or produce excess capacity. Markou and 
W addams Price (1999) argue that ‘R egulation in  a ll the industries has been binding, su g g estin g  that 
the com panies would have liked to charge higher prices had the price cap perm itted’. T his reinforces 
our assum ption that the firm operates at the price cap.
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The constraints relate to the outputs which the firm is expected to deliver. The 
regulators may not be able to detect failure to deliver these outputs, particularly 
where lags exist between investment being undertaken and output delivery, or where 
monitoring is costly. In addition, the penalty for non-delivery of the output targets 
may not be very significant from the firm’s perspective (ie, fines may be low relative 
to turnover). In this sense the output constraints are not ‘hard’, and the firm may 
choose to deliver output levels which are below target.
The period j profit function is:
=  p V  -  o c j -  c c j  -  v-(e’) -  y > ( y ) -  e  \p c }\
where ip(.) is the cost of effort function and E  [PC*] is the expected penalty cost 
for non-delivery of required outputs in the previous period63. These penalties arise 
in the context of statutory health, safety and environmental standards, and increase 
with the size of the difference between the outputs delivered, n*-1 , and the standard, 
nJ_1.
We assume, for simplicity, that the firm’s failure to deliver a required output is 
observed at the end of a period and penalised in the next period. The firm will not 
know the exact value of the penalty. The expectation will depend on the expected 
probability of being caught, 2, and the expected size of the penalty, p3. The expected 
penalty cost for period j is therefore:
E  [PC-7] =  E(zp> | n*-1 , # -1)
The firm has the information required to calculate profits for period j. It knows 
demand and its cost functions for period j+1. The firm also forms an expectation 
about the impact of current decisions on the period j+1 price cap and output targets. 
Specifically, the regulator’s decisions on the allowed revenue building blocks in the next 
periodic review are expected to mirror those at the most recent periodic review64. The 
firm does not attempt to determine the regulator’s optimal reaction to  its decisions, or 
indeed its optimal reaction to such reaction. This is because there are several factors 
which affect the regulator’s objectives and decisions, all of which are uncertain and 
random from the firm’s perspective. More formal and complex expectations are not 
formed in the face of this uncertainty.
^Follow ing Laffont and T irole (1993) we assum e that the cost o f effort function, and the marginal 
cost o f effort function, are increasing and convex: ip' (.) >  0; ip" (.) >  0; ip1" (.) >  0. In addition  
ip (0) =  0 and lim eJ 1 ip (e7) =  + 00.
64 We ass lim e that the firm has com plete inform ation about how the regulator set the elem ents of 
previous regulatory contracts (ie, the firm knows the details of the regulator’s m ethodology, as outlined  
in  section 2.2.1).
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The operating effort decision
The price cap is set on the assumption that the firm will reduce operating costs by a 
set amount - e7 . At a minimum the firm ensures that it meets this target. A lower 
effort choice would prevent the firm from breaking-even. The firm decides whether 
or not to  undertake a higher level of effort than this minimum requirement. A high
to make profits. The impact on the long-run profit stream depends on how long the 
regulator allows the firm to have a price cap based on forecast costs which are higher 
than those actually incurred.
For simplicity we assume here that capital costs are zero, and we let the price cap 
be set such that:
The firm will choose the level of effort which maximises the expected operating effi-
cost sharing rule will be at the next review. The expected sharing rule is determined 
by the following factors:
effort choice, e? >  e7, will improve the firm’s operating productivity level and allow it
The firm invests in effort level e7, and the two-period profit stream at the start of 
period j is:
where ir3
i= l
We define the firm’s operating efficiency rent as the difference between profit when 
extra operating effort is undertaken ( e3 > e?) and profit when no extra operating 
effort is undertaken (e7 =  e7)65.
Air° =  7r ^e7^  — tt ^e7^
|  (ej  -  e [V +  /?(1 -  Aj-7+1)gi+1] -  [^(e7) -  V7(^7)]}
ciency rent. The firm must therefore make a forecast of what the regulator’s operating
where:
65T his is sim ilar to  the approach taken by W illiam son (1997), who measures the ‘strength o f the 
incentive to reduce costs’ as the ‘percentage of any cost saving which the regulated company can 
expect to  keep as additional profit, over and above what the company wovld earn i f  it did not make 
any saving\
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•  X30~1,3 is the sharing rule used to transfer savings made in period j-1 to  customers 
in period j. The firm assumes that a similar rule will be used again at the next 
review. In particular, the firm will assume that the regulator will not use a rule 
which is more generous to the firm than the rule recently used:
E  (AjJ+1)  >  Ai~ 1J
•  n30 is a correction factor which is used by the firm if the regulator has demon­
strated a propensity to increase the rule from one review to the next. The firm 
will tighten the actual sharing rule used in the previous period by this correction 
factor to reflect the expectation that the regulator will introduce more sharing 
over time. A risk averse firm will have a larger adjustment factor as a means 
of insuring itself against the risk of the rule being tighter than expected. If the 
regulator has used similar sharing rules over time, the firm will assume that the 
next period’s sharing rule will equal that used most recently. This gives us66:
E  ( a " +1)  =  A j- 1^  if  A j-1'-’ ~  Aj- 2- '” 1 
E  ( A " +1)  =  A j - W + ^ i f A j - ' J ^ A j - ^ - 1
•  ^ ( e 3) is the expected probability of mid-period intervention by the regulator 
and this variable is used as a further adjustment factor by the firm. Intervention 
is relevant because it means that the firm has to share the benefit of any produc­
tivity improvements with customers before the next periodic review (ie, more 
quickly than expected)67. If the firm places a high probability on the regulator 
intervening in the next period it will increase the expected sharing rule by this 
factor. This gives us, potentially:
E  ( a « +1)  =  A j- l j  + Mj  +  ^ (e> )
The expected probability of intervention will be higher the more mid-period 
intervention occurred in previous periods.
The firm’s problem is to choose the level of effort in period j which maximises the 
expected two-period operating efficiency rent . That is:
max (e3 -  e*) [V +  /3(1 -  E ( AJ’J+1))^ ’+1] -  [^(e3) -  ^ (e7)]
66W e assum e that the firm only considers experiences in  the previous two periods.
67Mayer and Vickers (1996) stress that m id-period intervention means that the regulatory lag, and 
hence the sharing rule, is not fixed exogenously. That is, the lag is affected by the regulator’s decision  
to  intervene and hence ‘Unless credibility not to  intervene is total, the effective lag, so to  speak, w ill 
be shorter than the explicit lag’.
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The first-order condition of this problem gives us the familiar condition that the 
firm chooses effort up to the point where the marginal benefit of effort equals the 
marginal cost68:
<? + P Q - W * 1
This decision rule reflects the direct impact of the firm’s effort decision on its long- 
run profits. The higher the expected level of sharing - i.e. the higher E(\™ +1) - the 
lower the level of savings made, and the higher the level of output in period j the 
higher the level of effort undertaken.
The firm also considers the impact of the current operating effort choice on other 
elements of the next period’s price cap. The firm does not know exactly how the price 
cap will be set next period, although it may know the direction of the relationship 
between the cap and other variables, and hence it must form an expectation of the 
size of the change. The size of this effect, dE^ p  \  will depend on the following factors.
•  The firm’s operating effort level increases its productivity level and, hence, in­
creases the productivity of the industry on average. The higher the average 
industry improvement, the higher will be the sectoral operating effort target in 
the next period.
•  A high effort choice in period j may improve the firm’s operating cost level 
relative to other firms in the sector. In this case, the regulator will deem it 
to be ‘efficient’ at the next periodic review and it will be set a less stringent 
effort target for period j+1, relative to other firms who have to catch-up with 
the efficiency frontier.
•  A high effort choice in period j will reduce the firm’s operating costs and will 
make it difficult for the firm to propose a higher level of costs in the business 
plan submitted at the next periodic review.
Taking these direct and indirect effects into account, the firm’s operating effort 
decision is to set the expected marginal benefit of increasing effort equal to the marginal 
cost. The optimisation condition will be69:
qi +  jS(l -  E(A«+1))^ +1 -  ip'(e?)±f3
^ T h e second-order condition is —if)" (e) which ensures a local maximum w ith our convex cost 
of effort function. This is the second-order condition for all our profit-m axim isation and welfare- 
m axim isation problem s.
69W e assum e that an improvement in productivity can lead to either a reduction or an increase in  
the price lim it.
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The firm’s expected sharing rule may turn out to  be significantly different from that 
which is used by the regulator. This is because other factors, such as changes in the 
way that the regulator priorities the technical efficiency and distribution objectives, 
and/or increased pressure from the government for reduced prices, affect the regulator’s 
decision. These factors are not known to the firm when making its effort choice - ie, 
they are ‘noise’ in the expectation - and hence are not captured in the expected sharing 
rule.
The capital effort decision
The firm’s decision with respect to capital effort is very similar to that outlined above 
for operating effort. In particular, the firm has a profit-incentive to choose a higher 
level of effort than assumed by the regulator, and that level of effort will be chosen by 
reference to a marginal benefit equal to marginal cost condition.
We assume here that there are no operating costs, and the price cap is set so that:
p Y  =  r 7 x R C V 3 
— r 7 x
j - i  _______.   .
RC V °  +  K j N N I * +  N N I J 
i=1
To enable us to focus on the effort decision we assume that the difference in capital 
effort is the only factor which causes the allowed capital level to be different from the 
actual capital level. We also assume that the cost of capital assumption is correct. 
This gives us:
r7 = r7
N N f - N N I j  =  y - 7 *
The firm invests in effort level 7J and the relevant profit stream from period j 
forward is:
irc =  7T7 +  /?7t7'+1
7rj  = r7 x ^  ( x ^ N N f  -  N N I^ j  +  (j> -  -  ip(y>)
The firm’s capital efficiency rent from undertaking a higher than assumed level of 
capital effort capital ( '■f > 7 *) is:
A ttc =  7r ^7J )  — 7T ( 7^ )
=  ^ t 7 — t 7^  ^ r7 +  /?7~7+1A7,-7+1^ -f if)(t 7 ) — ^ ( t 7 )
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The firm will form an expectation of the capital sharing rule at the next periodic 
review. As with the expected operating sharing rule, this will be an adjusted function 
of the sharing rule used at the previous price review70:
E  (AJJ+1) = Arlj if Arlj ^  Ar2’^ 1
e  ( a « + i)  =  A r ^ - ^ i f  >  A r 2' ^ 1
A downward adjustment, /i£, is made to the previous period’s rule if the regulator 
demonstrated a propensity to  sharing more capital savings with consumers (i.e. reduce 
A£-7+1) from one period to the next. We stress, again, that the sharing rule used in 
the next periodic review may be very different from the firm’s expectation.
The firm’s problem is to choose the level of effort in period j which maximises the 
expected profit stream. That is:
max ^ y j  _  y j  _|_ ( 3 r i+ 1 E  (Ay+1))  4- ) — V’CV )
The first-order condition of this problem gives us:
r* +  (a^ +1) =  )
That is, the marginal benefit from an extra unit of capital effort is set equal to 
the marginal cost of an extra unit of capital effort. The higher the expected capital 
sharing rule - i.e. the lower the expected level of sharing of capital savings - the higher 
the level of effort. Similarly, the higher the cost of capital the higher the level of effort.
The firm must also consider the impact of increased capital effort on the next 
period’s price cap,  ^• The main effects on the price cap are the same as in the
case of operating effort71. The firm’s capital effort decision is therefore determined by 
the condition that:
W + 0r*+1E (A"+1) -  V'(y ) ± P =  0
The capital investm ent decision
The firm will undertake capital investment if it expects to be able to finance that 
investment for the duration of the capital project. The regulator sets the allowed level
roThe regulator is unlikely to intervene mid-period to require the firm to share capital savings w ith  
custom ers before the next periodic review. This is because low capital costs at the start o f a period 
may sim ply reflect an alternative profiling of the investm ent programme and higher costs m ay emerge 
later in the period. The regulator can therefore not attribute short-run capital cost reductions to  a 
sustained improvement in productivity.
71 The reader can pinpoint the effects by sim ply replacing the word ‘operating’ in our prior discussion  
w ith the word ‘capital’.
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of investment at the forecast efficient level. This may be less than the level which 
the firm believes is required for the project. In addition, the regulator only provides 
a guaranteed rate of return for the duration of the regulatory period. The firm is 
therefore left with some uncertainty as to whether it will earn sufficient revenues in 
future periods to offset the actual financing costs of the on-going investment project.
The firm’s decision with regard to a T-period capital investment project can be 
summarised as follows.
1. If the regulator has not allowed sufficient financing for the investment project in 
period j - the start of the project - the firm will not undertake the investment:
No investment if P N N P  > P N N I ^
2. If the regulator allows sufficient revenues for the project in period j, the firm 
will consider the difference between expected required and allowed financing in 
future periods. The project will not be undertaken if the allowed financing is 
lower than required expected financing. This will occur if the firm believes that 
the regulator intends to ‘hold-up’ the firm at a later date, either by reducing 
the allowed level of investment or by reducing the allowed cost of capital. If the 
project has begun, and this happens, the firm will be required to self-finance the 
remainder of the project itself. To avoid this risk, the firm will choose not to 
undertake the project in the first place:
No investment if E  (  V  P N N P ]  > E  (  Y" PNNI*
\*=j+i /  V=j+i
The firm is also aware that only investments which are allowed under the regu­
latory contract will be financed by the regulator. Other discretionary projects 
will therefore not be undertaken.
3. The firm will undertake the investment project if it expects the regulator to 
provide adequate financing for the duration of the project. This will occur if the 
firm expects that the regulator will pay due regard to  his duty to ensure it can 
‘finance its functions’ in all periods.
Investment if E  \ P N N P  | < E \  V  P N N I *
\i=j+1 /  li=j+1
A similar situation arises with maintenance expenditure. The allowed depreciation 
charge is determined over a longer length of time than the regulatory period, and the
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regulator may change the method of calculating that charge from one period to the 
next. Say the asset has an expected life of T-years and the efficient cost of maintaining 
it for that period is M. If the regulator sets the depreciation charge such that 8* < I f ,  
the firm will be reluctant to undertake the required expenditure. The firm will only 
be willing to undertake maintenance of the assets if it is sure that the depreciation 
charge is sufficient to cover the long-run costs involved.
The quality o f service decision
We noted above that the output constraints which the firm faces may not always be 
satisfied. The firm may choose to deliver an output level which is below the target 
set if there are financial benefits to doing so. We assume that when the firm reduces 
investment, by delivering a lower level of output, the impact on customers or the 
environment is immediate (ie, in the current year), and is observable and verifiable by 
the regulator72,73.
We define the net benefit of delivering quality of service level s-7 as:
NB( s j ) =  A tt (sj) + H (V) -  C  (s> ) ±  0E (a?(ii*” 1, S*- 1 , * * -* ))
where:
•  A tt (si) is the profit earned from choosing this level of service. This value is zero 
if the firm simply produces the regulator’s target, assuming all of the regulator’s 
other assumptions are correct.
•  H  (si) is the intrinsic reputation value which the firm earns from the quality 
of service provided. This value function is increasing in the quality of service 
provided74.
72In practice, a firm may be able to  reduce investm ent w ithout there being an im m ediate effect 
on the output delivered because the network condition is sufficient to provide the required outputs 
in  the short-term . The investm ent reduction w ill, however, jeopardise the long-term  serviceability of 
the network and increase the risk of service problems in the future. This adds a further dim ension 
to the firm’s decision - trading off the risk of an output delivery problem  being observed, and hence 
punished, in  the current period against the potential o f it  not being observed for som e tim e. This 
extra elem ent of the decision problem is not considered here but warrants further analysis.
73D alen (1997) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch4) consider the optim al regulatory contract when 
quality is unverifiable.
74 Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that reputation incentives are im portant if ‘The firm’s m ain 
incentive to provide quality is...th e threat of jeopardizing future trading opportunities w ith the buyer 
rather than current ones’. In the regulated u tility  sectors the firm has a long-term  licence to  provide 
services in  the franchise area and consumers do not have the option o f switching to another supplier 
if  the quality of service provided is insufficient. In these long-term  m onopoly industries, therefore, 
the reputation effect may not be significant. The regulator could attem pt to increase the size o f the 
reputation effect by introducing a licence condition which allowed the regulator to revoke the licence, 
and issue it to  another firm, if the current licence-holder underdelivered w ith respect to quality of 
service. T he idea of placing restrictions on the licence length is one which warrants further attention  
from the regulators.
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•  C  (sJ) is the level of compensation which is paid directly to consumers affected 
by service problems. This is zero if the quality of service is at or above the target 
set.
•  E  (A7 (s-7-1, s5-1, 1)) is the expected size of the quality of service adjustment 
made to the next period’s price cap. The expected size of the service performance 
adjustment will be correlated with the size of the adjustment used at the last 
review (A7-1).
To enable us to focus on the quality of service decision, we assume that the differ­
ence between the service level and the service target is the only factor which causes the 
assumed investment level to be different from the actual investment level. In particu­
lar we assume that all other required output targets are delivered, and the regulator’s 
assumptions on expected productivity and the cost of capital are correct. This gives 
us:
f j  — r3
N N f - N N I j  =  P - P
The profit stream from period j forward is then:
7T =  7T7 +  7T7+1
it3 = r> x ^  ( E ( \ y ) N N I *  -  N N I^ j  + (P -  j
The rent earned by the firm, when it produces quality of service level s-7, is the 
difference between the profit stream when this quality of service level is undertaken 
and the profit stream when the quality of service target is undertaken (sJ = s J).
A ir  =  it — 7r
= (P  — s3^ (r^ + E(XJC^ +1)^
If the firm delivers the target standard of service it will earn zero profits. If the
firm delivers a higher quality of service than the target set, s3h, it will make a loss. 
If the firm delivers a quality of service that is below the target, sj, it will make a 
profit. Profits will be higher the lower the level of expected capital cost sharing (i.e. 
the higher is E ( \JC’3+1)).
The firm will produce the level of service which yields the highest net benefit. The 
net benefit of delivering P  is:
NB(P) = H  (P ) + pE (A  (p>+1 | A  (p7)  , P , P ) )
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The net benefit of defivering a higher level of service, is:
N B (sl)  =  “ A7r (5h) +  H  (■sh)  +  PE  (A i f * 1 \ A  ( f t )  * 4 ’ «J) )
The net benefit of delivering a lower level of service, sj, is:
N B ( 4 )  =  Ax (sj) +  f f ( s j ) - C  (« f)  -  flE (A ( ? +1 | A ( ? )  , s j , ? , ? ) )
The firm must also consider the indirect impact of service performance in period 
j on the period j+1 contract. The level of service delivered may impact on the price 
cap in the following ways.
•  If a low level of service is delivered, the regulator will require the firm to catch up 
with the target without allowing additional investment for this on the grounds 
that the financing was already provided by customers.
•  A high level of service will signal to the regulator that a higher service target is 
feasible for period j+1. This may be applied at industry level or only to  the firm 
itself. The high target is likely to be set at current cost levels, requiring the firm 
to deliver more with the same level of revenues.
•  A low level of service, and the associated reduction in capital investment costs, 
will make any attempt by the firm to argue for high investment costs in its next 
business plan incredible to the regulator.
The ‘other outputs’ decision
The firm’s decision-making process with respect to health, safety and environmental 
standards is very similar to that outlined above for quality of service. The main 
difference is that there is no formal adjustment in the price-cap setting process75. 
Instead, the firm faces a lump-sum penalty from the non-economic regulators. The 
absence of any reward structure for outperforming the target means that the firm only 
considers whether to meet the target or breach it.
We define the net benefit of defivering output level nP as:
NB{nP) =  A tt ( n ^  4- M  — (3E(zpJ+1 | nJ, nJ)
where:
75 The service index used to  assess the water com panies’ performance at the 1999 review incorporated 
variables relating to both quality of service and environm ental standards. We assume here that the 
price cap adjustm ent only reflects quality of service performance (as was the case w ith electricity 
distribution) and that separate penalties exist for the other output targets. This ensures that the firm 
is not penalised tw ice for non-delivery o f these outputs.
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•  Air (pP) is the profit earned from choosing this output level. This value is zero 
if the firm simply produces the regulator’s target and all of the regulator’s other 
assumptions are correct.
•  M  (nP) is the intrinsic reputation value which the firm earns from the health, 
safety and environmental outputs provided. This value function is increasing in 
the level of output provided.
•  E(zpP+l | nj ,nJ) is the expected penalty which the firm faces from the non­
economic regulators in period j+1. The firm only faces this penalty if it produces 
a lower output level than the target, n\.
Following exactly the same argument as we used for quality of service, we define
the firm’s profit from choosing output level nP as:
Air = (nP — +  (3r^+1
Again, the firm chooses the output level which yields the highest net benefit. The
net benefit of delivering n-7 is:
NB(nP) = M
The net benefit of delivering a lower output level , nj,  is:
N B ( n ’ ) =  A tt (nj)  +  M  (nf )  -  pE(zp>+1 | n{,nj )
The firm will only choose the target level of output if the expected penalty cost is 
sufficiently high. The firm must also consider the impact of output delivery in period j 
on prices and profits in period j+1. The relevant factors are the same as those outlined 
above for quality of service delivery. In addition, the probability of being punished for 
non-delivery of required outputs will be higher in period j+1  if the firm was caught 
breaching the target in period j. This is because the non-economic regulators will 
increase the level of monitoring on poorly performing firms. The size of the penalty 
will also increase if the firm breaches the target repeatedly.
2 .3 .2  T h e  regu lator’s decision
The regulator observes the firm’s actual cost levels, and outputs delivered, at the end 
of each year of the regulatory period. The regulator is therefore able to see whether his 
cost forecasts were too high or too low, and whether the firm is delivering the required 
output targets. In addition, the regulator sees whether there have been changes in the 
firm’s operating conditions which may affect its ability to  finance its functions.
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When this information becomes available the regulator has two decisions to make 
in the implementation game. First, the regulator decides whether the firm needs to be 
penalised for underperforming with respect to output targets. Second, the regulator 
decides whether the regulatory contract should be revised mid-period in light of the 
information now available.
Output delivery
The regulator monitors the firm’s quality of service performance each year. An annual 
report is published showing how the firm performed relative to its target, and relative 
to other firms in the sector. This ‘name and shame’ approach is intended to provide 
a reputation incentive to the firm to meet its quality of service target.
If the firm fails to  meet a quality of service target it must pay compensation to 
those customers who are affected. If there is a serious breach of a service target, or 
if there are persistent and repeated problems, the regulator can issue an enforcement 
order. This is a legal instrument which requires the firm to take action to rectify 
the identified problem without the provision of financial assistance. The economic 
regulator does not impose any other direct penalties on the firm during the regulatory 
period but, as discussed in section 2.2.1, an adjustment will be made to the next 
period’s price cap to reflect service performance.
The non-economic regulators monitor the firm’s performance with respect to the 
other output targets. As with quality of service, the firm’s performance is published 
in an annual report. If the firm breaches a target, the non-economic regulator has 
the legal power to impose a penalty on the firm. The probability of a penalty being 
imposed depends on the extent of the breach and the level of monitoring undertaken by 
the regulator. The non-economic regulator can also use enforcement orders to change 
the firm’s behaviour.
The non-economic regulators may introduce revised output targets during the reg­
ulatory period. These changes are driven by new legislation. The impact on the firm’s 
profits will depend on how the economic regulator chooses to treat the associated 
cost increase. As discussed below, the regulator may choose to revise the contract 
mid-period and allow for the increased costs to be financed through the price cap. 
Alternatively, the regulator may decide that the firm can self-finance the additional 
output delivery for the regulatory period, and will include the investment in the reg­
ulatory capital value at the next periodic review.
2. The R PI-X  gam e 55
M id-period contract revision
During the period the regulator may observe that the assumptions underlying the 
regulatory contract are very different to what actually emerges. If this is the case, the 
regulator decides whether or not to revise the contract mid-period so that it reflects 
the updated information. In this way the incompleteness of the contract - ie, the fact 
that it does not cover all contingencies - makes commitment to the contract for the 
fixed period difficult.
There is no set principle or objective which the regulator uses when choosing 
whether or not to intervene. We present, in Appendix A, a number of cases where 
mid-period intervention occurred. The regulator’s decision depends on how he priori­
tises his three welfare objectives. The main benefits to revising the contract are that 
it improves allocative efficiency by making the price reflective of recent actual cost 
information, and it distributes efficiency rents from the firm to consumers earlier than 
expected. The cost is that the firm earns a lower share of any cost savings made, and 
therefore has a reduced incentive to improve technical efficiency. In future periods, the 
firm will take account of the mid-period intervention when forming its expectation of 
the sharing rule.
We note that the contract may also be changed in the firm’s favour. If output 
targets are tightened, the regulator may increase the price cap to cover the extra 
investment costs. This is most evident in the water sector, where provisions exist for 
the licence to be changed when the non-economic regulators introduce new output 
requirements during the regulatory period.
2.4 Concluding remarks
We have presented a detailed description of the way in which the regulator and the firm 
make their decisions in the RPI-X game. In addition, a number of fixed characteristics 
of the current regime have been highlighted. The description reflects the experiences 
which have been observed in the water and electricity sectors since privatisation. In 
Chapter 3 we use this description to  analyse the impact of the RPI-X regime on 
allocative and technical efficiency and on the efficient delivery of outputs. We also 
examine ways in which the details of the regime, and the mechanism itself, might be 
changed so as to improve its efficiency properties.
C hapter 3
W elfare under the R P I-X  regim e
Littlechild (1983, 1986), and others, argued that price cap regulation was the best 
available means of regulating the profitability of utility companies because it provides 
the firm with an incentive to minimise costs1. This technical efficiency advantage is 
also predicted by the economic theory of pure price cap regulation. The theory is 
based on the assumptions that the cap is set independent of the firm’s costs, and that 
the firm retains all of the rent from cost savings made. We know, from our description 
in Chapter 2, that the RPI-X mechanism does not operate in this way. Historical 
information is used to set cost forecasts, and the regulator shares a proportion of the 
efficiency rent with consumers over time. The practice of price cap regulation therefore 
differs from the theory. This must be explicitly recognised if the true welfare effects of 
the RPI-X mechanism are to be accurately determined. In addition, cost minimisation 
is only a partial measure of welfare improvement. The net welfare effect can only be 
assessed by also examining the impact on allocative efficiency and on the efficient 
delivery of outputs2.
Bearing these points in mind, we consider the welfare properties of the RPI-X 
mechanism in section 3.1. Specifically, we examine the impact of the price cap regime 
on allocative efficiency, technical efficiency and the efficient delivery of outputs3. The 
analysis is used to determine whether the RPI-X mechanism is defivering the maximum 
feasible level of welfare for a fixed price cap4. The analysis is based on our description
1The expected benefits o f price cap regulation are discussed in Beesley and Littlechild (1983) and 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988a).
2T his argument was also made by Vickers and Yarrow (1988a) who stress that ‘a finding that 
private firms have lower unit costs than their public counterpart does not necessarily im ply that their 
contributions to social welfare are greater; questions relating to  allocative efficiency and to the quality 
of goods or services provided also need to  be taken into account’.
3 W e do not consider the im pact of the regulatory regime on the distribution of benefits. A discussion  
of this equity issue can be found in Markou and Waddams Price (1999).
4 A large number o f articles have been w ritten which compare the price cap mechanism to alternative 
m echanism s, including rate of return regulation and sliding-scale regulation. The interested reader is
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of the RPI-X regime in Chapter 2 and, hence, is clearly grounded in the practice of 
price cap regulation rather than the high-level theory of pure price caps.
Our objectives our two-fold: (1) to enable the reader to better understand the 
welfare properties of RPI-X regulation; and, (2) to focus attention on the particular 
features of the RPI-X game which affect these welfare properties. We present, in sec­
tion 3.2, a number of alternative regulatory mechanisms which build on the existing 
RPI-X regime. The alternatives involve changes in the current price cap setting pro­
cess. We assume that the game characteristics are fixed by the institutional and legal 
framework of utility regulation in the UK, and will affect any regulatory mechanism 
which is used5. We explain how these alternative mechanisms may lead to an improve­
ment in allocative efficiency, technical efficiency and/or the delivery of an efficient level 
of quality of service. We also discuss the feasibility of the potential improvements be­
ing delivered given the limited information which is available to the regulator and the 
stochastic nature of demand and hence costs in the regulated network utility sectors.
Many of the arguments made here have been made by others, both practitioners 
in the regulated sectors and commentators6,7. These studies are generally discursive 
and high-level in nature. They highlight a number of concerns with the price cap 
mechanism, but they do not examine the specific elements of the RPI-X regime which 
affect the efficiency properties of this form of regulation. In addition, many of the 
papers are now quite dated and do not reflect the way in which the mechanism has 
evolved in recent years. We contribute to the debate on the merits of RPI-X regulation 
by bringing the existing arguments together in one place. We also ground the analysis 
in a framework which enables us to better understand how the nature of demand 
and costs in the industry, the characteristics of the RPI-X game, and the regulator’s
referred to  the following papers, and the references therein, for farther details: Armstrong, Cowan and 
Vickers (1994), Bennett and Waddams Price (2002), Braeutigam  and Panzar (1993), Gasmi, Ivaldi and 
Laffont (1994), G ilbert and Newbery (1994), Helm and Yarrow (1988), Lewis and Sappington (1989), 
Liston (1993), Lyon (1996), Mayer and Vickers (1996), Pint (1992), Sappington (2000), Schmalansee 
(1989), V iehoff (1995), W aterson (1992 and 1995), W eisman (1993 and 1994) and Yarrow (1989).
5 Bennett and Waddams Price (2002) provide a com plem entary discussion of the institutional and 
political factors which affect the power of incentive mechanisms.
6Early critiques of the RPI-X regulatory regime can be found in  Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers 
(1994), Beesley and Littlechild (1983,1989), Glynn (1992), Helm (1995a and 1995b), Helm and Yarrow 
(1988), Rees and Vickers (1995), Vickers and Yarrow (1988a and 1988b), W aterson (1992 andl995) 
and Yarrow (1989). More recent analyses of the regim e, which reflect changes made at the first and 
second rounds of periodic reviews, are provided by Bennett and Waddams Price (2002), Bernstein  
and Sappington (1999), Cowan (1997), Crew and Kleindorfer (1996), Green and Haskel (2001), Helm  
(2001), L ittlechild (2001), Lowe (1998), Markou and W addams Price (1999), Mayer (2000), National 
A udit Office (2002), Newbery (1999) and Waddams Price (1997a).
7 Critiques of a broader range of regulatory incentive mechanism s, including pure price caps, are 
provided by Crew and Kleindorfer (1996), Gasmi, Ivaldi and Laffont (1994), Laffont and Tirole (1993 
and 2000), Parker (2002), Sappington (2000), Vogelsang (2002), and the papers in  the 1989 RAND  
Sym posium  on price cap regulation.
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decision-making process affect the efficiency properties of price cap regulation. Any 
proposed changes must take account of these features to ensure that the potential for 
welfare improvement is linked to our understanding of the actual limitations of the 
existing mechanism given the characteristics of the game and the regulated industry.
3.1 The welfare properties
In this section we consider the impact of the RPI-X mechanism on the three elements 
of welfare. Section 3.1.1 focuses on allocative efficiency, technical efficiency is examined 
in section 3.1.2, and we examine the impact of RPI-X regulation on efficient output 
delivery in section 3.1.3.
Conflicts arise in the RPI-X game which prevent all types of efficiency from being 
delivered simultaneously. It is therefore difficult to measure the overall welfare impact 
of this mechanism. We find that technical efficiency incentives are, at least partially, 
offset by concerns about allocative efficiency and the provision of required output 
targets. In addition, the cost minimisation incentives are dulled by the way in which 
the RPI-X game is played. The primary benefit of price cap regulation may therefore 
not be as strong in practice as envisioned by the theory of pure price caps.
3.1 .1  A llo ca tiv e  efficiency
We consider here whether the regulatory contract delivers allocative efficiency in the 
RPI-X game. Allocative efficiency is achieved when welfare is maximised given current 
costs. When a firm has large fixed costs and/or increasing returns to scale - as in most 
network utility companies - marginal cost pricing is not feasible and we focus on 
average cost pricing as the appropriate benchmark. The firm earns zero profits with 
these prices.
Figure 3.1 shows the average rates of return earned in the water and electricity 
sectors since privatisation8. These suggest that allocative efficiency has not been 
delivered as firms are earning above normal returns9. We explain below why this 
problem arises with the RPI-X mechanism.
Under the allowed revenue approach, discussed in section 2.2.1, the price cap is 
essentially set equal to expected average efficient cost in the RPI-X game.
___________________________________  r? = E(ACi)
8 The rate of return is measured as current cost operating profit divided by the regulatory capital 
value. The data on current cost operating profit is taken from the firms’ annual regulatory accounts. 
The data on the regulatory capital value is taken from the regulatory agencies’s publications.
9 A s shown in Table A .14, the allowed pre-tax weighted average cost of capital has been set at less 
than 8% by all regulators. The actual rate of return has exceeded this benchmark in all sectors and 
in  all years since privatisation.
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Figure 3.1: Rates of return in the regulated sectors
We therefore have allocative efficiency if the regulator’s expectation of average 
efficient cost is equal to the actual level of average cost. There are several reasons why 
this will not be the case.
1. Asymmetric information about the firm’s underlying technology, and the unob­
servability of effort, mean that there is a positive probability that the regulator’s 
forecast of expected costs will be inaccurate. This is a problem which exists for 
all regulatory mechanisms.
2. In the utility sectors both demand and costs are stochastic in nature. In particu­
lar uncertain exogenous factors, such as weather and other random events (e.g. a 
World Cup football game leading to peak demand for electricity), affect demand 
levels, capacity utilisation and hence required costs. The regulator therefore has 
uncertainty about how the firm’s operating environment will change during the 
regulatory period and there is noise in the regulator’s forecast10. Again, this is 
not unique to price cap regulation.
3. The regulator uses the firm’s forecast of capital costs when setting allowed rev­
enues. The firm has an incentive to inflate this forecast. The expected capital 
costs used to set the price cap are therefore likely to be higher than required. 
This widens the gap between actual and expected average cost.
10Schm alansee (1989) argues that in this situation a welfare-maximising regulator w ill set a higher 
allowed price cap to  provide insurance to the firm, assuming the firm is risk averse. This moves the 
firm further away from an allocatively efficient price level.
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The fixed nature of the price cap exacerbates the allocative efficiency problem 
further. Even if the regulator’s expected average costs are correct at the start of the 
period the ex-post costs will, as a direct result of the technical efficiency incentives, 
be lower than the current costs11. There is thus a divergence between the allowed 
price level and average costs at the end of the period12. In this way the existence of 
multiple regulatory objectives means that attempts to deliver one objective prevent 
another from being achieved13. This is similar to the results of the multi-tasking 
literature, epitomised by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
Several authors have found that the welfare-maximising contract requires the reg­
ulator to pay a positive transfer to the firm14. In these analyses, the option of paying 
a zero transfer is available but is never found to yield the highest level of welfare. 
Under current legislation, the regulator is unable to pay transfers to the firm. We 
can therefore conclude that welfare is below the maximum level because transfers are 
restricted.
Finally, in an attempt to improve distribution, the regulator shares efficiency sav­
ings with customers over time. The sharing rules are chosen arbitrarily by the reg­
ulator. In particular, they are not chosen to maximise long-run welfare. Indeed, 
Mayer (2000) stresses that the choice of the five-year regulatory lag ‘has more to do 
with regulatory and political expediency than economic theory’. The final price level 
may therefore be distorted further away from the constrained welfare maximising level 
because the sharing rules are not optimal.
We conclude that allocative efficiency is not delivered under the RPI-X mechanism. 
The features of the RPI-X game which affect this element of welfare can be summarised 
as follows.
1. Asymmetric information and uncertainty - the regulator can only achieve second- 
best welfare levels when he is uncertain about the firm’s future cost and demand
11 Mayer (1999) em phasises that the system  ‘hinges crucially on projections that are inevitably 
disproved alm ost as soon as they are made1.
12 A sim ilar problem occurs w ith other optim al incentive mechanisms where the regulator is required 
to pay a rent to  the firm to  induce it to  undertake the optim al level of effort. These mechanisms are 
discussed in  detail in Laffont and Tirole (1993).
13It should be noted that the allocative efficiency problems of the RPI-X mechanism were recog­
nised from the outset. A decision was made that the delivery of productive efficiency today was more 
im portant than allocative efficiency. This short-run trade-off reflected the assum ption that, partic­
ularly w ith respect to  British Telecom, com petition would emerge to  reduce the extent of allocative 
efficiency. This com petition has not emerged for the natural m onopoly network firms, and regulator’s 
have used th e periodic review process as a means of reducing the allocative efficiency problem.
14For exam ple, Laffont and Tirole (1986) find, in their m odel o f regulation w ith moral hazard and 
adverse selection, that the optim al contract involves the firm setting price equal to marginal cost and 
the regulator paying the firm a transfer to induce it to decrease its  costs. There is therefore allocative 
efficiency, but at the expense of som e technical efficiency. In the absence of these transfers, th is optim al 
contract can not be im plem ented and there is som e loss o f allocative efficiency and technical efficiency.
3. W elfare under th e R PI-X  regim e 61
conditions. There is always a positive probability that allowed average costs will 
differ from actual average costs.
2. Restricted transfers - the regulator does not have the power, or the finances, to 
pay lump-sum transfers to  the firm. Optimal regulatory mechanisms, proposed 
in the literature on the new economics of regulation, are therefore not feasible15.
3. Multiple objectives - the regulator allows the firm to earn a rent to provide tech­
nical efficiency incentives, but this immediately results in allocative inefficiency. 
Attempts to deliver one objective therefore reduce the regulator’s ability to  de­
liver another.
4. Regulatory discretion - the sharing rules for operating and capital savings are 
chosen arbitrarily. We therefore expect a deviation from welfare maximisation as 
the price levels, incorporating these sharing rules, are not set so as to maximise 
long-run welfare.
Characteristics (1) to (3) are ingrained in the RPI-X game and will prevent any 
regulatory mechanism from delivering allocative efficiency. The fourth feature is unique 
to the RPI-X mechanism, as currently designed, and could in theory be changed 
by the regulator. However, as discussed in section 3.2.1, asymmetric information 
and uncertainty about future demand and costs will restrict the regulator’s ability to 
determine a welfare maximising sharing rule in practice. Attempts could also be made 
to alleviate the allocative inefficiency problem by improving the regulator’s information 
set. We explore these potential improvements further in section 3.2.
3.1 .2  T echnical efficiency
Price cap regulation was introduced for the utility sectors in England and Wales be­
cause it was thought to provide the firm with an incentive to  reduce costs. We show, 
in Chapter 4, that RPI-X regulation has delivered the expected cost savings. There 
is a question, however, as to whether the cost savings are as large as they could be, 
and whether they are sustainable in the long-term. We also question whether the cost 
saving incentives ensure that the firm chooses the most efficient combination of inputs.
The main problems with the technical efficiency incentives are summarised here 
and discussed in detail below.
1. The regulator shares cost savings with customers. This reduces the firm’s incen­
tive to make optimal effort choices.
15See Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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2. The sharing rules change over time. The firm is therefore uncertain about the 
actual benefit it will earn when it makes its effort choices. This may dull the 
effort incentives further.
3. The regulator may adjust the sharing rule in response to changes in the size of 
the cost savings made. If this occurs there is a ratchet effect problem. The firm’s 
incentive to reduce costs is offset by the knowledge that lower costs will trigger 
a higher sharing rule and, hence, reduce the gain from each unit of effort16.
4. If the regulator revises the contract mid-period, the firm’s expected sharing rule 
may be increased and future effort levels will fall.
5. Historical information is used to determine future cost allowances. This intro­
duces an additional potential ratchet effect problem. The firm weighs up the 
efficiency rent from reduced costs against the reduction in future profits frorfl 
prices being based on lower cost levels.
6. The incentive regime is different for operating and capital cost savings. It also 
varies across years in the regulatory period. This distorts the firm’s input choices 
and thereby reduces technical efficiency.
The incentive to  reduce costs
In Chapter 4 we provide evidence on the extent to  which firms have reduced their 
operating and capital costs since privatisation. Real unit operating costs have reduced 
significantly since privatisation in the electricity distribution, electricity transmission 
and water sectors. In contrast, real unit capital costs have increased although the 
increases may have been lower than would have been the case in the absence of RPI- 
X regulation. There has also been an increase in total factor productivity, but the 
average annual growth rates are relatively small.
We explained, in section 2.3.1, how the firm is provided with the incentive to reduce 
costs. In the words of Vickers and Yarrow (1988a), we argue that the incentives are 
in fact more ‘illusory’ than ‘real’. Our reasons are discussed below.
Im pact o f sharing rules
The firm has an incentive, under a fixed pure price cap, to undertake the welfare- 
maximising level of effort. This is because it retains all of the rent earned from reducing
16Papers which analyse the ratchet effect in  the regulatory environment include Armstrong and 
Sappington (2002), Currie, Levine and Rickman (1999), D alen (1997 and 2000), Preixas, Guesnerie 
and Tirole (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1988 and 1993, Chs 9&10) and Lewis and Sappington (1997). A  
more general analysis of the ratchet effect is presented in  Bolton and D ewatripont (2002) and Laffont 
and Martimort (2002).
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costs below the allowed level. In practice, as described in Chapter 2, the regulator 
shares a proportion of operating and capital efficiency rents with consumers, and 
thereby introduces a distortion between the theory of price cap regulation and the 
practice17. The sharing rule is decided without any explicit consideration of the firm’s 
long-term reaction to the rule. We therefore expect that the rule is time inconsistent 
and that it will be ex-post inefficient18.
We examine the impact of the sharing process on the firm’s incentive to reduce 
costs. We assume first that the firm knows the sharing rule when making its effort 
choice. This allows us to focus on the impact of sharing itself. We then examine the 
additional impact of the firm’s uncertainty about the sharing rule. Finally, the endoge­
nous relationship between the chosen effort level and the sharing rule is considered. 
The focus in this section is on the detrimental impact of sharing for technical efficiency. 
We recognise, however, that sharing is advantageous for allocative efficiency19.
We examine the impact of sharing by focusing on the firm’s operating effort choice. 
Parallel results hold for the firm’s capital effort decision. In our two-period model the 
price caps are calculated as20:
p1 =  0 — e1 
p2 =  6 — A2e* — e2
The firm’s profit level is:
?r =  (e1 -  e1)  q1 -  ip (e1)  +  /? ( ( [ l  -  A2] e1 +  (e2 -  e2) )  q * - ip  (e2) )  
and the level of welfare is:
W  =  V ( f )  +  ( 3 V ( f )  +  oltc
17This is also recognised by Markou and Waddams Price (1999) who em phasise that ‘As the process 
has developed som e incentive power has been sacrificed as both regulators and com panies have come 
to  recognise that high revealed profits are likely to be reflected in a tighter price constraint at the next 
review’.
18A detailed analysis of tim e inconsistency problems can be found in Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
They argue that decisions which are selected on the grounds that they are best ‘given the current 
situation and given that decisions w ill be sim ilarly selected in the future’ w ill be inefficient ex-post 
because no account is taken of the behavioural and expecation changes in response to the policy 
decision. The regulator’s decision-m aking process is undertaken in a sim ilar way and, hence, sim ilar 
problems are to  be expected.
19An analysis o f the benefits of cost sharing can be found in Schmalansee (1989).
20We ignore the possible indirect effects o f the firm’s effort choice on the next period’s price cap. 
For exam ple, we do not allow the regulator’s operating effort target for period 2 to depend on the 
actual effort level in period 1. This case, which arises in practice, would add further com plexity to  
the comparisons being made.
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where V(p) is consumer surplus at price p, and a  is the weight placed by the 
regulator on the firm’s profits21.
We compare the firm’s effort choice, with and without sharing, to the welfare- 
maximising level. When there is no sharing the second period price cap is:
p2 =  0 — e1 — e2
The first-order condition for welfare maximisation when there is not sharing is22:
g  (e1)  +  /?<72] =  0
=> i / ( e 1)  = qi + ^
The first-order condition for profit maximisation when there is no sharing is:
W  -  *
=> (e1)  =  Q1 +
We therefore confirm that, when there is no sharing, the firm chooses the welfare- 
maximising level of effort.
We now compare the effort levels when sharing is introduced. For a given sharing
rule, A2, the welfare-maximising effort level is determined by the first-order condition:
£  - »
=  (3q2>i +  a  (V -  ip' (e1) +  /? [ 1 -  A*] g2] =  0
=> tf/ (e1) -  q1 +  (3q2 +  ^ /?A2<?
The welfare-maximising effort level is higher with sharing than without. The dif­
ference between the effort levels is increased the higher the level of sharing that occurs. 
This is not surprising as, for the given value of a:, each unit of effort is worth more to 
the regulator the more sharing that occurs. This is because, with the weighted welfare 
function, the regulator places more value on the effort rent which is transferred to 
consumers than the rent which is retained by the firm. If a  =  1, so that the regulator 
weights profits and consumer surplus the same, the welfare-maximising effort level is 
the same with and without sharing.
21W e assume that this weight is exogenous and that it is fixed in the current period. The value 
can change over tim e, however, if the regulator changes his perspective on the im portance of the 
distribution objective.
22The second-order condition is —ip” (e) which ensures a local maximum w ith  our convex cost of 
effort function. This holds for all the welfare and profit m axim isations in  this section.
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The firm’s profit-maximising effort choice with sharing is determined by the con­
dition:
0  =  q1 -r l> '( e ') + l3 ( l - \£ )< i2 = 0 
=* %!/ (e1)  =  q1 +  /fy2 -  (3 \20q2
The higher the level of sharing that occurs, the lower is the level of effort chosen. 
This reflects the fact that each unit of effort is worth less to the firm the more sharing 
that occurs.
The firm’s effort choice with sharing is lower than the effort choice with no sharing. 
It is also lower than the welfare-maximising choice for the given sharing rule. We 
therefore conclude that the existence of a sharing rule distorts the firm’s effort choice 
away from the welfare-maximising level, and results in the firm undertaking a lower 
level of effort than is the case with no sharing. Technical efficiency is therefore reduced 
when savings are shared with consumers. This arises from the fact that the regulator 
has multiple objectives.
We note, as an aside, that the sharing of cost savings under the RPI-X mechanism 
has a similar impact to an explicit profit-sharing rule23. This is stressed by Armstrong 
and Sappington (2002) who argue that ‘implicit intertemporal profit sharing of this 
sort can limit the firm’s incentive to reduce its operating costs and expand its revenues, 
just as explicit profit-sharing requirements can’. The main difference between these 
regimes is that with formal profit-sharing the rule is set ex-ante, it is known to the 
firm, the proportion of rent which is shared is fixed over time, and sharing occurs 
immediately (ie, at the end of the financial year). In contrast, the implicit ‘profit- 
sharing’ under the RPI-X mechanism is built on an uncertain sharing rule, and the 
sharing occurs with a lag. The impact of this uncertainty, arising from the absence of 
commitment to the rule, is discussed below.
T h e  im p ac t o f u n certa in ty  The regulator chooses the sharing rule after the firm 
has made its effort choice, and makes no commitment from one review to the next 
as to what the sharing rule will be. The firm is therefore uncertain about what the 
rule will be when making its effort choice and its determines an expected sharing rule 
using the following function (see section 2.3.1 for details):
E  ( A « « )  =  A +  nj  +  t r ’ ( e ’ )
23See Burns, Turvey and Weyman- J ones (1995a and 1995b), Lyon (1996) and W aterson (1995) for 
a discussion o f the properties of sliding-scale regulation. See Mayer and Vickers (1996) for an analysis 
of the problem s w ith these schemes. Sappington (2000) presents details o f the use o f eam ings-sharing 
schem es in the US telecom s sector.
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Each period’s sharing rule reflects the regulator’s current position on the appropri­
ate trade-off between distribution and technical efficiency. Several factors, unknown to 
the firm, affect this position. These include the impact of political and consumer pres­
sure on the regulator; the size of the cost reductions delivered (introducing circularity 
into the firm’s problem); and, recent decisions made by other regulators and the Com­
mission on the appropriate level of sharing. The firm cannot predict the regulator’s 
objective function and, hence, cannot determine the expected sharing rule accurately. 
There is thus a positive probability that the expected sharing rule will be incorrect. 
We compare the effort choice with uncertainty to that which would emerge with
certainty. To simplify the analysis we assume that the cost of effort function is xf) (e) =  
2
y .  We therefore have:
e7 =  q* + (3q^ +1 — (3E(X3^3+1)q3+1 with uncertainty 
e3 =  q3 -f- — f3X30,3+1q3+1 with certainty (ex-post)
The welfare-maximising effort level for the given sharing rule is: e7 =  q3 +  A?-7"*’1 +
(~)/3Aj+V+1-
The firm’s effort level deviates from the ex-post profit-maximising level if the ex­
pectation of the sharing rule is incorrect. Uncertainty about the sharing rule therefore 
results in ex-post inefficiency. In addition, the firm’s effort choice will continue to be 
different from the welfare-maximising level. The extent of the difference depends on 
whether the firm has a pessimistic or an optimistic expectation of the sharing rule.
•  Pessimistic expectation: if E(X30+1) > A7+1, the firm’s effort choice will be lower 
with uncertainty than with certainty. This will widen the gap between the firm’s 
effort choice and that which maximises expected welfare, given the actual sharing 
rule.
•  Optimistic expectation: if E ( \30+1) < Aj+1, the firm’s effort choice will be higher 
with uncertainty than with certainty. This will reduce the gap between the firm’s 
effort choice and that which maximises expected welfare, given the actual sharing 
rule24.
The firm is most likely to  be pessimistic about the sharing rule if the regulator has 
increased the sharing rule from one review to the next. The firm adjusts the previous 
sharing rule upwards by the correction factor, if it expects the regulator to tighten
24This raises the question of whether the regulator has an incentive to  explicitly encourage the firm  
to have an optim istic expectation, perhaps by openly im plying that a low sharing rule w ill be used  
at the next review. This additional level o f strategic decision-m aking is not anaylsed here but may 
warrant consideration in  future research.
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the sharing regime over time. The larger the correction made, the more likely it is 
that the firm’s expectation will overshoot the actual rule used by the regulator. In this 
way, the regulator’s propensity to increase the rule over time increases the likelihood 
that the firm will have a pessimistic expectation.
The probability that the firm will have a pessimistic expectation is also increased 
if the regulator has shown, in previous periods, a propensity to revise the contract 
mid-period. The effect is expected to  be cumulative, with one-off changes having only 
a small impact on the expected sharing rule, but ongoing and/or large changes having 
a larger impact. Again, therefore, the regulator’s actions in earlier games impacts on 
the firm’s expectations and hence on its current, and future, effort choices25. Finally, 
the propensity to be pessimistic will increase if the firm is risk averse.
We conclude that the firm’s uncertainty about the sharing rule means that the 
effort choice will be ex-post inefficient. In addition, the effort choice will be significantly 
lower than the welfare-maximising level if the firm’s expectation of the sharing rule is 
pessimistic. This is most likely to occur if the firm expects the rule to be reduced over 
time, either at future reviews or by increased mid-period intervention.
Additional ratchet effect In the above discussion we assumed that the regulator 
chooses the size of the sharing rule exogenously. In practice the situation is likely to 
be more complex, with the regulator adjusting the size of the sharing rule in reaction 
to the size of the cost savings made by the firm. When small savings are made, the 
need to  maintain technical efficiency incentives is likely to be stronger than the need 
to distribute efficiency rents to consumers. When large cost savings are observed, 
however, distributional concerns are likely to become more prevalent. The level of 
effort therefore affects the way in which the regulator prioritises his objectives, and we 
can characterise the sharing rule as a function:
AJ+1(e7) such that > 0
In this situation the firm will also consider the impact of its effort choice on the 
future sharing rule. The net benefit of a high share of a smaller level of profit will be 
traded-off against the net benefit of a smaller share of a higher level of profit. There 
is thus a ratchet effect, with the firm’s incentive to reduce costs, in order to earn rent, 
being offset by the risk that the rent will be reduced, via the sharing rule, if the level 
of cost reduction is too high.
25 This point is also made by Laffont and Tirole (2000) who stress that ‘early regulatory reviews 
further decrease the real power of form ally high-powered incentive schemes’. Helm and Rajah (1994) 
also note, in relation to intervention by the water regulator, that ‘The experience of frequent inter­
ventions in  the first period w ill serve to weaken the credibility o f the DG’s fixed-period contract in  
the second’.
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The probability of mid-period intervention also increases with the level of cost 
savings. The higher the cost savings, the more pressure the regulator will come under 
from the government and consumer groups to  deliver price reductions as early as 
possible, and hence the higher the probability of intervention. Again, therefore, the 
firm considers the impact of its effort choice on mid-period intervention, and hence on 
the implicit expected sharing rule26. There is thus a secondary ratchet effect with this 
incentive mechanism.
We conclude that cost reduction incentives are dulled by uncertainty about the 
sharing rule. This occurs for the following reasons.
1. Regulatory discretion - the firm cannot predict the expected sharing rule accu­
rately. This is because it cannot determine how the regulator sets the rule from 
one review to the next. There is therefore a positive probability that the expec­
tation will be incorrect and the profit-maximising effort choice will be ex-post 
inefficient.
2. Limited foresight - the regulator does not consider the firm’s reaction in future 
periods to current regulatory decisions. He therefore does not explicitly take 
account of the fact that a tightening of the sharing rule will increase the firm’s 
expected sharing rule and, hence, reduce the level of effort chosen. In contrast, 
the firm considers the impact of current choices on the next period’s sharing 
rule. The different horizons over which decisions are taken means that neither 
player accurately determines the other player’s optimal actions and reactions, 
and decisions are not welfare-maximising.
3. Repetition - historic cost information is used by both the firm and the regulator. 
The sharing rule is changed in response to the level of savings of made. There is 
therefore a ratchet effect, where the firm reduces the effort level to  minimise the 
probability of the sharing rule being increased. The firm also uses experiences at 
previous reviews as the basis for setting its expected sharing rule. The regulator’s 
decision to increase the sharing rule over time therefore results in an increase in 
the firm’s expectation, and hence a reduction in the effort level.
U se o f historic information
In theory, a pure price cap is set without reference to the firm’s current level of costs. 
Under the RPI-X mechanism, the regulator makes explicit use of current and historic 
cost information when setting the firm’s price cap. This confirms Sibley’s (1989)
26Vickers and Yarrow (1988a) note that the ‘firm has to balance its desire for short-run profits 
against the risk of jeopardizing future profits by triggering a review of its prices’.
3. W elfare under th e R PI-X  regim e 69
concern that regulators would be unable to commit to not using the data once it 
became available, even though it is optimal to ignore the information. The practice 
is therefore, once again, different from the assumptions underlying the theory, and 
technical efficiency incentives are dulled.
Historic and current information acts as a signal about future costs. The endoge­
nous signal is of a relatively high quality, assuming some correlation between past and 
future costs, and hence the regulator is able to improve allocative efficiency by basing 
the price cap on a better information set. This improvement occurs at the expense of 
technical efficiency, however, and we see again the problems which arise when the reg­
ulator has multiple objectives. This trade-off is explicitly emphasised by Sappington 
(2000) who argues that using actual cost information to calculate the X-factor ‘can 
limit incentives for superior performance’ but it can also ‘limit the risk of affording 
enormous profit to the regulated firm or jeopardizing its financial integrity’.
We explain here how the regulator’s use of current and historic information reduces 
technical efficiency. We know, from section 2.3.1, that the firm considers the impact 
of its effort choice on the next period’s price cap. In the case of operating effort, the 
optimal effort level satisfies:
<f +  /3(1 -  E(A«+1))^'+I -  V-V) + P ( ^ P )  =  0
When assessing the size of the last term, the firm bases its expectation on
the past decisions made by the regulator. In particular, if the regulator set forecast 
base operating costs equal to current operating costs at the last periodic review, the 
firm will assume that a similar methodology will be used at the next review. The 
firm therefore knows that by revealing information about its cost saving potential, it 
provides the regulator with the opportunity to reduce future rents. This will reduce 
the marginal net benefit from increasing effort, and will thereby dull the firm’s cost 
saving incentives.
There is thus a classic ratchet effect problem in this dynamic game27. This effect 
arises because the firm makes decisions over a rolling two-period horizon. The problem 
would not exist if, like the regulator, the firm only considered the impact of its decisions 
on the current period28. This is recognised by Waddams Price (2000) who argues that 
incentives ‘proved to be effective within the price-cap period, but only for a myopic 
company which did not foresee the roles which lower costs or an inflated capital base
2rThe reader is referred to  W eitzman (1980) for a ‘m ultiperiod stochastic’ analysis of the ratchet 
principle.
28Currie, Levine and Rickman (1999) suggest that the effect could also be reduced if a pro-industry 
regulator was appointed by the government. T his would have significant im plications for welfare and 
distribution, however, which may outweigh the gains from reducing the ratchet effect.
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might play in determining the next cap’.
The ratchet effect is reduced if the regulator uses information on average costs in 
the sector to assess the firm’s future costs. The firm’s price is then only partially de­
pendent on its own costs, and the impact of current effort decisions on the next period’s 
price cap is reduced. This is consistent with the idea that mechanisms based on yard­
stick competition improve efficiency incentives. The ratchet effect is not completely 
removed, however, because the comparator information is generally used alongside the 
firm-specific information, rather than in its place.
We conclude that the cost reduction incentives under the RPI-X mechanism are 
reduced because current and historic cost information is used to  the set price cap. The 
problem exists because of the following three characteristics of the RPI-X game.
1. Multiple objectives - the desire to improve allocative efficiency, by using a better 
information set, is traded-off against the reduction in cost-minimisation incen­
tives.
2. Limited foresight - the firm takes account of its decisions on the next period’s 
price cap. The regulator, with his one-period decision horizon, does not consider 
these on-going effects when making the trade-off between allocative and technical 
efficiency.
3. Cost observability - historic cost information is easily available. The regulator 
does not, however, have reliable information on future costs or on the firm’s 
underlying cost functions. The historic data is therefore the best information set 
available.
There are two ways in which this problem might be alleviated. First, as noted 
by Armstrong and Sappington (2002), ‘When regulators cannot make binding com­
mitments regarding their use of pertinent information, welfare may be higher when 
regulators are denied access to the information’. It may therefore be better to make it 
harder for the regulator to access the information, perhaps by requiring the regulator 
to pay a fee to the firm, or an external body, for the data. Alternatively, the data could 
be made available with a lag, so that current information could not be used by the 
regulator. Both these options are problematic, however, as they remove the allocative 
efficiency gains of basing the price cap decision on the best available information set. 
They also run contrary to current legislation which requires private corporations to 
publish annual accounting reports. An alternative potential solution to the problem is, 
as briefly noted above, to base the firm’s price cap on the current costs of other firms 
in the sector. Such relative schemes are considered in more detail in section 3.2.1.
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Input choices
We have shown that, under the RPI-X mechanism, the firm has an incentive to reduce 
costs. This incentive is dulled by the use of an uncertain sharing rule and by basing the 
price cap on historic and current cost information. However, despite these limitations, 
some cost savings are expected to be delivered under the mechanism. We consider 
here the possibility that the reduction in costs will not necessarily improve welfare. 
This occurs if a decrease in one type of costs is simply offset by an increase in another 
type of cost (eg, labour costs are replaced with capital maintenance costs), or if the 
decreased costs are associated with a reduction in output produced. In this sense, cost 
savings are not always consistent with technical efficiency gains.
Operating and capital investments are often substitutable in the utility sectors. 
The firm may be able to reduce one type of investment by increasing the other29. 
These choices can be made efficiently by the firm, in a standard cost minimisation 
exercise. The RPI-X mechanism may distort the firm’s input choices away from this 
efficient level however30. This arises because the incentive mechanisms used to induce 
increased effort differ, in their impact, between operating and capital costs. The 
relative value of capital to non-capital inputs is therefore changed by the regulatory 
regime.
The two main reasons for this distortion are summarised here.
1. Assume that e7’ =  t 7 =  0 and e7 =  77 =  1. The efficiency rents from operating 
and capital effort are then:
A7t° =  (f +  (3{ 1 -  A7,7+1)g7+1 -  *0(1)
A7rc =  r7 +  /?r7+1A7,7+1 — 0(1)
Given that the interest rate is less than one, and the sharing rules are chosen 
independently, we expect the value of a unit of operating effort to be higher 
than the value of a unit of capital effort31. This reflects the fact that the firm 
only earns the financing cost of capital savings under the annual price cap but it
29 The evidence on productivity improvement in  the u tility  sectors since privatisation (see Chapter 
4) suggests that such input substitution has occurred. In m ost industries labour productivity has 
increased w hile total factor productivity has declined, or increased at a slower rate. This suggests, 
according to  Saal and Parker (2001), that ‘Capital for labor substitution has been occurring during 
the 1990s’.
30Prontier Econom ics (2003b) provides a discussion o f the input distortions which arise w ith the 
m echanism s used by both Ofwat and Ofgem.
31 Frontier Econom ics (2003b) find that ‘Direct comparison o f the benefit to  companies from a one-
off (recurring) gain in operating expenditure against the benefit of a one off (recurring) gain in the
capital expenditure suggests that com panies face stronger incentives to  make operating expenditure 
savings’. They argue that ‘econom ic efficiency is served....through setting equal incentives and allowing 
com panies to pursue the least total cost option’.
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earns the total level of operating cost savings. The firm is therefore more likely 
to make operating cost savings than capital cost savings, and its input decisions 
are distorted away from the cost-minimising choices of an unregulated firm.
2. Capital investment is retained in the regulatory capital value over time, and 
the regulator is required to allow the firm to earn an adequate return on this 
investment. There is thus an incentive to overcapitalise when the allowed cost of 
capital is higher than the firm’s actual cost of capital32. High capital levels can 
be induced by overinvesting in the assets, or by not investing in capital effort. 
In either case, the firm’s incentive to reduce capital costs is dulled and the price- 
setting process may result in input distortions similar to those associated with 
rate of return regulation (ie, the Averch-Johnson (1962) effect). This incentive 
to ‘raise the capital base to increase allowed profits’ is also noted by Markou and 
Waddams Price (1999).
The RPI-X mechanism may also distort the timing of input investment decisions33. 
When savings are shared at the periodic review, the firm has an incentive to make 
cost savings early in the period to reap the maximum benefit from those savings. In 
addition, because current cost information is used to set base operating costs for the 
next period, the firm has an incentive to have higher costs at the end of the period. 
This means that input decisions are influenced by the timing of the next review and 
are not solely driven by cost minimisation considerations over time. There is evidence 
that such trade-offs have been made by firms, with large reductions in operating costs 
just after a price review and increased costs as the next review approaches.
This discussion suggests that the way in which the RPI-X mechanism is designed 
distorts the firm’s input choices. The welfare cost arising from the inefficient use 
of inputs may offset the technical efficiency gains arising from cost reductions. The 
problem does not arise because of any fixed characteristics of the RPI-X game and 
could be changed by altering the details of the mechanism. For example, both the 
water and electricity regulators attempted to deal with the timing distortion problem 
in the 1999 price reviews. Rolling sharing rolls, where the length of the regulatory 
lag is independent of the time that savings are made, were introduced34. These rules 
are discussed in Appendix A. More generally, regulators could consider the impact of
32The overall effect depends on whether the profit gain from high capital levels, arising from the 
difference between the allowed and actual cost o f capital, is higher or lower than the profit gain from  
investing in capital effort. The trade-off w ill depend on the length o f the regulatory lag and the extent 
to which the allowed return is higher than the cost of financing the investm ent.
33See P int (1992) for an analysis o f the im pact of the regulatory regim e on the tim ing of investm ent.
^O fw at, the water regulator, introduced a rolling rule for operating and capital costs. Ofgem, the 
electricity distribution regulator, only introduced the rule for capital costs. This m ay have increased 
the distortion between operating and capital cost incentives further.
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the regulatory mechanism on total costs, and input choices, rather than focusing on 
reductions in operating costs and capital costs separately35.
3 .1 .3  E fficient ou tp u t d elivery
The level of welfare is affected by the amount of output that the firm produces, and by 
the quality of the output which is delivered to consumers. We consider here whether 
the firm has appropriate incentives, under the RPI-X mechanism, to  undertake the 
long-run investment required to ensure that sufficient capacity is always available. We 
also examine the firm’s incentive to deliver efficient levels of quality of service. The 
main concern is that the firm has a number of tasks to deliver - cost reduction and 
output delivery - and the incentive schemes which are focused on each individual task 
may conflict.
Investm ent incentives
Under a pure price cap regime investment costs are completely separate from the al­
lowed price, and the regulator makes no commitment that long-term costs will be 
recouped through the price cap. The more concerned the regulator is about distribut­
ing benefits to  consumers today, the higher is the risk that the allowed return will be 
lower than the required return. In this setup the firm will be reluctant to  undertake 
any long-term investments as it will be concerned that the regulator will not allow it to 
earn an adequate cost of capital. A welfare-maximising regulator will indeed have an 
incentive to ‘hold-up’ the firm in this way once the investment has been sunk36. This 
is confirmed by Vickers and Yarrow (1988a) who argue that ‘investment is inhibited by 
the fear of ‘unfair’ future regulation. Unless the regulatory and/or political systems 
provide a credible means of commitment of future fairness, this fear is not entirely 
unreasonable in view of the objectives of regulators’.
In the RPI-X game the regulator does not adhere to the strict principles of pure 
price cap regulation. In particular, the regulator provides the firm with some com­
mitment on the return which it will be able to earn on long-term investments. The
35 It would be interesting to  focus, in future research, on the regulation o f to ta l investm ent w ith  
a m ulti-dim ensional effort variable. This would capture the operating and capital elem ents of toted 
investm ent, and may allow for the design of incentive mechanisms which take account of the trade-off 
across these categories.
36Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, section 3.6) provide a useful overview of this hold-up 
problem. Armstrong and Sappington (2002) em phasise that the regulator’s ability to  ‘hold-up’ the 
firm can be lim ited by ‘im posing a legal requirement that the firm make a specified return on its assets’. 
A  theoretical m odel of the firm’s optim al investm ent decision in these circum stances is provided by 
Besanko and Spulber (1992). The hold-up problem under pure price cap regulation is also discussed 
in  Gilbert and Newbery (1994).
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hold-up problem is partially alleviated in the following ways37.
1. The regulator has a legal duty to ensure that the firm always earns a reasonable 
return on its asset base. Where the firm deems that the regulator has not 
set an adequate rate of return, it has the option of seeking an appeal to  the 
Commission38.
2. The price cap is set explicitly to ensure that allowed revenues in the next period 
cover expected costs. If the firm considers a long-term project as a series of 
‘short-term’ phases, it can attempt to ensure that the financing of each phase 
is adequately recovered at each periodic review39. In this regard Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers (1994) argue that ‘Commitment to future prices, if feasible, 
would be desirable ex ante. However, if the firm and regulator interact repeat­
edly, relatively efficient investment decisions can be encouraged’. A series of 
short-term contracts may also be preferable if exogenous shocks, and stochastic 
demand, mean that long-run investment requirements are highly uncertain.
3. Risky projects, where the costs fluctuate significantly because of exogenous fac­
tors, may be avoided by the firm. To overcome this problem, regulators have 
used cost pass-through schemes for costs which are considered to be out of the 
firm’s control. This ensures that investments which are uncertain at the time 
of the regulatory review will be automatically included in the capital value once 
incurred.
The RPI-X regime therefore incorporates elements of rate of return regulation 
which reduce the firm’s concern about an investment hold-up problem. Inevitably, as 
some of these provisions increase the fink between price and actual costs, there will 
be an off-setting reduction in technical efficiency incentives. In addition, the regulator 
will only allow investment in the regulatory capital value which is considered necessary 
and efficient. The firm will therefore remain reluctant to  undertake discretionary
37Levine (1999) presents a more detailed discussion of the type of solutions which are proposed 
in the literature to overcome the hold-up problem. The author suggests that the problem can be 
alleviated if the government appoints a regulator who is known to  be ‘pro-industry’. This would, o f 
course, lead to  its own problems w ith respect to decisions on allocative efficiency, technical efficiency 
and distribution.
^B esanko and Spulber (1992) propose that an extrem e rate o f return guarantee should be provided 
‘that is not revised by the regulator after the firm has made its capital investm ent’. The current 
‘financing of functions’ duty does not provide such a long-run guarantee and, hence, may not induce 
optim al long-run investm ent levels.
39 The outcom e is sim ilar to  that which arises in Salant and Woroch’s (1992) optim al pricing policy. 
In th is m odel, the regulator agrees to a specific tim e path for capacity investm ent and agrees to  cover 
the costs o f each phase as they are being undertaken (see Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, 
pp88-89)).
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investments which are not directly associated with current output requirements40. We 
also note, as found in the gas sector, that the regulator may allow an adequate return 
on the asset base, but may not guarantee a depreciation schedule which ensures that 
maintenance investment is adequately financed41.
We conclude that, in contrast to our discussion on technical efficiency, the specific 
details of the RPI-X mechanism may increase welfare relative to the theory of pure 
price cap regulation. The risk of the hold-up problem is reduced, although it is not 
completely removed. Despite this, underinvestment may still arise. This is because of 
the cost-saving incentive which is paramount in the RPI-X mechanism. Total costs 
can be reduced by simply not undertaking the required work. In this way the incentive 
to improve technical efficiency works against the objective of ensuring that efficient 
output levels are delivered42. This outcome is synonymous with the predictions of the 
literature on multi-task incentive schemes43. We discuss this problem with respect to 
the delivery of quality of service below.
M eeting quality o f service targets
A ‘command and control’ approach is used to regulate the quality of service delivered 
to consumers44. A target is set and the firm is provided with a financial incentive
40To offset this problem w ith long-term  projects regulators in  the water and airports sectors have 
allowed the firm to  include investm ent on assets in the course of construction in the asset base, 
rather than requiring the firm to dem onstrate that outputs have been produced before financing the 
investm ent.
41 During the 1997 review of Transco’s price cap Ofgas proposed using a ‘pay-as-you-go’ depreciation  
schedule, where depreciation charges would be increased at the tim e when the investm ent is required. 
The firm, in  contrast, sought a phased depreciation schedule, where the costs o f investing in  the asset 
base were recovered over the life o f the asset. A s noted by W addams Price (1997), concerns were 
raised about whether, under the ‘pay-as-you-go’ schem e, the regulator would be able to com m it future 
regulators ‘to allowing such revenues over several future price reviews’. Concerns about the regulator 
‘holding-up’ the firm once the asset base has been sunk are therefore evident in practice.
42 There is som e evidence that the profit-incentive has led to a reduction in  investm ent in output 
delivery. For exam ple, Markou and Waddams Price (1999) argue that investm ent patterns for British  
Gas indicate that ‘short-term  profit improvement’ m ay m otivate the company to lower its investm ent 
levels. They also argue that, in the water sector, ‘a decline in  renewals and m aintenance of the existing  
distribution network have proved an im portant source of dividend growth’.
43B ennett and W addams Price (2002) also discuss the problems which arise w ith m ultiple objec­
tives in the regulatory field. In a more general discussion, Helm and Yarrow (1988) em phasise that 
‘constraints on any one of the regulated firm’s decision variables is likely to  lead to adjustm ents in  
other decisions’. Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch3) consider the m ulti-task problem in  the more general 
framework o f designing a contract for regulating a m ultiproduct firm, where quality is one o f the 
products produced. Theoretical analysis o f m ulti-tasking can be found in  Athey and Roberts (2001) 
and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
^W e focus here on the regulation of quality o f service in  the water and electricity distribution  
sectors. In these sectors quality o f service regulation is considered as part of the RPI-X regim e. In 
other sectors additional regulatory mechanisms exist for quality of service which operate outside the 
price cap regime. For exam ple, sliding-scale incentive schemes exist for the system  operator business of 
the N ational Grid Company. Regulators may benefit from exploring these schemes further to  consider
3. W elfare under th e R PI-X  regim e 76
to meet that target. We assume here that the target set is appropriate and consider 
whether the firm has an incentive to meet the target in the RPI-X game. In the next 
section we consider whether the target is in fact efficient.
If there is price cap regulation, and no associated output regulation, the firm will 
have an incentive to reduce the quality of service delivered. This is because a reduction 
in quality of service is synonymous with a reduction in costs and the firm is able to earn 
above normal profits, at least until the end of the regulatory period. This incentive 
may be offset, to some extent, by the incentive to increase capital investment in the 
asset base and thereby earn higher profits in the long-run45. The net effect depends 
on the difference between the profit gained from a higher capital value, and the profit 
gained from reducing costs below the allowed level.
An analysis of BT’s service performance after privatisation suggests that the in­
centive to reduce costs was stronger than the overcapitalisation incentive46. Laffont 
and Tirole (1993) also note that in the US ‘there has been concern that ‘incentive 
regulation’ conflicts with the safe operation of nuclear power plants by forcing man­
agement to hurry work, take short-cuts, and delay safety investments’. The problem of 
non-delivery of outputs arises, according to  Williamson and Mumssen (2000) ‘because 
regulation seeks to constrain prices, rather than as a consequence of monopoly per se’. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) also argue that the higher the incentive to make cost savings, 
the greater is the incentive to reduce the level of outputs delivered. This outcome is 
consistent with the conclusions reached in Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) analysis 
of multi-task principal-agent models.
Regulators have attempted to address this problem by introducing output regular 
tion alongside the price cap mechanism47. The question we wish to consider is whether 
the schemes provide sufficiently strong incentives for the delivery of an efficient level 
of quality of service48. We first consider the impact of the quality of service regimes 
which existed between privatisation and 1999. In this timeframe, the regulatory tools 
used were consumer compensation payments and the ‘name and shame’ approach.
w hether they present viable, and welfare-improving, alternatives to the regime described here.
45T his overcapitalisation incentive is em phasised in Waddams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002).
46See Arm strong and Vickers (1995) and Rovizzi and Thom pson (1995) for a description of the 
service problem s which arose. Markou and Waddams Price (1999) also provide a review of the concerns 
which arose about quality of service when price cap regulation was introduced for British Telecom  
and British Gas in the 1980s. Banerjee and Dasgupta (2001) provide a more recent analysis o f the 
relationship between quality o f service and incentive regulation in  the US telecom s sector.
47W e note that the solution used is to  introduce separate incentive schemes for cost reduction and 
output delivery, rather than to  design mechanism s which focus on both tasks sim ultaneously. T his 
conflicts w ith  Holmstrom and Milgrom’s (1991) argument that ‘incentive problems m ust be analyzed  
in totality’. Further research on the application o f optim al m ulti-task incentive mechanisms to the 
regulation field may provide useful ideas on how to improve incentives in both areas.
^ R ovizzi and Thom pson (1995) provide a com plem entary analysis of the advantages and disadvan­
tages o f th e various schem es which are used to  regulate quality o f service.
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These tools are expected to  have a weak impact on output delivery for the following 
reasons.
1. Under the compensation schemes the level of payment per customer is low and 
the number of customers who make claims is also likely to be low49,60. Firms 
therefore do not face a significant financial cost for choosing a lower level of 
service - ie, C  (sf j  is low.
2. The ‘name and shame’ approach changes the relative size of the reputation pa­
rameters in the firm’s decision function. It is not clear that the firm would place 
a high weight on this impact relative to the profit made from underinvestment. 
This is particularly true when we consider that these are monopoly firms who 
do not face the risk of losing customers, even if they have a poor reputation for 
quality of service.
3. The regulator is not always able to  impose compensation payments in practice. 
This is because outputs are not always observable. Furthermore, low investment 
levels can not be associated directly with low output levels. This is because 
other factors, particularly cost efficiency improvements and exogenous shocks, 
affect the relationship between output delivery and required investment levels. 
It is therefore difficult to implement the quality of service regulatory regimes in 
practice.
Despite the theoretical concerns with these regulatory mechanisms there has been 
no evidence of significant service problems in the utility sectors during this period51. 
For example, according to Waddams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002), ‘The per­
formance of the water and sewerage companies against the various DG measures shows 
a pattern of consistent improvement across all companies and measures’. Similarly, in 
the electricity distribution sector, ‘There are steady and consistent improvements’.
49 Frontier Economics (2003a) found that payments in the electricity distribution sector ‘begin at 
£50 (for dom estic custom ers) 18 hours after supply fails, w ith  further paym ents o f £25 for every 
subsequent 12 hours until restoration. In a typical year the sum s involved are not large in  comparison 
to tota l price control revenue -  tens to hundreds of thousands of pounds (price control revenue is 
typically £100-200 m illion per year)’.
50Markou and W addams Price (1999) note that, in the early years after privatisation, few custom ers 
in the water sector made claim s under the guaranteed standards com pensation schemes. Indeed, the 
regulator believed that those who made claim s represented ‘only 1-2% of all the justifiable claim s, 
and attributed the difference to  customer ignorance (only 15% know of the scheme) and/or a belief 
that the com pensation involved (£ 5  for m ost claim s) was not worth it’. The proportion o f custom ers 
seeking com pensation has no doubt increased since then, but sim ilar problems remain.
51 Network Rail (formerly Railtrack) is the clear exception. In th is case it seems that the elem ents of 
the RPI-X mechanism which provide the firm w ith an incentive to  reduce capital costs outweighed the 
output delivery incentives. Further research is required to determ ine why Railtrack’s output delivery 
performance differed from that of electricity and water firms.
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The quality of service record in the utility sectors may suggest that the reputation 
effect is stronger than expected and/or that the firm is motivated by other, non-profit, 
concerns. Waddams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002), in discussions with com­
pany managers, found that ‘Companies are clearly sensitive to the standards set, but 
the direct financial penalty is often less important than reputational effects’. The 
reputation effect is particularly important for regulated firms expanding into interna­
tional markets where performance is an important factor in determining whether or 
not they are awarded contracts52. The National Audit Office (2002) also found, in 
a survey of water and electricity company managers, that ‘the publication of league 
tables by the regulator acted as an incentive for companies to maintain and improve 
service performance in order to maintain their reputation’.
There are concerns, however, that the current quality of service performance may 
not be an accurate reflection of future performance. This is because, as emphasised 
by The National Audit Office (2002), ‘pipe and wire networks have an underlying 
resilience and it could take some time for inadequate or inefficient expenditure on 
maintaining them to be reflected in declining performance against output measures’. 
If this is the case, then weak incentives in the regime may result in service problems 
in the future. Finally, while no problems have emerged it is not clear that the quality 
of service has been as high as it might have been, or, indeed, whether it has been too 
high.
In the 1999 water and electricity distribution reviews, the regulators tightened the 
output regulatory regime by linking quality of service with the price cap. This change 
is expected to increase the firm’s incentive to deliver a high quality of service, simply 
by making low quality of service more costly. A number of concerns remain, however, 
as to  whether the adjustment offers maximum incentives to  the firm.
1. The size of the adjustment is arbitrary and may be quite small.
2. The regulators can change both the basis on which the firm’s performance is 
assessed, and the size of the adjustment, at future periodic reviews. The firm 
therefore has ongoing uncertainty about the implications of its decisions.
3. The adjustment is based on the assumption that service problems will be ob­
served during the regulatory period and can then be penalised at the next pe­
riodic review. The lag between underinvestment and service problems may be
52W addams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002) suggest that th is reputation effect may be so 
strong as to  result in  the company producing too much quality. For exam ple, a firm may wish to  
improve quality o f service significantly to gain a reputation as an international u tility  company which 
provides quality. The firm w ill be particularly keen to do th is if  the costs of the investm ent can be 
recouped through the price cap. In this way, the authors argue, ‘consumers in the regulated market 
are effectively paying for the com panies’ marketing activity elsewhere’.
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longer than this, however, and may not be reflected in a price cap adjustment 
for some time. The higher the firm’s discount rate, and the longer the expected 
lag, the less weight will be placed on the penalty by the firm.
4. The adjustment is based on the firm’s performance relative to the target set by 
the regulator. It is not clear that this is the optimal incentive to provide, as the 
target may not represent an efficient level of service. This is discussed in more 
detail below.
5. Quality of service performance is affected by exogenous stochastic factors. For 
example extreme storms affect electricity availability on the transmission and 
distribution networks and hot dry summers limit the availability of water. To 
ensure that firms are not penalised for factors which are outside their control 
the price cap adjustment must distinguish firm-induced quality of service prob­
lems from those which are considered uncontrollable. This is important both 
for assessing performance relative to the firm-specific target and for assessing 
performance relative to rest of the sector when the exogenous shocks affect firms 
in different ways. This increases the complexity of the adjustment mechanism, 
which is highly aggregated in nature, and may increase the risks faced by the firm 
if not appropriately accounted for in the regulatory regime. Such risks would 
need to be compensated elsewhere - in higher required costs and/or a higher cost 
of capital - and may result in higher overall price caps.
As the price cap adjustment has only recently come into force, it is too early to 
assess whether the level of quality will improve under this tighter regime. Further 
research needs to be undertaken to assess the precise impact of the mechanism, and 
to determine whether particular aspects of its design affect the degree to which it 
improves quality of service.
Efficient targets
Rovizzi and Thompson (1995) argue that ‘efficient resource allocation requires that 
standards be established with reference to  consumers’ valuation of a quality improve­
ment and the corresponding costs of achieving it’53. This reflects the idea that a target 
is only efficient if it is equal to  the level at which the marginal social benefit of the 
output equals the marginal social cost. We therefore consider an output target to be 
efficient if the associated price reflects the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the output 
level.
53W addams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002) propose a sim ilar approach to setting an efficient 
target: ‘Econom ic theory suggests that regulators should choose standards according to consumers’ 
valuation and the marginal cost o f quality im provem ents’.
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Given this definition of an efficient output target, we argue that the quality of 
service targets set by the regulator may not be efficient54. The regulator considers the 
trade-off between increased prices and increased quality of service, but he does not 
have explicit information on consumer willingness-to-pay, particularly at firm level. 
In addition, as emphasised by Markou and Waddams Price (1999), the regulator’s 
decision on the appropriate target is based on vague duties. The standards therefore 
reflect, at best, the regulators’ judgement on what the price-output trade-off should 
be. This judgement may, as noted by Waddams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald, be 
‘motivated by political as well as economic factors’.
Even with a perfect incentive scheme, therefore, the firm may not deliver efficient 
output levels in the RPI-X game because the targets, which the firm is aiming for, may 
not be equal to the efficient level. This is a direct consequence of the limited infor­
mation which is available to the regulator. It may be possible to obtain more efficient 
targets by improving the information set or, as discussed in section 3.2.2, by delegat­
ing the decision on the price-output trade-off to the player with better information on 
consumer willingness-to-pay. In this context we note that the firm may have better 
information than the regulator about this trade-off. More importantly, local consumer 
groups are expected to  have the best information about average willingness-to-pay for 
particular outputs55. For all players, however, uncertainty about the required efficient 
level of quality will remain because of the stochastic nature of demand. Inefficiency 
will therefore remain, even if the target is chosen by the player with the best current 
information on average preferences.
3.2 Ideas on improving efficiency
Welfare is not maximised under the RPI-X mechanism. Allocative efficiency is not 
delivered, incentives for technical efficiency are dulled by the particular features of the 
RPI-X game, and, even with output regulation, it is not clear that the regulated firm 
is providing an efficient level of output to consumers. The mains reasons for these 
problems are outlined in section 3.1.
We therefore wish to determine ways in which welfare might be increased in the 
regulated sectors. We assume in this chapter that it is best to retain the RPI-X mecha­
54A sim ilar point is made by Forsyth (1999) w ith respect to  price cap regimes in  A ustralia. He 
notes that "The quality m onitoring approach supposes that the in itial level o f quality is optim al; this 
m ay or m ay not be the case’.
55 It is clear that custom ers are not homogeneous and hence w ill have different preferences about 
the appropriate trade-off between price and quality. It would be cumbersome and costly, however, to  
collect and collate inform ation on the w illingess-to-pay for every individual consumer. We therefore 
assum e that it is only feasible to base any m echanism  on an assessm ent o f what the average customer 
wants. W hile not ideal th is is the only realistic option in the absence of a com petitive market.
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nism, and we focus on ways in which its design and implementation can be changed56. 
This approach is justified on the grounds that it would be costly, particularly in terms 
of regulatory uncertainty, to introduce an entirely new mechanism. It is also not clear 
that a feasible alternative can be easily designed. Finally, technical efficiency gains 
have been delivered under the RPI-X mechanism, and it is important that these ex­
isting benefits are retained. Helm (1995c) also argues that ‘Reforms are likely to be 
more successful if they build on the existing system, than if they require tearing it up 
and starting from scratch’.
Improvements in welfare can most easily be delivered in the short-run by focusing 
on the design of the price cap itself. In the long-run, it may be desirable to also change 
the characteristics of the game, but a cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken before 
proceeding in this direction. The elements of the regime which we consider changing 
are as follows.
1. Technical efficiency incentives are dulled by the way in which savings are shared 
from one review to the next. We examine the possibility of improving these 
incentives by changing the way in which sharing is undertaken.
2. The quality of service delivered is not necessarily efficient. We propose a way 
in which the regulator may get closer to the efficient level of quality of service. 
Once the standard is identified, the firm can then be provided with an incentive 
to meet the target.
We explain how our proposed changes to the RPI-X mechanism might improve al­
locative efficiency, technical efficiency and/or the delivery of an efficient level of output. 
We also, importantly, discuss the feasibility of the proposals given the characteristics 
of the RPI-X game and the uncertain nature of the firm’s operating environment. No 
doubt several other improvements could be considered which relate to other facets of 
the regulatory mechanism57. These are left for further research.
Many of the proposed improvements have been suggested by others, usually in a 
more general context. The relevant literature is discussed alongside the individual 
proposals. Our contribution is to link the ideas with the specific features of the game 
described in Chapter 2, and to explain how the changes might yield a higher level of
56The need for change is supported by Mayer and Vickers (1986) who argue that ‘There are good 
reasons for seeking reform of current price regulation: allocative efficiency, distributional fairness and 
the credibility of regulation can a ll be enhanced through changes to  existing regulatory rules’.
57There are alternative ways o f improving welfare in  the regulatory regime which do not involve 
changes in  the mechanism itself. M ost notably, welfare could be increased by franchising the right to  
run the m onopoly business (ie, com petition ‘for the market’). T his option is discussed by Crampes 
and Estache (1997), D em setz (1968) and Harstad and Crew (1999).
3. W elfare under the R PI-X  regim e 82
welfare than the existing RPI-X mechanism. In essence, we provide a new twist on 
existing ideas by emphasising how they apply to the current practice of regulation.
We conclude this introduction by emphasising that this is the starting point for the 
design of an amended RPI-X mechanism. The ideas are preliminary and high-level at 
this stage. In addition, each proposed change is considered in isolation. Future research 
will need to include an analysis of the impact of the proposals on each other, and on 
existing elements of the RPI-X mechanism. Regulators will also need to consider 
how to convert the proposals into feasible, perhaps sector-specific, amendments to the 
current price cap regime. A more detailed analysis of the information requirements 
of each proposal, and the implications of uncertainty arising from stochastic demand 
and cost conditions, will also be required.
3.2.1 Im proving th e  sharing ru les
Cost saving incentives are dulled in the RPI-X game because savings are shared with 
consumers at each periodic review. We accept here that some element of sharing needs 
to be retained in the RPI-X mechanism. This is because sharing ensures that allocative 
efficiency is at least partially restored at fixed intervals and, importantly, it ensures that 
the price cap regime is politically acceptable and hence sustainable in the long-term. 
Mayer and Vickers (1996) similarly find, in the context of automatic profit-sharing 
rules and a static model, that ‘some relaxation of incentives is desirable because the 
loss of technical efficiency is second-order whereas the gain in allocative efficiency (or 
distributional efficiency, or risk sharing in a richer model) is first-order’. Sappington 
(2000) also argues that some sharing may increase aggregate welfare because the ‘losses 
from diminished incentives to minimize production costs are small relative to the gains 
from better aligning prices and costs when small amounts of earnings sharing are 
introduced (Lyon, 1996)’. The net impact depends on the weight which the regulator 
places on the firm’s profits relative to consumer surplus.
The way in which the sharing rules are designed has important implications for the 
firm’s cost saving incentives. We found, in section 3.1.2, that the technical efficiency 
problems are exacerbated by the fact that the sharing rule changes over time. This 
is because the firm’s effort choices are affected by uncertainty about the rule. We 
therefore suggest that technical efficiency incentives can be improved by requiring the 
regulator to commit to a fixed sharing rule. This rule should be chosen to maximise 
constrained welfare, given the existence of a sharing rule. Information limitations 
may prevent the regulator from finding this optimal fixed sharing rule however. We 
therefore also consider the familiar remedy of using a yardstick rule for setting the 
firm’s allowed efficiency rent.
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The welfare properties of the feed  sharing rule and the yardstick rule will be 
affected by the stochastic nature of the firm's operating environment. Even if the reg­
ulator had full information about current cost and demand conditions, it is unlikely 
that the ex-ante welfare-maximising rules would be ex-post efficient. This is because 
uncertain exogenous factors - notably weather - have a significant impact on demand 
in the water and electricity sectors58. By fixing the sharing rule the regulator loses the 
flexibility to react to such exogenous shocks and there may be a loss in allocative effi­
ciency. In addition, where firms are affected differently by demand shocks the yardstick 
mechanism may not provide an appropriate benchmark. This is because the efficient 
costs of one firm may no longer by correlated with those of another firm. Uncertainty 
and the nature of the shocks to the firm’s operating environment may therefore reduce 
the welfare gains which arise from the improvement in technical efficiency delivered 
by these alternative sharing rules.
Proposal 1: Fixing th e  sharing rule
Our first proposal is that the regulator should fix the size of the sharing rule over 
time - ie, set Aj-1’-7 =  X0 and AJ-1** =  Ac V/59. We found, in section 3.1.2, that when 
the firm is uncertain about the sharing rule, its effort choice will be ex-post inefficient. 
The firm is unable to make accurate forecasts of the rule because it cannot predict how 
the regulator’s judgement will change over time. A feed rule provides certainty and 
ensures that the firm’s effort choice is efficient, given the value of the sharing rule60. 
We assume here that the rule is independent of the level of effort undertaken by the 
firm61. This further improves technical efficiency by reducing the ratchet effect. The
58 The im pact o f the stochastic shocks vary som ewhat by sector. In electricity, a severe storm  may 
result in  service unavailability for a relatively short period of tim e. The firm would incur increased 
costs when fixing the problem and reduced quality of service performance. In the water sector hot 
dry summers are the prime source of concern. In the event of a drought the water network is placed 
under severe pressure because o f increased and peaky demand. This w ill result in service problem s 
- including potentially prolonged periods of water shortages - and w ill lead to uncertain investm ent 
levels as com panies attem pt to  alleviate the problem. In addition, water companies invest in  increased 
capacity to m inimise the risk of not being able to  provide supply in  the face of increased demand, 
particularly at peak tim es o f the day. The weather-effect is therefore, to  some extent, more extrem e 
and more long-term  in nature than that in  the electricity sector.
59The idea of using a fixed sharing rule is consistent w ith Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) conclusion  
that, when discretionary p o licy -m aking  leads to tim e inconsistency problems, a rules-based approach 
should be used. The proposal is also sim ilar to the ‘Passive Target Setting’ rules discussed by Laffont 
and Tirole (1993, Ch 9). W ith these rules dynam ic contracts are designed to  change in accordance 
w ith a known, and exogenous, revision rule over tim e.
60The effort level is not optim al - ie, welfere maximising - as the existence o f any sharing rule, 
whether fixed or not, reduces the cost saving incentive.
61 It m ay be possible to design a fixed sharing Junction, which allows the sharing rule to change, in a 
known way, in response to to  the level o f effort. This would provide the regulator w ith extra flexibility  
in term s of improving distribution and allocative efficiency, but would mean that the ratchet effect 
problems associated w ith sharing would remain.
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proposal will only work, however, if the regulator can credibly commit to the fixed 
rule over time.
An exogenous mechanism must be introduced in the RPI-X regime to ensure that 
the regulator is committed to the fixed sharing rule62. One option is to explicitly 
incorporate the requirement of a fixed rule into the firm’s licence and, perhaps, primary 
legislation63. The actual value of the rule should also be included in the licence. This 
ensures that all parties know the rule when making decisions, and it also means that 
the regulator requires the firm’s agreement to change the rule in the future. If the 
principle of a fixed sharing rule is included in primary legislation it would require the 
consent of parliament to be changed.
We stress that what we require here is commitment to the fixed sharing rule only; 
not long-term commitment to the entire regulatory contract. The regulator retains the 
discretion to change the other elements of the price cap calculation at each periodic 
review64. This is important because the regulator can reap allocative efficiency gains by 
basing each new price cap on the regulator’s improved information set. The adjustment 
to the cap will reflect changes in the underlying cost and output assumptions for the 
next regulatory period, rather than changes in the way in which historical savings are 
shared with consumers. It therefore more closely reflects the idea of a forward-looking 
price cap. Commitment to a sharing rule does, however, imply that there can be no 
mid-period intervention to share savings early with customers.
Our idea of ‘partial commitment’ reflects a compromise between two key results in 
repeated game theory65.
1. W ith complete contracts, full commitment is optimal in a repeated game. In 
this context the ‘the optimal long-term contract is obtained in a straight-forward 
manner as the replica of the one-shot optimal contract’ (see Laffont and Marti- 
mort (2002)). Armstrong and Sappington (2002) stress that all other policies are 
sub-optimal since ‘the regulator with full commitment powers could implement
62Crew and Kleindorfer (1996) suggest that the existence o f known sharing rules, as are observed 
in several incentive schemes in the US, m ay be ‘less vulnerable to reneging by the regulator’. This 
is because there is a transparent device by which custom ers always gain when the firm does w ell and 
which lim its how well the firm can do. There may therefore be less political pressure on the regulator 
to  im plem ent changes. In this sense the fixing of the rule m ay act as its  own commitment device.
63Arm strong (2003) argues that ‘contracts or licences are the obvious way to  prevent opportunistic 
behaviour’.
64 Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) em phasise that regulatory reviews are beneficial as they  
allow the regulator to  take account o f the fact that ‘Industry conditions - involving costs, new products, 
and the extent of com petition - are likely to  evolve in ways that are not foreseen’. There is no m ention 
in th is list, however, o f the need to  hold reviews to reflect changes in th e regulator’s m ethodology.
65The reader is directed to  Armstrong and Sappington (2002), Laffont and Martimort (2002) and 
Laffont and Tirole (1993), and the references therein, for a general analysis o f optim al regulatory 
contracts under a range o f commitment options in a dynam ic environm ent.
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this policy, but chooses not to do so’66.
2. W ith incomplete contracts, full commitment is not feasible as the regulator will 
be unable to commit to not recontracting on the basis of revealed information. 
Short-term contracts, in which the regulator bases the next period’s mechanism 
on all available information at the time of contracting, are all that can be ex­
pected.
The regulatory contract in the RPI-X game has elements which are incomplete - 
in the sense that all contingencies are not captured - while other elements, notably the 
need to share savings with consumers, are ‘complete’ in the sense that they are not 
necessarily affected by changes in the firm’s operating environment67. Game theory 
therefore suggests that it is optimal for the regulator to commit to those elements of the 
contract which are ‘complete’. Short-term contracts - incorporating this fixed element 
- allow the regulator to continue to revise the ‘incomplete’ elements of the contract. 
This idea that the contract is revised at known periods, but that it incorporates a fixed 
adjustment mechanism, is consistent with the contributions, discussed by Laffont and 
Tirole (1993), which allow for ‘various degrees of commitment’ between the extremes 
of full commitment and no commitment68. It also meets with the National Audit 
Office’s (2002) suggestion that ‘the key ingredient in the price control regime should 
be predictability, not absolute certainty’.
Commitment to the sharing rule increases the level of technical efficiency. The loss 
of flexibility in the sharing rule will mean, however, that the regulator cannot ensure, at 
each periodic review, that the current regulatory contract is welfare-maximising given 
his current information set. In particular, demand and cost conditions are stochastic 
in the regulated network utility sectors and the regulator will not be able to adjust the 
sharing rule in reaction to exogenous shocks. This is the cost of obtaining improved 
technical efficiency and reflects the standard problem with optimal long-term contracts 
which are ex-ante efficient but ex-post inefficient. Finally we note that the use of a fixed 
sharing rule, which is essentially an automatic adjustment mechanism, may reduce the
66This is also em phasised by Caillaud, Guesnerie, R ey and Tirole (1988) who argue that ‘Commit­
m ent is (weakly) desirable since the planner can com m it to  the strategy that it would choose in the 
absence of com m itm ent’.
67Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that incom plete contracts arise in  the context of regulation because 
regulators ‘are unable to  set the exact characteristics o f the goods to be produced tomorrow or because 
they may learn tomorrow technological inform ation that cannot be described today’.
^ T h e main contributions to  the analysis o f optim al regulatory contracts in a dynam ic environment 
w ith varying degrees of commitment are provided by Baron (1989), Baron and Besanko (1984 and 
1987), Laffont and Tirole (1988 and 1990) and Lewis and Sappington (1997). Armstrong and Sap­
pington (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chs 9 & 10) present useful summaries of the arguments 
made in these sem inal papers.
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costs of regulation. There is one less variable for the regulator to decide on at each 
review, and one less issue for interest groups to debate.
Ideally, with known costs and demand conditions, the fixed sharing rule would be 
chosen to maximise long-run welfare or to minimise long-run prices69. A theoretical 
analysis of the optimal regulatory lag is provided in Armstrong, Rees and Vickers
(1995). They suggest that the optimal lag, and hence presumably our sharing rule, 
will depend on the firm’s current cost level, the elasticity of demand, the marginal cost 
and marginal benefit of effort to the firm, and the precise relationship between effort 
and the firm’s cost function. The regulator is unlikely to have the required information 
on these parameters to determine the optimal rule70. We therefore expect that the 
regulator will be required to continue to choose an arbitrary value for the fixed rule.
The arbitrary fixed sharing rule will continue to provide the technical efficiency 
improvements discussed here, but it will not necessarily improve allocative efficiency 
as the rule will not maximise constrained welfare. The regulator will be unable to take 
account of the firm’s stochastic operating environment when setting the fixed rule and 
hence welfare may not be maximised ex-post. In addition, by fixing the sharing rule, 
the regulator loses the ability to use the sharing instrument as a tool for adjusting the 
price cap in response to exogenous shocks. For example, the regulator can not reduce 
the level of savings shared so as to provide the firm with some compensation in the 
event of a severe negative shock. Similarly, the regulator can not build insurance into 
the fixed rule to  provide some protection to the firm because the impact and proba­
bility of the risks are uncertain. We consider, in our next proposal, whether a relative 
rewards scheme would provide a preferable solution to the technical efficiency incen­
tives problem, given the regulator’s asymmetric information and uncertainty about 
the firm’s operating environment.
Proposal 2: A  relative rewards schem e
Our second proposal is that the regulator should alter the mechanism so that average 
industry effort, rather than firm-specific effort, is shared with consumers71. The firm’s 
rent is then determined on the basis of its performance relative to the industry rather 
than relative to the assumptions built into the regulatory contract. Such a sharing rule 
would lead to  an outcome which is similar to  that which arises in a competitive market
69 Arm strong, Rees and Vickers (1995) argue that ‘lower prices are closer to expected marginal costs, 
they induce greater cost-reducing efforts, and they are distributionally beneficial if  consumer interests 
carry more weight than profit in the welfare criterion’.
70This is noted by Frontier Economics (2003b): ‘In practice, it is not possible for the regulator to 
identify what this optim al retention period m ight be’. They argue that this is because information is 
not available on exactly how the firm’s effort choice changes w ith changes in  the regulatory lag.
71This proposed amendment to the RPI-X mechanism is only feasible in the water and electricity  
distribution sectors where more than one firm operates.
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- consumers benefit from improved efficiency in the industry through lower prices, and 
a firm which is more efficient than the average is able to earn above normal returns72. 
This promise of above normal returns provides the firm with an on-going incentive to 
improve technical efficiency. The proposal is also consistent with the schemes proposed 
in the literature on optimal regulatory contracts. These schemes pay different rewards 
to different cost types and do not assume that all firms in an industry earn similar 
rents.
Under this proposal, the price caps in our two-period operating cost model are:
p1 =  0 - e 5
*-2 n —1 H2p  =  9 — e  — e
where e2is the average level of effort in the industry:
y n  e i
e1 = —fc^ 1 k =  for n firms in the industry
The firm’s profit, given these price caps, is:
ir — {el -  e1)  q1 -  if) (e1)  -f /3 ^(e1 -  e1)^2 +  (e2 -  e2)q2 — if) (e2)]
The greater the difference between the firm’s effort level and the industry average, 
the higher is the rent earned by the firm. Of course, if the firm’s effort level is lower 
than the industry average it may make a loss.
The profit-maximising effort level is determined by:
£  -  , ■ - * ■ ( . ■ ) + < >  [ ( . - i ) / ] - °
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If >  (1 — A0) this effort level is strictly higher than that which the firm
chooses under the current sharing regime. The larger the number of firms in the 
industry the closer is the firm’s effort choice to the welfare-maximising level. The 
impact of the proposal may therefore be limited in practice because there are only 
twelve (ten) companies in the electricity distribution (water) sector. The regulator 
would be better off calculating the average effort level excluding the firm’s own effort 
level: y m -l  i 
■si _  2^k= l  e fc
“  n - l
72Beesely (1994) notes that th is reflects the Schum peterian concept of com petition - a dynam ic 
process - rather than the static neoclassical definition: ‘The regulator is playing both the role of 
creating the possibility o f earning innovatory gains and that o f the ‘perennial gale’ of com petition  
which tends to  then wash away over tim e’.
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W ith this benchmark, the firm will choose the welfare-maximising level of effort.
The firm has an incentive to  undertake high levels of effort because the benefit of 
any extra unit of savings, relative to the industry average, will all accrue to the firm. 
This incentive will hold for all the regulated firms, and hence we expect the industry 
level of effort to increase. This reduces the size of the firm’s profit - ie, the gap between 
the firm’s own effort level and that of the industry average will not be very large. We 
therefore see that the sharing scheme based on relative performance can reduce the 
rent earned by the firm, but at the same time it provides strong cost saving incentives. 
That is, allocative and technical efficiency may both be improved.
A further potential benefit from using this relative rewards scheme is that it may 
reduce the firm’s incentive to bias forecasts, as forecast costs no longer impact on the 
long-run profit stream. Indeed, as noted by Mayer (1999), the relative reward scheme 
eliminates the need for concern about accurately forecasting costs. This may even 
mean that the regulator does not need to collect forecasts in the first place, thereby 
reducing the costs of regulation significantly. We conclude that a sharing rule which 
is based on performance relative to other firms, rather than performance relative to 
the regulator’s contract, may yield a higher level of welfare.
Commitment to this relative rewards scheme is required to ensure that the firm’s 
decisions are based on certainty about future rules. That is, the regulator must an­
nounce ex-ante that a relative sharing scheme will be used, and the rule must not be 
changed ex-post. The issues raised about commitment in Proposal 1 must therefore 
also be addressed here. Commitment may be easier with this rule because average 
industry profits are reduced. In addition, concerns about distribution between con­
sumers on aggregate and overall industry profits will be lessened, and the exogenous 
pressures on the regulator to change the sharing rule will therefore be reduced.
Furthermore, the regulator does not have to calculate a specific sharing factor. 
The problems associated with the information requirements of proposal 1 do not arise 
here. However, several other information issues arise because of the need to ensure 
that the average effort level of the industry is an appropriate benchmark to judge the 
regulated firm’s effort level against. In particular the regulator must understand, and 
make adjustments for, any differences in the operating conditions of the firms and any 
differences in their historical efficiency levels.
The regulator must also consider whether exogenous stochastic shocks affect firms 
symmetrically or asymmetrically. If the effect is symimetric - e.g. all electricity dis­
tribution companies face the same storm and suffer similar consequences - then the 
yardstick mechanism remains appropriate as the average efficiency level of the industry 
is a suitable benchmark for an individual firm. However, the shocks may be asymmet­
ric, so that only a subset of firms face the shock or thie ability to deal with the shock
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varies by firm. In these circumstances some firms may be unable to attain the average 
efficiency level of the industry because of the variation in the distribution and impact 
of exogenous shocks. The yardstick mechanism may place undue risks on the firm in 
these circumstances and may limit investments, output delivery and ultimately both 
technical and allocative efficiency. It is therefore important that the role of the mech­
anism, and its specific design, take account of the stochastic nature of the sector being 
regulated. The scheme in practice is likely to be more complex than that described 
here and the benefits in terms of improved allocative and technical efficiency may be 
constrained by the extent to which firms’ operating conditions are different.
The idea of basing the sharing rule on the industry average performance is not new. 
It is a direct application of the principle of yardstick competition73,74. The amended 
sharing rule is also consistent with the spirit of relative price regulation proposed by 
Mayer (1999)75. The proposal is only feasible if the regulator has consistent informar- 
tion on the firms’ costs, and if the costs are highly correlated across the industry76. 
In addition, the regulator must ensure that the firms do not collude so as to provide 
adjusted information which operates in the industry’s favour. Finally, the regulator 
must be willing to allow some companies to suffer a loss when their effort level is 
significantly below average77. It may be difficult for the regulator to commit to this, 
given the duty to  ensure that the firm can always finance its functions, and a regime 
with less downside risk may be required in practice.
These obstacles are often used as explanations of why yardstick regulation is not 
observed in practice. For example, Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that ‘relative 
performance evaluation has not been used much in regulation’ because ‘regulated firms 
are often not comparable. That is, idiosyncrasies often prevail over common features’.
73See Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), Armstrong and Sappington (2002), Dem ski and Sap­
pington (1984), Frontier Econom ics (2003b), Helm  and Yarrow (1988), Mayers and Vickers (1996), Sap­
pington (2000), Sawkins (2001), Shleifer (1985), Sobel (1999), Vickers and Yarrow (1988a), Weyman- 
Jones (1995) and Yarrow (1989) for detailed discussions on yardstick regulation. Holmstrom (1982) 
presents a more theoretical discussion of the value of relative performance measurement in contract 
design.
74Formal yardstick measures are emerging in  the regulation o f electricity markets in other countries. 
The reader is referred to Waddams Price (2000a) for a description of the approaches which are currently 
being developed in  Norway and the Netherlands. W addams Price (2002) also provides a detailed survey 
of the different approaches used by the UK u tility  regulators to  compare firms’ costs w ithin a sector 
and to  determine efficient cost benchmarks. The role of cost com parisons in the electricity sector is 
also discussed in Jam asb and P ollitt (2000).
75The principle o f basing the average industry price on the average return in  the industry was also 
discussed much earlier by Yarrow (1989).
76 Bennett and W addams Price (2002) em phasise that ‘care m ust b e taken that only risks beyond 
the control of the firms are linked in  this way, as weakening a direct link between effort and outcom e 
w ill result in dam pening the incentive structure’.
77This is em phasised by Shleifer (1985) who argues that ‘It is essential for the regulator to commit 
him self not to  pay attention to the firms’ com plaints and to be prepared to  let the firms go bankrupt 
if  they choose inefficient cost levels’.
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We argue, however, that while it may be impossible to design a ‘first-best’ relative 
scheme, regulators could attempt to design a ‘second-best’ scheme. This is emphasised 
by Helm and Yarrow (1988) who argue that ‘Some additional information will always 
be better than none, and only if market conditions are entirely idiosyncratic (which is 
unlikely to be the case in practice) will the yardsticks effectively be useless’. Yarrow 
(1989) similarly argues that ‘the fact that perfect measurement is impossible does 
not in any way imply that regulatory systems should not attempt to make the best 
possible use of the information that is available’. The regulator would need to use 
all available information on the industry when designing the relative scheme. This 
would enable him to  take account of the expected differences across companies - both 
currently and in the face of uncertain shocks - and would increase the probability of the 
scheme improving technical efficiency relative to the current regime, while reducing 
the risks placed on individual firms. Ofwat’s approach to assessing operating cost 
efficiency based on econometric comparisons provides one example of how asymmetric 
operating conditions might be taken into consideration. Further research is needed on 
how to take account of the variation in stochastic shocks and on how to translate the 
comparator analysis into a feasible and weffare-improving relative sharing scheme.
3.2 .2  D eliverin g  th e  efficient q u a lity  o f  service level
In section 3.1.3 we found that the firm may have an incentive to deliver quality of 
service levels which are below the targets set in the regulatory contract. In addition, 
even if the targets are met, it is not clear that the level of quality delivered is efficient. 
This is because the targets, combined with the implied price caps, do not necessarily 
reflect consumer preferences about the price-quality trade-off. Any solution to the 
problem of service delivery will require these two issues to be addressed.
We assume that health, safety and environmental targets are fixed, and that there 
is no scope to  change the way in which they are regulated78. The regulator does, 
however, have flexibility over the quality of service target to set for the firm. We 
consider, in Proposal 3, a way in which the regulator may be able to bring the quality 
target closer to the efficient level. Proposal 4 discusses how the RPI-X mechanism 
could be used to ensure that the firm has an incentive to meet this target.
78Research into the advantages and disadvantages of market-based regulatory mechanisms - rather 
than com m and  and control - would be beneficial in  th is area.
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Proposal 3: Offer price-quality menus to  consumer groups
We propose that the regulator offers the local consumer group a menu of different 
price-quality options79:
{(Pl>*l) » (P2 .«2)  . (^ .* 3 ) ........(Pi-5?)}
The consumer group chooses its preferred price-quality pair from this menu. The 
chosen price-quality pair forms the contract which is offered to the firm in the contract 
agreement game, and the RPI-X game is otherwise played as described in Chapter 2.
Under this proposal the regulator constructs a (discontinuous) quality supply curve, 
using fixed assumptions about per unit operating and capital costs, potential efficiency 
improvements, the sharing of past efficiency savings and the delivery of other outputs. 
The consumer group similarly derives a quality demand curve and determines the 
point at which the regulator’s supply curve and the demand curve intersect. This 
process yields an estimate of the efficient quality level given current information and 
preferences.
The regulator’s quality of supply curve will be inaccurate in the sense that the 
cost forecasts on which it is based will be different to those which emerge ex-post. 
For example, the firm may be able to deliver the quality of service at a lower per 
unit cost, shifting the actual quality supply curve to the right of that assumed by 
the regulator. The change in unit costs may also vary with the amount of quality 
provided and hence the shape of the quality of supply curve may be different to  that 
assumed. The quality of service level is therefore second-best in the sense that ex-post 
welfare, based on actual costs, is not maximised. This is an inevitable consequence of 
asymmetric information and forward-looking price cap regulation.
In addition, both the regulator’s supply curve and the consumer group’s demand 
curve will be affected by exogenous shocks. As these are stochastic in nature they will 
not be built into the cost analysis or into the consumers’ preference function. The 
ex-post efficient level of quality of service may therefore be different to  that derived 
ex-ante. For example, if a water company faces a hot dry summer the per unit costs of 
providing quality of service increase, exacerbated by increased demand, and the supply 
function changes. At the same time, consumer preferences for quality may change in 
the face of restricted output levels and associated quality of service problems. Similarly, 
an electricity distribution company may face higher costs for delivering a given quality 
of service if the network is affected by a severe storm. The impact may be less severe 
than is the case in water as there is no additional requirement to  invest in increased
79See Baron and Myerson (1982), Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Lewis and Sappington (1989) for 
a more general discussion of the m erits o f offering a menu of contracts, rather than a single contract, 
in a regulatory regime.
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capacity, the weather-effect is generally for a shorter period of time, and the change 
in demand may not be as significant. In either case, the existence of the exogenous 
shock means that it may be more costly for the firm to reach a given target and/or 
consumer preferences for a given quality of service may change. The target is therefore 
unlikely to be efficient ex-post and the firm may face increased costs and risks when it 
is required to continue to meet it. This problem also arises with the targets currently 
set by the regulator.
Despite these limitations, there are many benefits of this proposal relative to the 
current quality regulation regime in the RPI-X game. In particular, the quality of 
service target, even if second best, is expected to be closer to an efficient level than 
one chosen on the basis of the regulator’s judgement about consumer willingness to 
pay. The main advantages are outlined here.
•  The proposal transfers the responsibility for determining willingness-to-pay from 
the regulator to the consumer group, and the regulator is only required to cal­
culate the cost of improvements. This reduces the cost of regulation.
•  The consumer groups have better information, and better incentives, than either 
the regulator or the firm to choose the appropriate price-quality trade-offs80,81. 
They will choose the {price,quality} pair which best matches current informa­
tion on consumer willingness-to-pay for quality. The consumer group will not 
have complete information on preferences over time and, in particular, will have 
uncertainty about future potential exogenous shocks. The chosen target will 
therefore not be optimal, but it may be closer to the efficient level than that 
chosen by the regulator or the firm as it is based on the best available current 
information set.
•  The use of consumer groups allows the regulatory regime to mirror, to some 
extent, a competitive market. Here individual consumers are offered a range
80The main alternative, considered in the literature and in practice, is to delegate the choice to  
the firm, as the m anagement is likely to  have better information than the regulator about consumer 
preferences. For exam ple, Lewis and Sappington (1992) derived a mechanism which delivered an  
optim al {price,quality} pair by inducing ‘the firm to employ its superior knowledge and ability entirely  
in  the social interest’. The problem is that the profit-maxim ising level o f quality, given the incentives 
to  reduce costs under the price cap, w ill not necessarily coincide w ith  th e level preferred by consumers. 
This is a standard externality problem, where the producer bases the decision on private benefits and 
costs rather than taking account of the social benefits and costs.
81 Spence (1975) also proposed basing the regulation of quality on a menu of price-quality pairs. 
He suggested that ‘the regulatory authority would manage price-quality trade-offs by confronting the 
firm, on behalf o f consumers, w ith a reaction function that reflects rates o f substitution between price 
and quality on the demand side o f the market’. Spence (1975) recognised, however, that the regulator 
is unlikely to have the information to determ ine these ‘rates o f substitution’. We suggest that th is 
information problem can be overcome by getting the consumer groups to choose from am ongst the 
contracts, and thereby reveal the current price-quality trade-off dem anded by consumers.
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of price-quality options and choose the one which matches their willingness-to- 
pay criteria (ie, preferences)82. In the utility sectors, the firm cannot provide a 
different quality of service to different consumers within a region. This is because 
the quality of service is determined on the network and cannot be varied for 
individual households. The best the firm can do is offer a level of service which 
meets the average preferences of consumers within its franchise area. Consumer 
groups are responsible for representing this ‘average consumer preference’ in the 
regulatory regime83.
•  The use of a menu of {price,quality} options ensures that the consumer group is 
aware of the cost of any quality choice. A key criticism, made by regulators and 
the Commission, of standard consumer surveys is that consumers will always 
state a preference for a higher quality of service when information about the 
associated price is not clarified84. The regulator’s menu, which incorporates all 
other assumptions in the allowed revenue calculation, provides the consumers 
with the information required to compare the set of feasible contracts.
•  The regulator offers the consumer group a broad range of options in each period, 
allowing for the possibility that preferences change over time85. The regulator 
is able to update the information used to construct the {price,quality} menu 
at each periodic review. A key advantage here is that the regulator can allow 
consumers to choose whether they want cost savings to be shared as lower prices 
or as higher levels of service. This is a decision which the regulator currently 
makes on the basis of his own judgement. Changes in the way in which savings 
are treated may affect the firm’s technical efficiency incentives. The regulator 
will need to ensure that the impact of the consumer group’s choice, between 
lower prices or higher quality, is revenue neutral from the firm’s perspective. A
82 Frontier Econom ics (2003b) note that ‘If consum ers had a choice of network services in  a com pet­
itive marketplace, they would be able to  select the com bination o f price and quality that best suited  
their personal preferences. But they cannot “vote w ith their feet” against a m onopoly supplier’. Under 
our proposal the consumer group ‘votes’ on behalf o f individual consumers.
83Spence (1975) provides another justification for presenting the menu of options to  the consumer 
group rather than individual consumers. He finds that the welfare-m axim ising level o f quality is 
determ ined at the point where the average benefit o f quality equals the m arginal cost. Marginal 
consumer preferences do not provide ‘an accurate measure o f the social benefits o f the increase in 
quality’ because ‘in  many cases, the m arginal consumer is quite unlikely to be representative in  his 
marginal valuation of quality’. For this reason the quality level should be determ ined using inform ation 
on the average benefit across all consum ers.
^W addam s Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002, pp5-6) provide an interesting discussion o f the 
factors which affect consumer responses in  w illingness to  pay surveys.
85Forsyth (1999) argues that the ‘optim al level o f quality w ill change over tim e, as incom es rise and 
custom ers are prepared to pay for a higher standard o f quality, and as the cost o f achieving a given  
level o f quality changes w ith technological developm ents’. In our schem e, consumer groups are able 
to  express these changes in their contract choices at each periodic review.
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fixed sharing rule will help here. If the firm retains the same proportion of the 
savings made, and the consumer group determines how the fixed consumer share 
is divided between price reductions and quality improvement, there should be 
no impact on the firm’s cost saving incentives.
We conclude that the regulated industry could move closer to an efficient level of 
quality of service if the consumer group chose the preferred price-quality pair from 
a menu offered by the regulator. The improvement, relative to the current system 
where the regulator chooses the price-quality pair, arises because the consumer group 
is assumed to  have better information on current preferences. The target may not 
be optimal ex-post, however, as both the demand and supply curves will adjust in 
the face of cost efficiency improvements and exogenous shocks. This is therefore a 
move towards the optimum rather than a mechanism which reaches the optimum with 
certainty.
The proposal is relatively simple to implement and would not increase the costs of 
the regulatory regime significantly. The regulators currently use financial models to 
determine the size of the price cap under a number of different assumptions. These 
models could be used to  calculate a range of different prices for different quality levels, 
holding all other factors constant. Similarly, the regulator already meets with con­
sumer groups during the periodic review and discusses the price-quality trade-off issue 
with them. The menu of {price,quality} options would provide a clear focal point 
on which to base these discussions, but would not increase the level of interaction 
required.
The area in which costs will increase is for the consumer groups, who will be under 
pressure to ensure that they have up-to-date information on consumer willingness- 
to-pay for quality of service. The consumer organisations would therefore need to 
be provided with adequate resources to ensure that they can collect the required 
information on consumer preferences. The powers and duties of the consumer groups 
would also need to be clarified in the legislation, and brought in line with those of the 
regulator, the firm and the Commission. Markou and Waddams Price (1999) stress, in 
this regard, that care should be taken to ensure that consumer groups are required to 
consider both the costs and benefits of any decision. If only the benefits are considered 
there is a danger that consumer groups will ‘become real champions of a particular 
cause’, irrespective of the impact on investment costs86. In addition, the independence 
of the consumer groups would need to be ensured.
85Markou and Waddams Price (1999).
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Proposal 4: Devising a penalty for not m eeting th e  target
When Proposal 3 is implemented, the quality of service target will be the best avail­
able current estimate of the efficient standard. In this case, both overshooting and 
undershooting the target are inefficient. The regulator will want to penalise the firm 
for underperforming relative to  the contract, and will not want to  provide an incentive 
for the firm to outperform the target. The consumer group has indicated that it does 
not require a higher level of service and, in particular, that it is not willing to pay a 
higher price for the higher level of service87.
We propose that the current financial incentive mechanisms - namely compensation 
payments and the price cap adjustment - be removed, and replaced with an ex-post 
penalty. We assume that, as now, the firm’s performance will always be audited and 
that the penalty will be imposed if a breach of the target is identified88. The regulator 
must show that the ex-post penalty is credible by including the details of the scheme, 
and the penalty size, in legislation. Without such credible commitment, the firm will 
assume that there is a positive probability that the penalty will not be used, and it 
may risk reducing the quality of service below the target.
To determine the size of the penalty the regulator must consider the firm’s incentive 
compatibility constraint89. In the absence of any penalty regime the firm will deliver 
a lower level of service if:
Ajrc (s’)  +  H  (s’)  >  H  ( ? )
The regulator should therefore set a penalty, F s , which makes the firm indifferent 
between choosing sf and P. As the penalty can only be imposed after the level of 
service has been chosen, it will be discounted by the firm. The regulator must therefore 
choose the penalty such that:
An-c ( 4 )  + H  (sf )  -  0 F S = H  (s’)
87If the firm delivers a higher level o f service, w ith  the same or a lower level o f costs than assum ed, 
the regulator w ill use the revealed inform ation to offer new price-quality pairs to the consumer in the 
next period. In this way consumers do have the option of getting higher quality at the same price in  
the next period, but they are not required to pay for a higher quality o f service which they did not 
request.
^ I f  auditing is costly the regulator would need to  trade-off the cost o f m onitoring the firm’s per­
formance against the benefit of being able to  punish the firm for breaching the standard set. This 
trade-off may affect the design of the optim al penalty regime. Further analysis of mechanism design  
w ith costly auditing can be found in Baron and Besanko (1984), Laffont and Martimort (2002) and 
Laffont and Tirole (1993, C hl2).
89Waddams Price, Brigham and Fitzgerald (2002) suggest that the penalty should be based on the 
value o f the service lost to  consumers. This is very difficult to  measure, particularly when consumers 
them selves may not be able to  place a value on the im pact of any reduction in  service quality.
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The penalty could be incorporated into the allowed revenue calculation at the pe­
riodic review. This ensures that the firm’s consumers automatically get compensated. 
The allowed revenue formula, for year one of the regulatory period, becomes:
= 0* qj + %  +  ( f {  X IXTvij -  Fs
The key difference between this proposal and the existing price cap adjustment is 
that the firm is only penalised if it underdelivers relative to the target chosen by its 
own consumers, rather than being judged relative to  other firms in the industry.
In practice, the regulator is unlikely to  have the information required to set this 
fixed penalty exactly. The reputation value will not be quantifiable, and the regulator 
will not, as emphasised elsewhere, be able to identify the proportion of profits earned 
which are attributable to underinvesting in quality of service. The best available 
alternative is to  simply set a very high, arbitrary, penalty. If the firm believes that the 
regulator is committed to the penalty, it will not risk choosing a lower level of service 
and, hence, the penalty will never be charged. The regulator’s ability to com m it  
may, however, be restricted by its requirement to  ensure that the firm can finance its 
functions. A very high penalty, which might result in the firm making a financial loss, 
would breach this duty and, hence, the firm would assume that the regulator cannot 
credibly commit to it. It may therefore be easier for the regulator to commit to a 
penalty which was set equal to a fixed proportion of the firm’s profits (eg, 10%), as 
this would always ensure that the firm retained some profits after the penalty was 
imposed.
The regulator must exercise caution when imposing the high penalty on the firm. 
Ex-post if may be more difficult, and more costly, for the firm to reach the required 
target given exogenous shocks in its operating environment. The regulator should 
therefore only impose a high penalty when the failure to reach a target is attributable 
to firm behaviour rather than exogenous shocks. It is difficult to make such distinctions 
however. This increases the complexity of the regime but reduces the risks that the 
firm faces. It also creates a further problem, whereby the firm may attempt to influence 
the information provided to the regulator, and the interpretation of that information, 
to reduce the probability of facing a penalty.
Given these problems with the penalty regime, it may be beneficial to retain the 
relative price cap adjustment, allowing the regulator to use information on other firms’ 
performance as a check. For example, if all firms failed to meet their target then the 
regulator may conclude that there is no need for an adjustment because they were all 
affected by an exogenous shock. If, however, one firm failed to meet its target but all 
other firms met theirs then that firm could face a downward price cap adjustment.
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The regulator must ensure that exogenous shocks affect firms symmetrically before 
using industry performance as a benchmark.
The price cap adjustment may also be preferable to the large fixed penalty because 
the regulator can moderate the size of the downward adjustment so as to take account 
of the risk of exogenous shocks affecting firm performance. The flexibility in the price 
cap adjustment may therefore be beneficial. We continue to suggest, however, that 
the adjustment should only be downward as there is no case for rewarding the firm for 
producing more quality than is demanded by consumers. Only if the regulator found 
that exogenous shocks led to an increase in quality of service demanded during the 
period would such outperformance be justified.
3.3 Conclusion
RPI-X regulation was chosen for the utility sectors in the UK because, as a fixed price 
cap regime, it was expected to reduce monopoly power, and thereby increase welfare, 
by providing the firm with an incentive to reduce costs. We found, in Chapter 2, that 
the regime which operates in practice is different fiom that assumed in the theory 
of pure price cap regulation. It is therefore, perhaps, not surprising that the welfare 
properties of the actual regime are more complicated than originally envisioned.
The main problems, discussed in detail in section 3.1, are summarised here.
•  Allocative efficiency is not delivered because of asymmetric information about 
the firm’s future costs, and because the technical efficiency objective requires the 
firm to be able to earn a positive rent. In addition, welfare is not maximised when 
the regulator is unable to pay transfers to the firm. These problems arise with 
all mechanisms designed under the same conditions. The allocative inefficiency 
problem is exacerbated in the RPI-X game because the rules used to share cost 
savings with consumers are not chosen to  maximise total welfare.
•  Cost savings incentives are delivered, but they are not as strong as expected in 
the theory of pure price cap regulation. This is because the regulator shares sav­
ings with consumers over time. In addition, the sharing rule is chosen arbitrarily 
and, hence, the firm makes its effort decision in the face of uncertainty about the 
marginal benefit of each unit of effort. A ratchet effect problem also arises be­
cause the regulator bases the price cap on historic cost information. Finally, the 
RPI-X mechanism distorts the firm’s input choices and thereby reduces technical 
efficiency.
•  The final element of welfare which we considered is the efficient delivery of out­
puts. We conclude that the RPI-X regime provides the firm with some protection
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against the hold-up problem, but the incentive to reduce costs may lead to un­
derinvestment in output delivery. The existing output regulatory regime may 
not be sufficiently strong to offset this effect. In addition, the regime is focused 
on standards which do not reflect consumer willingness-to-pay and, hence, it is 
not clear that the quality of service provided is efficient.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that while welfare may be higher under the current 
RPI-X mechanism than would be the case with no regulation, it is not maximised. 
The problems are driven by the legal and institutional framework within which de­
cisions are made - ie, the characteristics of the RPI-X game - and by the way in 
which the regulator chooses to set the price cap and output targets. It is difficult to 
change the characteristics of the game, but the regulator has the freedom to change 
the methodology used to design the regulatory contract.
This suggests that regulators, and other interested parties, should consider ways 
of changing the RPI-X mechanism, taking account of the characteristics of the existing 
game, so as to  increase the level of welfare. We have proposed a small number of 
possible changes in section 3.2. These suggest that allocative efficiency might be 
increased by using relative rewards schemes. Technical efficiency incentives might be 
improved by fixing the sharing rules used over time and/or by basing the sharing 
rule on a relative scheme. Finally, the efficient level of service might be delivered by 
allowing consumer groups to  choose their preferred price-quality combination from a 
menu of contracts, and by imposing an ex-post penalty on the firm for underdelivering 
relative to this chosen quality level.
The actual improvements delivered by these proposals will depend on the charac­
teristics of the regulated sector. In particular, asymmetric information, a stochastic 
operating environment, and significant variation across firms may limit the feasibility 
and welfare-improving potential of the alternative mechanisms. Further research is re­
quired to identify how these factors constrain the potential improvements in allocative 
efficiency, technical efficiency and quality of service delivery.
These proposals are preliminary at this stage. An on-going research programme 
should include a theoretical analysis of the precise net welfare effects of each proposal90. 
In particular, we would want to examine the impact of each proposal on the other 
proposals, and on the existing elements of the RPI-X mechanism. For example, the 
technical efficiency gains arising from the regulator committing to a fixed sharing rule 
should be weighed against the potential allocative efficiency costs of not being able 
to  adjust the contract in reaction to changes in the stochastic operating environment.
90The detailed analysis required to determ ine the exact properties of our proposed changes reflects 
Helm’s (1995a) warning that *To identify faults in  the current regulatory regime is however relatively 
easy. To design a system  which improves upon it is much harder’.
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This welfare analysis should take account, in the first instance, of the constraints 
imposed by the fixed characteristics of the RPI-X game and the nature of cost and 
demand conditions in the regulated sector. We should also, however, consider whether 
the proposals could be improved if some of these characteristics, such as the regulator’s 
objective function, were changed.
A feasibility study - presumably at sector level - also needs to be undertaken. 
Evidence on regulatory mechanisms in other countries could provide useful insight on 
what type of adjustments do and do not work. For example, profit-sharing schemes in 
the US telecoms sector could be examined to determine how a fixed sharing rule might 
be calculated. In Latin America, several regulatory agencies operate under detailed 
licence conditions which explicitly outline the methodologies used to set the regulatory 
contract. These case studies could be used to evaluate the impact of commitment 
devices on welfare. Any comparisons, across countries and/or sectors, need to take full 
account of differences in the regulatory regimes which are in place. This is because, as 
we have learned from our analysis of the RPI-X game, the way in which any regulatory 
mechanism is designed and implemented has significant implications for its actual 
impact on welfare.
Chapter 4
Productivity growth in the water 
and electricity sectors
RPI-X regulation was introduced in the UK utility sectors on the grounds that it 
outperformed other regulatory regimes, notably rate of return regulation, in terms 
of its ability to control a firm’s monopoly power. In particular it was argued that 
price cap regulation provides the regulated firm with an incentive to reduce its costs 
over time. In this chapter we examine whether this promise has been delivered by 
calculating productivity growth rates in the water and electricity sectors in England 
and Wales. Chapter 3 discusses the productivity improvement incentives from a more 
theoretical perspective.
Annual productivity growth rates are calculated for the following firms.
•  The ten water and sewerage companies (WASCs) - the companies which hold 
a licence to provide monopoly water and sewerage services within a specified 
region in England and Wales.
•  The distribution businesses o f the twelve regional electricity companies (RECs) in 
England and Wales - the companies which hold a monopoly licence to distribute 
electricity from the high-voltage network, along lower-voltage power lines, to  the 
end-user within a specified franchise area1.
•  The transmission business of the National Grid Company (NGC) - the company 
which holds the monopoly licence to  transmit electricity from upstream gener­
ation plants, along high-voltage lines, to the distribution network. The licence 
area covers all of England and Wales.
1 These twelve com panies are also referred to  as Public E lectricity Suppliers (PE Ss), along w ith  
ScottishPower, Scottish Hydro-Electric and Northern Ireland Electricity.
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These companies have been subject to RPI-X regulation since 1990. We calculate 
productivity growth for the period 1991 to 2000, covering at least two regulatory 
periods for each of the sectors2. We stress that the objective is not to carry out a 
comparative efficiency analysis of the firms in each sector. Instead we focus on sectoral 
trends over time. Appendix B provides further information on these companies.
Productivity is measured in two ways in this analysis. First, we examine changes 
in the firm ’s costs. The regulatory regime is expected to  deliver large reductions in 
unit costs over time. Annual changes in real unit operating costs and real unit capital 
investment are presented to determine the extent to which the price cap regime has 
delivered these anticipated cost savings.
Productivity involves more than a reduction in costs however. This is particularly 
true if cost reduction is associated with a reduction in the amount produced and/or 
by a reduction in the quality of service provided. We therefore also measure trends in 
the firms’ technical efficiency level. There is an improvement in technical efficiency if 
the regulated firm is producing the same amount of outputs using less inputs, or more 
output using the same amount of inputs.
We consider trends in technical efficiency using estimates of total factor productiv­
ity (TFP). Three alternative measures of TFP are calculated - a Tomqvist Index using 
calculated input shares, a Tornqvist Index based on econometrically estimated input 
shares, and a Malmquist Index calculated using data envelopment analysis (DEA)3. 
For our short data set no one methodology is ideal, and we wish to examine the im­
pact of the methodology choice on the productivity assessment. Using a number of 
methodologies also allows us to provide a range of TFP growth rates. This is consid­
ered preferable when individual point growth rates may suffer from potential biases.
Having identified the changes in cost efficiency and technical efficiency since pri­
vatisation, we turn to the question of how the RPI-X mechanism has influenced this 
productivity performance. Our analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that the price 
cap setting process affects the firm’s effort choice, and hence the extent of productivity 
improvement. The elements which are of most interest are the expected length of time 
over which cost savings axe retained, and the impact of regulatory commitment on
2The regulatory periods over which the price cape were set are as follows:
NGC - 1990 to 1993; 1993 to  1997 and 1997 to 2001 
RECs - 1990 to 1995 and 1995 to 2000 
WASCs - 1990 to  1995 and 1995 to 2000
sBecause o f th e short data set, we are unable to estim ate a production function for NGC. We 
therefore do not calculate Tom qvist Indices w ith estim ated input shares for NGC. One possible proxy 
measure for NGC’s estim ated input share is the input share from the electricity distribution production 
function. It was decided that this proxy was inappropriate given the technological and cost structure 
differences between the transm ission and distribution networks. Similarly, Malmquist Indices, which 
are calculated using information on comparator com panies, could not be calculated for NGC as it  is 
a national m onopoly and distribution companies were considered inapproriate comparators.
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this expected regulatory lag. We also consider the impact of takeovers and mergers, 
and the level of quality of supply, on productivity trends during the period. Finally, 
we introduce a variable which controls for the number of years since privatisation.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 summarises related literature. 
The variables of interest and the data sources used in the analysis are outlined in 
Section 4.2 and described in detail in Appendix C. Section 4.3 presents information 
on changes in unit cost levels since privatisation. The different methodologies used to 
calculate TFP are defined in Section 4.4, and the average annual TFP growth rates 
are presented in section 4.5. The impact of the regulatory regime on cost efficiency 
and technical efficiency is examined in section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.1 Related literature
A vast literature exists on productivity in the regulated sectors. To ensure that this 
review is focused and concise we only consider two aspects of the relevant literature 
here. First, we look at the body of literature which measures the rate of productivity 
growth in the regulated utility sectors in England and Wales. We contribute to this 
body of literature by providing updated estimates of productivity growth in the water 
and electricity sectors, and by using a number of different methodologies to  measure 
productivity. Our research also stands out for incorporating more than one industry, 
enabling us to undertake cross-sectoral comparisons. The second body of literature 
which we are interested in analyses the impact of incentive regulation on productivity 
growth. We contribute to this literature by examining how the price cap setting process 
in the RPI-X regime affects the productivity growth rate. Our analysis is carried out 
using a cross-sectoral panel dataset, with all companies in the panel subject to RPI-X 
regulation since 1990/91.
4.1 .1  P ro d u ctiv ity  in  th e  U K  u tility  sectors
In this section we sum m arise  the literature which measures productivity growth in the 
regulated utility sectors in England and Wales. The studies on productivity in the 
electricity and water sectors relate most closely to our work4. We first discuss the 
large volume of research on the impact of privatisation on productivity.
4 A study o f productivity in the gas sector can be found in Waddams Price and W eyman-Jones
(1996).
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The privatisation effect
A large number of studies have examined the impact of the Conservative Government’s 
privatisation programme on productivity. The impetus for this research was the need 
to test the claim, from economic theory, that privatisation would lead to an increase 
in productivity5.
We do not provide details of individual papers here but instead refer the reader 
to Europe Economics and Crafts (1998, Ch7) and Waddams Price (2000a) for useful 
reviews and summaries of the main studies. More recent research and literature surveys 
can be found in Pollitt (1999) and Green and Haskel (2001). The results of the studies 
are quite mixed, suggesting that privatisation had an uncertain impact on productivity. 
Bearing this in mind, the broad conclusions reached are outlined here.
•  There was an increase in productivity in most industries after privatisation, 
although in some cases the growth in total factor productivity was quite low.
•  Privatisation had a greater impact on labour productivity than on total factor 
productivity. This suggests that there may have been substitution across inputs. 
In particular, reductions in employment costs may have been offset by increases 
in the capital stock and/or a reduction in turnover.
•  Productivity growth was simultaneously affected by the change in ownership, 
market liberalisation, corporate restructuring, and regulation. It is difficult to 
separate out the effect of each individual policy change because there is no ob­
vious counterfactual which the evidence can be compared against. Some studies 
have concluded, however, that the transfer of assets to private ownership had 
the least impact on productivity growth, while the opening up of previously 
monopoly markets to competition had the strongest positive effect. Corporate 
restructuring and competition were also found to  have had a greater impact on 
productivity than regulation in a number of studies. Most of the studies only 
consider the period up to 1995/96 and hence, as noted by Green and Haskel 
(2001), ‘stop before the effect of regulation can be estimated with any reliabil­
ity’.
•  Productivity improvements did not always coincide with the timing of privati­
sation. For many companies productivity growth was observed before flotation.
5D etails o f the privatisation programmes in each of the u tility  sectors can be found in Armstrong, 
Cowan and Vickers (1994), Newbery (1999), and Vickers and Yarrow (1988a). See Beesley (1997), 
Markou and W addams Price (1999), P ollitt (1999), Vickers and Yarrow (1988a), and Yarrow and  
Jasinski (1996), for discussions of the expected costs and benefits o f privatisation.
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In other sectors there was a decline in total factor productivity at privatisation, 
but pre-privatisation levels were restored after a few years.
Productivity in th e  electricity distribution sector
In this section we summarise the main findings in the recent literature on productivity 
growth in the electricity distribution sector in England and Wales6. The conclusions 
which can be drawn from this literature are that productivity improved just before pri­
vatisation, and there was a subsequent significant increase in total factor productivity 
after the 1994 price review.
•  Bum s and Weyman-Jones (1996) found that cost efficiency improved slightly 
after privatisation. This was deemed to  be a ‘one-off effect’ and, it was claimed 
that ‘privatization has not affected the organization of inputs in the productive 
process’. The authors also stress that the change in cost efficiency may have been 
caused by changes in accounting policies rather than the privatisation process 
per se.
•  Hattori, Jamasb and Pollitt (2002) found that TFP declined in the electricity 
distribution sector just before privatisation, but there was a large increase be­
tween 1995 and 1996.
•  Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999) found that average annual growth in TFP was 
6.3% for the period 1990/01 to 1997/98, with the highest growth rates after the 
1994 price review. The growth rate varied significantly across companies, with 
a lowest rate of 3.6% and a highest rate of 9.4%. They also concluded that the 
productivity growth reflects technological change (ie, a shift in the productivity 
frontier) rather than efficiency change. This suggests that the regulatory regime 
has not led to a significant catch-up effect across companies in the sector, but 
‘the industry as a whole is responding to the technical efficiency incentives of 
privatisation’.
•  Weyman-Jones (1995) found that efficiency improved just before privatisation, 
and the variance in efficiency levels fell across companies. He also emphasised 
that comparative studies need to take account of differences in the firms’ oper­
ating environments.
6A range of different m ethodolgies have been adopted in these papers. In som e cases regulatory 
cost functions are esim ated using ordinary least squares, generalized least squares, and within-groups. 
In others, real unit operating cost changes and total factor productivity growth have been calculated  
directly using accounting data. Finally, som e authors, notably W eyman-Jones, have used data envel­
opment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis to  compare efficiency levels w ithin the sector and over 
tim e. Further details can be found in the individual papers.
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•  Weyman-Jones (2001a) examined whether Ofgem’s relative efficiency rankings 
in the 1999 distribution price review were sensitive to the type of methodology 
used to determine the firms’ efficiency levels. Ofgem’s analysis was based on a 
simple corrected ordinary least square regression analysis. Weyman-Jones found 
that the rankings did not vary significantly when other methodologies were used, 
but the actual efficiency scores did vary slightly. He concluded that ‘the use of 
stochastic and non-convex methods of nonparametric efficiency measurement’ 
are preferable.
•  Weyman- Jones (2001b)  provided a brief summary of the main studies on produc­
tivity growth in the electricity distribution sector. The main conclusion reached 
is that ‘In the immediate aftermath of privatisation, productivity growth seemed 
not to differ markedly from pre-privatisation experience, but, following the 1994 
control, considerable improvement can be seen’.
Productivity in th e  water sector
In this section we summarise the recent literature on productivity growth in the wa­
ter and sewerage sector in England and Wales7. The conclusions from this research 
differ slightly from those outlined above for electricity distribution. There has been a 
significant reduction in operating costs in the sector, but this has not been matched 
by an improvement in total factor productivity. This suggests that there has been 
substitution from non-capital inputs to  capital inputs. It may also reflect the fact 
that output measurement in these calculations does not always take account of the 
increases in quality which have been delivered.
•  Europe Economics and Crafts (1998) found that water companies reduced real 
unit operating expenditure by 3.8% per annum between 1993 and 1998. This 
was largely due to an average annual increase in labour productivity of 4.6%. 
The study finds that the reductions were driven, in equal proportion, by shifts in 
the sectoral efficiency frontier and by a narrowing of the relative efficiency gap 
between companies.
•  Hunt and Lynk (1995) examined the impact of the government’s policy, at pri­
vatisation, to separate the functions of production, economic and environmental 
regulation in the water sector. The conclusion reached was that the separation 
policy reduced the economics of scope in the industry, and that this would lead to
7 As w ith  the electricity distribution studies, a broad range of m ethodologies have been used to 
measure productivity in the water sector. A ttem pts have also been made to incorporate improvements 
in  drinking water and environm ental quality as outputs in  the production process.
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an increase in costs. There is no analysis, however, of how the privatisation and 
regulation process post 1989 may have compensated for this loss in efficiency.
•  Lynk (1993) examines the impact of private ownership on efficiency by comparing 
the performance of the private statutory water companies (the current water only 
companies) to that of the public regional water authorities (the current water 
and sewerage companies) before privatisation. The study concludes that average 
inefficiency was substantially higher in the private sector than in the public 
sector. The author concluded that there is no evidence that private ownership 
is superior in this sector.
•  Markou and Waddams Price (1999) found that average annual labour productiv­
ity growth was higher before privatisation (7.8%) than afterwards (6.5%). They 
also emphasised that, according to Ofwat, operating costs fell by 8% in the water 
sector between 1992/93 and 1997/98, and by 10% in the sewerage sector.
•  Saal and Parker (2001) found that non-capitalized labour productivity was 
higher post-privatisation, with the largest improvement in the 1995-99 period8. 
In contrast, there was a decline in average annual TFP growth after privatisa­
tion. This suggests that the increase in capital investment overshadowed the 
reduction in labour costs and any increase in the quality-adjusted output level. 
The productivity measures used incorporate an output index which reflects ‘both 
the quantity and quality of water and sewerage services’.
•  Shaovl (1997) used a value added or net output approach to  measure efficiency9. 
He found that ‘Significant increases in efficiency had occurred prior to privati­
sation leaving little room to improve efficiency without jeopardising levels of 
service and future service provision’. The conclusion reached is that ownership 
change had little effect on efficiency because, according to the author, there was 
no scope for ongoing improvements in this area.
•  Thanassovlis (2000) described the results of a data envelopment study commis­
sioned by Ofwat for the 1994 periodic review. The study predicted that operating 
costs could be reduced by 26.67% during the 1995 to 2000 period. This improve­
ment would arise from inefficient firms catching up with the estimated 1992/93 
efficiency frontier, and takes no account of potential shifts in the frontier over
8D etails o f productivity growth rates for individual water and sewerage com panies can a lso  be 
found in th is paper. Similar results are presented in  Saal and Parker (2000).
9Saal and Parker (2001) argue that using value added as an output measure is com m only regarded 
as ‘inappropriate in  regulated industries where prices are not determ ined in  m arkets’.
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time. The results from the DEA analysis were similar to those derived by Ofwat 
using regression analysis.
4 .1 .2  Im pact o f  regu lation  on p ro d u ctiv ity
In this section we discuss the literature which examines the impact of incentive regu­
lation on productivity. The literature is divided into two strands: studies which focus 
on regulation in the US, and those which consider productivity change in other coun­
tries. A discussion on the principles of how to empirically test the impact of regulatory 
schemes can be found in Joskow and Rose (1989).
The US experience
We summarise a selection of recent studies which discuss the impact of regulation on 
productivity in the US. These studies generally focus on the state telecommunications 
markets, where comparisons can be made across different regulatory regimes over time. 
Kridel, Sappington and Weisman (1996) provide a complementary survey of earlier lit­
erature in this area. The general impression which we get from the studies summarised 
here is that it is questionable that incentive regulatory mechanisms, including price 
cap regimes, have delivered on their promise of improving productivity significantly 
relative to rate of return regulation.
•  Ai and Sappington (2002) found, for the period 1986 to 1999, that the oper­
ating costs of the regional Bell operating companies were 4.5% lower with rate 
case moratoria than with rate of return regulation. In contrast, costs were not 
lower, on average, with earnings sharing or price cap schemes relative to rate of 
return regulation. The cost comparison changed when applied to the regulated 
firms which operated in local competitive markets. In this environment, costs 
were lower with all three incentive schemes than with rate of return regulation. 
This suggests that ‘local competition and incentive regulation appear to play 
complementary roles in motivating cost reductions’.
•  Granderson and Linvill (1996) examined the productivity growth of twenty in­
terstate natural gas pipelines companies which were subject to  rate of return 
regulation between 1977 and 1987. TFP was found to  grow at an average an­
nual rate of 6.4%. Regulation was found to  have had only a small effect on 
the level of growth, but it did have an impact on the characteristics of the pro­
duction technology. When the effects of regulation were taken into account the 
proportion of productivity growth which was attributed to scale economies was
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reduced by 38%, and the proportion which was attributed to technical change 
was increased by 28%.
•  Majumdar (1997) considered the impact of different types of incentive regulation 
on productivity in the US local telecoms market between 1988 and 1993. He 
found that ‘while the introduction of a pure price-cap scheme has a positive effect 
on technical efficiency, the introduction of an eamings-scheme alone eventually 
has a detrimental effect on technical efficiency’. In addition, it was found that 
a combined price-cap and eamings-scheme had a positive effect on productivity, 
but the impact was smaller than with a pure price-cap scheme. This suggests 
that a pure price cap regime is the best means of improving productivity.
•  Resende (1999) examined the impact of incentive regulation on productivity 
growth in the local telecommunications sector. The main conclusion reached 
was that ‘alternative regulatory regimes (price-cap and incentive regulation) do 
not seem to play any role in improving technical efficiency, in comparison to 
traditional rate-of-retum regulation’. This contrasts, significantly, with the pre­
dictions of economic theory.
•  Roy croft (1999) calculated the TFP growth rates of the local exchange carriers 
owned by Ameritech for the period 1990 to 1997. The productivity growth rate 
was then regressed on a number of regulatory and technology control variables 
to assess the impact of the regulatory regime on productivity. The author found 
that ‘the introduction of price cap and incentive regulation leads to statistically 
significant increases in TFP growth’.
•  Uri (2002)10 measured productivity improvement in the telecommunications sec­
tor between 1988 and 1999. The analysis focused on the nineteen local exchange 
carriers which have operated under price cap regulation since 1991. TFP was 
found to have grown by about 5.5% per year. The author noted that the ‘growth 
is due primarily to innovation rather than improvements in efficiency’. This sug­
gests that regulation has had little impact on productivity during the period.
Evidence from other countries
In this section we summarise a number of studies which analyse the impact of price 
cap regulation on productivity in the UK and Spain. The main lesson from these 
studies is that price cap regulation has led to operating cost reductions, but it is not 
clear that it has led to  an overall improvement in productivity.
10A very sim ilar analysis is found in Uri (2001). As the studies, and results, are so sim ilar we do 
not discuss this second paper here.
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•  Arocena and Waddams Price (2001) examined productivity growth differences 
between the publicly and privately owned Spanish coal-fired generation compa­
nies in the period 1984 to 1997. All the firms, independent of ownership type, 
were subject to incentive based regulation since 1988. Cost-plus regulation had 
been used before then. The authors found that public sector firms were more 
efficient before the price cap mechanism was introduced. The efficiency of the 
private firms increased when price cap regulation was introduced. Much of this 
increase occurred at the time that the regime was changed, with little further 
improvement under the price cap system. In addition, the average improvement 
was driven by the less efficient firms catching up with the frontier, while there 
was only ‘modest’ change in the frontier itself.
•  Domah and Pollitt (2001) undertook a social cost-benefit analysis to assess the 
impact of privatisation and restructuring on the UK electricity supply and dis­
tribution businesses between 1986/87 and 1997/98. They found that ‘there was 
a rise in real unit distribution and supply controllable costs by about 15 per 
cent immediately after privatisation in 1990. The cost remained at a high level 
until 1994-95, after which there was a dramatic fall’. The largest fall came after 
1996/97. This trend demonstrates, according to the authors, ‘a clear relation­
ship between the cost changes and changes in the regulatory ‘environment” . In 
particular, the cost falls coincided with the tight distribution price controls set 
for the 1995 to 2000 period.
•  Hattori, Jamasb and Pollitt (2002) compared the cost efficiency of the distribu­
tion companies in England and Wales to that of Japanese electricity distribution 
companies which are subject to rate-of-return regulation. They found that the 
average efficiency scores ‘are declining over time in both countries’ and that 
the ‘UK electricity distribution shows significantly better performance over the 
Japanese electricity distribution’ between 1995/96 and 1997/98. The authors 
used these results to  tentatively conclude that ‘the relative changes over time 
seem to indicate the effectiveness of incentive regulation’.
•  Saal and Parker (2001) examined the question of whether the tightening of the 
price cap in the 1995 water periodic review led to  an improvement in productivity 
growth. They found that non-capitalised labour productivity growth increased 
significantly between 1995 and 2000, but there was no significant increase be­
tween 1985-90 and 1990-95. The authors concluded, from this, that ‘the more 
rigorous economic regulation embodied in the 1994/95 price review was the pri­
mary stimulus for operational efficiency gains and not the change of ownership
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per se\ The tightening of the regulatory regime does not appear to  have had a 
similar impact on TFP growth, with the average annual growth rate declining 
in the 1995-2000 period relative to the early years after privatisation. The au­
thors therefore concluded that ‘the productivity results are not consistent with 
the hypothesis that the regulatory system became more effective in generating 
efficiency gains after the price review’.
•  Tilley and Weyman-Jones (1999) used a panel data regression to examine the 
factors, including the timing of the price cap reviews, which may have affected 
productivity growth in the electricity distribution sector since privatisation. 
They found that the TFP growth rate was affected by a structural break at the 
time of the 1995 distribution price control. There is no other explicit analysis of 
the impact of the regulatory regime on the productivity growth rate however.
4.2 Relevant variables
Details of the variables which are used to  calculate productivity, and the relevant data 
sources, are provided in Appendix C and summarised here. Financial data is taken 
from the firms’ annual regulated accounts and non-financial data is taken from reports 
published by the regulators and the Centre for Regulated Industries.
Output is measured as the volume delivered in the electricity sectors, and the 
number of properties connected to the network in the water sector. We also use a 
quality-adjusted output measure. This takes account of changes in the proportion of 
output which is of ‘good quality’ over time. In the electricity sector, quality relates to 
the level of service interruption in the sector. In the water sector, a weighted quality 
index is used which captures the quality of service provided to  consumers in the water 
and sewerage sectors (ie, water pressure and sewerage flooding problems), drinking 
water quality and environmental quality. Turnover is used to measure the value of 
output to  the firm.
We assume that two inputs are used in production, capital and non-capital. The 
capital level is measured as the current cost value of gross fixed assets at the year-end. 
The capital cost is calculated as the sum of the financing cost of capital plus the cost 
of depreciation:
(Rental rate x Capital level)+capital charges
We also consider the level of gross capital expenditure when examining trends in unit 
costs. This is equal to the annual additions to fixed assets.
The level, and value, of non-capital inputs is measured as the value of the firm’s 
controllable operating costs. The financial measure is used because there is no clear
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physical measure which encompasses all the non-capital inputs.
4.3 Cost efficiency
The primary theoretical benefit of RPI-X regulation is that it provides the regulated 
firm with an incentive to reduce its costs. We wish to determine the extent to which 
this is true by examining the annual rate of change in real unit costs for the regulated 
businesses.
4.3.1 R ea l u n it op eratin g  costs
We first consider the rate of change in real unit controllable operating costs (RUOC). 
This measure allows us to compare the performance of different firms while taking 
account of differences in the scale of activities. We look at the standard measure of 
unit operating costs and a measure which takes account of quality of supply:
Controllable operating CostsRUOC  =  
QRUOC  =
Output 
Controllable operating Costs
Quality-adjusted output
Figure 4.1 shows the trend in RUOC  since privatisation and Figure 4.2 shows the 
trend in QRUOC  since privatisation. We see that there has been a large decrease in 
real unit operating costs in all sectors since 1990. The trend in the annual rate of 
change is not significantly altered when we use the quality-adjusted output measure. 
The rate of decline has been smoothest in the electricity distribution industry. There 
was a step-jump in the water industry in 1992/93, which was followed by a smooth 
and small decline. This was driven by the large reduction in employment costs for 
all water companies in 1992/9311. NGC has had the largest overall decline.Table 4.1
shows the average annual change in real unit operating costs for each of the sectors. 
Annual change is measured as the log level in year t minus the log level in year t-1. 
Again, we see that there have been large reductions in real unit operating costs in all 
sectors since privatisation. This suggests that the cost reduction incentive properties 
of the regime are working. In the electricity sector, the rate of decline was highest in 
the 1995-2000 period. In contrast, it was higher immediately after privatisation in the
11 The large reduction in  employment costs reflects a reduction in  the number o f em ployees in  the 
sector. We expect, however, that it also represents a transition from direct em ploym ent contracts to  
contracting-out, which should be picked up in  the controllable operating costs m easure. Furthermore, 
com panies may have reduced the level o f employment costs classified as direct operating costs but 
increased the level of capitalised employment costs. Accounting changes such as th is em phasise the 
need to use total cost measures rather than operating costs only to exam ine trends in  productivity.
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Figure 4.2: QRUOC Index
water sector, reflecting the large reduction in labour costs in 1992/93. These results 
are consistent with the literature discussed in section 4.1. The rates of decline change 
marginally when we use the quality-adjusted output measure.
Table 4.1: Average annual change in RUOC
1990-95 1995-2000 1991-2000
RUOC
Distribution -3.73 -7.74 -7.75
NGC -5.18 -13.2 -8.65
Water -18.06 0.65 -7.67
QRUOC
Distribution -3.75 -7.75 -7.98
NGC -6.01 -13.4 -8.99
Water -18.4 0.57 -7.87
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4.3.2 Real unit capital costs
We also consider the firm’s performance with respect to real unit capital costs (RUCC). 
The measures used for unit capital costs are:
Gross capital expenditure 
Output 
Gross capital expenditure 
Quality-adjusted output
Figure 4.3 shows the trend in RUCC  and Figure 4.4 shows the trend in QRUCC  
since privatisation. The use of the quality-adjusted output measure has only a minor 
impact on the trend. Capital costs increased in the early years after privatisation and 
then declined in all sectors up until 1996. The decline was most significant for NGC. 
After 1996 (ie, the second regulatory period for water and electricity distribution) 
there was another increase in real unit capital costs. This, again, was followed by a 
decline towards the end of the regulatory period. We therefore see cyclical variability 
in this variable, with the cycles affected by the timing of price reviews.
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Figure 4.3: RUCC Index
Table 4.2 shows the average annual change in RUCC for each of the sectors. RUCC 
has increased in all sectors since privatisation, with the largest increase in the water 
sector. There was a significant decline for NGC in the period 1990 to 1995. When the 
quality-adjusted volume measure is used, growth is marginally smaller. The growth 
rate is higher for NGC and the water companies post-1995. It is higher for electricity 
distribution in the 1990-1995 period. The sectors, particularly water, are characterised 
by large capital investment programmes which are aimed at improving the quality of 
supply provided. The improvements may not be delivered for some time however. 
This is because there is a significant lag between the capital investment and delivery
RUCC
QRUCC
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of supply improvements, with many capital projects taking up to 20 years to com­
plete. This means that there is an increase in capital expenditure today which is not 
necessarily offset by an increase in outputs delivered.
Table 4.2: Average annual change in RUCC
1990-95 1995-2000 1991-2000
RU CC
Distribution 2.51 0.08 1.32
NGC -7.07 2.25 1.40
Water 2.61 6.35 4.69
Q RUCC
Distribution 2.49 0.07 1.09
NGC -7.90 2.06 1.06
Water 2.26 6.27 4.49
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4 .3 .3  A nalysis
We have found that real unit operating costs have reduced significantly in the water 
and electricity sectors since privatisation. This indicates that the RPI-X mechanism 
has delivered on its promise to deliver cost reductions. There has, however, been an 
increase in real unit capital costs during the period. This reflects the fact that large 
investment programmes have been undertaken but the quality of supply improvements 
may not have been delivered yet. In this sense output requirements may be operating 
against the cost saving incentive. We cannot determine, however, whether the growth 
in real unit capital costs is higher or lower than it would have been in the absence 
of price cap regulation. Ian Byatt, the Director General of Water Services, stressed 
in the 1999 water periodic review that the growth in capital investment was partly 
financed by efficiency improvements12. This suggests that the real unit capital cost 
growth rate was tempered somewhat by the cost saving incentives.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that real unit operating cost savings have been deliv­
ered in the 1990-2000 period and, although real unit capital costs have increased, the 
extent of the growth may have been reduced by the presence of RPI-X regulation. We 
examine the particular features of the RPI-X mechanism which affect these trends in 
unit costs in section 4.6.
The impact of regulation on total costs is difficult to determine from these partial 
cost measures. The large reduction in real unit operating costs is partially offset by 
fluctuations in capital costs, as discussed in the literature reviewed in section 4.1, and 
the overall impact on technical efficiency is unclear. For this reason an analysis of 
measure which capture the relationship between production and total costs is needed. 
That is, we wish to capture the impact of all inputs used on outputs rather than 
relying on single-input measures. This is particularly important when we consider, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, that the firm may have an incentive to  bias its input choices 
away from non-capital to capital under the RPI-X mechanism. Europe Economics and 
Crafts (1998) also argue that ‘Among different possible ways of measuring productivity, 
the most relevant for making comparisons between sectors will be TFP, since this is 
not affected by changes in the relative use of different inputs but only by the overall 
efficiency with which the inputs are used’. Bearing this in mind, we analyse the 
relationship between inputs and outputs in more detail using TFP measures.
12This is confirmed by Green and Haskel (2001). They note that price increases in the water 
industry, driven by increased capital expenditure, could indicate the absence of efficiency gains. They 
note, however, that the regulator believes that ‘efficiency im provem ents actually halved the price 
increases which would otherwise have been required between 1995 and 2000*.
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4.4 Measuring growth in TFP
In this section we explain each of the methodologies used to calculated TFP growth. 
The growth rate estimates are then presented in section 4.5. We calculate the annual 
rate of growth in TFP for the water, electricity distribution and electricity transmission 
companies. In its simplest form TFP is measured as the weighted sum of outputs to 
inputs:
T F r  Ef=i wiVi
E *= i vi xi
where y% is output x j is input j ,  W{ is the weight on output *, and Vj is the weight 
on input j .
We use two different approaches to estimate the annual change in this measure. The 
Tomqvist Index assumes the input and output markets are efficient and determines 
the weights using input shares. We initially calculate these input shares directly, and 
then estimate them econometrically from the production function13. We also use a 
Malmquist Index to  calculate the change in T F P14. This uses a linear programming 
method - data envelopment analysis - to estimate the optimal weights on inputs and 
outputs.
4.4 .1  T o m q v ist Indices
We use the standard growth accounting approach to calculate the annual change in the 
Tomqvist Index. We assume that each regulated firm has a Cobb-Douglas production 
function:
Y =  AKalP
In the production function, the variable A represents the firm’s TFP. It is also 
referred to as the Hicks neutral shift parameter. K is the capital input into the 
production process and L is the non-capital input. Y is the value of output produced 
by the firm, a  is the elasticity of output with respect to capital, and j3 is the elasticity 
of output with respect to non-capital inputs. These parameters are also the input 
shares in the Tomqvist Index. We know that if a  +  /3 > 1 there are increasing returns 
to scale, if a  4- /? <  1 there are decreasing returns to  scale, and if a  4- j3 =  1 there are 
constant returns to  scale. We do not make any a priori assumptions about the returns 
to  scale of the regulated firm’s technology.
Taking logs we estimate the firm’s TFP as:
13It was not possible to  estim ate a production function for NGC so we only have a Tom qvist Index 
based on calculated input shares for electricity transmission.
14As comparator firms are needed to calculate M alquist Indices, these T FP estim ates were only  
available for the water and electricity distribution sectors.
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In A  = In Y  -  a ln K  -  f3InL TFP
The annual growth in TFP is then calculated as15:
A In A  =  A In Y  -  a A In K  -  f3AInL  TFP Growth
Table 4.3 summarises how each of these variables are measured. There are two 
different output variables and two different sets of parameters. We therefore have four 
measures of TFP based on the Tomqvist Index approach.
Table 4.3: Variables used for calculating TFP growth
Variable Possible measures
Output level (Y)
Capital level (K) 
Labour level (L) 
Capital costs (rK) 
Non-capital costs (wL) 
Value of output (pY) 
Parameters
Volume delivered1
Output adjusted for quality level (year-on-year ‘Good quality’)
Current cost value of gross fixed assets (minus revaluations)
Controllable operating costs
(Treasury rate*Capital level)-1-Capital charges2
Controllable operating costs
Turnover
Calculated input shares 
Regression estimate of input shares
Notes to Table: (1) Number of properties for the WASCs. (2) Capital charges are 
depreciation and infrastructure renewals charges for the WASCs.
The output and input variables are taken directly from the sources discussed in 
Appendix C. We also need to determine the values of the Cobb-Douglas parameters, 
a  and (3. We use two different methods to  calculate these parameters, both of which 
introduce potential biases into the estimates.
1. We calculate the parameters using the share of capital and non-capital costs in 
turnover.
2. We estimate the production function using regression analysis and use the esti­
mated coefficients for our parameter values.
Each approach is explained below. The calculated TFP growth rates are presented 
in section 4.5.
15 AInA =  InAt — InAt-1;
AInY - InYt -  InYt- 1;
A lnK  — InKt — InKt-i; and
AInL =  InLt — InLt-i.
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The Tomqvist Index approach may produce biased TFP estimates because of the 
limiting assumptions which are made to  aid the calculations. The main assumptions 
which may be of concern are as follows16:
•  production is undertaken using a Cobb-Douglas technology;
•  output prices are equal to marginal cost;
•  input prices are equal to the value of the marginal product of the input; and
•  the only output measure used is the physical number of units produced; no 
account is taken of changes in the quality of the output provided17.
We do not know what each firm’s technology is, and the Cobb-Douglas restriction 
is generally regarded as an acceptable assumption in the literature. This restriction 
means that the actual TFP numbers may not be 100% accurate, but the calculations 
provide us with a useful guide on changes in productivity over time and relative dif­
ferences across sectors. The second and third assumptions are only required when 
the parameters are calculated directly using data on input shares. This approach is 
adopted below. We also calculate the parameters by econometrically estimating the 
production function for each sector. In this situation the assumptions on efficient out­
put and input prices are no longer required. Finally, we have attempted to  deal with 
the last problem by adjusting output for the level of quality provided.
Calculated input shares
We initially assume that the firm chooses the level of inputs which maximise profits. 
We also assume that the product, capital and labour markets are perfectly competitive. 
Under these conditions a profit-maximising firm chooses the amount of labour at which 
the wage rate is equal to the marginal revenue product of workers, and the amount of 
capital at which the cost of capital is equal to  the marginal revenue product of capital. 
That is, as summarised by Hulten (2000), each input is paid its marginal product 
and hence the output elasticities, a  and (3, can be substituted by income shares. The
16Many of these concerns are em phasised by W eym an-Jones (2001b) who argues that ‘The underly­
ing assum ptions are unlikely to  apply to the analysis o f privatised u tilities in network industries, both  
because of their residual market power and because of their known history o f productive inefficiency 
under state ownership’.
17T his is noted by Hulten (2000) who stresses that ‘the TFP residual is intended to  m easure only 
the production of more goods - th is is what a shift in  the production function m eans - and only 
the costless portion at that. Innovation that results in better goods is not part of the TFP story’. 
W addams Price (2000a) also stresses the need to  develop new dim ensions into the productivity analysis 
- such as quality and reliability o f service -  to  ensure that the incentives o f the regulatory regim e are 
‘appropriately directed’.
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main assumption here is that prices are reasonable proxies for marginal products (ie, 
products are sold at marginal cost prices). If this is not the case, the TFP estimates 
calculated using this approach will be biased.
Green and Haskel (2001) support the use of TFP measures for productivity, but 
they recognise that ‘factor shares may not reflect output elasticities if firms have market 
power, so that if market power changes with privatisation then measured TFP may 
change for reasons not to do with efficiency’. This raises the question of whether the 
use of income shares is appropriate for the regulated monopoly firms. In our analysis 
the monopoly firms have market power, but regulation is expected to control this 
through the use of price caps (p). In particular, for the period which we are analysing, 
price caps have always been in place. We argue that, as the firm essentially takes its 
price as given under the regulatory regime, its choices axe constrained in a similar way 
to the price-taker in a competitive market.
Hulten (2000) also discusses the assumption, underlying the TFP calculation, that 
technological change affects the marginal productivity of all inputs in the same way. 
This is unlikely to apply in the utilities with factor-specific innovations being more 
prevalent - eg, engineering changes which improve the productivity of the network 
assets, or corporate changes which allow for labour-saving devices to  be introduced. 
This means that the TFP measure will be biased. Hulten (2000) suggests using a 
‘factor-augmentation’ production function to deal with this bias. It is not clear, how­
ever, how this function would be estimated without ex-ante information on the rates 
of factor augmentation. We proceed with the standard TFP measure noting that it 
may be biased.
Bearing these limitations in mind we calculate a  and (3 directly as:
_  r K  _  Capital costs 
p Y  Value of output 
_ wL _  Non-capital costs 
pY  Value of output
Appendix C explains how capital costs, non-capital costs and the value of output 
are measured. Table 4.4 shows the value of these input shares for the electricity and 
water sectors. The capital share is higher than the non-capital share in all sectors. 
The capital share is similar in the electricity distribution and electricity transmission 
sectors. In the electricity transmission sector the non-capital share is very small. The 
calculations suggest that there are decreasing returns to scale in the electricity sectors, 
but constant returns to scale in the water sector.
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Table 4.4: Average calculated input shares for the period 1991-2000
Capital share Non-capital share Returns to scale
Distribution 0.462 0.328 0.790
NGC 0.445 0.087 0.532
Water 0.904 0.175 1.079
The TFP growth rates calculated using these input shares are presented in section
4.5.
E stim a ted  in p u t shares
The assumptions regarding marginal cost pricing in the income share approach may not 
hold in the regulated sectors. We therefore also estimate the input share parameters 
using regression techniques. The estimated production function coefficients, a  and j3, 
are used as the input shares in the TFP growth equation.
The equation which we estimate is:
yit = a 4- akit +  (3lit + 1 +  ^  +  eit
where y is the log of volume produced, k is the log of capital, I is the log of non­
capital inputs, t  are time dummies, 77 is an unobservable firm-specific effect, and e is 
the random error term18. The coefficients on capital and non-capital are expected to 
be non-negative.
We estimate separate production functions for the water sector and for the elec­
tricity distribution sector. There is an implicit assumption here that each firm within 
a sector has the same technology and, hence, the estimated sectoral parameters can be 
used to calculate each firm’s TFP growth rate. There is insufficient data to estimate a 
separate production function for NGC and hence we do not calculate Tomqvist indices 
on this basis for the electricity transmission sector19.
The production functions are estimated using the following techniques:
•  ordinary least square (OLS);
18Baltagi (1995) suggests that the firm-specific effect may represent ‘unobservable entrepreneurial 
or m anagerial skills o f the firm’s executives’.
19 We considered using the distribution production function parameters as a proxy measure for 
NGC’s estim ated input shares. It was decided that this was inappropriate as the technologies and 
cost structures of the two network levels are different and the production functions would therefore be 
different. Burns and W eyman Jones (1996) argue that the distribution network may be viewed ‘as a 
more com plex version o f a transm ission system  since the costs of both types of network are influenced 
by spatial and geographic factors such as the size of the area served, the density o f custom ers, and so 
on’. They stress, however, that costs w ill be different because distribution production is not affected  
by ‘where the power com es from, and how much it costs’. The generation sector has more o f an im pact 
on transm ission costs. We therefore expect there to  be som e differences in the underlying production 
functions.
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•  OLS on the first-differenced production function (FDOLS);
•  within-groups estimation (WG); and
•  Anderson-Hsiao estimation (AH).
We describe each estimation technique and its properties in Appendix D. We 
present estimation results for the standard production function and for the constant 
returns to scale production function (j3 =  1—a). Appendix D also provides an analysis 
of the variables in the production functions. We find that capital and labour, and the 
constant returns to  scale variable capital/labour, are non-stochastic. There is also a 
possibility that the error term is correlated over time. This means that the capital and 
labour regressors will be correlated with the error term in the production function.
With these endogenous explanatory variables, the parameter estimates calculated 
using OLS, first-differenced OLS and within group estimation are inconsistent. The 
Anderson-Hsiao estimates are, however, consistent. We therefore use this approach 
to estimate the parameters of our production function. W ith this methodology the 
production function is differenced, thereby removing the firm-specific effect, and in­
strumental variables are used to estimate the model given the endogeneity of capital 
and labour in the production function.
We find, in our detailed analysis in Appendix D, that it is reasonable to impose 
a constant returns to  scale restriction on the production functions. Indeed, we only 
obtain reasonable estimates from our data set when this restriction is used. The first- 
differenced equation which is estimated is:
A(2/ -  l)u = a A (k -  l)it +  Aeit
We estimate this equation using a number of different instruments for the endoge­
nous regressor. Details of the instruments which were used are presented in Appendix 
D. We choose the most preferred instrument set for each sector on the grounds that 
it satisfies the Sargan Test and it provides reasonable coefficient estimates. In both 
the water and electricity distribution sectors, the preferred instrument set is the level 
of (k — I) lagged two- and three-periods.
The Anderson-Hsiao estimates for the coefficients in the constant returns to scale 
production functions are presented in Table 4.5. Standard errors are presented in 
brackets. In both sectors the estimated coefficients are statistically significant. We 
also see that the instruments used are valid as the Sargan Test is satisfied20. There 
may be heteroscedasticity in the electricity distribution and water data and, hence, the
20The p-value on th e Sargan statistic indicates that there is a high probability that th e null hypoth­
esis that the instrum ents are valid is true.
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estimates may not be efficient. There is no evidence of autocorrelation in either sector. 
We note that the estimated electricity distribution capital share is much higher than 
the capital share calculated using the income share approach. The capital shares in 
the water sector are similar under both approaches. The TFP growth rates calculated 
using these estimated input shares are presented in section 4.5.
Table 4.5: Estimated input shares
Distribution Water
Capital share 0.921* 0.864*
(0.880) (0.135)
Labour share (1-capital share) 0.079 0.136
R2 (overall) 0.82 0.42
X2 statistic 254.6 176.8
Sargan statistic 0.15 0.74
p-value on Sargan statistic 0.70 0.39
No of observations 72 60
Summary
We calculate the growth in TFP as:
AT F P  -  A  In Y  -  a A ln K  -  (3AInL  TFP Growth
Two measures are used for the level of output (Y) - the volume of output delivered 
and the quality-adjusted level of output. The capital level (K) is measured as the value 
of gross fixed assets, and the level of non-capital inputs (L) is set equal to controllable 
operating costs.
We estimate the parameters in this equation, a  and /?, in two ways. First, the 
parameters are calculated directly using the ratio of capital and non-capital costs to 
turnover. This income share approach is only valid if there is marginal cost pricing in 
the output market and if input markets are perfectly competitive. Given that these 
conditions do not hold in the regulated utility sectors, we also estimate the production 
functions directly and use the coefficient estimates as our parameters in the calculation 
of TFP growth rates.
We note that the first set of parameters are firm-specific but, in the second case, 
the parameter estimates are sectoral and the same parameter is used for each firm in 
the sector when estimating its TFP growth rate. In addition, a constant returns to 
scale restriction is imposed in the econometric analysis but no assumption is made 
about the returns to scale in the income share calculations.
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The calculated parameters are presented above in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. We see 
that the parameters are quite similar for the water sector. This may be because the 
assumption of constant returns to scale is reasonable here. In contrast, the estimated 
parameter in the electricity distribution sector is much higher than the capital share 
calculated using the income share approach. It is not clear which, if either, of these 
capital share estimates is most reasonable. The TFP growth rates calculated using 
these estimated input shares are presented in section 4.5.
4.4 .2  M alm qu ist In d ices
We also measure the growth in TFP in the water and electricity distribution sectors 
using Malmquist Indices. These Indices are calculated using data envelopment anal­
ysis and no assumptions are made about the firm’s technology, or competition in the 
product and input markets. We explain here how the indices are calculated and the 
corresponding TFP growth rates are presented in section 4.5. We are unable to cal­
culate TFP growth with this methodology for NGC as there is only one transmission 
company in England and Wales and no suitable comparators on which to base the 
estimation.
The idea behind Malmquist Indices originates from Farrell (1957). He used distance- 
measures to  determine the economic efficiency of a firm. The measures, which incorpo­
rate technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, are illustrated in Figure 4.5 for a two 
output and single input technology21. The production possibility frontier (PPF) indi­
cates the maximum amount of output combinations, (2/1,2/2)) which can be produced 
with the given input (a:). The isorevenue line shows the amount of revenue which can 
be earned from different output combinations given existing prices. The firm operating 
at point A is technically inefficient (below the PPF) and allocatively inefficient (below 
the isorevenue line). Technical efficiency is measured by the distance ratio ^  and 
allocative efficiency is measured by the distance ratio Overall economic efficiency 
is then measured as the product of these measures giving us:
Efficiency =  ^
The position of the PPF can be estimated using Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). More specifically, we use linear programming techniques to construct a piece- 
wise frontier or ‘envelope’ so that all data points in the sample lie on or below the 
frontier. The frontier is constructed so that the input and output weights in the TFP 
formula are maximised subject to the constraints that the efficiency measure must be
21 Technical efficiency measures the firm’s ability to  m axim ise the level of output produced for a 
given set o f inputs. A llocative efficiency measures the extent to  which the firm uses its inputs in  
optim al proportions given the current technology and input prices.
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Figure 4.5: Measuring efficiency
less than or equal to one for each data point. This contrasts with the Tomqvist Index 
where calculated weights, based on observed data, are used.
When panel data is available, Malmquist Indices can be const meted using these 
DEA frontiers. The indices provide a measure of annual TFP change for each firm and 
each year in the panel. The Malmquist Index calculates distance functions relative to 
the current PPF and relative to the PPF in the previous year. The relevant formula, 
for TFP change between period s and period t, is a geometric mean of the current and 
previous period TFP indices22,23:
m =
1/2
ds(yt ,x t ) d*(yt , x t )
s\
ds(ys,xa) d t ^ s i X s )
where y  is the set of outputs, x  is the set of inputs and d?(yi,Xi) is the output- 
orientated distance function given the period j technology and period i inputs and 
outputs. If m is greater than 1 there has been growth in TFP. If it is less than one 
there has been a decline in TFP.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the distance functions included in the Malmquist Index for 
a constant returns to scale technology involving a single output and a single input. 
The firm is at point s in period s and point t in period t. In both periods the firm is 
inefficient - ie, below the frontier. There has been an advance in technology between 
period s and period t as illustrated by the change in the position of the frontier.
Each distance function is calculated using linear programming methods. Details
22Fare et al (1994) proposed this geometric index. They note that ‘this form is typical of Fisher 
ideal indexes’.
23The notation used here is borrowed from Coelli et al (1998).
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Figure 4.6: Distance functions
of the process can be found in Coelli et al (1998). The linear program is solved four 
times for each firm - for period i inputs relative to period j ’s technology set; for period 
i inputs relative to period i’s technology set; for period j inputs relative to period i’s 
technology set; and for period j inputs relative to period j ’s technology set. The four 
programmes are run for each firm for each pair of adjacent time periods. Constant 
returns to scale is assumed in the calculation of the distance functions using DEA.
The main advantages of Malmquist Indices over Tomqvist Indices are as follows24.
• Cost or price data are not required. This means that income shares do not need 
to be estimated and hence we do not run into problems about how to calculate 
these shares.
• There is no assumption that firms are profit-maximisers or cost-minimisers.
• We do not impose any assumption (eg, Cobb-Douglas) on the functional form of 
the production function25.
• The entire panel data set can be used to calculate TFP change, and the change 
can be decomposed into efficiency change (ie, firms catching up with the efficiency
24 The discussion of the advantages and disadvantages o f Malmquist Indices is largely taken from 
Coelli et a l (1998). W eyman-Jones (2001a) and Jam asb and Pollitt (2000) provide similar arguments 
for and against Data Envelopment Analysis. A detailed discussion of this approach can also be found 
in  Majumdar (1997).
25 Fare et al (1994) show that w ith a Cobb-Douglas production function the Malmquist Index is 
equal to th e ‘ratio of the efficiency parameters’ of the function.
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frontier) and technical change (ie, shifts in the efficiency frontier)26.
The main disadvantages of this approach, many of which also arise with economet­
ric estimation of the production function, are:
• The shape and/or position of the DEA frontier can be affected by measurement 
error.
•  The results will be biased if any inputs or outputs are excluded.
• The efficiency scores are determined relative to the best performing companies 
in the current sample. Introducing extra firms can therefore reduce the score. In 
addition, efficiency scores can’t be compared across studies which have different 
samples.
•  The linear programming method is ‘data-hungiy’. That is, it operates best with 
large datasets. If there are only a few firms, and many inputs and outputs, most 
of the firms will appear on the frontier.
We measure TFP growth in the regulated water and electricity distribution sectors 
using these Malmquist Indices27. We construct two indices; each of which has one 
output and two inputs. The inputs used are the capital level and the non-capital level. 
These measures are discussed in Appendix C. We use two different output measures 
- volume and quality-adjusted volume.
4.5 TFP Growth - the evidence
We use the three methodologies discussed in section 4.4 to calculate the rate of growth 
in TFP in the regulated sectors. The average annual growth rates for the electricity 
distribution and water sectors are presented in Tables 4.6 and 4.8. We provide data on
26 The M almquist Index formula can be decom posed into two parts:
m = d*(yt,xt) x d*(yt,st) da(ya,xa) d*(ya,xa)
1 /2
dt{yt-,xt)
da(ya,xa)
d°(yt,xt) ds(ya,xa)
d*(iyt,xt)
1 /2
where is a measure of how the firm’s distance function has changed relative to the current
PPF from one period to  the next (efficiency change) and X is a measure o f how the
PPF  has changed from one period to the next (technical change).
27The M almquist Indices were constructed using © D E A P2.1. This programme was kindly provided 
by Tim  C oelli - w w w .une.edu.au/econom etrics/cepa.htm . D etails about this programme can be found 
in  C oelli (1996).
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the average growth rate for the entire period since privatisation (1991-2000), and for 
each of the regulatory periods 1991-1995 and 1995-2000. NGC’s average annual TFP 
growth rates are presented in Table 4.7. Again, the data is provided for the entire 
period since privatisation (1991-2000) and for each of NGC’s regulatory periods; 1991- 
1993, 1993-1997 and 1997-2000. The sectoral trends in TFP growth are shown in 
Figures 4.7 to 4.9 at the end of this section. These charts are based on the standard 
output measure but we note that the trends over time do not change significantly when 
the quality-adjusted output measure is used. We summarise the main findings from 
each approach here.
Table 4.6: Average annual TFP growth rates in the electricity distribution sector
91-00 91-95 95-00
Tornqvist Indices (%)
Calculated shares
Standard output measure 
Quality adjusted output measure 
Estim ated shares 
Standard output measure 
Quality adjusted output measure
1.97 1.62 2.25
1.98 1.48 2.38
0.88 0.84 0.92 
0.90 0.89 0.82
M alm quist Inc ices (%)
Standard output measure 
Quality adjusted output measure
2.50 2.03 2.88 
4.13 3.30 4.80
Table 4.7: Average annual TFP growth rates for NGC
91-00 91-93 93-97 97-00
Tornqvist Indices (%)
Calculated shares
Standard output measure 
Quality adjusted output measure
1.67 -1.77 3.28 1.82 
2.14 -1.23 4.02 1.88
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Table 4.8: Average annual TFP growth rates in the water sector
91-00 91-95 95-00
Tornqvist Indices (%)
Calculated shares
Standard output measure 0.95 2.08 0.04
Quality adjusted output measure 1.15 2.44 0.12
Estim ated shares
Standard output measure 0.92 2.07 0.00
Quality adjusted output measure 1.12 2.43 0.08
M almquist Indices (%)
Standard output measure 
Quality adjusted output measure
3.68
5.40
8.23
12.45
0.04
-0.24
T o r n q v is t  In d ic e s  based  o n  ca lcu la ted  sh a res
The average annual change in TFP is positive but reasonably small in all sectors 
when calculated using the unadjusted output variable. The average growth rate since 
privatisation is highest in the electricity distribution sector and lowest in the water 
sector.
The electricity distribution sector average growth rate was higher in the second 
regulatory period (1995-2000) than the first. These averages hide the fact that there 
was a steady increase in the growth rate up to  1996, and that this was followed by a 
decline in the rate up to 1998. There was a slight improvement in the rate of TFP 
growth after this, but the size of the improvement was well below the rates experienced 
in the first regulatory period.
In contrast, the average growth rate was higher in the water sector immediately 
after privatisation (1991-1995). This is largely due to the high growth rate in 1993 
which was driven by the large drop in labour costs at the time. The growth rates have 
fluctuated significantly over time, with an increase in 1995 and a notable reduction in 
productivity (negative TFP growth rates) between 1997 and 1999. These fluctuations 
coincide with the periods just after the end of a price review and just before a price 
review, respectively.
NGC’s average annual TFP growth rate has also fluctuated over time. There was 
negative growth in 1992 but this was followed by positive, and increasing growth in 
all other years. There was an average decline in TFP in the first regulatory period 
(1991-1993). This was followed by large TFP growth rates in the second period (1993- 
1997). Productivity growth continued in the third period (1997-2000), but the rate of 
change was lower than in the second period.
When the quality-adjusted output measure is used, the trends in TFP growth 
remain the same. In general the size of the growth rates are higher, confirming that
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the firm is delivering ‘more’ with the given level of inputs. The difference is most 
significant for NGC, and for the water sector between 1991 and 1995. The only case 
where we get lower TFP growth rates with the adjusted output measure is for the 
electricity distribution sector between 1991 and 1995.
T o r n q v is t  In d ic e s  based  o n  e s tim a te d  sh a res
We find positive average annual TFP growth in all sectors with this methodology. The 
growth rates are lower than those based on the calculated shares, significantly so for 
electricity distribution. The trend in the growth rate is the same for both sectors as 
it was for the calculated share measure, as seen in figure 4.8.
We again find that the use of the quality-adjusted output measure increases the 
level of TFP growth slightly in all sectors, but it does not change the general trends in 
the growth rates. The only exception is the electricity sector between 1995 and 2000, 
where the growth rate is again smaller with the adjusted output measure than with 
the unadjusted output measure.
M a lm q u is t  In d ic e s
Our calculations based on this methodology also indicate that there has been an av­
erage annual improvement in TFP in all the sectors since privatisation. The growth 
rates are significantly larger than those calculated using the Tornqvist Indices in both 
the electricity distribution and water sectors. The water sector has the highest rate 
of improvement. These growth rates may be biased by the small sample size for the 
DEA calculations.
The trends in TFP growth rates are similar to those from the Tornqvist measures. 
Productivity has fluctuated in the electricity distribution sector, with a steady increase 
up to 1995, a step-jump improvement in 1996, followed by a decline up to 1998 and an 
improvement in 1999. The pattern of change has also been stark in the water sector. 
There was significant TFP growth between 1990 and 1995, primarily driven by the 
large decline in labour costs in 1993. This was followed by a period of very low, almost 
zero, growth between 1995 and 2000. This low level of growth was driven by negative 
or zero TFP growth rates in 1998, 1999 and 2000.
The improvement in productivity is significantly higher in both the water and 
electricity distribution sectors when the quality-adjusted output measure is used. This 
is a marked difference from the Tornqvist Index measures. The trends over time are 
not affected by the use of the quality-adjusted output measure however.
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Summary
We conclude that there has been some improvement in TFP in each of the regulated 
sectors since privatisation.
•  Average annual TFP growth in the electricity distribution sector ranged from 
0.88% to 2.50% for the period 1991 to 2000, depending on which measure was 
used to calculate TFP. The annual reduction in real unit operating costs for 
the same period was comparable at 1.32%. The range was wider - from 0.9% 
to 4.13% - when quality-adjusted output was used. The reduction in real unit 
operating costs based on the quality-adjusted output measure also lay within 
this range at 1.09%. For nearly all measures TFP growth was higher in the 
period 1995 to  2000 than for the first regulatory period. This is consistent with 
the literature discussed in section 4.1.
•  NGC’s annual TFP growth rate was 1.67% for the period 1991-2000, which is 
slightly higher than the annual reduction in real unit operating costs of 1.4%. 
When quality-adjusted output measures are used, average annual TFP growth 
was 2.14% and the reduction in real unit operating costs was again lower at 
1.06%. NGC’s productivity improvement was highest during the second regular 
tory period (1993 to 1997).
•  In the water sector, average annual TFP growth for the period 1991 to 2000 
was in the range 0.92% to 3.68%. The reduction in real unit operating costs 
was higher at 4.69%, suggesting that the reduction in operating costs is at least 
partially offset by increased capital costs. This is consistent with the literature 
discussed in section 4.1. The range was higher, but of a similar width, when the 
quality-adjusted output measure was used: 1.12% to 5.4%. The quality-adjusted 
real unit operating cost reduction was just inside this range at 4.49% per annum. 
Productivity improvement was higher for the period 1991 to 1995 than for 1995 
to 2000.
In general, the average annual growth rates have been reasonably small. The 
rates are slightly higher when the quality-adjusted output measure is used. In the 
water sector the rates of productivity improvement contrast significantly with the 
large reductions in real unit operating costs but in the electricity sectors the annual 
efficiency improvements reflected in TFP growth rates and in real unit operating costs 
reductions have been comparable. The rates of TFP growth vary over time in each of 
the sectors, and in some cases appear to have been affected by the timing of regulatory 
reviews. For example, there is evidence of productivity improvements immediately
4. Productivity growth in the water and electricity sectors 131
after a periodic review (e.g. in 1995 for water) and for productivity to be slowed down 
just before a periodic review.
The trends in the growth rates do not vary significantly when we use different 
methodologies to estimate the TFP. However the growth rates are significantly higher 
when the Malmquist methodology is used instead of the Tornqvist Indices. The growth 
levels are reasonably similar from the calculated Tornqvist Indices and the estimated 
Tornqvist Indices however. This indicates that the choice of methodology will have 
an impact on conclusions reached about the rate of productivity improvement in the 
regulated sectors since privatisation. These differences are only a matter of degree in 
the level of growth, however, and we stress that the general trend in growth rates does 
not change significantly from one methodology to another. This can be seen in figures 
4.7 to 4.9.
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Figure 4.7: TFP Growth: Tornqvist Indices using calculated shares
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Figure 4.8: TFP Growth: Tornqvist Indices using estimated shares
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Figure 4.9: TFP Growth: Malmquist Indices
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4.6 Impact of RPI-X Regulation
There has been a reduction in real unit operating costs, and an increase in total factor 
productivity, across the water and electricity sectors since privatisation. We wish 
to determine how, if at all, these productivity changes have been affected by RPI-X 
regulation. The main aspects of the RPI-X regime which are expected to impact on 
the change in productivity are outlined here28. Many of the points made are discussed 
in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
•  The price cap mechanism provides the firm with an incentive to reduce costs. The 
higher the share of efficiency savings which a firm expects the retain, the greater 
the incentive to reduce costs. We found, in section 3.1.2, that this incentive 
is dulled by two key features of the price-cap setting process. First, the firm’s 
decision about how much cost reduction to undertake is determined by the length 
of time over which it expects to be allowed to retain the profits. This length of 
time is called the regulatory lag. Second, the regulator will intervene to change 
the regulatory contract mid-period with positive probability. This is often done 
when the regulator wishes to share the benefits of cost savings with consumers 
early. The absence of commitment to  the contract reduces the length of time 
that profits are retained for and, hence, reduces the net benefit from making 
cost savings in the first place. The incentive to reduce costs is determined by the 
interaction of these two factors, as the expected regulatory lag will be affected 
by the extent of regulatory commitment. We therefore include the joint impact 
of these two variables as a measure of the expected share of efficiency savings.
•  Since privatisation the regulated firms have been under increasing pressure to 
deliver a higher quality of service to  consumers. Any attempts to reduce costs 
may therefore have been offset, at least partially, by the demand for more quality. 
Of course, as discussed in section 3.1.3, the incentive to  reduce costs may have 
worked in the other direction, with the firm choosing to underdeliver on quality.
The overall impact of the output targets on productivity is ambiguous. Produc­
tivity improvement would arise if the firm adjusted its production processes so 
that the higher level of output was delivered with the same or lower levels of 
inputs. There would also be evidence of productivity improvement, however, if
28W e note, as an aside, that the level o f the price cap does not im pact on the incentive to  improve 
productivity. So long as th e  price cap  is not so  severe as to  endanger th e  financial viability  o f the  
firm, there w ill always b e  an incentive, no m atter w hat the value o f  X , to  increase efficiency levels 
beyond those assum ed b y  the regulator. T he incentive is determ ined by ‘the right o f the com pany  
to  any residual profit’ (Markou and W addam s Price, 1999). It is therefore th e m ethodology used to  
share savings at periodic reviews, rather than  th e  size o f the X-factor, which is expected  to  affect the  
rate o f change in  productivity.
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both the level of output and the level of inputs were reduced. This would be at 
the expense of quality of service. We therefore need to examine the impact of 
the quality of service level on trends in productivity.
•  The incentive to make operating cost savings does not necessarily translate into 
an incentive to  become more productive. As noted in section 4.3, capital cost 
increases may offset a reduction in operating costs, some forms of operating 
costs (eg, the costs of contracting out work) may increase while others (eg, 
direct labour costs) may decrease, and cost reduction in one year may be offset 
by increased costs the next year29. In addition, as noted above, the incentive to 
reduce costs may be offset by an increase in required outputs.
For these reasons, the regulatory regime, which is primarily focused on delivering 
operating cost savings, may not necessarily improve the firm’s overall productiv­
ity level. We therefore examine the impact of the regulatory regime on changes 
in real unit operating costs and on TFP growth rates. We expect to find, given 
our analysis of the RPI-X regime and evidence in the literature discussed in sec­
tion 4.1, that the regime has a greater impact on unit operating costs than on 
TFP.
The rate of productivity growth is also affected by factors outside of the RPI-X 
regime. We focus on two specific factors here. First, the firm’s productivity is expected 
to improve after privatisation because the change of ownership provides new cost 
reduction incentives30. We wish to determine how privatisation affects the change in 
productivity over time. In particular, we wish to see whether the impact reduces after 
a number of years. The second factor of interest also relates to the firm’s ownership. 
We consider the impact that takeovers or mergers may have on the firm’s productivity 
performance. It is assumed that a primary reason for undertaking such corporate 
activity is to reduce costs and hence we expect that the corporate activity will improve 
future productivity.
We have identified a number of factors within the RPI-X regime, and two factors 
relating to ownership, which may have had an impact on productivity growth trends in 
the water and electricity sectors since privatisation. We test the relationship between
29Markou and W addams Price (1999) present a  formal m odel w hich shows how the R PI-X  mechanism  
will ‘lead to  a significant increase in capital and decrease in  labour em ployed after privatisation, and  
more particularly a sharp rise in  labour productivity’.
30Vickers and Yarrow (1988a) provide a detailed discussion o f  th e  expected  theoretical im plications 
of a  transfer from public to  private ownership. T he reader is also referred to  Green and Haskel 
(2001), Helm and Yarrow (1988), Markou and W addams Price (1999), P ollitt (1999), Yarrow and  
Jasinski (1996) and Yarrow (1989) for discussions o f th e expected  advantages and disadvantages of 
privatisation.
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these variables by estimating the following equation using annual data on each of the 
regulated firms:
Aprodit = fii ( e f f  share) +  fopriva  +  fccorpit 4- faqualit + t + £it
where:
•  Aprod, is the annual change in productivity, measured here as the growth in TFP 
and as the reduction in real unit operating costs (RUOC).
•  e f f  share captures the firm’s expectation of the share of efficiency savings which 
it will retain. It is equal to the product of the expected regulatory lag and the 
degree of regulatory commitment (lag x comm).
lag is the firm’s expectation of the length of the regulatory lag. We expect 
that the longer the regulatory lag, the greater the level of reduction in real unit 
operating costs.
comm  is a commitment index which represents the firm’s belief about how com­
mitted the regulator is to the current regulatory contract. The more committed 
the regulator is to the regulatory contract, the higher is the firm’s expectation 
of the profit it earns from each unit of effort, and hence the higher the level of 
cost reduction.
We expect the combined term to have a positive impact on productivity growth. 
TFP will increase with an increase in the expected efficiency share and the change 
in real unit operating costs will decline - get more negative - with an increase in 
the expected efficiency share.
•  priv is the number of years since privatisation. If privatisation is the main factor 
affecting cost savings and productivity, we expect the rate of improvement (an 
increase in TFP or a decrease in real unit operating costs) to decline the longer 
the time period since privatisation. In contrast, if regulation has an ongoing and 
significant impact, cost savings and productivity improvement would continue 
to be strong as the private firm matures. The presumption is that productivity 
growth later in the period would be attributed to the impact of regulation rather 
than privatisation.
•  corp is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the regulated firm was in­
volved in a takeover or merger in the previous year. A firm’s cost saving potential, 
and productivity growth rate, are expected to improve if the firm is taken-over 
and/or if it merges with another company. That is, we expect a positive relation- 
ship between TFP growth and this variable and a negative relationship between 
the real unit operating cost change and the corporate restructuring variable.
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•  qual is a scale variable which represents the level of quality-adjusted output 
delivered by the firm. The higher this variable the more ‘output’ the firm is 
delivering with its inputs. This may constrain productivity improvements.
•  t  is a time dummy variable.
We explain in Appendix E how each of these explanatory variables are constructed. 
The estimation results are presented here.
4.6.1 Estim ation results
We present below the results of our estimation. The data used is a pooled cross- 
section for the electricity distribution, electricity transmission and water sectors. We 
have twenty-three companies and data over nine years, giving us 207 observations in 
total31,32. There are numerous problems with our results which we believe are driven 
by the relatively short dataset, a limited amount of variability in the explanatory 
variables, and the range of missing variables which also affect productivity growth. The 
low goodness-of-fit measures which arise in most of the models suggest, in themselves, 
that regulation is not the primary factor affecting productivity change in these sectors. 
In addition, the extremely high goodness-of fit measures which arise in the Malmquist 
Index regressions are considered unreliable. There is also likely to be measurement 
error with both the dependent variables and the explanatory variables. The analysis is 
therefore considered preliminary at this stage and would warrant further investigation 
when a longer and more variable dataset is available.
We estimate the equation using an ordinary least squares regression (with robust 
standard errors)33. We present the estimation results for eight different dependent 
variables - the unadjusted and quality-adjusted change in real unit operating costs, 
and the three unadjusted and quality-adjusted TFP growth rates discussed in section 
4.4.
31 W e have not estim ated  Tornqvist Indices using estim ated  shares or M alm quist Indices for NGC. 
W hen these variables are used  as the dependent variable we have tw enty-two com panies and nine years 
o f data, giving us 198 observations.
32W e also estim ated the equation using an alternative data  set which had the 1992/93 data  for all 
w ater com panies removed. T his was done to  check w hether the large efficiency improvement in  th is 
year, arising from the reduction in labour costs, affected th e  im pact regression results significantly. 
W e found that for m ost measures th e  goodness-of-fit measures did  not change significantly w ith  th is  
alternative data  set and for m ost variables the size and sign o f the coefficient estim ates did n ot change 
by very much. In addition m ost estim ates rem ained statistica lly  insignificant. T he main variation  
w as w ith  th e  expected  efficiency share variable w hose coefficient becam e negative for som e Tbrnqvist 
measures, which is inconsistent w ith our expectations. T he value o f th e  coefficient continued to  be  
very low, however, and w as statistically  insign ifican t.
33W e also considered estim ating the equation using the w ith in  group m ethodology. It w as decided  
th at th is was inappropriate as there is very little  varation in  the variables across firms. M ost o f the  
variation is  over tim e an d /or  across sectors.
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The results are presented in Table 4.9. Standard errors for each of the coefficient 
estimates are provided in brackets. We also present the 95% confidence interval for each 
coefficient in square brackets below the coefficient estimate. A * on a coefficient, or on 
the F-statistic, indicates that the estimate is statistically significant a t the 1% level 
(ie, it has a p-value which is less than 0.01). We consider these results by discussing 
each of the productivity measures separately.
Table 4.9: Impact of Regulation: OLS estimates
Productivitymeasure
Tornqvist 
Calculated Estimated
Malmquist RUOC
Standardoutput
Effshare (lag*commitment) .0008 .0010 -.0001 -.0237*
(.0016) (.0016) (.0050) (.0051)
[-.002,.004] [-.002,.004] [-.01,.01] [-.034,-.014]
Yrs since privatisation -.0297 -.0227 .2986* .1105*
(.0119) (.0106) (.0831) (.0342)
[-.053,-.006] [-.043,-.002] [.136,.461] [.043,.178]
Corporate activity .0058 .0092 .0062 .0096
(.0190) (.0091) (.0237) (.0695)
[-.031,.043] [-.009,.027] [-.04,.053] [-.127,.146]
Quality-adjustedoutputlevel .0001 -.0001 .0030 .0001
(.0002) (.0001) (.0017) (.0005)
[0,0] [0,0] [0,.006] [-.001,.001]
n 207 198 198 207
R2 0.37 0.54 0.99 0.32
F-statistic 16.68* 33.25* 9640.91* 22.09*
Quafity-adjustedoutput
Effshare (lag*commitment) .0011 .0014 .0072 -.0240*
(.0016) (.0017) (.0055) (.0050)
[-.002,.004] [-.002,.005] [-.004,.018] [-.034,-.014]
Yrs since pr ivatisation -.0284 -.0219 .2592 .1093*
(.0119) (.0109) (.0938) (.0340)
[-.052,-.005] [-.043,-.001] [.075,.443] [.043,.176]
Corporateactivity .0046 .0080 .0049 .0108
(.0189) (.0109) (.0410) (.0694)
[-.032,.042] [-.009,.027] [-.075,.085] [-.125,.147]
Quality-adjustedoiltputlevel .0000 -.0002 .0034 .0001
(.0002) (.0002) (.0019) (.0005)
[0,0] [-.0001,0] [0,.007] [-.001,.001]
n 207 198 198 207
R2 0.38 0.53 0.98 0.33
F-statistic 16.26* 38.73* 2911.72* 22.23*
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T o r n q v is t  In d ic e s  w ith  ca lcu la ted  in p u t  sh a res
When this productivity measure is used, all of the coefficient estimates are statisti­
cally insignificant, and the goodness-of-fit of the model is quite low. The F-statistic is 
statistically significant, however, suggesting that the overall model is reasonably ap­
propriate. This is true for both the standard output measure and the quality-adjusted 
output measure. We find that the coefficient on the efficiency share variable is positive 
but quite low. The sign of the relationship corresponds with our expectation that the 
firm will be more productive the longer is the lag and the more commitment there is 
to the contract but the size of the coefficient suggests that the relationship is not very 
strong.
The number of years since privatisation has a negative coefficient, suggesting that 
as the privatisation effect reduces over time it is not compensated by a regulation 
effect. There is a positive coefficient on the corporate activity variable, as expected, 
but the size of the correlation is small. There is also a small but positive coefficient 
on the level of quality-adjusted output delivered.
The results are very similar when the quality-adjusted output TFP measure is 
used as the dependent variable. The sign of the coefficients are the same for all of 
the variables, and the size of the coefficients are in general marginally higher with this 
measure (ie, they become more negative or more positive).
T o r n q v is t  In d ic e s  w i th  e s t im a te d  in p u t  sh a res
W ith this productivity measure all of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The 
goodness-of-fit of the model, as measured by R2 and the significance of the F-statistic, 
is reasonable however. There are less observations with this estimation compared to 
the calculated Tornqvist Indices because of the absence of NGC from the dataset.
The signs of most of the coefficients are the same for both the Tornqvist measures. 
The only difference is with the quality-adjusted output level, which is negative but still 
very low in this model. The positive coefficients on the expected efficiency share and 
corporate activity variables are slightly higher with the estimated input share indices. 
The coefficient on the privatisation term is less negative.
The results do not change significantly when the quality-adjusted TFP growth rate 
is used as the dependent variable. The sign of the coefficients are not changed and, in 
most cases, the size of the coefficient is increased slightly (ie, becomes more negative or 
more positive). We also note that the comparison between the estimated coefficients 
in the two Tornqvist models does not change when we consider the quality-adjusted 
measures.
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M a lm q u is t  In d ic e s
We get the most promising results when this productivity measure is used. The R2 
value is very high, and some of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. 
The goodness-of-fit measure is so high that it is considered an unreliable indicator of 
the appropriateness of the model.
Surprisingly we find a low negative coefficient on the expected efficiency share 
variable in the standard model. This contrasts with our expectation that an increase 
in expected efficiency share would lead to an increase in productivity. The number 
of years since privatisation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This 
may suggest that regulation has an ongoing impact on productivity growth when the 
privatisation effect dwindles away. We also find a small but positive coefficient on both 
corporate activity and the quality-adjusted output level. This is consistent with our 
expectations.
As with the other TFP measures, the analysis does not change significantly when 
quality-adjusted output is used. The main exception is that now the efficiency share 
variable has the expected positive sign, although the size of the coefficient is still 
relatively small. It is however higher than was the case in the estimation using Tom- 
qvist Indices. The signs of the coefficients on the other variables do not change. The 
privatisation coefficient is lower than in the standard model and is now statistically 
insignificant. The corporate activity coefficient is lower, and the coefficient on the 
quality-adjusted output variable is slightly higher.
R e a l u n i t  o p e ra tin g  co s ts
Two of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant when the change in real 
unit operating costs is used as the dependent variable in our estimation. The R2 value 
is comparable with that obtained when the Tornqvist Indices are used.
We find, as expected, a negative relationship between changes in real unit operating 
costs and the expected efficiency share. This indicates that an increase in the efficiency 
share leads to a decline in real unit operating costs (i.e. a productivity improvement). 
This estimate is statistically significant and the size of the coefficient is higher than in 
all other models, suggesting that the regulatory regime has a greater impact on cost 
reduction than on technical efficiency.
The number of years since privatisation has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, and the size of the coefficient is quite high. This implies that the longer 
the time since privatisation, the lower the rate of decline in real unit operating costs. 
This suggests that regulation does not have an ongoing effect on the change in real 
unit operating costs after the privatisation effect has been reduced. We also find a
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small positive coefficient on corporate activity which suggests that real unit operat­
ing costs increase after corporate restructuring (i.e. there is not an improvement in 
productivity). Similarly, an increase in the quality-adjusted output level would lead 
to a small increase in real unit operating costs according to the small but positive 
estimated coefficient.
When the quality-adjusted output level is used to calculate real unit operating costs 
the signs of the coefficients do not change. The coefficients are also only marginally dif­
ferent in size with this adjusted measure. Finally, we note that for the efficiency share 
and privatisation variables the direction of the relationship between the coefficients 
and the productivity growth measure are the same as when the Tornqvist Indices are 
used. The relationship is stronger with real unit operating costs however.
4.6 .2  Sum m ary
We conclude that the regulatory variables have some impact on productivity growth, 
but the goodness-of-fit measures suggest that other factors also affect the growth rate. 
In general the methodology used to calculate the dependent variables affects our anal­
ysis and it is difficult to determine an exact relationship between productivity growth 
and each of the explanatory variables. In addition it is difficult to draw conclusions 
when most of the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant.
However, the results can be used as a benchmark guide to the relationship between 
productivity growth and RPI-X regulation34. We summarise the key conclusions here.
•  As expected, TFP growth increases with the expected efficiency share. The size 
of the impact is quite small however - the confidence intervals for the Tornqvist 
TFP measures suggest that with 95% probability the interval -0.002 to 0.004 
contains the true coefficient. The interval with real unit operating costs is slightly 
higher, -0.034 to  -0.014, but the coefficient is still quite low. The may support 
the argument that regulation has more of an impact on operating cost levels 
than on technical efficiency.
•  For all our productivity measures, except the Malmquist Indices, there is a neg­
ative relationship between productivity growth and the number of years since 
privatisation. This suggests that regulation may not have an ongoing impact 
on productivity when the privatisation effect dwindles away. The confidence in­
tervals for the Tornqvist TFP measures suggest that with 95% probability the
34The reader is reminded that productivity growth is measured as an increase in  TFP and a decrease 
in  real unit operating costs. Opposite signs on the coefficients are therefore an indication of a con­
sistent relationship between productivity growth and the explanatory variables when the underlying 
dependent variable changes.
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interval -0.043 to -0.002 contains the true coefficient. The interval with real unit 
operating costs, 0.043 to 0.178, suggests a higher coefficient. This suggests that 
regulation may have greater impact on real unit operating costs than on TFP.
•  For all our TFP variables, corporate activity is positively correlated with pro­
ductivity growth but the size of the impact is quite small. There is a negative 
relationship between productivity growth when the decline in real unit operat­
ing costs is used as the dependent variable. The confidence intervals for the 
Tornqvist TFP measures suggest that with 95% probability the interval -0.031 
to -0.043 contains the true coefficient. The interval is higher but quite wide with 
real unit operating costs; -0.127 to 0.146.
•  The higher the level of quality-adjusted output produced, the lower is the level 
of productivity growth. This suggests that the additional output requirements 
constrain productivity growth somewhat. The opposite relationship is observed 
when the Tornqvist Indices with estimated factor shares are used as the depen­
dent variables. In all cases the size of. the impact is very small and potentially 
non-existent. The confidence intervals for the Tornqvist TFP measures suggest 
that with 95% probability a very small interval around zero contains the true 
coefficient. The interval with real unit operating costs, -0.001 to 0.001, also 
indicates that the coefficient is low.
•  When we use the quality-adjusted productivity measures the results are not 
altered significantly. In most cases the coefficient signs are the same as when 
the unadjusted productivity measure is used, but the size of the coefficients are 
changed marginally. The confidence intervals for all coefficients are very close to 
their counterparts in the standard models.
In general, therefore, the estimation results are consistent with our analysis in 
Chapter 3. We reiterate, however, that there are limitations to the model, and the 
size and direction of the coefficients are partially dependent on the methodology used 
to calculate TFP. It is therefore difficult to reach any firm conclusions here about the 
relationship between RPI-X regulation and productivity improvement.
4.7 Conclusion
We examined the extent to which the RPI-X regime has delivered on its promise of 
improved productivity by calculating costs changes in the water and electricity sectors 
since privatisation. There has been a significant decline in real unit operating costs
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in all sectors, but real unit capital costs have increased. The rate of increase may be 
lower than would be the case in the absence of the incentive regime.
Cost savings do not necessarily imply an improvement in productivity however. We 
therefore also measured the rate of growth in TFP to see whether the RPI-X regime 
has succeeded in improving technical efficiency in the regulated water and electricity 
sectors. Three different methodologies were used to calculate TFP - Tornqvist In­
dices using input shares which were calculated directly from the firm’s income shares; 
Tornqvist Indices using input shares taken from the estimated sectoral production 
functions; and Malmquist Indices calculated using Data Envelopment Analysis35. We 
found that, for all methodologies, the rate of growth in TFP has been positive but 
relatively small, particularly when compared to the reductions in real unit operating 
costs. We also found that the rate of TFP growth varies significantly over time and it 
appears to be affected by the timing of periodic reviews.
Our analysis of the trends in productivity growth does not change significantly 
when the growth rates are calculated using quality-adjusted output levels. The actual 
size of the growth rates are different, however, depending on which methodology is 
used to calculate TFP. This suggests that care should be taken in interpreting the 
results of any productivity study, as the outcome will be affected by the measure used.
Having found evidence of some improvement in productivity since privatisation we 
wanted to determine how, it at all, the growth was affected by the regulatory regime. 
We estimated the relationship between each of our productivity growth measures and a 
number of regulatory and ownership variables using regression analysis. The goodness- 
of-fit measures for this analysis are relatively low, suggesting that other factors also 
have an impact on productivity growth. In addition, the estimated coefficients varied 
slightly in size depending on which productivity measure was used as the dependent 
variable. The direction of the relationships were, however, generally consistent with 
our expectations. The limitations of the model, and the variation across different pro­
ductivity measures, makes it difficult to form any firm conclusions on the relationship 
between productivity growth and RPI-X regulation.
Our study of the impact of RPI-X regulation is preliminary at this stage. A number 
of interesting relationships have been identified, many of which conform with our ex- 
ante expectations. Further analysis, ideally involving an extended dataset and more 
explanatory variables, would be valuable in determining whether the relationships 
estimated here hold over a longer, and more varied, timeframe. More research is 
also required to determine which of the TFP measures best captures the extent of 
productivity improvement in the regulated sectors.
35 Only the first m ethodology was used to calculate NGC’s T FP growth rate.
C hapter 5
G ood delegation regim es
With a price cap mechanism the regulator delegates the price choice to the firm but sets 
an upper limit on the price level which can be chosen1. The firm is therefore operating 
under a restricted delegation contract2. Delegation is used because the regulator does 
not know the firm’s cost and is therefore unable to simply direct the firm to choose 
the optimal price level3. Holmstrom (1984) also emphasises that delegation has the 
lowest transaction costs from amongst the set of mechanisms which can be used to 
coordinate the firm’s information.
As described in chapter 2, the regulator sets the price constraint so that average 
revenue is equal to the expected efficient average costs at the cap. If the firm’s cost level 
is lower than the regulator’s forecast, it is able to earn profits and there is allocative 
inefficiency. As discussed in Chapter 3, this arises because of asymmetric information 
and because the firm is provided with an incentive to undertake cost-reducing effort. 
The problem is particularly acute if, given its actual cost level, the firm is able to 
choose the monopoly price from the constrained choice set4. This will only arise if 
there is a sufficient degree of cost uncertainty - i.e. if the range of potential costs types 
is quite wide and the single cap is unable to capture all of the potential variation in 
cost levels. In addition, as discussed in further detail in section 5.1.4, a monopoly firm
1The chapter title is borrowed from Schmalansee (1989), ‘Good Regulatory Regim es’. As in that 
article, we do not find the absolutely optim al regulatory m echanism but instead compare the welfare 
levels of four pre-defined contract options.
2Baron (1989) provides a useful discussion on the relationship between delegation games (where 
the firm makes the price decision and the regulator sets a fixed relationship between the transfer and 
the chosen price) and revelation gam es (where the firm announces its type and the regulator sets the 
allowed price and transfer sim ultaneously in a contract).
3Green and Stokey (1981) explain, in a more general framework, how delegation allows the principal 
to  make better use of the agent’s information. Holmstrom (1977) also em phasises that delegation is 
used ‘as a means of transm itting information and overcoming inform ational gaps’.
4Laffbnt and Tirole (1993, p i54) find that under a pure price cap regime som e cost types w ill 
choose the price cap w hile others w ill choose their m onopoly price.
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will only price below the cap if demand is elastic. The problem of a firm being able to 
choose its monopoly price under a price cap regime will therefore only arise in a limited 
number of industries which have elastic demand and sufficient variation in expected 
cost levels. The analysis in this chapter may therefore not be directly relevant for the 
core water and electricity industries currently subject to RPI-X regulation in the UK 
as they face inelastic demand curves. The discussion is likely to be of more relevance 
for sectors in which consumers are price sensitive, perhaps because price levels are 
high and/or there are supply constraints due to scarcity.
Assuming a regulated industry meets the conditions of elastic demand and signifi­
cant cost uncertainty, there is a concern that the regulated firm will continue to price 
at its monopoly level under the price cap, restricting the expected welfare benefits 
of this regulatory regime. This scenario raises the question of whether the regulator 
could increase welfare by placing more restriction on the firm’s choice set, and increase 
the probability that the monopoly price is no longer a feasible option. The main issue 
is whether the extra restriction would cause the firm to choose a lower price level, 
thereby increasing welfare, or a higher price level. We will see that the effect depends 
on the regulator’s belief about what the firm’s cost is.
The allocative inefficiency of the price cap contract is emphasised in the theoretical 
literature on optimal mechanism design. Baron and Myerson (1982) examine a static 
model with known demand and asymmetric information about the firm’s costs5. In 
this framework they found the contract which maximises expected welfare subject to a 
set of individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints6. If the regulator’s 
belief function about the firm’s cost level satisfies the monotone hazard rate property, 
the optimal regulatory contract is fully separating7. The regulator offers the firm a 
menu of cost-specific price levels, and the firm chooses the price level from the menu 
which maximises its profit. An information rent is paid to  the firm to incentivise it to
5Baron and Myerson’s (1982) model has been extended by several other authors to include asym­
m etric inform ation about demand, m ulti-product m onopoly firms and m ulti-period interactions be­
tween the regulator and the firm. See, for exam ple, Armstrong and Vickers (2000), Armstrong (1999), 
Baron and Besanko (1984), Finsinger and Vogelsang (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1986), Lewis and Sap- 
pington (1988a and 1988b), Loeb and M agat (1979), Riordan (1984), Sappington and Sibley (1988), 
Sibley (1989) and Vogelsang (2001).
6The revelation principle allows Baron and Myerson (1982) to  focus on direct mechanism s which 
ensure that the firm is honest about its cost level when choosing the price level.
7The distribution function, F(0), has a m onotonically increasing hazard rate if:
a > \ m j
Laffont and Tirole (1993) suggest that this is synonom ous w ith  a ‘decreasing returns assum ption’. 
That is, the m onotone hazard rate im plies that the marginal gain from improved productivity decreases 
as the level o f efficiency increases.
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choose the w elfare-m axim ising price level given its cost8. Each cost-type then chooses 
a different price level from the menu. In this analysis price cap regulation, which 
results in a semi-separating outcome with some types bunching at the price cap, is not 
optimal.
In Baron & Myerson’s analysis, and throughout the mechanism design literature, 
termed the ‘new economics of regulation’ by Laffont (1994), there is an assumption 
that the regulator can pay an unrestricted transfer to  the firm. In reality regulators 
are established as independent bodies which do not have the power to raise revenue to 
finance transfers. The regulator’s only source of income is the revenue earned directly 
from consumers, and hence the transfer paid to the firm is limited to be less than 
or equal to this revenue. We assume in this analysis that the constraint holds with 
equality. The welfare maximising contract with unrestricted transfers is therefore not 
feasible in practice. This was noted by Schmalansee (1989), who emphasised that this 
is the primary reason why the proposed theoretical mechanisms have not emerged in 
practice. Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch2) also argued that when transfers are restricted, 
the economic theory on optimal pricing contracts changes. We therefore expect that 
the welfare-maximising regulatory contract will be different when this constraint is 
included.
We have a situation where the contract proposed by optimal mechanism design 
theory is infeasible, and the price cap contract used in practice is suboptimal. The 
transfer restriction means that the regulator has lost some flexibility when designing 
the regulatory contract, and the only degrees of freedom remaining relate to  the level 
of choice to give to the firm. This leads us to consider the question of whether an 
alternative delegation contract, with more or less restriction on the firm’s choices than 
the price cap, could yield a higher level of welfare when the transfer paid to the firm 
is restricted.
It has proved simpler, algebraically, to determine the welfare-maximising delegation 
contract by considering the firm’s output choice. Our discussion is therefore focused 
on output floors rather than price caps. We note, as confirmed by De Fraja and 
Iossa (1998), that fixed output regulation results in the same outcome as fixed price 
regulation when the firm is a single-product monopoly and demand is known by all 
parties. Conclusions reached here therefore immediately apply to the situation where a 
regulator sets restrictions on the firm ’s price decision. In addition, an analysis based on 
output decisions allows for direct comparisons with the existing literature on optimal 
regulatory mechanisms which tends to focus on output rather than price choices.
In this chapter we abstract from the detail of how RPI-X regulation works in prac­
8 A useful exposition o f the rent extraction-efficiency trade-off in  principal-agent m odels can be 
found in Laffont and M artimort (2002).
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tice, and use a simplified framework to analyse the question of whether the output 
floor contract is the best means of regulating the monopoly firm. The welfare prop­
erties of a range of output contracts are examined using a single-period model where 
the monopoly firm’s cost level lies in a bounded continuum. The regulator does not 
know the firm’s cost level but he does know the bounds of the continuum of costs, and 
he has a belief function over the continuum about where the firm’s actual costs lie. 
The interval of possible cost types is wide, reflecting the regulator’s uncertainty about 
the firm’s efficiency level. The regulator and firm have full information about the 
elastic demand function. In addition, the regulator has no outside source of financing, 
and the transfer paid to the firm is restricted to be equal to the revenue earned from 
consumers.
W ith this framework we compare the welfare level under each of the following 
contracts.
1. An output floor contract in which the regulator delegates the output choice to 
the firm but restricts the firm’s choice to be above a fixed point (the floor). The 
firm can choose any output level on the continuous interval above the floor.
2. A welfare-maximising fully separating contract, along the lines of that proposed 
by Baron and Myerson (1982), in which the firm chooses its output level from 
a menu of cost-specific outputs designed by the regulator. It turns out that the 
outcome with this contract corresponds to the case of unrestricted delegation.
3. A no-delegation contract in which the firm is offered a take-it-or-leave-it single 
output level. The output level is equal to the welfare-maximising pooling output 
level.
4. A restricted two-interval delegation contract in which the firm is offered a choice 
set which is equal to that offered under the output floor contract, but with an 
extra set of output levels now disallowed. That is, the regulator introduces a 
discontinuity into the set of allowed output levels relative to the output floor 
contract, and thereby reduces the amount of choice which the firm has.
We emphasise that we are not designing the absolutely optimal contract but are 
instead finding the best contract from amongst this set of feasible contracts. That 
is, we are assessing whether one form of contract dominates another from a given set 
of options. In section 5.1 we describe the model in more detail. In section 5.2 each 
contract type is derived, and the firm’s choices under that contract are explained. 
Welfare under the unrestricted delegation and no delegation contracts are compared 
to  welfare under the output floor contract in section ??. We find that, when the
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transfer is restricted, the output floor contract yields a higher level of welfare than 
both these extremes. That is, delegation with a lower bound on the firm’s choice set 
is better than no delegation and unrestricted delegation.
In section 5.4 we explore the question of how much restriction should be placed 
on the firm’s choice set by comparing the output floor contract to the restricted two- 
interval delegation contract. We find that the output floor contract, despite its preva­
lence in practice, is not always best. Given this, we derive sufficient conditions under 
which the regulator is better off placing an additional restriction on the firm’s choice 
set, and sufficient conditions under which the regulator is better off with the output 
floor contract. The analysis is extended, in section 5.5, to include contracts with even 
more restrictions than the two-interval contract. We use a simulated example to ex­
amine how an increase in the level of restriction affects the level of welfare. Section 5.6 
concludes with a summary of our main findings and a discussion of possible extensions 
to the analysis.
Before undertaking our own analysis we briefly review the relevant literature in 
this area. The literature on price cap regulation does not make explicit comparisons 
between the rules observed in practice and those which have been derived from first 
principles in the mechanism design literature. Instead this body of literature focuses 
on comparing the efficiency properties of existing regulatory rules to other existing 
rules, as epitomised by the volumes of research comparing price cap regulation to rate 
of return regulation9. There has therefore been no formal analysis comparing the 
contracts proposed by theory and those which are used in practice. Our contributions 
to the literature are the explicit exposition of how the transfer restriction affects the 
optimal direct mechanism originally derived by Baron and Myerson (1982), and the 
formal comparison of the welfare properties of the price cap contract with the optimal 
fully separating and pooling direct mechanisms. These comparisons are of interest for 
industries with elastic demand and significant cost uncertainty.
Laffont (1994) presents a brief analysis of the impact of restricted transfers on the 
mechanism design problem when the firm can alter its costs through investment in cost- 
reducing effort. He finds that when transfers are restricted, and costs are unobservable, 
high rents are required to  provide optimal efficiency incentives to the firm. A folly 
separating contract will therefore be costly for the regulator. Levaggi (1999) considers 
the optimal level of procurement by the government when it faces a stringent budget 
constraint. The conclusion of this analysis is that a fully separating contract will not
9See, for exam ple, Bradley and Price (1988 and 1991), Braeutigam  and Panzar (1993), Crew (1994), 
Joskow and Schmalensee (1986), L ittlechild (1983), Lyon (1996), and the RAND (1989) Symposium  
on Price Cap Regulation . Laffont and Tirole (1993, Sections 2.6 and 2.7) provide a useful guide to  
the types o f mechanisms that are considered. Gasm i, Ivaldi and Laffont (1994) provide an evaluation  
of many o f these regulatory schem es using sim ulation techniques.
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be allocatively efficiency because it is ‘too expensive for the principal’. The optimal 
contract involves a pooling equilibrium or a bargaining solution. Restricted delegation 
contracts, including price cap regimes, which result in semi-separating outcomes are 
not explicitly considered in these papers.
The question of how much restriction to  place on the firm’s choice set has also not 
been considered in detail in the delegation literature. Papers on optimal delegation in 
static models tend to presume that the choice set is made up of a continuous interval, 
with a lower and upper bound at most10. For example, Holmstrom (1977,1984) found 
that there is an optimal solution to  the principal’s delegation problem which comprises 
a nondegenerate and finite single interval. In his analysis of quantity controls, where 
upper limits are placed on the amount a manager can produce, he found that the 
principal will prefer an interval without a gap to one with a gap when the state 
variable has a normal distribution. This result is specific to the conditions of the 
example however. Indeed Holmstrom (1977) recognised that there may be situations 
where the single interval is not optimal but argues that ‘If the optimal control has 
gaps, it is quite hard to derive, and certainly an analysis of interval controls can be 
defended on pragmatic grounds’.
Despite this, there are examples of dynamic delegation models, with moral hazard 
and asymmetric information, which find that the optimal choice set is disjoint (ie, 
made up of more than one interval). For example Szalay (2001) finds that the princi­
pal may wish to curtail the agent’s decision set so that there is a region of ‘prohibited 
intermediate choices’ as well as a region of ‘prohibited extreme choices’. In line with 
this we argue that, despite the increased complexity involved, regulators should ex­
plore the option of restricting the firm’s choices further if there is evidence that this 
will increase welfare. The need for alternative contracts is only relevant, however, in 
industries with elastic demand and where there is a wide range of potential cost types 
(i.e. cost uncertainty). The analysis of the preferred level of restriction to place on 
the firm’s choice introduces a new aspect to the design of regulatory mechanisms, and 
opens up a new set of issues for regulators to consider in practice.
10 Arm strong (1994) does not sim ply assume that the continuous interval contract is  optim al but 
finds, in his A ppendix A, local sufficient conditions for th is to  be the case. He concludes that if 
the principal’s beliefs about the sta te of the world are such that the probability density function is 
relatively flat (a more precise condition is provided in  the article) the single interval decision set is 
locally optim al. A s our objective function differs from that analysed by Armstrong (for exam ple it 
is not always concave in  the agent’s action choice), and we do not im pose any prior restrictions on 
the shape o f the regulator’s belief function, we expect to  find a different set o f conditions. We note 
that in later versions o f this working paper Arm strong sim ply assum es that the decision set will be a 
continuous interval and does not analyse when this is optim al.
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5.1 The Model
We use a stylised single period model to compare the level of welfare under different 
regulatory contracts. The key features of the model are outlined below, All functions 
are assumed to be continuous and differentiable.
5.1.1 T he firm
The firm is the sole provider of a single product to  consumers. There is a unit price 
for the product. Price and output are observable and verifiable. There is no threat 
of entry as the firm possesses an indefinite licence to operate as a monopolist in the 
market.
The firm faces a linear demand function:
q(jp) = a — bp a >  0,6 > 0
We assume that there is always some production, q{jp) >  0. 
is known with certainty by both the regulator and the firm, 
obligation the firm is required to always meet demand.
The firm’s production costs are:
C(0) =  Oq
The marginal cost of producing network access, 0, represents the firm’s efficiency 
type and it can take on any value in the continuous interval [#l, 6h V The firm is 
classified as efficient if it has a low marginal cost, 0l , and as inefficient if it has a high 
marginal cost, Oh - The firm’s cost level is exogenous. In particular the firm cannot 
change its cost level by investing in cost-reducing effort. We assume that the firm 
knows its own type with certainty but the regulator does not know the firm’s type. 
The model is therefore one of adverse selection only, rather than moral hazard and 
adverse selection11.
We assume that the firm earns all of its revenue, T , from the regulator. We use 
the standard accounting convention that consumers pay the regulator for the product 
consumed, and the regulator then chooses how much income to transfer to the firm. 
That is, the regulator acts like a clearing-house between consumers and the firm12.
11 Laffont and Martimort (2002) em phasise that in  m odels w ith cost-reducing effort the ex-post 
observability o f cost technically makes the single-period model w ith effort a m odel o f adverse selection  
only anyway.
12A  sim ilar approach is adopted by Laffont and Tirole (1993) where they assume that the revenue 
‘generated by the sale o f the outputs is received by the state and that the cost is reimbursed to  the 
firm’ (p i 68).
The demand function 
As part of its licence
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This simplifies the analysis greatly while having no impact on the firm’s incentives 
relative to the case where it earns revenue directly from consumers.
The firm chooses the output level which maximises profit. The profit function is:
7r(0) — T  — Oq
5.1.2 T he regulator
The regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer to the firm. The offer specifies 
the type of regulatory contract which the regulator intends to  use and the precise 
details of that contract. We discuss, in section 5.2, the contract options which are 
considered by the regulator. We assume that both parties can commit to the terms 
of the contract and that the legal framework for enforcing the contract exists. This 
means that once the contract has been agreed, and the firm’s output choice is revealed, 
the regulator cannot change the regulatory mechanism.
The regulator knows the demand function with certainty but does not know the 
firm’s cost type. We assume that he has a prior belief that the firm’s efficiency level is 
distributed with a distribution function F  (6) on the interval [Ol , Oh]. The associated 
probability density function is f(0 ). We assume that the regulator’s belief coincides 
with the actual distribution of types (ie, his belief structure is accurate) and that the 
probability distribution is common knowledge. We also assume that the density func­
tion is strictly positive for all types and, hence, the distribution function is continuous 
and increasing.
O bjective function
Following Baron and Myerson (1982) we assume that the regulator maximises a weighted 
sum of consumer welfare (CW ) and the firm’s profits (?r(0)):
W(q,0) = C W  + \ tt(0)
The weight on profits, A, lies in the interval (0,1). As noted by Laffont and Tirole 
(1993), this weight is synonymous with the regulator discounting the firm’s welfare 
relative to consumer welfare. As the weight is less than one the regulator cares more 
about consumers than the firm and therefore dislikes providing the firm with a positive 
rent.
Gross consumer surplus for the known demand function is:
V{q) =  p(x)dx  =  y  -  ^
Consumer welfare is equal to gross consumer surplus minus the revenue paid to the 
firm:
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c w  =  ^ - £ - t  b 2b
Given uncertainty about the firm’s type the regulator’s objective function is:
r^H
Ee(W (q,9)) =  /  W(q, 0)f(9)d9 E x p ec ted  W elfare
= C { f  -  -  a -A )r}/(*)<*>
Constraints
When m axim ising expected welfare the regulator faces two standard mechanism de­
sign constraints - an individual rationality constraint and an incentive compatibility 
constraint. We also introduce a third constraint on the transfer paid to the firm.
Under the individual rationality constraint the regulator ensures that the firm 
makes non-negative profits13:
7r(0) > 0 VO Rationality
This implies that the regulator must ensure that the firm, whatever its type, continues 
to  produce under the regulatory contract (ie, there is no firm shut-down).
Under a direct mechanism the firm, of type 9, announces its type to be 9. The 
regulator presents the firm with a contract | t ( 0 ) ,  <?(0)j and the firm earns profit:
tt (9,0) = T (0 )-0 q (0 )
The incentive compatibility constraint ensures that the firm’s announcement is 
honest. It is stated as follows.
7r(0) =  max7r(0,9) V0, 9 Com patibility
?
Under this constraint it is privately optimal for the firm to report its type hon­
estly14.
Finally we assume that the regulator has no outside source of income - eg, unre­
stricted money from the Treasury or the right to impose taxes directly on consumers -
and hence the amount of revenue which is transferred to the firm is restricted to be less
13W e have an ‘interim  individual rationality constraint’ because we are considering the case where 
the contract is agreed after the firm knows its type.
14T his constraint is only relevant when the regulator offers a menu of type-specific contracts. In 
this situation a firm may have a private incentive to  misrepresent its type and the regulator designs 
the contract to  offset this incentive. W hen non-type specific pooling and delegation contracts are 
offered the firm gets the sam e contract offer no m atter what its announced type and hence incentive 
com patibility is not an issue.
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than or equal to  the revenue earned from consumers. We assume that the constraint 
holds with strict equality15:
2
T  =  pq(p) =  R estricted transfer
b
This restriction reflects the idea that the regulator is an independent body which 
has no access to Treasury funds and which is not required to provide funds to the 
Treasury. Utility regulators in the UK were created with this kind of independent sta­
tus. We recognise, at the outset, that the regulator would be better off if the financing 
was available for an unrestricted transfer but we assume that the existing institutions 
and legislation are unlikely to change in practice and, hence, transfers are likely to 
remain restricted for the foreseeable future16. In comparison to the mechanism design 
literature with unrestricted transfers, the regulator has lost an important regulatory 
instrument and we therefore expect him to have less degrees of freedom when choosing 
the welfare-maximising contract. Indeed the only instruments available to  the regula­
tor are the form of the contract and the level of output(s) allowed in that contract17.
W ith the transfer restriction imposed the regulator’s objective function becomes:
E . m , M  -  £ '  +
Appendix F considers the comparative static properties of this function. The main 
results are as follows.
•  The level of welfare is increasing in output for a firm of type 6 (Lemma F .l).
•  The rate of change in welfare, arising from a change in output, is increasing in 
the level of output if the welfare function is convex (A € (0,0.5)) (Lemma F.2).
•  The rate of change in welfare, arising from a change in output, is decreasing in 
the level of output if the welfare function is concave (A £ (0.5,1)) (Lemma F.3).
•  Welfare is decreasing in type for a given level of output. The rate of decrease is 
constant for all types (Lemma F.4).
•  The rate of change in welfare is decreasing in type for a given level of output. 
The rate of decrease is constant for all types (Lemma F.5).
15W e also rule out the possiblity that the regulator sets a two-part tariff. This pricing option has 
been used by some authors, for exam ple Baron and Besanko (1987), to mirror the role o f an unrestricted 
transfer function. The fixed payment in the two-part tariff, which is funded by consumers, is used to  
influence the firm’s incentives in the sam e way as a transfer.
16Laffont and Tirole (1993, C hl5) explain how concerns about the regulator m isusing his power, 
perhaps because of regulatory capture, provide a rationale for not allowing the regulator to  control an  
unrestricted transfer budget.
17The form of the contract relates to  the amount o f restriction which is placed on the firm’s choice 
set.
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5 .1 .3  T h e  o u tp u t floor contract (C ontract F )
We assume, initially, that the regulator limits the monopoly firm’s behaviour by using 
an output floor contract. In subsequent sections we compare welfare under this con­
tract to the  welfare level under a number of alternative contracts. Under the output 
floor contract the regulator delegates the output choice to the firm but restricts the 
firm’s choice to  lie in a single interval which is bounded below by the output floor18. 
The contract is:
choose qe  [^min, oo]
The set of forbidden output levels is: [0, qnun)-
The regulator must ensure that the firm continues to produce under this regulatory 
contract (individual rationality). A sufficient condition for this is that: 7r(Oh ) > 0- 
The minimum feasible level of output is therefore set where the inefficient type’s profits 
are exactly equal to zero. This gives us the output floor:
9m in ~  CL
For notational simplicity we continue to use the term <7min, recognising this restriction 
on its value.
The conditions of the contract restrict the firm’s choice from below. We know that 
as a profit maximiser the firm will produce its monopoly output level if it is within its 
allowed choice set. If, however, the monopoly output level is not available, the firm 
will choose the level of allowed output which is closest to it. This is ensured by the 
fact tha t the firm’s profit function, incorporating the transfer restriction, is concave 
and symmetric in output. This gives us:
q =  q M (0)  \ i q M (0)  e ^ ^ o o ]
q =  <?min i f  Q (@) ^  9min
The semi-separating choices under the output floor contract are illustrated in figure
5.1 and summarised as:
q =  qM(e)
q  =  gmin if fle ( °  , $H
18T he regulator is only concerned w ith  types who produce output levels that are too low. It is 
therefore presumed unnecessary to place on upper lim it (ie, ceiling) on the firm’s output level. We 
note that the firm optim ally chooses never to produce more than q (0) =  a  — bO, as any higher output 
level results in a loss.
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Figure 5.1: Output choices under contract F
5.1.4 Industry characteristics
In our description of the output floor contract we found that some cost types would 
be able to choose their monopoly output level as it lies above the output floor. That 
is, for some types:
a  - b » H <  a- ^  =  < T W
We consider here the conditions which need to prevail in the regulated industry 
for this outcome to arise. When comparing the output floor contract to other contracts 
we assume that these characteristics exist.
Cost constraints
The firm’s monopoly output level will be greater than the output floor if:
?  < 20h - 0  V0b
-  Yb + l
As this condition must also hold for 0l we find that the interval of types must 
satisfy the following constraint if some types are able to choose their monopoly output 
level above the output floor:
^  -  0h < Oh ~ Ol
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The range of possible cost levels must therefore be sufficiently wide - i.e. there must 
be sufficient uncertainty about the cost level. This is a necessary and sufficient condi­
tion for the situation to arise where some types will be able to choose their monopoly 
output level under the outptrt floor contract.
In addition, if the firm prices at marginal cost, the level of. output should be 
positive. This will always arise if costs satisfy the condition:
o < e L < e „ < ^
This ensures that:
0 <  -  — Or  < 0 h  — &l
Elasticity o f demand
The elasticity of demand in the regulated industry is:
At the output floor the elasticity is equal to:
—b0H
£n ----p a — b$H
The demand curve is elastic at the output floor if:
>  1W ha — bOjj
2 b
If the demand curve is elastic, a firm of type 6 will be able to choose its monopoly 
output level under the output floor contract if::
a ^ a 0 ^ .— — |—  Oh2b ~  2b 2 ~
However, the monopoly output level will not be feasible under the output floor 
contract for any type, even when demand is elastic, if:
a a Or a
— < 0 H <  f- —  <  -2b ~  H -  2b 2 b
Elasticity of demand is therefore consistent with the monopoly output level being 
above the output floor in some circumstances but it is not a sufficient condition. The 
constraints on the cost interval must also be met.
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The demand curve is inelastic at the output floor if:
e« < Y b
W ith the inelastic demand curve the constraint on the width of the cost interval is 
never satisfied. This is because the inelasticity constraint at the high cost level, and 
the constraint on the width of the cost interval, can not be met simultaneously since:
a 0 a—  4* — < Oh  <  —V(9 is never feasible given 6 > 02b 2 2b
W ith an inelastic demand function no type will be able to choose its monopoly 
output level under the output floor contract. This suggests that elasticity of demand is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the situation to arise where a regulated firm  
is able to choose its monopoly output level under the output floor contract. Therefore, 
before deciding whether or not to change the form of the regulatory contract, the 
regulator will first need to calculate the elasticity of demand for the particular industry 
in question. This will allow him to determine whether the concern discussed in this 
paper arises in that particular industry.
Industries o f interest
We conclude that a firm may be able to choose its monopoly output level under the 
output floor contract if:
•  demand is elastic; and
•  there is a sufficiently wide interval of cost types (i.e. a high degree of cost 
uncertainty).
Table 5.1 provides estimates of the own price elasticity of demand in a range of 
utility industries across a number of countries19. These show elasticity estimates less 
than one for electricity and water, supporting the generally accepted conclusion that 
demand in these sectors is relatively inelastic. The inelasticity is largely affected by 
the necessary nature of these products, with consumers being unwilling to reduce 
consumption in response to a price increase. Furthermore, particularly in the case of 
water, the absence of alternative substitutes affects the degree to which consumers can 
respond to price changes. The estimates for the mobile telecommunications industry 
are highly variable, with evening demand close to being elastic. However there is
19W e note that the m ethodologies and data used to  measure these demand elasticities are often  
subject to criticism . It is beyond the scope of this paper to critically assess the estim ates but we 
accept that they may not be robust. They are used here purely for illustrative purposes.
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evidence that up to 22% to 29% of consumers in the UK switch operators in search of 
a cheaper tariff package, suggesting that consumers are highly price sensitive in this 
sector20. Demand for natural gas appears to be elastic.
These aggregate measures may conceal the fact that some consumers - notably 
large users - will be more price sensitive than others. For example, if the price of 
water increases, a factory which uses large volumes of water on a daily basis - and is 
metered - will use water more efficiently by introducing new technologies and working 
practices. Similarly a large user of gas will become more energy efficient in response 
to a price increase so as to reduce the total cost to the firm. In addition, electricity 
supply businesses may encourage their end-user customers to be more energy efficient 
to reduce the overall costs of electricity purchased, thereby making the demand which 
electricity distribution companies face more elastic. Regulated businesses which have 
a higher proportion of large user customers may therefore have a more elastic demand 
function.
Consumers are more likely to be price sensitive if water and energy resources be­
come scarce - placing pressure on consumers to reduce the volumes used - and if the 
cost of water or energy is a high proportion of a company or household’s overall ex­
penditure21. In some countries water efficiency schemes are introduced which actively 
encourage consumers to be more price sensitive and to reduce the level of water used. 
For example, in California and New York water prices were high because of scarcity 
problems and households purchased new water efficient technologies and changed their 
consumption behaviour in response to these prices. This again emphasises the point 
that, when considering the question of whether or not to change the form of the regu­
lated contract, a regulator should estimate the elasticity of demand for the particular 
regulated firm as the actual elasticity for a sector may vary by firm, by country and/or 
over time.
We conclude that the concern that a regulated firm will be able to choose its 
monopoly output level under the output floor contract is less likely to arise in the 
regulated water and electricity distribution sectors in the UK than in other sectors such 
as gas and mobile telecommunications. This is because current estimates indicate that 
demand, at least at an aggregate level, is currently inelastic in these sectors. Further 
estimates of the actual elasticity of demand for individual firms, taking account of the
20Com petition Commission (2002, p53, para 2.193), Vodafone, 0 2 , Orange and T-Mobile: Reports 
on references under section 13 of the Telecommunications A ct 1984 °n  the charges made by Vodafone, 
0 2 , Orange and T-Mobile fo r terminating calls from  fixed and mobile networks.
21 For exam ple, water com panies are large users o f electricity and gas. As energy prices increase 
these com panies look for ways to becom e more energy efficient. Similarly, the electricity generating 
com panies are large users of water and also seek to  implement water efficient technologies as water 
prices increase.
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characteristics of their consumers, would be required to confirm that this is the case. 
This analysis is beyond the scope of this paper but would be a useful next step in 
future research.
The analysis in this chapter may therefore not be highly relevant for the core 
regulated sectors in the UK. The problem discussed here may arise in other sectors 
where consumers are more price sensitive. Furthermore the problem may arise in 
the regulated network utility sectors in other countries - which face different supply 
constraints and price levels - and may even become more relevant in the UK if the 
nature of demand changes over time or if firm-specific elasticity estimates reveal more 
price sensitivity than the aggregate historical estimates suggest.
Table 5.1: Estimates of own-price elasticity across a range of sectors
Industry/Product Own price elasticity
U K  fixed to  m obile calls (1997 to  2001)1
- daytime -0.42 to -0.33 (long run)
-0.26 to -0.17 (short run)
- evening -0.95 to -0.76 (long run)
-0.58 to -0.41 (short run)
- weekend -0.54 to -0.43 (long run)
-0.20 to -0.20 (short run)
E nergy  dem and
Australian residential energy demand (1984 ro 1998)2
- electricity -0.35 to -0.34
- natural gas -1.03 to -1.02
Norwegian household electricity demand (1976 to 1993)3
Short run -1 to -0.4
Long run -1 to -0.3
US urban residential energy demand (1972 to 1975)4
Electricity -0.25 to -0.72
Gas -2.07 to -0.94
UK electricity demand (1937 to 1938)5 -0.89 (short run)
P rice  elastic ities for pub lic  w a ter supply6
Australia Sydney Water (1960 to 1994) -0.13
Copenhagen, Denmark (early 1990s) -0.10
France (1988 to 1993) -0.26 to -0.17
Italy (mid-1990s) -0.24
Korea (1998) -0.29
New Zealand (1980s) -0.29 to -0.08
Illinois, US (mid-1980s) -0.71 to -0.48
Sources: 1dotecon (2001); 2 Akmal and Stern (2001); Halvorsen and Larsen (1999);
4Lakshmanan and Anderson (1980); 5Houthakker (1951); 6OECD (1999)
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5.2 Alternative Contract Options
We compare expected welfare under the output floor contract to welfare under three 
other contract options. W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  r e g u la te d  in d u s tr y  h a s  a n  e la s t ic  
d e m a n d  c u r v e  a n d  t h a t  t h e  e x p e c te d  in te r v a l o f  c o s t s  s a t is f ie s  t h e  c o n d it io n s  
d e s c r ib e d  in  s e c t io n  5.1.4. There is thus a risk that the regulated firm will be able 
to choose its monopoly output level under the output floor contract. The objective is to 
determine whether the contract with a single constraint, which is observed frequently 
in practice, is in fact ‘best’22. If welfare is found to be higher under an alternative 
contract option, this raises the question of whether existing regulatory mechanisms - 
such as the RPI-X regime - should be changed.
Given asymmetric information about the firm’s costs, the regulator is unable to set 
a direct output rule for the firm and first-best is not attainable23. We therefore focus 
our attention on a number of second-best feasible mechanisms which take account of 
the asymmetric information in the model. Specifically, we assume that the regulator 
can offer the firm one of the following alternative regulatory contracts. We explain 
below how the regulator determines each contract and how the firm makes choices 
under the contract.
•  Optimal fully separating contract (C o n tr a c t  S )  - the regulator offers the firm 
a menu of type-specific output levels and the firm chooses one output from this 
menu of discrete points. The contract is:
choose qe{q{0)}
The regulator’s menu of type-specific output levels is determined by imposing full 
separation and, given this, maximising expected welfare subject to the individual 
rationality, incentive compatibility and transfer constraints. As we will show this 
contract can be implemented by simply delegating the output decision to the firm 
without placing any restrictions on the choice set. It therefore corresponds to 
the case of unrestricted delegation and there are no forbidden output levels.
•  Optimal pooling contract (C o n tr a c t  P )  - the regulator offers the firm a single 
take-it-or-leave it output-level, qp . The output level is determined by imposing 
the condition that the contract is pooling and, given this, maximising expected
22W e reiterate that, in the spirit o f Schmalensee (1989), we are seeking the contract which yields the 
highest level of welfare from am ongst a predeterm ined set rather than the absolutely optim al contract.
23This is the level o f output which m axim ises the unrestricted social welfare function, when the 
firm’s type is known, subject to  the constraint that the firm make nonrnegative profits. For a firm of 
type 0 the first-best output level is qFB{0) = a —b0.
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welfare subject to the individual rationality and transfer constraints. This con­
tract corresponds to the case of no delegation. All output levels except one are 
forbidden.
•  Restricted two-interval contract (C o n tra c t  R 2)  - the regulator delegates the 
output choice to  the firm but restricts the firm’s choice set. The restricted 
choice set is the same as that in the output floor contract but with an additional 
set of output levels disallowed. The contract is:
choose qe [^ min? X  +  fc]U[7 — k, oo]
The set of extra forbidden output levels, relative to the output floor contract, 
is: (X  +  k ,Y  — k). X and Y are determined exogenously and they satisfy the 
condition that 0 <  qmm < X  < Y 24. The parameter k determines the size of the 
interval of additional disallowed output levels, with 0 <  k < Y-rX. The smaller 
is k, the larger is the set of disallowed outputs. The output floor contract is an 
extreme case of this contract where k = .
The options presented here reflect different degrees of choice given to  the firm. 
They range from unrestricted delegation of the output choice to complete restriction 
(or no delegation). In between these extremes the regulator can place intermediate 
levels of restriction on the firm’s choice set. We focus initially on the restricted two- 
interval contract, but consider the case for contracts with more than two-intervals in 
section 5.5. The greater the number of intervals, the more restriction is placed on 
the firm’s choice. This is because the set of disallowed output levels has increased 
relative to the output floor contract. This analysis allows us to determine what the 
optimal form  of the delegation contract is25. Once the welfare-maximising contract 
form has been determined the regulator will calculate the optimal value of the interval 
boundaries in this contract. This issue is not considered in this paper but is clearly 
the next required step in future research.
5.2 .1  O p tim al fu lly  sep arating  contract (C on tract S)
We determine the optimal fully separating and pooling contracts by extending Baron 
and Myerson’s (1982) mechanism design model to  include our restriction that the
24The determ ination of these boundaries is not considered in  this papier although it is clear that
for the bounds to  have an im pact on the firm’s choices we require X  < Y  <  qm ( # l ) .  qm (Ol ) is the 
monopjoly output level o f the efficient firm and is equal to  .
26The reader is referred to Holmstrom (1984) for the theorem  on the existence o f a solution to  the 
delegation problem.
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transfer paid to the firm is equal to the revenue earned from consumers. This additional 
constraint changes Baron and Myerson’s results significantly.
The regulator’s problem is to determine the contract which will maximise expected 
welfare subject to the transfer restriction, the individual rationality constraint and the 
incentive compatibility constraint. It can be stated as follows:
max /* "  (  -  XOq (0) -  (1 -  A)T  (0) \  f(0)dBm eum JoL \  t> 26 » W  v I Ki j JK I
subject to:
7r(0) > 0  VO R a tio n a lity
7r(0) =  max 7r(0,0) VO, 0 C om patib ility
?
T  =  aq(0)-Jq(0)]  T ransfer
Assuming that the profit function is differentiable incentive compatibility implies, 
at the optimum where 0 = 0, that:
chr ^0,0^
dO ' 9=9
=» T'(0) = 0q'(0)
The restriction on the level of transfers implies that:
=  aq'W  -  2 (g(g)) 1/(0)
Therefore, if both the incentive compatibility constraint and the restricted transfer 
constraint are to be satisfied we require:
0q'(6) =  [a ~ 2 ( # ) ) ]  Feasibility
In Baron and Myerson’s (1982) paper, and in much of the literature which has 
stemmed from it, there is an assumption that the regulator’s belief function satisfies 
a monotone hazard rate property26. This ensures, in the analysis when transfers are 
unrestricted, that the optimal contract is always fully separating. Here, however, the
26W ith a m onotone hazard rate the conditional probability o f there being no further efficiency im ­
provements increases as the firm’s type increases (ie, as the firm becom es more efficient, the probability 
of it making further efficiency improvements decreases). That is, as the firm gets closer to  the efficiency 
frontier a marginal improvement in efficiency becom es more difficult. Bagnoli and Bergstrom  (1989) 
provide details of the many standard distributions which satisfy this condition. They also provide 
sufficient conditions on the density function for the m onotone hazard rate property to hold.
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condition for incentive compatibility and the transfer restriction to hold simultaneously 
is independent of the regulator’s belief function and, hence, the monotone hazard ratio 
assumption no longer ensures that the optimal contract is fully separating. Indeed, a 
contract which satisfies this feasibility condition might be fully separating, pooling or 
semi-separating.
Pull separation implies that output cannot be constant over an interval of types 
( m  ^  0). The feasibility condition is then only satisfied lfi
/A\ a — bOm  = —
Only this output level ensures that both constraints are satisfied. Notably this is the 
monopoly level o f output and it is the only feasible contract which is available to the 
regulator if the regulatory mechanism is forced to be fully separating. This is consistent 
with Vickers and Yarrow’s (1988a) prediction that, when lump-sum transfers are not 
feasible, ‘Price would have to exceed unit cost’ and there would be a further ‘departure 
from allocative efficiency’. The outcome is also an extreme confirmation of Laffont 
and Tirole’s (1993, Ch2) claim that the transfer restriction will lead to ‘an increase 
in the consumer price away from marginal cost and toward the monopoly level’. We 
therefore conclude that with this contract there is no evident benefit of regulation, 
and the outcome is consistent with the unrestricted delegation of the output choice to 
the firm.
The output choices under the optimal fully separating contract are illustrated in 
Figure 5.2 and summarised as:
q =  qM (0) V 0
We note that Baron and Myerson’s (1982) level of output under the optimal con­
tract with unrestricted transfers is:
mq'(e) = a — b <? +  ( ! - A)
m i
The introduction of the transfer restriction alters the optimal contract in the fol­
lowing ways.
•  Our optimal regulatory contract might be fully separating, pooling or semi- 
separating, even if the regulator’s belief function satisfies the monotone hazard 
rate property. Baron and Myerson’s optimal contract is always fully separating 
with this assumption on the regulator’s belief function.
•  W ith our fully separating mechanism all types produce the monopoly level of 
output (ie, less than the first-best level). Some types are producing more than 
they do under Baron and Myerson’s contract while others are producing less.
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Monopoh
Output
Type
Output
Y-k -
X + k -
Figure 5.2: Output choices under Contract S
The net welfare effect of the transfer restriction depends on the shape of the 
regulator’s belief function over cost types.
• The role of the transfer as a means of providing the firm with an incentive to be 
honest is eliminated. Instead the regulator has to allow all types to earn high 
profits - the monopoly level - to ensure incentive compatibility.
5.2.2 Optimal pooling contract (Contract P)
The optimal pooling contract is a special case from the set of contracts which satisfy the 
above constrained welfare maximisation problem. The feasibility condition is trivially 
satisfied as the output level is constant across all types (q'(Q) =  0). The regulator only 
needs to consider the impact of the individual rationality and transfer constraints on 
the welfare maximisation problem. The regulator’s problem becomes:
C { a- y - [^ - X6qP- { 1 - x y l v }
subject to:
tt(0) > 0 V0 
b
To minimise the cost of ensuring individual rationality for all types, the regulator 
sets the transfer so that the profit of the highest cost firm is equal to zero. We then
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have: T 9 =  6nqp • This condition is only consistent with the transfer restriction when:
( f  =  a — b$H 
T9 =  aOH -  b02H
Notably the output level is again independent of the regulator’s belief function. The 
most inefficient type produces the first-best level of output and makes zero profits. All 
other types produce an output level that is lower than first-best, and make positive 
profits equal to 7r(0) =  (a — bOH) (Oh — 0 ) >  0. We note that in this contract all firms 
produce at the equivalent level of output as the output floor in contract F. This is not 
surprising given that it is the individual rationality constraint which influences the 
contract design in both cases.
The choices under the optimal pooling contract are shown in Figure 5.3 and sum­
marised as:
V 0
Output
Y-k -
X+k -
Contract deviation from monopoly output
*knin
Monopoly
Output
Type
Figure 5.3: Output choices under Contract P
5.2.3 Restricted two-interval contract (Contract R2)
In our final contract the regulator takes the optimal output floor contract and intro­
duces an additional set of disallowed output levels in the firm’s choice set. This is 
thus an alternative delegation contract but with increased restriction relative to the 
output floor contract. The profit-maximising firm will choose its monopoly output 
level if it lies within the allowed choice set. If the monopoly output level lies outside
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the firm’s choice set, it will choose the closest allowed output level given the concavity 
and symmetry of the profit function.
The optimal output choices, as a function of type, are illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
These choices are derived in Appendix F.
Output
Y -k -
X + k -i
Contract deviation from monopoly output
(a-X-YVb 
(a-2(Y-k)yb 1 (a-2(X+k))/b
 1----
(a-q™„yb
Monopoly
Output
"Type
Figure 5.4: Output choices under Contract R2
The semi-separating choices under the restricted two-interval contract are:
a — 2(Y  — k)q =  qM( e ) \ { 0 e  \GL,
'a — 2( Y  — k) a - ( X  +  Y)'
q =  Y - k  if 0e ^ b , b 
q =  qM( 0 ) i i  06 (
• r  s\ ( &  2 ^ m i n
q =  qmin II Oe I — -—
b ’ b 
a -  2 ( X +  k) a -  2qmin
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5.3 Welfare comparison: contracts F, S and P
Table 5.2: Comparing the output floor contract to contracts S and P
Interval of Types F s P
mlu qM(0)
Qmin
qM(9)
qM(0)
9min
f7min
A comparison of the firm’s output choices under the output floor contract (F) and the 
optimal fully separating (S) and optimal pooling (S) contracts is provided in Table 5.2. 
All types in the interval $l < 0  < °~2^ mln produce the same level of output under the 
output floor contract and the optimal fully separating contract. Those types who lie 
in the interval <  0 < 0H produce an output level higher than their monopoly
level under the output floor contract. We therefore have a situation where, relative to 
the fully separating contract, no type chooses a lower level of output under the output 
floor contract and some types choose a higher level of output. As welfare is increasing 
in output for any given type we can conclude that the output floor contract increases 
welfare relative to the optimal fully separating contract. That is, delegation with the 
output floor restriction is better than unrestricted delegation.
We also find that the output floor contract yields a higher level of welfare than 
the optimal pooling contract. All types in the interval Ol < 6 < choose a
higher level of output under the output floor contract than they produce under the 
optimal pooling contract. All other types produce the same level of output under both 
contracts. We therefore, again, have a situation where no type is choosing a lower level 
of output under the output floor contract and some types are choosing a higher level 
of output. Welfare is therefore higher under the output floor contract than under the 
optimal pooling contract. That is, delegation with the output floor restriction is better 
than no delegation.
The restriction on transfers means that the optimal fully separating and pooling 
contracts result in output levels which may be undesirably low. This problem can 
be at least partially overcome by delegating the decision to  the firm and placing a 
lower-bound on the output choices27. This results in a semi-separating contract. This 
result contrasts with the standard literature on optimal regulatory mechanisms with 
unrestricted transfers which finds, for most standard belief functions, that the fully
27 Armstrong and Vickers (2000) find a sim ilar result in their analysis of m ultiproduct price regula­
tion. They find that when demand is known, costs are unknown, and there is no lump-sum  transfer, it  
is optim al to  give the firm som e discretion over its pricing policy (ie, give it discretion over individual 
tariffs w hile regulating overall revenues or a price index). They do not, however, explore the issue of 
what the optim al amount of discretion is.
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separating contract is best28.
5.4 Welfare comparison: contracts F and R2
We assume here that the regulator chooses from a range of delegation contracts which 
place different degrees of restriction on the firm’s choice set. The minimum level of 
restriction arises under the output floor contract, and the pooling contract offers the 
maximum level of restriction (ie, no choice). We have already shown that the minimum 
level is better than the maximum case of no delegation. The prevalence of output floor 
type contracts in practice might also suggest that the minimum level of restriction is 
better than any other restricted delegation contract. This has not, to our knowledge, 
been formally analysed. We therefore wish to examine the question of whether the 
output floor is in fact the best means of restricting the firm’s choice set. We continue to 
assume that the regulated industry has an elastic demand curve and that the expected 
interval of costs satisfies the conditions described in section 5.1.4.
If it is the case that the output floor arrangement does not always yield the highest 
level of welfare, we also wish to identify the circumstances under which the regulator 
should place more restrictions on the firm’s output choices. We examine this aspect 
of the regulation problem by comparing the output floor contract to the restricted 
two-interval contract. The question of whether even more restriction on the choice 
set would yield a higher level of welfare is explored in section 5.5, using a restricted 
m-interval contract (contract R 71, m  > 2).
_________ Table 5.3: Welfare Impact of Output Choices
Interval of Types
a —2 ( Y —k) 
bIq =
h  = 
h  =  
h  = 
h  =
a - 2 ( Y - k )  o - ( X + V )  
b » b
’a - ( X + Y )  a - 2 ( X + k )  
b » b
a - 2 ( X + k )  o - 2 gmin 
b » b
F R2 Welfare Change (given 6)
qM(e) qM(6) 0
qM(6) Y - k +
qM(0) X + k -
qM(8) qM{6) 0
9min 9m in 0
A high level comparison of the firm’s output choices between the output floor 
contract and the restricted two-interval contract are provided in Table 5.3. We show 
the direction of the welfare change arising from the different output choices for each 
interval of types. For some types (Ii) there is an increase in welfare when we move
28We note that our results hold even if  the regulator’s belief function satisfies the m onotone likeli­
hood ratio property. This is because the optim al fully separating and optim al pooling contracts are 
independent of the belief function when the transfer function restriction is introduced.
5. G ood delegation regimes 168
from contract F to contract R2, but for other types (I2) there is a decrease in welfare. 
The net effect on expected welfare depends on the weight placed on each type interval, 
and on how the change in welfare from a change in output varies across types. These 
factors are explored in detail below.
5 .4 .1  I s  C o n t r a c t  F  a lw a y s  b e s t ?
In this section we consider the question of whether the output floor contract always 
yields the highest level of welfare from amongst the set of restricted delegation con­
tracts. We find that there exists at least one case where an alternative contract, with 
more restriction than the output floor contract, yields a higher level of welfare. This 
result means that we cannot assume that the output floor contract is always best and 
a new dimension needs to be added to the design of regulatory delegation contracts 
which focuses on the optimal form of the choice set29. This analysis is of interest for 
industries with elastic demand and a relatively wide interval of potential cost types.
We use the following formulas to  compare expected welfare under the alternative 
contracts.
The level o f ex p ec ted  w elfare u n d er co n trac t R2 is:
Ee[W(q,0)\ =
q-2(y-fc) o-(x+y)
JtL ” W(qM(9), 8)f(6)d0 + W(Y -  k, 6)f(e)d6
k —2(X+k)  f t~ ^ . i n l n
+  L - < x + y ,  W(X + k, 6)f{e)dB +  W(qM(0),e)f(6)dB
+ W(qmm,8)mde
(5.1)
W ith contract F expected welfare ia as above but calculated at k — .
The change in  ex pec ted  w elfare arising from a change in k is30:
=  dEe [W{q,e)\ 
dk
( r - ^ 1 d W (X  + k,6) _  d W ( Y - k ,0 )  \
y a-jX+Y) d q (0) f t 9 ) * 6 J a r 2{Y - k ) (0) f W ^ j
The function A gives us the change in expected welfare arising from a small increase
29W e use the phrase ‘form of the choice set’ to  refer to the amount of restriction which is placed on 
the firm’s choices. The question o f where the restricted choice sets should lie on the output interval 
remains a central elem ent of the design of the regulatory contracts, and becom es ever more com plicated 
the more restrictions are introduced (ie, the more com plex the form of the choice set). This elem ent 
o f the contract design is not considered in  this paper.
30The calculation is based on the formula: ^  fa(y) y)^x  =  {jf(b(y), y))b'(y) — f(a(y), y)a'(y)} +
/X> %(x 'y'>dx
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in k (ie, moving from Contract R2 towards Contract F)31. As suggested by Table 5.3, 
only types in the regions I\ and I2  affect the change in welfare when the choice set 
is changed. If the firm’s type is in 7i, it will choose a lower level of output when k 
is increased and there is a reduction in expected welfare. If the firm’s type is in I2 , 
it will choose a higher level of output when k is increased and there is an increase in 
expected welfare.
If A > 0 for all k we know that an increase in k will lead to an increase in welfare. 
That is, a choice set with a smaller set of disallowed output levels (less restriction) 
yields a higher level of welfare. Similarly, if A < 0 for all k we know that an increase in 
k will lead to a decrease in welfare. That is, a choice set with a larger set of disallowed 
output levels (more restriction) yields a higher level of welfare.
Let f a_(xb+Y) — Bq(a\ ’ f{G)dO be called Integral X  from th is point on.
b
Let / 0_2(y_fc) dWfy(0) f{Q)d® be called Integral Y  from th is point on.
b
A will be positive if Integral X is greater than Integral Y, and it will be negative 
if Integral Y is greater than Integral X.
Theorem  5.1 The output floor contract is not always best.
Proof. (B y example)
The regulator maximises a concave welfare function:
W  = C S + \ tt Xc (0.5,1)
The regulator does not know the firm’s cost but has a belief that 9 is distributed 
with a non-increasing density function, f(0), f{ 9 )  < 0.
The regulator delegates the output decision to the firm and considers offering it 
one of two alternative choice sets:
•  Contract F: choose q € [^ min, 00]
•  Contract R2 : choose q £ (famim X  4- k] U [Y — k, 00]), k =  , e small
The difference between these two choice sets is simply that contract R2 introduces 
a small set of disallowed output levels, of size e, in the output floor choice set. The 
two-interval choice set yields a higher level of welfare if a small increase in k from 
( Y -K -e 'j ^0 ^ 2^ ) (the output floor case) results in a decrease in expected welfare.
31 The reader is reminded that the parameter k determ ines the size of the interval o f additional 
disallowed output levels, w ith 0 <  k <  y ~x . The smaller is k, the larger is the se t o f disallowed 
outputs.
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The impact of a small increase in k  on expected welfare is equal to:
d w ( x  + k,e) r -^ W 1 a w ( Y - k , e )
A  ~  /«-(-y+y) — a q je j— m d e ~  — a f i e )— / (  )
Calculated at k — y ~^~e this is equal to:
=  a w (x ± x ± ,te)
y qr (x + y ) d q (Q) ) J a-(Y +x+e) d q (Q} )
A small increase from k to leads to a reduction in welfare if:
I a w { y ^ , e) fS= s r ^ m l ± $ = t j 9 )
\Ja-(Y+X+e) dq (9) f  O de\ > \Ja-L2£±y) dq(6) m d °
Integral Y  > Integral X
We know that:
1. The intervals of integration are the same length.
2. Integral Y starts a t a higher value than Integral X, for all Ae(0.5,1):
d W (X+x+JL, «-(y+*+*)) y  + X  + e
dq (9) ~  26
d W (Y+ *-£, Q-(*+ y>) Y +  X  +  ( 2 A - l ) e
dq (0) “  26
Y +  X  +  e  ^ Y  + X  + (2A — 1) e 
26 26
3. W ith the concave welfare function (Lemma F.3):
dW (X ± Z ± e ^  aW {X±Z=±e)
— e f a — > — 8 ^ 0 ) — for a  ®ven 6
4. The rate of change in welfare is decreasing in type for both output levels and 
the rate of decrease is the same (Lemma F.5):
d W (Y ± f± ^ i0) d W (Y+* - £,0)
dq (9) 89 ~  dq(9)89
Points 3 and 4 imply that for 0 6  I\ and & E  I2  (9 < &)'.
dW (*-+$-t£,9) d W (^ f ^ ,0')
dq (9) > dq(9)
=  —A
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and:
d W (¥±x+£-,0)
dq (0) > dq (0) >  dq (0)
That is, the magnitude of the welfare decrease in the region 7i is larger than the 
welfare gain in the region I2 - The impact on expected welfare also depends on the 
regulator’s expectation about which region the firm’s type lies in.
As /  (0) is non-increasing across the regions of interest (ie, f  (0) > f  (01)) we have:
d W { Y ± £ ± e , e) g w f X i f X ' f f )
W e )  f  w  >  W W )  f  { )
That is, the density function reinforces the direction of the relative magnitude of 
the change in welfare arising from a change in output.
As we are integrating these two functions over the same length interval, and the 
integral for types in the region I\ starts at a higher point than the integral for types in 
the region J2, we can conclude that the integrals retain the same relative magnitude 
as the integrands. This gives us, as required:
q-(X-fV)\ f - - T —  r a- (y: x - e) d W ( Z ± f ^ , 0 )
dq(0) ^  '  J«-(X+Y). dq(0) ^  '
That is, an increase in k  to leads to a reduction in welfare. This means that
the two-interval restricted contract, with the additional interval of disallowed output 
choices, yields a higher level of welfare than the output floor contract.
We therefore conclude that the output floor contract is not a local optimum when 
the welfare function is concave and the regulator’s belief function is non-increasing in 
type. This is because there exists at least one restricted two-interval contract, in the 
‘neighbourhood’ of the output floor contract, which yields a higher level of welfare. 
There is thus at least one case in which the output floor contract is not best. ■
Figure 5.5 provides an extreme example of a density function which is non-increasing. 
There is a high density for types in the region 7i and a very low (approximately zero) 
density for types in the region I2 . We therefore know that there is a much higher 
weight placed on the decrease in welfare in region I\ relative to the increase in welfare 
in the region I2 , and hence expected welfare decreases if we move from contract R2 to 
contract F. We also find, as derived in Appendix F, that if the regulator’s beliefs are 
uniform the output floor contract is not best.
Theorem 5.1, and the examples of density functions which meet its conditions, 
suggest that, if the regulator places a lower weight (or the same weight) on the firm 
being inefficient relative to the weight placed on the firm being efficient, a restricted 
contract with two intervals will yield a higher level of welfare than the output floor
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f(0)
1
0a-2(Y- k)/b a-(X+Y)/b a-2(X+k)/b
Figure 5.5: Example of the regulator’s belief function
contract. This implies that, in industries with elastic demand and cost uncertainty (i.e. 
a relatively wide interval of potential cost types), simple output floor arrangements 
are not always best and, hence, regulators should consider th e  possibility of 
introducing fu rther restrictions on th e  firm ’s choice set when delegating 
ou tpu t choices to  them .
5.4.2 C hoosing  be tw een  c o n tra c t F  a n d  c o n tra c t R 2
We know, from Theorem 5.1, that it is not always optimal for the regulator to offer the 
irm the output floor contract when delegating the output choice. The regulator must 
■herefore consider a new dimension to the regulatory mechanism design problem: under 
vhat circumstances should the output floor contract be offered to the firm, and under 
vhat circumstances should additional restrictions be placed on this contract? We 
assume throughout that demand is elastic and that the interval of cost types is wide. 
We first present sufficient conditions under which the restricted two-interval contract 
rields a higher level of welfare than the output floor contract. We then find sufficient 
conditions under which the output floor contract yields a higher level of welfare than 
.he restricted two-interval contract. These sufficient conditions are intended to provide 
a high-level guide as to the circumstances under which the regulator should choose 
one form of restricted delegation contract over another. In section 5.5 we use a simple 
simulated example to consider the case for extending the number of restrictions in the 
choice set further.
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D om inance o f co n trac t R 2
We find that the regulator will be better off offering the firm contract R2 rather than 
contract F if his beliefs are non-increasing and concave with type32. This result implies 
that if the regulator places a higher probability on the firm being efficient, relative to 
it being inefficient, then welfare will be increased if an output floor arrangement is 
replaced with a delegation contract where some of the choices under the output floor 
arrangement are now disallowed.
L em m a 5.1 Suppose locally the regulator’s belief function, f (9) ,  is non-increasing 
and concave. Then welfare from a restricted two-interval choice set increases with the 
size of the interval of disallowed output levels. That is, the more restriction there is 
in the two-interval choice set (ie, the lower is k) the higher is the level of welfare. I f  
the welfare function is convex, the belief function only needs to be non-increasing for 
this to holcF3.
P roof. See Appendix F ■
P ro p o sitio n  5.1 Suppose the conditions of lemma 5.1 hold. Then welfare is higher 
under contract R2 than under contract F.
Proof. The choice set under Contract F corresponds to a restricted ‘two interval 
choice set’ in which k is at its maximum value - . We know, from Lemma 5.1, that 
any Contract R2 which has a lower value of k will yield a higher level of welfare under 
the conditions of the Proposition. The regulator is therefore better off with Contract 
R2 than Contract F. ■
We have shown that if the regulator’s beliefs are non-increasing and concave in 
type then the more restricted delegation contract - Contract R2 - is preferred to the 
output floor contract. Essentially this means that if the regulator places more weight 
on the firm being efficient rather than inefficient it will be optimal for a more restricted 
choice set to be included in the delegation contract. This implies that a firm which is 
a ‘good’ type, because it has low cost, is in some sense penalised because it is possible 
to induce it to  choose a higher level of output with a more restricted contract.
32If the welfare function is convex (ie, A <  | )  the belief function only needs to  be non-increasing. 
We treat the weight on profits in the welfare fim ction as exogenous here and hence assume that one 
case or the other (ie, concavity or convexity) applies. In practice, however, the regulator may choose 
the value o f A to reflect his belief about the appropriate distribution of rents between consumers and 
the firm. The endogeneity o f this decision w ill need to be taken into account when determining the 
welfare-maxim ising form of the delegation contract. This is an aspect of the contract design problem  
which should be explored in future research.
33 We know, from Appendix F .l, that the im pact of the output level on the rate of change in welfare 
arising from a change in  output depends on whether the welfare function is concave (A >  or convex 
(A <  ^). The analysis o f the im pact of a change in the size of the prohibited interval in the decision  
set therefore varies w ith the value o f A and each possibility must be considered separately.
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D om inance o f co n trac t F
We have found sufficient conditions under which the restricted two-interval contract
yields a higher level of welfare than the output floor contract. In practice it is the 
latter contract which is observed, and this is also considered to be the simplest and
higher level of welfare than a contract with a more restricted choice set. The conditions 
we find are, perhaps surprisingly given the prevalence of this form of contract in 
practice, more complex and less intuitive than those found for the restricted two- 
interval contract to be preferable. At a general level, however, the conditions suggest 
that if the regulator places a higher probability on the firm being inefficient rather 
than efficient, and if the extent of the difference is sufficiently large, then the output 
floor contract will yield a higher level of welfare than the alternative contract with 
extra restrictions on the choice set.
Taken together Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 provide a high-level guide to  regulators on 
the conditions under which the output floor contract should and should not be used. 
As sufficient rather than necessary conditions the requirements of the Propositions 
may be overly demanding. It is a useful first step in the analysis of the optimal form 
of delegation contracts however.
L em m a 5.2 Suppose locally:
(i) the regulator’s belief function, f  (9), is increasing and convex;
(ii) the rate of increase is large enough to offset the decreasing rate of change in
hence most practical delegation arrangement to use. We therefore wish to ensure that 
the simple output floor contract is used whenever it yields a higher level of welfare 
than alternative restricted delegation contracts.
We determine sufficient conditions under which the output floor contract yields a
welfare:
(Hi) the degree of curvature of the belief function is greater than a positive integer:
(iv) the degree of convexity is sufficiently large:
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Then welfare from a restricted two-interval contract decreases with the size o f the 
interval of disallowed output levels. That is, the more restriction there is in the two- 
interval choice set (ie, the lower is k) the lower is the level of welfare. With a concave 
welfare function convexity of the belief function is not required for this to hold.
Proof. See Appendix F. ■
P ro p o sitio n  5.2 Suppose the conditions of Lemma 5.2 hold. Then contract F  yields 
a higher level of welfare than contract B?.
P roof. The choice set under Contract F is essentially a ‘two interval choice set’ in 
which k is at its maximum value . We know, from Lemma 5.2, that any Contract 
R2 which has a lower value of k will yield a lower level of welfare under the conditions 
of the Proposition. The regulator is therefore better off with Contract F than Contract 
R2. ■
We have shown that if the regulator’s beliefs are sufficiently increasing and suf­
ficiently convex, Contract F is preferable to a contract which places an additional 
restriction on the firm’s choice set. We note that more conditions are required on 
the density function here compared to the sufficient conditions needed for contract R2 
to yield a higher level of welfare. It is also interesting that the sufficient conditions 
are dependent on the parameter values X and Y in this situation. In particular, the 
size of the lower boundary, X, and the distance between the boundaries (ie, the ratio 
of X to Y) is a key influence on whether or not these sufficient conditions are met. 
The conditions are not immediately intuitive but they suggest that the regulator must 
place a sufficiently higher weight on the firm being inefficient rather than efficient for 
expected welfare to be higher with the output floor contract.
We also find, as shown in Corollary 5.1, that if the conditions are met so that the 
output floor contract yields a higher level of welfare than Contract R2, then Contract 
F will yield a higher level of welfare than any other delegation contract incorporating 
more restrictions on the firm’s choice set.
C oro llary  5.1 Suppose the conditions of Lemma 5.2 hold. Then contract F  will yield 
a higher level of welfare than any restricted m-interval contract, contract Rm, which 
has m  >  1 intervals of disallowed output levels.
P roof. (Sketch)
Assume the conditions of Proposition 5.2 hold. Take two contracts. The first, 
contract Rm l , has in-1 sets of disallowed output levels. The second contract, Rm, is 
equivalent to contract Rm_1, except that an additional set of disallowed output levels 
has been introduced. By the same logic as the proofs of Lemma 5.2 and Proposition
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5.2, the regulator prefers the contract with m  — 1 intervals to the contract with m  
intervals.
Expected welfare is higher when the gap between two intervals is closed, indepen­
dent of the position of that gap. The Proposition can therefore apply to the comparison 
of any two choice sets, where one is equivalent to the other except for the fact that, 
in one section of the choice set, two of the intervals of the contract with m  intervals 
are combined to  form a contract with m  — 1 intervals.
By iteration we can see that a contract with m —2 intervals is preferred to a related 
contract with m  — 1 intervals, a contract with m  — 3 intervals is preferred to a  related 
contract with m  — 2 intervals, and so forth. We therefore have a hierarchy of contracts, 
where B? is a choice set with j  intervals, such that:
F y R 2 y  i*3 y  i?m_1 >~ FT
We conclude that if the conditions hold for the output floor contract to be preferred 
to the restricted two-interval contract, then the output floor contract is preferred to 
all delegation contracts which place additional restrictions on the firm’s choice set. ■
5.5 Introducing further restrictions
We have found that, given the assumptions of our model, the output floor contract 
yields a higher level of welfare than unrestricted delegation (the fully separating con­
tract) and no delegation (the pooling contract). This suggests that some form of 
restricted delegation contract is best. When we focus on a set of restricted delegation 
contracts we find that the output floor contract, despite its prevalence in practice, 
is not always best. The characteristics of the regulator’s belief function determines 
whether the introduction of one additional restriction on the firm’s output choice set 
enhances welfare relative to the output floor contract.
We assume that the industry characteristics discussed in section 5.1.4 and the 
conditions of Lemma 5.1 hold here, and extend the analysis to determine whether 
increased levels of restriction lead to higher welfare levels. We only consider contracts 
which include a countable number of intervals. Extending the mathematical analysis 
to  formally compare contract F to a restricted m-interval contract is overly complex, 
and adds little to our general result that, in some situations, more restriction is better 
than less. We therefore use a simulated example to examine the case for introducing 
more disallowed output choice sets in the restricted delegation contract34.
^Sim ulations are used in  several sem inal papers on the literature comparing welfare under a range 
o f regulatory contracts. For exam ple, Gasmi, Ivaldi and Laffont (1994) and Schmalensee (1989) base 
their analysis o f various incentive schemes on the results o f a detailed sim ulation exercise. Armstrong, 
R ees and Vickers (1995) also use sim ulations when analysing the optim al length of the regulatory lag.
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When considering restricted m-interval contracts we expect that, under the same 
conditions as are found in Lemma 5.1, the regulator prefers to have more intervals 
in the choice set rather than less. We stress that a contract with m intervals is an 
adjusted form of the contract with m-1 intervals, where an extra interval of disallowed 
choices has been added. That is, we are not considering arbitrarily chosen contracts 
with different numbers of intervals, but are focusing on the impact of amending an 
existing contract by introducing an extra interval of disallowed output levels in the 
delegated choice set.
In our simulated example we assume that the regulator’s belief function has a uni­
form distribution. In this situation we know that the restricted two-interval contract 
yields a higher level of welfare than the output floor contract. We wish to  confirm that 
as we increase the number of intervals further there is an on-going increase in welfare. 
From a practical perspective we also want to determine the marginal welfare gain from 
an extra interval, as the regulator will presumably wish to trade-off the marginal cost 
of increased complexity in the delegated contract against the marginal benefit.
The set-up for our example is as follows.
•  There is a simple linear demand curve, q =  100 — p.
• The firm’s marginal cost lies in the interval [$l , Oh] =  [5,95], W ith this we know 
that the only feasible output values he in the region (0,95] and the monopoly 
output levels he in the region qM(0n),qM(0L)] =  [2.5,47.5]. The interval is 
sufficiently wide to meet the industry characteristics discussed in section 5.1.4.
•  The regulator beheves that the firm’s marginal cost has a uniform distribution: 
0 ~  U on the interval [0l, Oh ]-, f (0) — •
•  The regulator delegates the final output decision to the firm but restricts the 
firm’s choice set. We discuss below the range of restrictions which the regulator 
considers.
•  The firm chooses the level of output from the restricted choice set which max­
imises profit.
•  The regulator chooses the regulatory contract which, given the firm’s expected 
choices, yields the highest level of welfare: W  =  C S + Xtt. We consider the cases 
of A =  {0.25,0.5,0.75}.
We consider five alternative delegation contracts. Appendix F explains how the 
simulations for each contract option were carried out.
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Casel: Unconstrained, - the regulator delegates the output choice to the firm and 
sets no restrictions on the firm’s choices. This results in each type choosing its 
monopoly output level and corresponds, as we have shown in Section 5.2, to the 
outcome from the optimal fully separating contract.
Case 2: Output floor - the regulator delegates the output choice to the firm and sets 
an output floor on the firm’s choices. We have shown, in Section 5.2, that the 
optimal floor corresponds to the first-best output level of the inefficient type. 
This gives us: gmjn =  5. Demand is elastic at this output floor.
Case 3: Two intervals - the regulator delegates the output choice to the firm, sets 
the same output floor as in Case 2, and adds an extra restriction that outputs 
between two points, X and Y, cannot be chosen by the firm. We find the values 
of X and Y that yield the highest level of welfare.
Case 4: Three intervals - the regulator delegates the output choice to the firm, takes 
the welfare-maximising contract in Case 3, and adds an extra restriction that 
outputs between points W and Z cannot be chosen by the firm. Two options are 
considered.
1. choose W and Z to  the right of X and Y; and
2. choose W  and Z to the left of X and Y.
Prom amongst these options we find the values for W and Z which maximise welfare.
Case 5: Four intervals - the regulator delegates the output choice to the firm, takes 
the welfare-maximising contract in Case 4, and adds an extra restriction that 
outputs between points U and V cannot be chosen by the firm. Three alternative 
options are considered.
1. choose U and V to the right of {W, Z, X, Y}35;
2. choose U and V in the middle of {W, Z, X, Y};
3. choose U and V to the left of {W, Z, X, Y}.
Prom amongst these options we find the values for U and V which maximise 
welfare.
An example of the contract options for cases 3, 4 and 5 are illustrated in Figure 
5.6. Tables G .l, G.2 and G.3 in Appendix G show the interval values considered, and 
the corresponding welfare levels. The main welfare comparisons are discussed here.
35The Case 4 interval points may alternatively be ordered as {X , Y,W , Z}.
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Case 3 allowed choices.
Example Case 4
"1 I----1--------------- 1---- ►q
5 X  Y 95
I TH------1—I--- 1 1 I ►q
0 5 W Z X  Y 95
Example Case 5
i i r m  i r
5 W Z U V X  Y 95
Figure 5.6: Example simulated contract options
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show the firm’s output choices with the two, three and 
four interval contracts when A =  0.25 36. The allowed output intervals are as follows:
Two : [5,29.88] U [36.62,47.5]
Three : [5,9.79] U [29.74,29.88] U [36.62,47.5]
Four : [5,9.79] U [29.74,29.75] U [29.78,29.88] U [36.62,47.5]
The output choices follow the pattern expected. As the number of intervals in­
creases, the impact of the additional interval is reduced when it is very close to an 
existing interval and/or is very narrow. This is what happens with the extra interval 
in the four interval contract.
36The values are slighly distorted as the sim ulations restricted the output choices to be in intervals 
of 0.25 which in some cases meant that very sm all intervals (ie, w ith bounds which were less than 0.25 
apart) had no effect on output choices. The im pact on welfare is expected to  be m inim al, however, as 
such tight intervals would not alter the output choices, and hence welfare, significantly.
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Figure 5.7: Two interval contract output choices
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Figure 5.8: Three interval contract output choices
Figure 5.10 shows the level of welfare from each of the contract choices for the three 
values of A. We see that welfare increases with the number of intervals for all values 
of A. Welfare, not surprisingly, varies with the value of A, and the marginal change in 
welfare from an increase in the number of intervals also varies with the value of A.
Table 5.4 shows the marginal welfare change from increasing the number of inter­
vals. In the case of a concave welfare function (A =  0.5,0.75) the size of the percentage 
change increases when we go from none to one, one to two, and two to three intervals. 
It then declines, however, when we increase the number of intervals to four. For the 
convex welfare function (A =  0.25) there is always an increasing marginal gain from 
increasing the number of intervals.
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Figure 5.9: Four interval contract output choices
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Figure 5.10: Welfare under restricted delegation contracts
Table 5.4: IVarginal change in wel: are
Interval Change A = 0.25 A = 0.5 A = 0.75
None to one 2.67 3.30 3.43
% 0.45 0.42 0.35
One to two 5.40 48.37 6.44
% 0.91 6.08 0.65
Two to three 11.94 15.81 11.69
% 1.99 1.87 1.17
Three to four 17.97 6.05 5.10
% 2.93 0.70 0.50
We find, in our simulated example, that welfare increases with the level of re­
striction placed on the choice set. Further research is needed to determine where the 
regulator stops when considering how many discrete intervals of disallowed choice sets 
to include in the contract. It is not clear at this stage what the optimal restricted 
contract looks like in the limit. We expect that, in a practical setting, there will be 
situations where the welfare gain from more intervals is traded-off against the cost of 
designing complex delegation contracts.
While we cannot estimate the actual costs which would arise in the regulatory 
office, we can give an indication of the extra complexity that arises when we increase
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the number of intervals in the contract. When running the simulations for the two 
interval contract we had to find the values of X and Y which maximised welfare for the 
given value of A . When we moved to three intervals, we had to  consider two scenarios 
when finding W  and Z for a given value of A - to the left and to the right of the X and Y 
from the optimal two interval contract. Our workload (or at least that of the Matlab© 
programme) increased twofold. This was reflected in the time taken to determine the 
three interval contract which yielded the highest level of welfare. Moving to the four 
interval case increased the complexity of finding the optimal contract even further. We 
had three scenarios to consider here, and the workload was increased relative to the 
three interval case and relative to the two interval case. There is thus an increasing 
cost to  increasing the number of restrictions in the delegation contract. This cost 
needs to be considered alongside the marginal welfare gain discussed above.
This example suggests that when the belief function is uniform, an increase in the 
number of restricted choice intervals in the delegation contract increases welfare. We 
have also shown that there is an increased amount of effort required to generate more 
complicated contracts. Further analysis is required to determine if this is true for other 
distributions which satisfy the conditions of Proposition 5.1.
5.6 Conclusions
Fixed price cap contracts are amongst the most prevalent regulatory mechanisms used 
in practice37. These contracts provide strong incentives for the regulated firm to im­
prove technical efficiency but they do not yield maximum welfare levels. In particular 
there is a risk, in industries with significant cost uncertainty (i.e. with wide intervals 
of potential cost types) and elastic demand, that the regulated firm will continue to 
price at the monopoly level under the price cap contract. It is therefore appropriate 
to consider the case for introducing alternative forms of fixed price contract which 
may yield higher levels of welfare38. We note however that the problem is unlikely 
to  be significant in the regulated water and electricity sectors in the UK as demand 
is inelastic in these industries. The analysis is therefore of more relevance for other 
sectors which face elastic demand functions.
W ith this in mind we compared welfare under the standard price cap contract 
to  a number of different contracts which delegate the price choice to the firm but
37We move to an analysis o f price cap regulation in our concluding remarks as this is a more frequent 
m ode of regulation than output floors in  practice. We stress, again, that a ll conclusions reached in  
th is paper for output floors autom atically translate to  the mirror-case of price caps.
38 It is expected that the fixed nature of the contract w ill ensure that technical efficiency incentives 
are retained even if the form of the contract is changed. The strength o f the incentives may change, 
however. This aspect o f the contract design problem warrants further attention in  future research.
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place more, or less, restriction on the firm’s allowed choice set. The level of restriction 
determines the form  of the contract. The comparisons considered were a no delegation 
contract (the pooling case), an unrestricted delegation contract (the fully separating 
case) and a restricted two-interval contract which incorporates the choice set under 
the price cap contract but with an additional set of disallowed price levels.
We found, using a single-period adverse selection model with restricted transfers, 
that the price cap contract yields a higher level of welfare than the no delegation 
contract and the unrestricted delegation contract. This implies that some form of 
restricted delegation contract is best, but it is not clear that the cap is necessarily 
the welfare-maximising level of restriction to place on the firm’s choice set. Indeed 
an analysis of alternative restricted delegation contracts showed that the price cap 
contract is not always best. This result introduces an extra dimension to the design of 
regulatory contracts. The regulator first needs to determine what the optimal level of 
restriction is, and then determines the welfare-maximising boundaries in that contract. 
We have not considered the second element of the regulator’s problem here.
We found sufficient conditions under which the price cap contract is best, and 
sufficient conditions under which a two-interval contract with an additional restriction 
to the cap is best. In the latter case we also found, using a simulated example, that 
increasing the level of restriction further - with three- and four-interval contracts - 
yields increasing levels of welfare. We noted, however, that the cost of creating overly 
complex contracts would need to be traded-off against this welfare gain in a practical 
setting. Further research is needed to determine what the optimal number of such 
intervals is.
The sufficient conditions under which the price cap contract is and is not best 
relate to  the characteristics of the regulator’s belief function; in particular, whether or 
not it is increasing, and whether it is convex or concave. Many practitioners criticise 
the mechanism design literature on the grounds that any contract which requires the 
distribution function of the firm’s type to be common knowledge cannot be used in 
practice39. We argue, however, that the sufficient conditions of our propositions can 
be used in a general way in practice, without the regulator needing to know the full 
density function. For example, if the regulator has a very high belief that the firm is 
efficient we can conclude, along the lines of the proof to Proposition 1, that the price 
cap contract is not best. Similarly, if the regulator has a very strong belief that the 
firm is inefficient - skewing the density function towards the high types - we conclude 
that the price cap contract is best. We recognise, however, that as sufficient but not 
necessary conditions our results are of limited use to regulators if they have beliefs 
which do not fall neatly into the conditions derived.
39See, for exam ple, Crew and Kleindorfer (2002).
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This paper contributes to the literature on optimal regulatory mechanisms in three 
key ways.
1. We presented a formal proof of how the restricted transfer function affects the 
standard mechanism design problem. This enabled us to  determine the optimal 
fully separating and pooling mechanisms, and allowed us to compare their welfare 
properties to  those of the price cap contract. It is important that these welfare 
comparisons are made explicit rather than being presumed, particularly when 
less restrictive constraints on the transfer function may allow for pooling, fully 
separating or semi-separating mechanisms to yield the highest level of expected 
welfare.
2. In contrast to the theory and practice of price cap regulation, and the literature 
on optimal delegation in a single period, we have not presumed that the regulator 
can only restrict the firm’s choice set to be a continuous interval. In this way we 
extend the framework for designing a regulatory contract to explicitly include 
an analysis of the level of restriction, or form, of the contract.
3. We have shown that the price cap contract is not always best, and we found 
conditions under which more restriction on the firm’s choice set is better than 
less. From a policy perspective this suggests that regulators in sectors with 
elastic demand and cost uncertainty should, in some circumstances, consider 
amending the form of the price contracts used in practice.
Our comparison of the restricted two-interval contract to the price cap contract is 
based on a limited model, and a number of extensions could be considered in future 
research to better reflect actual regulatory environments. First, we could allow the 
firm to reduce its costs by undertaking effort. At a high level, we would expect that if 
the regulatory lag and other parameters are the same in the fixed price cap contract 
and the fixed two-interval contract, then the firm would have an incentive to reduce 
costs in each case as it would retain the profits earned for itself40. The complication in 
the two-interval case is that the effort choice will, by reducing costs, affect the profit- 
maximising price level. In addition, the output level will affect the firm’s effort choice 
as it determines the marginal benefit of each unit of effort. Given this endogeneity 
between the price choice and the effort choice, the firm may need to make trade-offs 
between the optimal level of effort and the possibility that the new cost level will push 
the optimal price into a disallowed interval. This may encourage the firm to undertake
40Laffont and Tirole (1993, Ch2) sim ilarly suggest that, when the transfer is restricted, the ‘main 
incentive issues' addressed in their analysis o f optim al regulatory mechanisms do not change but the 
‘pricing issues’ do.
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less effort so that the profit-maximising price, given cost, is at a higher allowed level. 
Alternatively, it may encourage the firm to undertake more effort, so that a lower 
allowed price yields a higher level of profit. In general the incentive to reduce costs 
will be retained in any restricted m-interval contract if the contract is fixed for a set 
period. The extent of the incentives may be affected by the impact of the effort choice 
on feasible optimal price choices however.
A second extension involves the comparison of the contracts in a dynamic frame­
work41. Again the impact on effort choices over time would need to be considered. The 
issues are likely to be similar to the static model with effort if the rules about sharing 
past savings, and using historical information to set the contract, are the same across 
all contract forms. We expect the firm to care about its reputation in the dynamic 
model and, as the price choice could reveal the firm’s type, more bunching may occur 
at the extremes of any choice set.
We also need to consider the fact that the regulator’s choice of contract may change 
over time. Consider the case of a regulator who has a very high belief that the firm is 
inefficient at privatisation. The optimal choice set is the price cap contract. The firm 
operates under this fixed-price contract and becomes more efficient. The regulator’s 
beliefs change and, in time, we may reach a point where there is now a high belief 
that the firm is efficient. Under these circumstances a move to a choice set with more 
restriction is optimal. The impact of the incentive mechanism on the firm’s cost level 
and the regulator’s belief function may therefore result in the optimal form of the 
delegation contract changing over time.
A further extension of the dynamic analysis would involve the regulator being 
unable to commit to always using a restricted delegation contract and he may wish to 
move to the optimal fully separating or optimal pooling contracts as more information 
on the firm’s costs becomes available. The absence of commitment to the contract 
form would, no doubt, result in a ratchet effect problem, and it would be useful to 
determine the impact of such ‘mechanism cycles’ on welfare.
41Legroe (1993) analyses the im pact o f repetition on delegation contracts in  a more general setting. 
He em phasises that the contract choice in the first period w ill be used as an inform ation signal in future 
periods. This paper may provide a useful basis for exam ining welfare under our range of regulatory 
contracts in a dynam ic framework.
C hapter 6
Conclusion
We have analysed the efficiency properties of the RPI-X regime in this thesis. We 
found that technical efficiency incentives have been delivered, but are not as strong as 
expected. This is demonstrated by the fact that there has been a significant decrease 
in real unit operating costs since privatisation, but only a moderate improvement 
in total factor productivity growth. Allocative efficiency is not achieved with this 
regulatory regime, and the cost-saving incentives have the potential to  distort the 
firm’s decision on output delivery. In addition, the regulators do not use willingness 
to pay information directly to set output targets, and hence there is concern that the 
quality of output produced is not efficient.
These properties are affected by the characteristics of the game played by the 
regulator and the firm, and by the way in which the cap itself is set. Bennett and 
Waddams Price (2002) reach a similar conclusion when they argue that ‘Incentive 
mechanisms within utilities are limited both by the nature of the industries and the 
need to achieve political consensus in the design and outcome of their regulation’. In 
particular, the level of welfare delivered is dependent on the trade-offs which are made 
between allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, output delivery and distribution1. 
This vindicates our argument that a detailed understanding of the way in which a 
regulatory mechanism operates in practice is required if an accurate assessment of its 
welfare properties is to be made.
Given that welfare is not maximised with this regime, we questioned whether 
alternative mechanisms could be designed which might increase welfare2. The charac­
lrThis was noted, early on, by Helm and Yarrow (1988) who found that ‘measures to improve 
allocative efficiency are frequently in substantial conflict w ith m easures to prom ote cost efficiency, and 
interventions in respect o f one aspect of company decision-m aking tend to produce perverse incentives 
in  respect o f other dim ensions of choice’.
2According to  Helm (1995a) the popular position on RPI-X  regulation is  that ‘it is better than  
what we had before and better than the American alternative, so why change?’. Chur detailed review  
of the welfare properties o f the current RPI-X regime explains, we hope, w hy change is needed.
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teristics of the game are assumed fixed by the legislative and institutional framework, 
and we focused on the design of the contract itself3,4. We found, in the first instance, 
that technical efficiency might be increased by retaining the RPI-X mechanism but 
changing the way in which savings are shared with consumers. Similarly, quality of 
service might be improved, with the RPI-X contract remaining in place, if the choice 
between a range of price-quality contacts is given to consumer groups. We also found 
that the regulator might be able, in some instances, to increase welfare by placing 
more restriction than the cap on the firm’s price choice set. This opens up a whole 
new dimension to the regulatory debate which focuses on the issue of what form of 
fixed price contract should be used. The feasibility of these potential improvements 
is limited to  some degree by the nature of the regulated sector (e.g. whether or not 
demand is stochastic, whether or not demand is elastic, and whether or not there is 
significant cost uncertainty) and the regulator’s asymmetric information set.
Sappington (2000) argues that all regulatory mechanisms have their advantages and 
disadvantages and that ‘no regulatory plan is a perfect substitute for the discipline of 
competitive markets’. We are therefore not surprised to  find that there are benefits 
and costs associated with the RPI-X regime, and that welfare is not maximised. This 
does not mean, however, that we should assume that the mechanism is as good as we 
can get in the absence of a competitive market. Efforts should be made to make the 
regulatory scheme better, even if it can never be first-best. We recognise, however, 
that there may be resistance to change.
Cox and Isaac (1987) argued that the preference to stick with rate-of-retum regula­
tion at that time was ‘due more to historical precedence than to inherent superiority’. 
A similar argument could also be applied to  those who claim that there is no need to 
change the current RPI-X mechanism. Inertia and tradition are not, however, sufficient 
reasons to  ignore the possibility of increasing welfare within the regulatory regime.
Some of our proposals, particularly the use of contracts with more restriction on 
the firm’s choice, would be difficult to implement. Complexity should also not be used 
as an excuse for staying with the current arrangement. Indeed, as noted by Vickers 
and Yarrow (1988a), ‘Effective regulation is necessarily a complex business, and to
3 A key lesson from our analysis is that the regulatory framework and regulatory m echanisms should 
be designed sim ultaneously, as the former affects the welfare properties of the latter. If we were 
devising an entirely new regulatory regime we would consider using a different framework - to change 
the characteristics of the game - as well as a different incentive mechanism. We assum e, however, that 
we are constrained by the existing framework, as established in the privisation legislation for each 
sector, and we have focused out attention on changes which could be m ade w ithin th is framework.
4 We stress, again, that it has only been feasible to consider a sm all sam ple o f potential improvements 
in  this analysis. Further ideas, including proposals to  develop penalties for overforecasting, and an 
analysis o f the case for franchising the right to  operate the network business, should be explored in  
future research.
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pretend otherwise is likely to have damaging long-term consequences for the industries 
concerned’. We therefore suggest that regulators consider how these proposals might 
be converted into feasible regulatory mechanisms given the specific characteristics of 
the firm’s operating environment, rather than deciding in advance that they are too 
costly or difficult to introduce.
Our research has highlighted a number of areas to be explored further. The fol­
lowing extensions would aid our understanding of how the RPI-X mechanism affects 
welfare, and enable us to determine feasible ways of increasing welfare in the existing 
regulatory regime.
•  Sappington (2000) emphasised that ‘current estimates of the impact of incentive 
regulation may not reflect accurately its true long term impact’. This suggests 
that ongoing analysis of the welfare properties of the mechanism should be un­
dertaken, particularly as the specific details underlying the regime change. This 
analysis should incorporate both theoretical arguments and empirical testing.
•  A richer description of the RPI-X game could be developed which incorporates 
the consultation phase of the periodic review process. This would allow us to 
analyse the precise impact of the different interest groups, including the industry, 
on the regulator’s decision-making process. It would also enable us to analyse in 
more detail the information transmission game which the firm and the regulator 
play when business plans are submitted.
•  We have assumed that the firm makes decisions as a profit-maximiser with a ten- 
year horizon. In practice, managers and shareholders within the firm are likely 
to have different objectives, from each other and relative to profit-maximisation. 
The impact of alternative objectives, and hence choices, on the mechanism’s 
efficiency properties should be explored further. This will help us to understand 
how future improvements to the mechanism should be designed so that they are 
appropriately focused on the party making the relevant decisions.
•  Our analysis of the welfare impact of the RPI-X regime could be used as the 
basis for an empirical examination of the costs and benefits of this form of reg­
ulation. The research could be based on a similar methodology to that used by 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Domah and Pollitt (2001). Such an exercise 
would, no doubt, be very difficult to undertake, particularly as there is no clear 
benchmark against which to compare the changes in prices, profits and total fac­
tor productivity. One possible counterfactual to  consider is what would happen 
with a pure price cap. Any analysis of the welfare impact of the regime should
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include the costs of regulation itself. These costs have not been discussed here 
but are considered to be growing in all sectors5.
•  It would be interesting to undertake a similar detailed analysis of price cap reg­
ulation in the US, and to compare the welfare effects of these schemes to  the 
RPI-X mechanism. The comparison should reflect both the way in which the 
price caps are designed and implemented, and the underlying characteristics of 
the games which are played between the firms and the regulators. This would 
enable us to determine the factors which have most influence on the level of wel­
fare. The comparative analysis could be extended to price cap regimes in other 
countries. The Chilean electricity distribution industry might be of particular 
interest here as it has been in place since 1982 and it is, according to Di Telia 
and Dyck (2002), ‘closer to many theoretical properties of pure price cap than 
other regimes’. The price cap schemes used in Australia would also be of interest 
as they were, at least originally, based on the UK regime6.
•  We have presented a selection of high-level changes which could be made to the 
regulatory contract to potentially increase welfare. Four of these focused on 
changes to the existing price cap contract, while the fifth was based on altering 
the form of the contract so that more restriction is placed on the firm’s price 
choice. Farther analysis of the impact of these proposals on total welfare is 
required. This should focus on the net effect of trade-offs between allocative 
and technical efficiency. In addition, an analysis of how these proposals could 
be translated into feasible mechanisms should be undertaken, taking account 
of information limitations and uncertainty about the firm’s future operating 
environment.
•  Finally, there are no doubt several other changes which could be made to the way 
in which the X-factor is set, and to the regulatory contract more generally. It 
is hoped that our description of the RPI-X game provides a framework in which 
the impact of such changes can be explored. Several authors have argued that 
the regulatory institutions and legal rules should be changed so as to  increase 
welfare. These issues were discussed in detail in the government’s 1997 review 
of utility regulation. We argue that it is also important to consider the case 
for improving the detail of the regulatory contract itself, within the confines of 
the existing legal and institutional structures. There are thus two related, and 
complementary, strands of research which require ongoing consideration.
5 See the study by W S Atkins and OXERA (2001) for further information on the increased running 
costs o f the regulators’ offices.
6Forsyth (1999) presents a description and critique of the price cap schemes used in A ustralia.
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A ppendix A
Background to  the R PI-X  gam e
In Chapter 2 we present a description of how RPI-X regulation works in the UK utility 
sectors. The background information used to create this description is summarised 
here1, with the section headings corresponding to the relevant sections in Chapter 2. 
The information relates to our description of the players in the RPI-X game and to 
the description of decision-making in the Contract Agreement game. Our discussion 
of the regulated firm’s decisions in the Implementation Game is based on standard 
economic analysis of a profit-maximising firm. This is because no public information 
is available about how the companies make their operating and regulatory decisions. 
We do, however, provide evidence on the extent of mid-period intervention by the 
regulators in the Implementation Game.
Our description is based on a review of the practice of RPI-X regulation in the 
following sectors: (1) electricity distribution; (2) electricity transmission; and (3) the 
water and sewerage sector. RPI-X regulation is also used in the gas transportation, 
airports, rail network and telecoms sectors. Secondary-source information about these 
sectors is occasionally used to validate statements made in the description. Inevitably 
with such a generalisation some of the details relate more to one sector than to  oth­
ers. In addition some details which are of importance in only one sector may not be 
mentioned here.
The information is sourced from consultation and decision documents published 
by the water regulator (Ofwat) and the energy regulator (Ofgem, formerly Offer). In 
the first round of reviews after privatisation little information was released on how the 
regulators came to their decisions. Ofwat was better than most, but the details of the 
final proposals for each firm were not published. Most of the facts have therefore been
1Our objective is to sum m arise the relevant information, and thereby save interested parties from 
having to  digest the large amount of detail contained in the many reports published by Ofgem (Of­
fer), Ofwat and the Competition Commission. A full list of the relevant reports is included in the 
bibliography for the interested reader.
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taken from the most recent rounds of periodic reviews - ie, the 1999 water review, 
the 1999 electricity distribution review, and the 2000 electricity transmission review2. 
Due to an increased focus on openness and transparency, the regulators presented far 
more detail on how price caps were set in these reviews than ever before. Secondary 
information sources have also been used3.
A .l Overview of the RPI-X game 
A .1 .1  P lay in g  a  gam e
Chapter 2, and our discussion of the welfare properties of the RPI-X mechanism in 
Chapter 3, are based on the assumption that the regulator and the firm play an 
infinitely repeated regulatory game. This idea has been supported by others, including 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988a). Regulators have also indicated that they believe that a 
game is being played. For example, Ofgem (1999a) argues that companies place ‘undue 
emphasis on the periodic process’ and this, along with other elements of the regulatory 
regime, has ‘led to a form of regulatory game between the regulator and the regulated 
companies’.
In each of the sectors, the regulator and the firm have met at regular intervals to 
agree on the next period’s regulatory contract and, in some cases, to agree on changes 
in the contract mid-period. We present, in Tables A .l to A.3, a summary of the 
main events which have led to these interactions since privatisation. These timelines 
support the idea of ongoing, and repeated, interactions between the players. We note 
that there would have been more interaction at recent price reviews, as the regulators 
have published an increasing number of consultation papers.
2A complementary description, and critique, of RPI-X regulation in the gas sector can be found 
in Waddams Price (1997a and 1998). Helm and Rajah (1994) provide an analysis of regulation in 
the water sector at the first periodic review, and Turvey (2002) presents a description of regulation 
in the electricity distribution sector. Littlechild (2001) also provides a review of recent regulatory 
developments in the electricity sector.
3Information has been taken from Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994, Chs 9-11) and Vickers 
and Yarrow (1988a, Part II). Both books provide a detailed, but early, description of regulation in the 
gas, electricity, water and telecoms sectors. More recent information, particularly on the institutional 
framework in each of the sectors, was obtained from the OXERA guides on regulation in the water, 
gas and electricity sectors.
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Table A.l: Timeline of events in the electricity distribution sector
1990 First price control cam e in to  effect for th e 1990-1995 period (April 1st)
T he twelve R E C s were floated on the stock  exchange (Dec)
1993 1995 price review announced and consultation  paper published (O ct)
1994 Price control proposals announced for 1995-2000 period (A ug) 
Proposals accepted by all 12 R E C s
Scottish  Hydro-Electric rejected its  price control proposals (O ct) 
Scottish  H ydro-Electric case referred to  th e  MM C (Nov)
1995 Re-review  o f  price control announced (March)
MM C published its  decision on H ydro-Electric’s  price controls (June) 
R evised price controls announced for 1996-2000 period (July)
Proposal accepted by all twelve REC s 
ScottishPow er began a  judicial review case against Offer
1996 N IE rejected th e  price control proposals presented by Ofreg (July) 
NIE case referred to  th e  MM C (Sept)
T he High Court rejected ScottishPow er’s judicial review case (July) 
ScottishPow er case referred to  th e Court o f A ppeal
1997 MM C published their decision on N IE ’s price controls (March)
NIE rejected th e  regulator’s  revised contract (Aug)
NIE case referred for judicial review (Sept)
Court o f A ppeal ruled in  favour o f ScottishPow er (Feb)
1998 1999 price review announced (Feb)
C onsultation papers published (Feb, July, D ec)
T he H igh Court rejected N IE ’s judicial review case (June)
NIE case referred to  th e  Court o f A ppeal (July)
Court o f  A ppeal rule in  favour o f NIE (O ct)
Business plans subm itted  (Nov)
1999 C onsultation papers published for 1999 price review (May, O ct)
Draft price control proposals published (A ug)
Final price control proposals published for 2000-2005 period (D ec) 
Proposals accepted by all 12 R EC s
2000 Inform ation and Incentives Project begins  
U tilities A ct passed by Parliam ent
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’able A.2: Timeline of events in the electricity transmission sector
1990
1992
1995
1996
1999
2000
First price control cam e into effect for 1990-1993 period (April 1st)
Price control proposals announced for 1993-1997 period (July)
Prosposals accepted by NGC
1996 price review announced and in itial consultation  published (Nov)
N G C floated on th e stock  exchange (Dec)
C onsultation  papers for 1996 price review published (March, May, Aug) 
Price control proposals published for 1997-2001 period (O ct)
Proposals accepted by NGC
2000 price review announced and in itial consultation  paper published (Dec) 
Business plan subm itted  (January)
C onsultation  papers for 2000 price review published (M arch, Aug)
D raft price control proposals published (June)
Final price control proposals published for 2001-2006 period (Sept) 
Proposals accepted by NGC
Table A.3: Timeline of events in the water sector
1989 W ater com panies floated on the stock exchange (Dec)
1990 First price control cam e in to  effect for 1990-2000 period (April 1st)
1991 1994 price review  announced and consultation  paper published (July)
1992 C onsultation  paper for 1994 price review published (Nov)
1993 C onsultation  papers for 1994 price review published (Feb, July, Nov)
Interim  determ inations to  revise price caps o f 17 com panies
1994 Business p lans subm itted  (March)
F inal price controls published for th e 1995-2005 period (July)
Proposals accepted  by nine WASCs; rejected by one W ASC and one W O C  
T w o cases referred to  th e MM C (Sept)
1995 D G  encourages firms to  share efficiency savings early (April)
M M C ’s recom m endations published (July)
1996 D G , again, encourages firms to  share efficiency savings early (July)
1999 price review  announced (O ct)
1997 C onsultation  papers for 1999 review published (Feb, June, July)
1998 Com panies agree to  change regulatory period to  5 years (January)
C onsultation  papers for 1999 review published (Feb, March, April, July, Sept, O ct)
1999 C onsultation papers for 1999 review published (Jan, March)
Business p lans subm itted  (April)
Draft price control published (July)
F inal price controls published for 2000-2005 period (Nov)
Proposals accepted by all 10 WASCs; rejected by tw o W OCs
2000 C ases referred to  th e C om petition Com m ission (Feb)
C om m ission recom m endations are published (Sept)
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We assume that the game is repeated at five-year intervals. This reflects the length 
of the regulatory periods in most of the utility sectors, as shown in Table A.4. Our 
assumption that there is no known end-date to the RPI-X game is justified by the 
details of each firm’s licence. These licences axe issued for an indefinite period and, 
hence, the firm is assumed to have an infinite right to the monopoly franchise. The 
Privatisation Acts include provisions for the relevant Secretary of State to remove a 
licence from the firm. This requires a long notice period, however, and notification 
could not be given until a minimum period after privatisation. For example, the 
notification period in the electricity sector is 25 years and notice could not be given 
until ten years after privatisation (ie, March 31st 2000). There are strict conditions 
under which notification to terminate a licence can be given - eg, continuous failure 
to provide sufficient capacity to  meet demand. The regulatory agencies were also 
established indefinitely. While the individual Director General changes, the existence 
of the regulatory body, and its powers and duties, does not. The game is therefore 
expected to be played indefinitely.
We have assumed that the regulator makes all contract offers to the firm, and the 
firm chooses whether or not to accept them. This reflects the practice in the UK 
where only the regulator proposes changes to a contract4,5. Under the Privatisation 
Acts the contract revision can only be implemented with the acceptance of the firm, 
or following a decision by the Commission. This places a constraint on the regulator.
4T his is in  direct contrast to  th e practice o f rate o f return regulation in th e  U S where the firm often  
requested a rate hearing w hen costs increased beyond the current allowed level. T he firms presented  
their ow n case on w hat the contract should be in  these hearings.
5In the water sector a firm can request that the regulator undertake an Interim D eterm ination  
during the period. In addition, under the ten-year regulatory period th e  firm could request that 
a  periodic review be held after five-years. In b oth  cases, w hile the firm has th e  right to  request a 
contract review, it  does not present a contract offer to  the regulator. Once th e  review is underway, 
the regulator is  responsible for designing the revised contract, and th e  gam e proceeds as described in  
Chapter 2.
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Table A.4: legulatory periods
Sector R egu la to ry  P e rio d
W ate r1 1990-2000
1995-2005
2000-2005
D istrib u tio n 1990-1995
1995-2000
2000-2005
Transm ission 1990-1993
1993-1997
1997-2001
2001-2006
B T 1984-1989
1989-1993
1993-1997
1997-2001
B ritish  G as 1987-1992
1992-1997
1997-2002
Note: lrrh e  water industry was privatised w ith  a ten-year regulatory period. T he regulator had the  
option o f revising the contract after five-years and th is option was taken in  both  1995 and 2000. In 
January 1998, the water industry agreed to  a licence m odification w hich form ally changed th e  period  
to  five-years.
Source: Ofgem, Ofwat and Offer - various publications; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994)
A .1.2  The Players 
T h e  reg u la ted  firm
We describe the regulated firm as a natural monopoly. This research therefore only 
applies to the following companies: the integrated water and sewerage companies 
(WASCs) and the water only companies (WOCs); the electricity distribution business 
of the Regional Electricity Companies (RECs); the electricity transmission company 
(NGC); the transportation business of British Gas (Transco); the railways operator 
(Network Rail, formerly Railtrack); and, the local-loop network business of British 
Telecom6. All of these firms have been regulated by the RPI-X mechanism since they 
were privatised. It is assumed that regulation will be required in the long-term given
6In the 2000 review, Ofgem m ade a clear d istinction betw een N G C ’s role as a  tra n sm ission  assset 
owner (T O ) and its  role as a system  operator (SO ) on  the network. T his latter role has becom e  
increasingly im portant w ith  th e  introduction o f the N ew  E lectricity Trading Arrangem ents (N E TA ). 
W e are interested in the long-term  regulation o f the core m onopoly business, the transm ission asset 
owner operations.
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the absence of feasible competition in these sectors.
We have assumed that the regulated firm produces a single good. This is a sim­
plification of reality. All the utilities provide a range of products to consumers. For 
example, electricity distribution companies distinguish between electricity supplied at 
different times of the day. Our description therefore abstracts from reality, and further 
research is required to explore the impact of the RPI-X game on the decisions of a 
multi-product firm.
We have also assumed that a number of regulated firms operate in the sector. This 
is only true for the electricity distribution and water sectors, where regional monopoly 
companies were established at privatisation. In the case of electricity transmission, 
telecoms, gas transportation and railways, the privatised network firm is a national 
monopoly. There is thus no scope - unless within company comparisons are possible - 
to introduce the relative scheme discussed in Chapter 3 in these sectors7.
As noted above, the assumption that the firm is a profit-maximiser is made because 
we do not have any concrete evidence on what alternative objectives motivate the 
regulated firms. This assumption allows us to focus on the familiar economic analysis 
of profit-maximisation and cost-minimisation.
T h e  e c o n o m ic  r e g u la to r
Each sector has its own regulator agency, headed by a Director General (DG). In 
energy, the regulatory agency is called Ofgem. It was established in 1999 and repre­
sents the merger of the former gas regulatory agency (Ofgas) and electricity regulatory 
agency (Offer). The water regulatory agency is called Ofwat. The agencies are inde­
pendent non-ministerial government departments and their running costs are financed 
through licence fees from the regulated industry.
The regulator is responsible for ensuring that the firm meets its licence conditions, 
and is able to propose changes to the licence where this is considered necessary. In 
particular, the regulator sets the firm’s price cap, monitors the firm’s charging regime 
to ensure that it meets the constraints of the cap, and proposes revisions to the cap 
over time. We note that the regulator is not required to  use the RPI-X mechanism 
and could, at any time, change the form of regulation entirely (including deciding that 
no regulation is needed). In practice, the regulators in the natural monopoly sectors 
have adopted this form of regulation at every review since privatisation, and they 
continuously express their support for the price cap mechanism.
The regulator also sets quality of service standards for the firm and monitors the 
firm’s performance relative to these standards. Increased powers in this area were
7Intra-com pany comparisons may be feasible in  the gas sector. For exam ple, cost comparisons can  
b e m ade across Transco’s Local D istribution Zones (LDZs).
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given to the regulators under the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992. No 
clear guidelines are given on the form of regulation which should be used for quality of 
service. All regulators now collect and publish annual information on quality of service 
performance. Guaranteed Standards Schemes exist which require the firm to pay 
compensation directly to customers who experienced service problems. In addition, 
since the 1999 price reviews, water and electricity distribution companies have faced 
the prospect of a service performance adjustment to the next period’s price cap.
We have assumed that the regulatory agency can be modelled as an individual 
decision-making unit. In practice this was true up to 2000, with the individual DG in 
each sector operating as the primary decision-maker. There has been a move towards 
collective decision-making in recent years. In the Utilities Bill 2000, the government 
changed the organisational structure of the energy regulatory agency, Ofgem, so that 
it is now headed by a board (The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority) rather than 
by an individual. The chairman of this board operates like the DG in terms of making 
public statements on behalf of the board but final decisions are made collectively rather 
than by a single individual. The newly created regulator in the communications sector, 
Ofcom, will also be headed by a board with both a chairman and a chief executive. 
Implications of this collective approach to decision-making should be examined in 
future research.
In our description of the RPI-X game the regulator makes decisions which reflect 
his current position on the trade-off between allocative efficiency, technical efficiency 
and distribution. This is our interpretation of how the regulator translates his legal 
powers and duties into a set of objectives.
The regulator’s duties are set out in sectoral legislation and can be summarised as 
follows.
•  Protect consumer interests (long-term and short-term).
•  Ensure the firm carries out its functions properly.
•  Set price limits which allow the firm to finance the proper carrying out of its 
functions8.
In the water sector the duty to protect consumer interests is secondary to the 
financing of functions duty. In contrast, in the energy sector, the regulator’s ‘principal 
statutory objective is to protect the interests of consumers (present and future)’9.
8In th e  water sector there is an  additional requirement th at the financing o f functions duty must 
be carried out to  enable the firm to  earn an adequate rate o f return on its  investm ent. T his introduces 
an elem ent o f  rate o f return regulation into the price cap regime.
9Ofgem  (2002).
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The regulator has a significant amount of discretion in interpreting these duties and 
deciding how they should be delivered. This regulatory discretion exists because the 
Privatisation Acts established very high-level duties but provided no guidance on how 
they should be interpreted or implemented.
We have also assumed that the regulator only considers the impact of his decisions 
on the current period (ie, the next five years). This assumption is justified for two 
reasons. First, regulators are appointed for five-year periods, usually to coincide with 
the regulatory period. There is the option for the post to be renewed (as occurred for 
Ian Byatt, the first water regulator, and Prof Stephen Littlechild, the first electricity 
regulator) but this cannot be presumed. The second reason why the regulator only 
considers the short-term effect of his decisions is that he is, legally, unable to commit a 
future regulator to any decisions or methodologies used. The implication of this is that 
their is no point in the regulator making decisions about the medium- to long-term 
as these will not necessarily be implemented. This is also the reason why we assume 
that only short-term contracts are feasible in the RPI-X game.
C o m p e t it io n  C o m m iss io n
The Competition Commission is an independent organisation which undertakes inves­
tigations into anti-competitive or monopolistic behaviour when cases are referred to 
it by the Director General of Fair Trading or by the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry. In addition, the Commission is required to act as an appeals body in the 
utility sectors when a firm rejects a proposed revision to its licence. It is this role 
which is of interest to us.
The Commission’s stated objective is to ensure that the price cap which is included 
in the licence is in the public interest. There is no clear definition of what this means 
however. The Commission is required to take account of the regulator’s duties when 
setting a price cap. These may vary slightly from one sector to the next10. This 
suggests that the objective function for choosing one price cap over another will be 
similar to that used by the regulator.
Each case is reviewed on its own merits and decisions made are expected to reflect 
the information supplied during the inquiry. This means that the Commission may 
have a different information set to the regulator. It also means that the Commission 
may make decisions which are only appropriate for the specific firm in question. These 
decisions do not apply to the rest of the industry, even if they are generally relevant 
(eg, a decision on the value of the cost of capital).
10D etails o f  how th e Com m ission interprets th e  regulator’s duties can be found in  the reports 
published for each case. T he relevant references are provided in  th e  bibliography.
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The Commission’s public interest decision and recommendations are published in 
a detailed final report. The regulator then devises an alternative contract, taking 
account of these recommendations, and this is implemented in the firm’s licence. The 
Commission has no further role in the process. In the water sector, the regulator 
is obliged to implement the Commission’s recommendations exactly. In the energy 
sector, however, the regulator has discretion in deciding on the final contract. The 
current price cap must be amended if the Commission found it to not be in the 
public interest. The licence change is expected to deal with the specific concerns 
raised by the Commission, but it does not have to exactly reflect the Commission’s 
recommendations.
N o n -e c o n o m ic  r e g u la to r s
A number of other regulators are involved with the regulation of the utility sectors.
•  In the electricity sector, the Health &; Safety Executive (HSE) is responsible for 
ensuring that the regulated firms meet legal standards relating to  safety on the 
network.
•  The Environment Agency (EA) is responsible for setting the environmental stan­
dards which water companies must meet when they discharge sewage to coastal 
waters, rivers and lakes. The EA is also responsible for the national management 
of water resources.
•  The Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) is responsible for regulating the quality 
of water at the consumer’s tap.
All these organisations contribute to the price-setting process by presenting in­
formation to the economic regulator on the outputs which are required for the next 
regulatory period. The water sector regulators are most active as the costs of environ­
mental and drinking water improvements have a major impact on the price control. 
The non-economic regulators also work, on an on-going basis, to ensure that firms are 
meeting their legal duties with respect to output delivery. They are responsible for 
ensuring that the firm introduces appropriate remedies when problems arise.
T h e  g o v e r n m e n t
The government influences the operating environment in which the regulator and the 
firm make their decisions. The Secretary of State responsible for each of the sectors 
can:
A . Background to  th e R PI-X  game 221
• terminate the licences of existing firms, in exceptional circumstances, and ap­
point new firms in their place;
•  remove the existing DG, in exceptional circumstances or at the end of his contract 
period, and appoint a new DG;
•  provide guidance to the regulator on statutory obligations (usually environmental 
and social) which the firm must meet;
•  set financial penalties for breach of statutory obligations; and
•  introduce new legislation relating to the regulatory institutions and the market 
structure.
When making decisions the Secretary of State is bound by the same duties as the 
regulator.
The government has also, through taxation, directly affected the profits earned 
by the regulated firms. Most notably, in the 1997 Budget the Labour Government 
introduced a Windfall Tax on utility profits. In this way, the government by-passed 
the regulator to share the efficiency savings made by firms with the general public.
By setting the initial price caps at privatisation the government set a precedent 
of what was expected from price cap regulation. These initial caps influenced the 
decisions which regulators had to make in the future. For example, Surrey (1996a) 
emphasises that ‘We repeatedly identify the importance of the very lenient initial 
settlement which was determined by the Government (as opposed to the regulator) as 
the prime cause of the imbalance between the benefits received so far by shareholders 
on the one hand and consumers on the other’. There is thus a sense in which future 
price reviews needed to ‘correct’ for the leniency of the caps set at privatisation.
C o n s u m e r  g r o u p s
A number of consumer organisations operate in the utility sectors.
•  In the energy sector customers are represented by energywatch. This organi­
sation, established under the Utilities Act 2000, represents the merger of the 
Gas Consumer Council and the Electricity Consumers’ Committees which were 
established at privatisation, energywatch is an independent body which works 
with, but entirely separate from, the energy regulator.
The water consumer organisation, WaterVoice, was established in April 2002. 
It represents a name change for the Ofwat National Consumer Council, the
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umbrella organisation of the Ofwat Customer Service Committees. These or­
ganisations were established at privatisation. WaterVoice is currently a part of 
Ofwat and its resources are financed by the regulator. It is due to be replaced 
by an independent Consumer Council for Water in the next Water Act11. We 
assume that the consumer group retains an arms-length relationship from the 
water regulator and, in particular, that it is entitled to hold its own views.
•  The National Consumer Council represents consumers in all areas of the econ­
omy, including the utility sectors.
These consumer groups operate at both regional and national level. This ensures 
that firm-specific matters are dealt with, and that a consistent position is taken on 
industry-wide concerns. The groups investigate complaints made about individual 
companies, provide free information to consumers about the industry and their local 
service provider, and undertake independent monitoring of each firm’s output delivery 
and charging performance. They also represent consumer interests in discussions with 
the economic and non-economic regulators, with the relevant industry, and with the 
government and the European Commission. A key role of the consumer groups is 
to provide the regulator with information on customer complaints, and on consumer 
preferences with respect to prices and output delivery.
A.2 The contract agreement game
A .2.1 The regulator’s move
We assume that the RPI-X mechanism applies to the unit price of the single good that 
the firm produces. In practice, as noted above, the regulated firms produce a number 
of products and the cap is applied to an index of regulated prices12. In the water and 
airports sectors, the cap is applied to  a tariff basket which is equal to the weighted 
sum of the prices of individual regulated products. The weights are calculated as the 
proportion of total revenue attributed to each product in the previous year. These are 
fixed from the current period forward but axe endogenous over time. In the electricity 
distribution and gas sectors, the cap applies to changes in average revenue earned
U It is now expected  that the Council w ill not be established before April 2005 (see Ofwat 2003).
12Arm strong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) note that the regulation o f an index o f prices is preferable 
to  the regulation o f prices separately as ‘it  gives the firm more freedom to  respond to  uncertainty in  its  
costs’. There is no cap  set on individual prices but prices are subject to  standard restrictions im plied  
by com petition legislation (eg, prices m ust be non-discrim inatory). In addition, rebalancing across 
prices m ight b e  restricted by universal service obligations and other lim its on  cross-subsidisation. A  
key elem ent o f the regulator’s role, w hich is not discussed here, is deciding w hich prices should be  
included in the regulated index and w hat form o f index to  use.
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from all regulated products. In electricity transmission, the cap applies to changes in 
maximum total revenue earned from regulated products. The cap on all these different 
price indices operates in the way described in Chapter 2 for a single price.
In our description, the regulator determines the cap by mechanically calculating the 
net present value of required revenues for the period. This broadly reflects the approach 
taken by the regulators since privatisation13. The final price cap determination does 
not generally fall out of a financial model, and is likely to be chosen on the basis 
of the regulator’s judgement about the appropriate profile of prices for the period. 
Regulators do use financial models to calculate price cap ranges, however. They do 
not publish the actual financial models used but they emphasise the ‘building block’ 
approach by publishing detailed consultation papers which cover all of the elements of 
the allowed revenue calculation. The reports published by the Commission also show 
the type of modelling which is used to  determine allowed revenues. In addition, Ofwat 
(1998e) published its Financial Rule Book for the 1999 periodic review. This provided 
more detailed information on the modelling approach used.
The firm is not constrained to make cost or financing decisions which lie within 
the assumptions made by the regulator. Ofgem (1999b) stressed that the capital 
projections used to set the price control ‘do not represent a fixed sum to be spent and 
can only be likened to a contract in the sense that the price control is effectively a 
fixed price contract for the delivery of output’. Similarly, Ofwat (1999e) emphasised 
that ‘Companies now know exactly what they should achieve, and the price limits 
which will enable them to deliver outcomes for customers and for the environment. 
Ofwat and the quality regulators will focus on the outcomes. Delivery by companies 
will be monitored on an annual basis. How they deliver is their responsibility; they 
have scope for innovative and cost-effective solutions’.
We assume that the regulator has asymmetric information about the firm’s future 
costs, and that he observes historical total cost information from all firms in the 
sectors. Under the terms of its licence, the firm is required to present the regulator 
with all information requested, both historical and forecast. In addition, the firm 
is required under corporate legislation to publish annual financial accounts for the 
regulated business. The regulator therefore has access to a wide range of financial and 
non-financial data. Table A.5 summarises the type of information that is used by the 
regulators. Comparator information is only available to the regulators in the water 
and electricity distribution sectors. In other sectors, comparisons are often made with 
firms in other regulated sectors.
13Arm strong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) and Beesley (1996a) provide discussions o f  how th is net 
present value approach is  used in the regulated sectors.
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Table A.5: The regulator’s information
D em and
Knows
Forecasts 
Info for forecast
Demand in next period 
Demand in previous periods 
Long-term demand 
Firm’s demand forecast 
Historical trends
C apacity
Knows
Forecasts
Info for forecast
Existing capacity 
Required capacity 
Expected change in demand
O perating costs
Knows
Forecasts
Info for forecast
Level in previous periods - all firms in sector 
Operating effort level in next period 
Business plan - all firms in sector 
Historical trends - all firms in sector 
Productivity in comparator industries
C apital investm ent
Knows
Forecasts 
Info for forecasts
Level in previous periods - all firms in sector 
Output targets in previous periods 
Capital productivity 
Capital level in next period 
Business plan - all firms in sector 
Historical trends - all firms in sector 
Productivity in comparator industries
M aintenance
Knows
Forecasts 
Info for forecasts
Expenditure level - all firms in sector
Serviceability record - all firms in sector
Required expenditure
Risk of future service problems
Firm’s report on asset condition
Historic maintenance levels - all firms in sector
Serviceability record - all firms in sector
Forecasts - all firms in sector
C ost o f capital
Knows
Forecasts
Info for forecasts
Interest rates, equity risk premium, betas and debt premium 
Cost of capital for next period 
Market information +  academic advice
O utputs
Knows
Forecasts 
Info for forecasts
Output targets in previous periods - all firms in sector 
Output delivered in previous periods - all firms in sector 
Impact of revised target on capital investment 
Historic per unit cost levels
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The problem faced by the regulator is that he does not have the technical expertise 
to determine how total cost information is affected by current technology, the firm’s 
level of effort, the amount of output produced, and exogenous factors. In addition, the 
regulator is unable to determine whether the accounting information, or information 
on output delivery, is accurate. Auditors and the non-economic regulators are used 
as checks here, but concerns remain that the firm may alter the historical data so as 
to improve its position with the regulator. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
regulator cannot determine whether the forecasts provided by the firm are honest. The 
regulator therefore has access to a relatively large data set but problems exist with 
the quality of the data, and with the regulator’s ability to interpret the information 
appropriately when making his own forecasts.
Our assumption that demand is known with certainty is limiting. In practice the 
regulator and the firm often use the same demand forecasts provided by independent 
organisations, or the regulator uses the firm’s own forecasts. In this sense there is no 
asymmetry of information about demand, although there is uncertainty about how it 
evolves over time. Similarly, our assumption that the firm is certain about how its 
costs change over time is unrealistic. In practice the firm will have some uncertainty 
about how the operating environment, and hence its costs, will change during the 
regulatory period. For example, environmental standards may be tightened or there 
may be a reduction in the interest rate at which capital is financed. We do not consider 
this uncertainty in our description so that we can focus on the impact of asymmetric 
information between the regulator and the firm. The reader is referred to Frontier 
Economics (2003a) for a useful analysis of how the energy regulator might design 
regulatory mechanisms to deal with this uncertainty.
Sharing past cost savings
We assume that the regulator shares historical efficiency savings with consumers at 
the periodic review. Littlechild (1986) recognised that the X factor would need to be 
revised periodically in the sectors where there was little prospect of competition devel­
oping. The rules used have reflected the regulators’ judgements about the appropriate 
trade-off between improved distribution and reduced technical efficiency. The absence 
of a formal theoretical model for sharing savings meant that the rules varied by sector, 
and they were changed by regulators within each sector over time14. This is why we 
assume, in our description of the RPI-X game, that the regulator uses his discretion 
when setting the rule, and why we assume that there is no commitment to the rule 
over time.
14Houston (1996) provides a useful summary of the sharing rules used by the regulators in the early 
years after privatisation.
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A brief overview of sharing rules shows how the priority placed on different ob­
jectives has changed over time. At privatisation the government was concerned with 
ensuring that the firm was profitable (to ensure a successful privatisation), and that it 
improved its technical efficiency under the regulatory regime. The technical efficiency 
objective therefore dominated the distribution objective at this point, and there was 
no discussion about sharing the firm’s ‘efficiency rent’ with consumers. After some 
time, however, the regulated firms earned high profits, and the regulators were placed 
under pressure by the government and consumer groups to share some of these profits 
with consumers. At this point the distribution objective became more important, and 
the regulators introduced large price cuts across the sectors. This reduced the net 
present value of the return earned by the firm and thereby dulled the incentive to im­
prove technical efficiency. We see that the regulator’s judgement about the appropriate 
sharing rule changes over time, reflecting his changing position on the importance of 
the distribution objective relative to the technical efficiency objectives.
Table A. 6 provides a number of examples of how the regulators shared operating 
cost savings. We see that the length of the regulatory lag has been reduced to equal 
the length of the regulatory period in most sectors. In cases where the regulatory lag 
was longer than the regulatory period, the regulators used a ghdepath approach to 
share savings gradually with consumers.
These examples show that the regulator makes no commitment, from one review to 
the next, as to what the operating cost sharing rule will be. This reflects the degree of 
discretion and judgement which is used to set the rule in the first place. For example, 
during the 1994 electricity distribution review, Offer (1994) stated that ‘in future I 
would not expect the same need to make one-off changes in price, so there would be 
a correspondingly stronger case for incorporating all appropriate adjustments into the 
value of X ’. This suggests that savings would be passed onto customers more gradually 
in the future. Contrary to this statement, Ofgem did deliver another large one-off price 
cut to customers in the 1999 periodic review. Similarly, in the 1994 price review Ofwat 
allowed water companies to retain efficiency savings made in 1990 to 1995 for 10 years 
(ie, to  2005). In the 1999 price review the regulatory lag was changed to 5 years, and 
savings made in 1995/96 were returned in the 2000/01 price cap (ie, five years earlier 
than originally proposed).
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Table A.6: Operating Cost Sharing Rules
R eview R ule Im plied A*J
W ater
1995 review
1999 review
Lag=10 years 
Glidepath 
Lag=5 years 
Rolling mechanism
1 V i < j  — 2 
| < A ?  <1 ,  i = j -  1 
I V  i
BT
1992 review Lag=10 years 
Glidepath
1 V i < j  — 2 
g < A « < l ,  i = j - 1
M anchester A irport
1997 review (MMC) Lag=10 years 
Glidepath
1 V i < j  — 2 
8  < Aj < 1, i = j -  1
NGC
1997 review Lag=5 years 1 Vi
B ritish  Gas
1997 review Lag=5 years 1 Vi
REGs
1995 review 
1999 review
Lag=5 years 
Lag=5 years
’<S> 
> 
>
Source: Competition Commission, Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Ofgem, Ofwat and Offer - 
various publications
Regulators have not varied their decisions on sharing capital savings very much. 
The trend has gone from retaining capital forecasts in the regulatory capital value 
indefinitely, to replacing forecast capital costs with actual capital costs at the end 
of each regulatory period. A number of examples are given in Table A.7. The level 
of actual investment included in the regulatory capital value may higher than the 
allowed level, but lower than the firm’s actual capital costs. This is emphasised by 
Frontier Economics (2003a) who note that ‘the regulator has discretion over whether 
or not to  include items of historical capital expenditure’ when adjusting the regulatory 
capital value at each review. Ofgem (1999d) include higher actual levels in the opening 
regulatory capital value if they are deemed to be ‘necessary and efficient’ or ‘prudent’. 
In the water sector, the regulator undertakes a process of ‘logging up’ when investment 
increases dining the period because of changes in environmental or drinking water 
outputs.
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Table A.7: Sharing rules for capita investment
R eview Investm ent in RCV Im plied
RECs
1999 review Actual 1991-1999 
Actual 2000-2005 (rolling)
(j* + S i -MV*-«i ) 
(Ti+Si+Ni-T) 
(p+st+lVi-Si )
^Tt+ S i+ N i-6t^
NGC
1996
2000
Actual 1990-1996 
Actual 1997-2000
( j H ^ + iV * - ^ )
[?*+&+&-?) 
(/*+£*+JV*-5* )
(Ti+si+Ni-T)
W ASCs
1994
1999
Forecast 1990-1994 
Actual 1990-2000 (rolling)
1
( li+Si+Ni-S i)
j
Source: Ofgem, Ofwat and Offer - various publications
In our description of the RPI-X game we do not examine cost levels in each year 
of the regulatory period. In practice, the sharing of cost savings at the periodic 
review creates a timing distortion in the firm’s incentive to make savings during the 
period. The firm has an incentive to make higher cost savings in the early years of 
the regulatory period. This is because any savings made at this point are retained for 
the full period, while savings made later are also only retained until the next periodic 
review, and hence for a shorter number of years. This effect was noted by Arthur 
Anderson (Ofgem 2000g) when examining trends in NGC’s costs.
In the 1999 water review Ofwat introduced a rolling mechanism for passing on past 
operating and capital cost savings to customers. Under this methodology savings are 
retained by the firm for five years, independent of when the savings are made. These 
rolling rules are intended to smooth the firm’s efficiency incentives over the regulatory 
period. Ofgem also made a commitment, in the 1999 distribution review, that at the 
next periodic review asset values would be adjusted on a five-year rolling basis. It is 
not clear how credible this commitment is as we know the regulator cannot require 
another regulator to use this methodology.
As an aside, we note that Ofwat (1997) explicitly recognised the impact that the 
sharing rules have on the firm’s efficiency rent. Calculations were provided showing 
the impact of different operating cost sharing rules on the firm’s efficiency share. Un­
der the 1994 glidepath approach, where outperformance was transferred to  customers
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progressively over a ten year period, the firm obtains 32% of the net present value of 
the savings made. Under a five-year straight line glidepath, where outperformance is 
transferred to customers gradually over a five-year period, the firm earns 28% of the 
net present value of savings. If all savings are shared at the start of the next regulatory 
period the firm gets 18% of the net present value of savings. These examples illustrate 
the impact of the regulator’s sharing rule on the efficiency rent earned by the firm. 
Frontier Economics (2003b) and Williamson (2001) provide further examples of the 
impact of different rules on the firm’s efficiency share.
Forecast operating costs
In our description, we assumed that the regulator sets the firm’s base operating costs 
equal to  its current operating cost level, adjusted downwards to reflect the regulator’s 
assumption of what the base costs of an efficient firm would be given the current tech­
nology. Table A.8 provides examples of the methodologies used to set base operating 
costs by the water and electricity regulators in recent reviews. When making these 
adjustments the regulators take account of the impact of firm specific-factors, such 
as operating conditions and the state of the assets inherited at privatisation, on total 
costs. For example, Offer (1994) emphasised that its cost forecasts were based on 
the assumption that companies ‘were managed efficiently and that they maintained 
or improved standards of service, but taking account of the particular circumstances 
under which each company had to operate’.
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Table A.8: Efficient base operating cost adjustments
R eview Efficient benchm ark Firm ’s base operating costs
R ECs
1994
1995 
1999
Average industry costs in 1992/93 
Normalised average costs in 1997/98
Benchmark at start of period 
Removed redundancy costs 
Standardised own costs1
NGC
2000 Efficient costs2 Benchmark at start of period
W ASCs
1994
1999
Average industry costs in 1992/93 
Average industry costs in 1997/98
Actual adjusted for exceptional costs 
Actual adjusted for exceptional costs
Note: *The firm’s own operating costs were normalised to bring them in line with average costs in
the industry. Adjustments were made for differences in accounting policies, cost allocation decisions
and firm-specific factors. The regulator also reduced the firm’s own costs to bring them in line with
the efficient industry benchmark, 
o
The efficient cost benchmark was calculated by examining NGC’s own historical costs, the costs of 
comparator utility companies (including the Public Electricity Supply Companies), the costs of 
transmission companies in other countries and the costs of non-utility companies.
Source: Ofgem, Ofwat and Offer - various publications
The regulator rolls the efficient base operating costs forward to reflect his assump­
tion about the expected improvement in the firm’s productivity level. We assume that 
the productivity targets incorporate a shift in the industry frontier and an additional 
firm-specific ‘catch-up’ element. Table A.9 provides examples of the information used 
by regulators to  determine the size of the shift in the industry frontier.
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Table A.9: Sectoral efficiency targets
R eview B asis for industry target
R E C s
1994
1999
Evidence from other industries 
Information from companies 
Advice from consultants 
Best operating practice 
Average productivity growth in UK economy 
Advice from consultants
N G C
1996
2000
Business plan costs 
Information on ‘well-managed’ companies 
International comparisons 
Advice from consultants 
Business plan costs 
Costs of other utilities 
Advice from consultants
W A SC s
1994
1999
Performance in UK economy 
Costs in international water sectors 
Costs of other UK sectors
Source: Ofwat, Offer and Ofgem - various publications
Detailed methodologies are used to calculate the firm-specific element of the pro­
ductivity targets in the water and electricity distribution sectors. According to Arm­
strong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) the Department of the Environment undertook ‘a 
comparative efficiency review’ when setting the K-factors at the water sector privati­
sation. Ofwat used econometric analysis to compare the firms’ efficiency levels in the 
1994 and 1999 water price reviews. In the 1994 and 1999 distribution reviews, Ofgem 
(Offer) used regression analysis to determine whether each company was on or below 
the efficiency frontier16. The frontier was established by the base costs of a peer group. 
Ofgem combined the regression analysis with work provided by consultancy firms. It 
was stressed that the regulator was wary of placing ‘an undue reliance on a statistical 
analysis of operating costs’ (Ofgem, 1999d).
Both Ofgem and Ofwat use the comparator analysis to band firms into relative 
efficiency levels. They shy away from setting a different target for each firm because of 
concerns about the limitations of econometric analysis in precisely defining the relative 
efficiency of individual firms. The banding of firms is often influenced by other factors
15 Weyman-J ones (2001a and 2001b) provides a critique of the methodology used by Ofgem in the 
1999 price review.
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such as advice from consultants, output delivery performance, and company-specific 
circumstances.
In the electricity distribution sector, the regulator set the same efficiency target 
for all firms, but used the efficiency banding to determine firm-specific adjustments 
to efficient base operating costs. In the water sector, the efficiency bands are used to 
set different efficiency targets for the firms over the entire period, and base operating 
costs are based on the firm’s own costs.
Table A.10 shows the operating efficiency targets used by regulators in the water 
and electricity distribution sectors. The range of targets across the industry can be 
quite wide. We also see that the targets have tightened over time and inefficient firms 
are being required to catch-up with the frontier early in the period.
Table A. 10: Firm-specific efficiency targets
R eview Catch-up decision Target range
RECs
1994 In base operating cost adjustment 2% pa
1999 75% of the way to frontier by 2001/02 
Move in line with frontier to 2004/051
2.3% pa
NG C
1996 n.a. 2.5% pa
1999 n.a. 3.5% pa
W ASCs
1994 50% of the way to frontier by 2000 Water: 1-3.5% pa 
Sewerage: 1-3.4% pa
1999 Meet most efficient firm early in period Water: 1.4-4.5% pa 
Sewerage: 1.4-5% pa
Note: * Ofgem assumed that the industry frontier for electricity distribution would move in line with 
the RPI for the control period. That is, the expected productivity improvement would be no greater 
than that for the economy in general.
Source: Ofwat, Offer and Ofgem - various publications
R egulatory capital value
We assume that the opening regulatory capital value is calculated using information on 
the firm’s market value at privatisation. Table A. 11 shows how this value is calculated 
in the water and electricity sectors. We see that it is essentially the actual market 
value of the company at flotation adjusted for sectoral-specific factors.
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Table A .ll: Opening regulatory capital value
R eview M ethodology
RECs
1994
1995 
1999
Market value at flotation plus a 50% uplift 
Market value at flotation plus a 15% uplift
As for 1995
NG C
1996
2000
Market value at flotation plus adjustment for Energis
As for 1996
W ASCs
Privatisation
1994
1999
Discounted current cost cashflows from existing assets 
Average market value over first 200 days trading
As for 1994
Source: Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994); Ofgem, Offer and Ofwat - various publications
The opening value at flotation is rolled forward by actual net new investment to 
give the opening value at the start of the next regulatory period. The regulator then 
forecasts required investment for the next regulatory period to determine the forecast 
asset value.
We assume that regulators use the firm’s capital cost forecasts as the basis for 
assessing required net new investment. Table A. 12 provides examples of the size of 
adjustments made by individual regulators to these forecasts. The rationale for the 
adjustments vary by sector but in general they follow those outlined in our description 
of the game. In particular, consultants are used to  undertake detailed benchmarking 
analysis to  ensure that the forecast investment levels are efficient relative to the best 
available technologies. Where the firm’s forecasts are considered too high, relative to 
the efficiency benchmark, downward adjustments are made.
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Table A.12: Adjustments to capital investment
R eview Forecast A djustm ent
RECs
1994
1999
£5.6bn
£6bn
-£660m
-£950m
NGC
1996
2000
£l.lbn
£1.5bn
-£700m
-£220m
W ASCs
1999 n.a. -£655m1
brecasts
Note: *This is the value of the WASCs quality improvement programme which was disallowed by the 
regulator because the programmes proposed by individual companies were not supported by the 
DWI or EA, and/or because the regulator deemed the proposed solutions to not be ‘cost-effective’. 
Source: Ofgem, Ofwat and Offer - various publications
The regulators also make downward adjustments to the forecasts because their 
assessment of capital effort is higher than that used by the firm. The sectoral pro­
ductivity target is determined by examining changes in capital productivity in other 
sectors in the economy, and in the same sector in other countries. The regulators also 
take account of any expected technology shocks in the sector. In the water sector, the 
firm’s relative capital productivity change is determined by comparing per unit capital 
cost forecasts on individual activities (eg, laying a pipe) across firms. In the electricity 
distribution sector, the regulator considers the level of historical and forecast capital 
investment across firms. Ofgem have not published information on the actual targets 
used. Ofwat’s targets for capital expenditure are presented in Table A. 13.
Table A.13: Capital efficiency targets in the water sector
R eview Target for period
1994
1999
Water: 0-8.7% 
Sewerage: 0-8.5 
Water: 9-24% 
Sewerage: 7-19%
Source: Ofwat - various publications
In the 1999 distribution price review, Ofgem (1999c) adjusted the allowed revenue 
of three companies by 0.25% for apparent overforecasting. This contrasts with our 
assumption that the regulator does not make ex-ante adjustments for expected fore­
casting bias. This is the only time that a regulator has explicitly done this, however,
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and it will be interesting to see whether it becomes a more prominent element in the 
price cap setting process in future reviews.
Finally, both the water and electricity distribution regulators have considered mak­
ing output-delivery adjustments to the investment forecasts. In the 1994 distribution 
review Offer (1993) considered whether the investment programme assumed for the 
1991 to  1995 period had been carried out. It was argued that this retrospective re­
view was needed to ‘ensure that further capital expenditures are justified on the basis 
of a rigorous analysis taking into account compliance with statutory obligations and 
planning standards, the effects on quality of service, and the likely costs and benefits 
involved’. In the 1994 final proposals no reference was made to  any adjustments made 
to  reflect unjustified underspend relative to that which was allowed at privatisation. In 
the 1994 water review Ofwat (1993c) examined the firm’s record at delivering service 
to customers and proposed that ‘offsetting adjustments will be made to costs or capital 
values, so that customers do not pay for standards which they have not received’.
We assume in the RPI-X game that the regulator takes the outputs as given when 
calculating efficient net new investment. In practice a number of iterations usually 
take place here with the economic regulator, and other regulators, testing the impact 
of changes in the output targets on required costs. This only occurs if the targets are 
considered flexible in any way.
C ost o f capital
We have assumed that the regulator calculates a single value for the cost of capital 
using historical financial market information. In practice, a range of cost of capital 
values are usually calculated. Table A. 14 provides examples of the ranges which were 
used in recent reviews. There has not been much variation in the value used across the 
sectors, despite the lengthy and detailed debates which arise at each review in relation 
to this variable16.
Most regulators have used the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to calculate 
the allowed cost of capital level17. Under this model the cost of capital is a weighted 
sum of the required return on equity and the required return on debt financing. That 
is:
r  =  (1 - g ) C O E  + (g)COD  
=  ( l - g ) [ r *  + ( E R P x ( 3 ) \ + 9Y
16 A  small change in the cost of capital has a significant impact on the firm’s revenues, given the 
size of the asset bases in the utility sectors. This is why this variable is so prominent in discussions 
at all periodic reviews.
17This is confirmed by Buckland and Fraser (2001).
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Here r  is the cost of capital, COE  is the cost of equity, g is the level of gearing 
and COD  is the cost of debt. The cost of equity is equal to the return earned on a 
riskless asset - the risk-free interest rate r*- plus the additional expected return from 
a risky stock. This additional return is equal to the equity risk premium (E R P ) times 
the firm-specific equity beta (/?). The equity risk premium measures the differences 
between the return earned on a market index and the risk free rate. The equity beta 
measures the systematic riskiness of the firm relative to the market index. The cost 
of debt is estimated as the observable yield on the firm’s debt, Y.
The regulators compare the results from the CAPM model to those of other finan­
cial models - eg, the dividend growth model - and to the cost of capital values used by 
other regulators and by the Commission. When deciding on the final value the regu­
lator also consults with key players in the financial market and academic experts. In 
those sectors where it has become increasingly difficult to obtain financial information 
on the regulated firms - because of takeover and merger activity - the regulators have 
used comparator cost of capital estimates from other utility sectors.
Table A. 14: A lowed cost of capital
Review R ange
B ritish  G as (p re-tax )
1992
1993 (MMC)
5-7%
4-4.5% on existing assets 
6.5-7.5% on new investments
W ASCs
Privatisation
1994 (post-tax)
1995 (MMC, pre-tax)
1999 (pre-tax)
2000 (MMC, pre-tax)
7%
5-6% on new investments 
6-7% on existing assets (by 2005)
6-8%
4.25-5.25% (+0.75% for WOCs) 
5.6% (Mid Kent Water)
R E C s (p re-tax )
1994
1995 (MMC)
1999
7%
7%
6.5%
N G C  (p re-tax )
1996
2000
7%
6.25%
Source: Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994), OXERA (1998a, 1999), Ofgem, Ofwat and Offer - 
various publications
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D epreciation
We assume that the regulator sets the allowed depreciation charge equal to annualised 
required maintenance expenditure over the expected life of the asset. The asset lives 
are determined by analysing the current physical state of the network and by consid­
ering the rate at which the assets are expected to depreciate. Here the regulator relies 
on information provided by the firm about the physical state of the network assets.
As assumed in our description, the regulators use historical maintenance expendi­
ture levels as the basis for setting future expenditure requirements. These are adjusted 
downwards for suspected inefficiency. For example, in the 1994 water review Ofwat 
(1994) argued that ‘Assets should be properly maintained, but customers should not 
have to pay for gold plating’.
The water and electricity distribution regulators assess whether the firm’s historical 
investment levels are efficient by comparing them with those of other firms in the 
sector. In other sectors, the regulators undertake benchmarking analysis with firms in 
other industries. Regulators also employ engineering consultants to undertake detailed 
studies of the firm’s expenditure requirements. These are still based on company 
information about the physical assets. With these comparisons the regulator forms a 
judgement on what the efficient level of maintenance expenditure is.
Once the total amount of required maintenance expenditure has been forecast the 
regulator calculates an annual depreciation charge which will cover the net present 
value of the expenditure over a number of years. Table A.15 summarises the method­
ologies used by the regulators to calculate the depreciation charge. In general straight 
line current cost depreciation is used. Using this methodology the value of deprecia­
tion does not change significantly from one period to the next, except where a large 
proportion of assets reach the end of their lives18.
18The net present value of expected maintenance expenditure is always recouped by the firm, what­
ever the methodology used. The timing at which funding becomes available varies with different 
methodologies. In this regard the firm and the regulator may have different preferences about whether 
the expenditure should be spread evenly over a long time period, front-loaded or recouped at the time 
when the assets have almost fully depreciated.
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Table A.15: Calculating the depreciation charge
R eview M ethodology used
RECs
1994
1999
Uniform over 10-15 years for flotation assets 
Uniform over 33 years for post-vesting assets 
Tilted over 20 years for post-vesting assets
W ASCs
1994
1999
Average annual spend over asset life 
Average annual spend over 23-years
Source: Ofwat, Offer and Ofgem - various publications
A llow ed revenue, service perform ance and th e  X -factor
We assume, in our description of the RPI-X game, that the regulator makes a quality 
of service adjustment to the level of allowed revenue in the first year of the regulatory 
period. This type of adjustment was introduced in the 1999 electricity distribution 
and water price reviews. This was the first time that a formal link was introduced 
between quality of service and allowed prices19.
The initial price cut was adjusted by 0.5% to  —1% in the water sector for those 
firms who were identified as having service performance which was significantly above 
or below average. The adjustments in the electricity distribution sector ranged from
0.5% to -0.375%. The size of the adjustment was chosen arbitrarily. In the water sector, 
the negative adjustment was applied to three WASCs and the positive adjustment was 
applied to two WASCs. The positive adjustment was applied to three companies in 
the electricity distribution sector, and the negative adjustment was applied to two 
companies. No adjustment was made for the other companies (five WASCs and seven 
RECs).
Ofwat are currently working on improving their quality of service index for the 
2004 price review and the size of the allowed revenue adjustment may be increased. 
There has been a greater amount of activity in this area in the electricity sector. 
Ofgem announced, during the 1999 distribution review, that it would undertake further 
research into the appropriate way to measure quality of service, and that it would 
design a more robust performance adjustment during the regulatory period. This
19The idea of linking standards of service achieved to the price control was also raised in the 1994 
distribution price review. Offer concluded that such a regime would not be feasible until consistent 
measures for quality of service variables were determined and data collected over a number of years. 
The regulator therefore focused attention on gathering the required information between 1995 and 
2000 rather than designing a specific mechanism at that point.
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research was undertaken in the Information and Incentives Project (IIP) between 1999 
and 2001, and resulted in a formal licence change in April 200220.
The April 2002 licence change formalised the service performance adjustment by 
adding an extra ‘service parameter’ in the formula for the allowed change in average 
revenue. The parameter is negative for those companies who fail to meet quality 
of supply targets during the price control period. The amount of the adjustment is 
limited to 1.75% of revenue in each year of the period. The parameter is positive for 
those companies who deliver a quality of supply higher than their 2004/05 target by 
the end of the period. The firms who outperformed relative to their target are banded 
together and the top portion get 2% of regulatory revenue. All other outperforming 
firms receive a prorata reward for their relative performance. This reward focuses on 
improvement during the regulatory period rather than annual changes.
Under the new incentive scheme, service performance is to be monitored during 
the 2000-2005 regulatory period and the financial adjustments will be implemented in 
the 2004 review. In future regulatory periods, the adjustments could be implemented 
on an annual basis. Ofgem also intend to base targets in the next regulatory period 
on performance in this period.
When annual allowed revenue has been calculated the regulator determines the 
required X factor profile. As noted in our description of the RPI-X game, several 
different combinations of X-factors can deliver the same net present value of revenue 
and the regulator uses his judgement as to which one is most appropriate. Table A.16 
provides example of the range of X-factors used by regulators in recent reviews. We 
see that the X-factor can be constant over time or vary by year21. In particular the 
X-factor in the first year of the regulatory period, the Po cut, may be very large.
20The reader is referred to the various Ofgem reports cited in the bibliography for more detail on this 
project. Frontier Economics (2003b) also provide a useful summary of the Information and Incentives 
Project.
21 Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) note that ‘In telecommunications, gas, and electricity X  
factors are constant throughout the regulatory period, and it appears that regulators generally prefer
to have constant factors For BAA and most water companies, however, the X or K factors are not
constant. This is presumably because of the large investment programs in these two industries’.
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Table A.16: X-factors
Period Price Cap (%)
RECs
1990-1995 
1995-20001 (A)
1995-20001 (B)
2000-2005
RPI+0 to RPI+2.5 
P0 cut (1995): RPI-11 to RPI-17 
X (1996-2000): RPI-2 
P0 cut (1996): RPI-10 to RPI-13 
X (1997-2000): RPI-3 
P0 cut (2000): RPI-19 to RPI-33 
X (2001-2005): RPI-3
NGC
1990-1993
1993-1997
1997-2001
2001-2006
RPI-0
RPI-3
P0 cut (1997): RPI-20 
X(1998-2001): RPI-4 
X (2001): RPI-0 
X (2002-2006): RPI-3
W ASCs
1990-1995 
1995-20002 (A) 
1995-20002 (B) 
2000-20052 (B) 
2000-20052 (C)
RPI+3 to RPI+7 
RPI+0 to RPI+5.5 
RPI+0.5 to RPI+4 
RPI+0 to RPI+3 
P0 cut (2000): RPI-9.3 to RPI-19.4 
X (2001-2005): RPI-0.5 to RPI+2.1
Note: * Offer agreed the price controls for the 1995-2000 period in August 1994 (marked A). In March 
1995 the distribution price review was reopened because the regulator argued that information learnt 
since August suggested that the original contract was too lenient. The revised contracts were agreed 
in July 1995 (marked B). The 1996 Pq cuts were in addition to those already agreed for 1995.
o
At privatisation the regulatory lag was set at ten years for the water sector but the regulator had  
the option, which was taken-up in 1995 and 2000, to revise the existing contract after a five-year 
period. Price caps were therefore set for the period 1990 to 2000 at privatisation (marked A) and for 
the period 1995 to 2005 (marked B) at the first review in 1994. In the 1999 review the regulator 
changed the length of the regulatory lag to five years and prices were formally set for 2000 to 2005 
only (marked C).
Source: OXERA Guides; Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994); Ofwat, Ofgem and Offer - 
various publications
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O u tp u t targets
We assumed that the regulators set output targets which do not allow for a deterio­
ration in current standards. That is, the target for the next period is set equal to the 
current standard of service plus a possible upward adjustment. We outline a number 
of cases below where the regulator has tightened the firm’s quality of service targets 
from one period to the next.
•  During the 1994 electricity distribution price review, the DG examined the stan­
dards of service which companies delivered to customers. Offer (1994) indicated 
that the price control was set to ‘raise levels of service in a number of areas’ and, 
more generally, that there was an expectation that existing standards would be 
maintained alongside the reduction in prices. The DG increased the minimum 
level of some of the Overall Standards and reduced the required response time 
for some companies for the Guaranteed Standards.
•  In the 1999 electricity distribution review, the DG introduced slightly tighter 
targets for availability of supply and security of supply. The targets were set by 
‘applying a required percentage improvement over the period of the price control 
(2000/01 to 2004/05) to the forecast performance for 1999/00, which was derived 
from a 10-year linear trend in actual performance’ (Ofgem, 2001f).
•  Offer considered reducing the standards set for NGC in 1995 as a means of 
providing lower prices to customers. It was decided (Offer, 1996d) that there 
should be ‘no general relaxation in standards’, but the company could reduce 
some standards in some circumstances (eg, good weather) as long as ‘there was 
no widespread loss of supply’. Offer also noted that ‘customers should be offered 
more choice about the level of security supply they wanted’.
•  In the 1994 and 1999 water reviews, Ofwat expected companies to maintain ex­
isting standards of service, and to fund any discretionary improvements through 
cost savings.
Ideally targets would be based on information about the level of quality that cus­
tomers are willing to pay for. This principle is often recognised explicitly by the regula­
tors. For example, in the 1994 review, Ofwat (1993b) emphasised that the costs which 
are included in the price cap calculation should reflect ‘whether customers are pre­
pared to pay to maintain levels of service’. The following examples show the attempts 
which have been made to collect data on consumer preferences.
•  Offer (1993) clearly stated that the allowed investment for the next regulatory 
period should be guided by information on the customers’ trade-off between price
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and quality. A MORI survey was published which found that few customers were 
‘willing to receive lower standards of service in exchange for lower electricity 
prices’ (Offer, 1994). It is not clear how, if at all, this information was built into 
the regulator’s final decision.
• In the 1999 distribution review Ofgem (1999b) provided high-level evidence on 
willingness-to-pay: ‘there is limited willingness to pay modest sums for quality 
improvements’. It is not clear what the source of this information was or how 
robust the findings are. Ofgem (1999d) also noted that it did not have a formal 
system for weighting quality of supply against costs. This was considered a 
limitation of the methodology used, and the regulator stated that it wanted to 
improve the information base in the future so that it was better able to analyse 
the operating cost-capital expenditure-quality trade-off.
•  In the 1994 water review, Ofwat (1993b) argued that not enough was done at 
privatisation to ‘assess whether customers were willing to pay the price of the 
substantial improvements in standards that were required of the companies’. 
The regulator therefore encouraged companies to undertake customer surveys to 
assess willingness-to-pay for service improvements. It is not clear how, if at all, 
this information was used to  set the price caps. It is thought that Ofwat placed 
little emphasis on it as it did not trust the results of the surveys used.
•  In the 1999 water review, consumer groups, companies, the EA and the DWI 
undertook surveys to determine customer willingness-to-pay for service improve­
ments and for changes in drinking water quality and environmental standards. 
Ofwat (1998f) summarised the findings of these surveys. The evidence was used 
to reinforce the high-level judgement that customers did not want further in­
creases in bills, but that they would welcome improvements if these could be 
delivered through efficiency savings. The specific investment programmes were 
not determined using regional willingness-to-pay information, however, because 
Ofwat (1998f) believed that ‘Only broad conclusions can be drawn since re­
spondents were usually not presented with detailed and costed improvements 
that they could trade-off against specific bill reductions’.
In most cases the collected data was not transparently used to set the service tar­
gets. This is generally because of the difficulty of collecting reliable willingness-to-pay 
information. One particular problem is the fact that consumers are not homogeneous 
and it is difficult to establish a simple measure to reflect a wide range of opinions on 
the appropriate price-quality trade-off. In addition regulators, and the Commission, 
are often sceptical about the value of information gathered from surveys. For example,
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Ofwat (1998f) argued that ‘Questions about willingness to  pay tend to reveal more 
about customers’ values than the decision they would actually make when confronted 
with real choices’. The final decision on the quality of service required by consumers 
therefore usually reflects the regulator’s judgement which will be partially influenced 
by the survey information collected.
A .2.2  The firm's move
The firm decides whether or not to accept the regulator’s contract proposal by compar­
ing profits under that contract to the expected profits from a Commission investigation. 
Table A. 17 provides some examples of the differences between the Commission’s con­
tract and that proposed by the regulator. These suggest that the Commission generally 
provides similar price caps to the regulator. It is difficult to judge whether or not the 
firms involved benefited from the Commission’s contract, however, as the underlying 
assumptions, including the output targets, could be very different. For example, the 
firm may be required to deliver more outputs with the same level of revenues, or it 
may be required to deliver higher efficiency savings but be allowed earn a higher cost 
of capital.
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Table A. 17: Comparing price cap proposals
C a se R e g u la to r C o m m iss io n
S o u th  W e s t  W a te r
1995 95/96: R PI+1.5%  
96 /97 -99 /00 : R PI+1%
95/96: R PI+1%  
96 /97 -99 /00 : R PI+1%
B G  p ic
1997 97/98: RPI-20%  
98 /99-01 /02: RPI-2.5%
97/98: RPI-21%  
98 /99 -01 /02 : RPI-2%
M id  K e n t  W a te r
2000 00/01: RPI-19.7%  
01 /02 -03 /04 : R PI+0%  
04/05: R PI+1.6%
00/01: RPI-19.7%  
01 /02: R PI+4.5%  
02/03: R PI+3.2%  
03 /04 -04 /05 : R PI+0%
H y d r o -E le c tr ic
1995 95 /96-99 /00: RPI-1% 95/96: RPI-0.3%  
96 /97 -99 /00 : RPI-2%
N I E  (T & D )1
1997 97/98: RPI-30%  
98 /99-01 /02: RPI-2%
97/98: RPI-25%  
98 /99 -01 /02 : RPI-2%
Note: lrThis is the price cap for Northern Ireland Electricity’s Transmission and Distribution 
business. Separate caps are set for the Power Procurement business and for the Supply business. 
Source: O X ER  A  (1998b) and C om petition Com m ission (2000)
In practice, firms have tended to accept the regulator’s contract proposal. Arm­
strong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) note that ‘Typically firms have preferred to avoid 
the uncertainties of an MMC review’. Table A.18 shows the few cases where a refer­
ence has been required in the water and electricity sectors in England and Wales. The 
Commission also investigated the price cap for Scottish Hydro-Electric in 1995 and for 
Northern Ireland Electricity in 1997. The relatively few number of Commission cases 
may reflect the fact that regulators take account of the ‘outside option’ of an appeal 
hearing when devising the contract proposal. They do this by making assumptions 
which are consistent with those used by the Commission in the past, thereby reducing 
the probability of the Commission offering a contract which is very different from that 
proposed by the regulator. This is in the regulator’s interest as he also faces large 
costs, both financial and in terms of time, if there is a Commission investigation at 
the end of the periodic review process.
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Table A. 18: Competition Commission references
R e v ie w F ir m ’s  d e c is io n
R E C s
1994 A ccepted  by all
1995 A ccepted  by all
1999 A ccepted  by all
N G C
1992 A ccepted
1996 A ccepted
2000 A ccepted
W A S C s
1994 9 accepted  
South W est W ater rejected  
Postsm outh  W ater (W OC) rejected
1999 All accepted  
M id-Kent W ater (W O C) rejected  
Sutton  & E ast Surrey W ater (W O C) rejected
Note: Offer agreed the price controls for the 1995-2000 period in August 1994. In March 1995 the 
distribution price review was reopened because the regulator argued that information learnt since 
August suggested that the original contract was too lenient. The revised contracts were agreed in 
July 1995.
A .2.3  The C om petition  Com m ission G am e
We assume that the Commission first decides whether the existing cap is in the public 
interest. In all price review cases held to-date the Commission has found that the 
current price limit is not in the public interest and should be changed. This is not 
surprising given that firms’ costs have been significantly lower than assumed at each 
periodic review, and that output targets have changed over time. Once this decision 
is made the Commission considers how the cap should be changed to deal with the 
public interest concerns.
We assume, in this regard, that the Commission may make different assumptions 
to the regulator. Table A.19 highlights a number of examples where the Commission’s 
assumptions have been different to those used by the regulator. The details behind 
these assumptions are provided in the published reports. Despite these differences, 
the final price caps have been vary similar (see Table A.17).
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Table A .1 9 : Different a lowed revenue assumptions
R eview R egu lato r Com m ission
S ou th  W est W ate r (1995)
N N I (1995-2005)
O perating costs  
Sharing operating savings
£900m  
£908m  
10-year glidepath
£950-990m  
£930-950m  
5-year glidepath
B G  pic (1997)
C ost o f capital 
R C V
NN I (1997-2002)
5.92-7.6%
£12.4bn
£2 .4b n
7%
£11.6bn
£4.1bn
M id K en t W ate r (2000)
C ost o f capital 
O perating efficiency target
5.5% 
4.3% p.a.
5.6%  
3.7% p.a.
H ydro-E lectric  (1995)
N N I (1995-2000) £255.4m £277.9m
N IE  (1997)
O perating costs £ 3 0 1.8m £328. lm
Source: O X E R A  (1998b) and C om petition  Com m ission (2000)
We include the firm’s option to seek a judicial review in our description of the 
RPI-X game. In general the regulators have implemented final licence changes which 
closely reflect the recommendations of the Commission. In the case of water, the 
recommendations are implemented exactly. There has therefore only been two judicial 
review cases to-date, one of which was taken by a firm not involved in the original 
Commission investigation.
1. ScottishPower: on the basis of a recommendation made by the Commission, 
Offer adjusted Hydro-Electric’s supply price control formula so that the Great 
Britain Yardstick was used as the basis for determining generation costs in the 
control. ScottishPower, the other operator in Scotland, requested that the same 
change be made to its price control. Offer rejected this request and the case was 
referred to the High Court. Offer won the judicial review case. The matter was 
then referred to the Court of Appeal which ruled in favour of ScottishPower in 
February 1997. The regulator considered making a further appeal to the House 
of Lords, but finally made the required amendment to ScottishPower’s licence, 
recognising that a further appeal would be lengthy and costly.
2. Northern Ireland Electricity: following the Commission’s report, Ofreg intro­
duced a revised licence condition for NIE’s transmission and distribution busi­
ness in 1997. The details of the licence change were different to those proposed
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by the Commission. In particular, the regulator made different assumptions on 
the size of the regulatory capital value at privatisation, on the treatment of de­
preciation, and on the allowed levels of capital and operating costs. When the 
regulator continued to refuse to implement the Commission’s exact findings NIE 
pursued the matter via a judicial review. The High Court in Belfast supported 
the regulator’s stance in June 1998, but the company then sought a further in­
vestigation by the Court of Appeal. In October 1998 the Northern Ireland Court 
of Appeal ruled in NIE’s favour and the firm’s licence was changed.
In both cases the firm has won the right to have the Commission’s recommenda­
tions, rather than the regulator’s alternative contract, implemented into its licence. 
The cases took a long time to resolve, however, and the outcome was shortly followed 
by another price review which changed the contracts again.
A.3 The implementation game
We are not able to provide evidence on how the regulated firms make their decisions 
in the implementation game. The decision-making processes in the boardroom are 
not publicly available and, hence, we rely on the standard economic assumption of 
profit-maximisation for our description.
We do, however, have evidence on the extent to which the regulators choose to 
change the regulatory contract mid-period22. The unexpected interventions are often 
driven by pressure from the government or consumer groups to  reduce the profits 
earned by the firm. In other cases, the intervention was signalled at the periodic 
review - for example with cost past-through mechanisms - and was therefore expected 
by the firm.
•  Formal revision in response to high profits: In the electricity distribution sector 
the regulator set price limits in 1994 for the period 1995 to  2000. After the 
final price limits had been agreed the regulator learnt that higher profits and 
lower costs were feasible, and he announced that the price limits were to be 
revised. New contracts were proposed in July 1995. This intervention involved 
a complete and formal revision of the regulatory contract - essentially a second 
periodic review.
22The extent of mid-period intervention in the mid- to  late-1990s is usefully summarised by 
W illiam son (2001) as follows: ‘A windfall tax has been levied, and regulators have reopened re­
views, clawed-back gains from outperforming revenue caps and revisited revenue blocks such as the 
regulatory asset base and depreciation*.
A . Background to  th e R PI-X  gam e 248
•  Formal revision in response to changing market conditions: British Gas’s reg­
ulatory contract was formally revised in 1993 when the MMC recommended a 
relaxation in the price cap for transportation. This was proposed as compensa­
tion for the introduction of competition in the small customer market at a faster 
pace than expected. Similarly, during the 1991 duopoly review in the telecoms 
sector, British Telecom’s price cap was changed from 4.5% to 6.25% for the last 
two years of the existing regulatory period (1992 to  1994). These are examples 
of how a change in policy - in this case market structure considerations - can 
lead to a complete reopening of the regulatory contract.
•  Formal revision in response to changing input prices: In 1992 and 1993 the 
construction price index fell significantly, reducing the capital investment costs of 
water companies below what was assumed when prices were set at privatisation. 
In response to this Ofwat introduced a licence change to revise the price cap 
of seventeen companies downwards in 1993 and 1994. This is an example of a 
partial formal revision to the contract.
•  Formal revision in response to tighter output targets: Upward revisions to the 
price cap have also been observed in the water sector when output targets have 
been changed during the regulatory period. Whether or not the contract is for­
mally revised depends on the cost of delivering the new targets. If the regulator 
believes that the efficient costs can be covered under the existing price limit the 
contract is not revised. The regulator will, however, include any additional cap­
ital investment in the regulatory capital value at the next periodic review. If, 
however, the financial cost of the required output is large, and the firm is unable 
to ‘finance its functions’ under the current price limit the regulator will, usually 
at the firm’s request, hold an interim price review. This results in a formal and 
full revision to the contract mid-period.
•  Informal revision in response to high profits: Shortly after the new price limits 
came into effect in 1995 the WASCs made large profits and dividend payments. 
In response, the regulator recommended that companies deliver the benefits of 
cost savings to customers immediately by charging prices which were below those 
allowed under the price limit23. That is, the firms were encouraged to operate as 
if an implicit lower price cap was set. This form of benefit sharing is an example 
of an informal adjustment to the ‘spirit’ of the regulatory contract, rather than 
an actual revision to the detail of the written contract.
23Although no formal mechanism was used to implement such benefit sharing schemes, and no indi­
cation was given of what would happen companies who didn’t adopt this approach, several companies 
voluntarily set lower prices in the latter years of the 1995-2000 regulatory period.
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•  Automatic pass-through of costs: In the gas, electricity supply and airports sec­
tors provisions are in place to allow some costs to be passed-onto customers as 
soon as they are incurred24. This results in an automatic adjustment to the price 
cap during the regulatory period. As this is built into the regime it does not 
involve any revision of the contract. The types of costs which firms are allowed 
passthrough are as follows - (1) Electricity supply companies were able to pass 
on wholesale prices, transmission charges, distribution charges and the fossil fuel 
levy to customers. (2) British Gas is able to pass through an index of gas pur­
chase costs. Between 1987 and 1992 all purchase costs we passed through. Since 
1992 the company has only been able to pass through a gas price index less 1%. 
(3) BAA can pass through up to 95% of security costs in its airport charges.
The regulator’s decision to change the contract is made in reaction to one of three 
events - a change in costs because of exogenous shocks, an increase in costs because of 
the introduction of new outputs, and a higher than expected improvement in the firm’s 
efficiency level. In general, the non-economic regulators have attempted to coordinate 
the timing of output decisions with the periodic review so that changes mid-period 
are minimised. The legislative timetable does not follow the regulatory timetable, 
however, and changes may therefore arise at any time. This is particularly notable 
in the water sector where output targets are driven by EU Directives and, as noted 
by Ofwat (1998f), ‘History has shown that it is likely that further new obligations 
will be imposed before the next review’. We should therefore expect intervention in 
response to output changes to continue. The concern, however, is whether regulators 
will continue to change the contract in response to the high-profits which firms earn 
because the RPI-X mechanism is working as expected.
24 A theoretical analysis o f the implication of cost pass-through for allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency can be found in Holzleitner (2001). We do not discuss this issue here.
A ppendix B
T he regulated businesses
We calculate productivity growth rates for the water, electricity transmission, and 
electricity distribution sectors in Chapter 4. The analysis is based on data for the 
following companies:
•  the ten water and sewerage companies (W ASCs) - companies which hold a 
licence to provide monopoly water and sewerage services within a specified region 
in England and Wales;
•  the distribution business o f the twelve regional electricity companies (R EC s) 
in England and Wales - companies which hold a monopoly licence to distribute 
electricity from the high-voltage network, along lower-voltage power lines, to the 
end-user within a specified franchise area1; and
•  the transmission business of the National Grid Company (N G C ) - the company 
which holds the monopoly licence to transmit electricity from upstream genera­
tion plants along high-voltage fines to the distribution network. The licence area 
covers all of England and Wales.
Other companies of interest, which could be included in an extended version of 
this analysis, are BT (formerly British Telecom), Transco (formerly British Gas) and 
Railtrack. BT and Transco have been excluded as it is difficult to collect a consis­
tent dataset which is focused on the regulated network monopoly elements of these 
businesses. Railtrack has been excluded as the available dataset is relatively short.
The companies considered here undertake a number of different activities in ad­
dition to the provision of their regulated services. We wish to clarify precisely what
1 These twelve companies are also referred to as Public Electricity Suppliers (PESs), along with  
ScottishPower, Scottish Hydro-Electric and Northern Ireland Electricity.
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element of each company’s activities are of interest to us to ensure that the appropri­
ate data is abstracted from published regulatory accounts. The regulated businesses 
which we focus on are those which the regulator applies a stand-alone price cap to.
•  WASCs - the WASCs were privatised on December 31st 1989 and floated on the 
London Stock Exchange on December 11th 1990. The regulator sets a single 
price cap (the K factor) for the provision of water and sewerage services. That 
is, the combined provision of water and sewerage services is treated as a single 
network monopoly by the regulator. We also adopt this approach, while recog­
nising that there may be scope to introduce competition in some elements of the 
business (eg, abstraction or customer services)2. We also note that, by consider­
ing both businesses together, and by combining all elements of service provision 
(eg, treatment, distribution, customer services), we are unable to consider im­
portant efficiency questions relating to the individual elements of the production 
process.
•  Electricity distribution - the RECs were privatised on March 31st 1990 and 
floated on the London Stock Exchange on December 11th 1990. They are 
responsible for the supply and distribution of electricity. Initially both activities 
were regulated, but over time competition has been introduced into supply. Dis­
tribution remains the core network monopoly activity of these companies. We 
therefore focus attention on the distribution business of these companies only. 
The regulator has always set a separate price cap for the distribution business.
•  Electricity transmission - the National Grid Company was privatised on March 
31st 1990. It was initially owned jointly by the RECs but was floated on the 
stock exchange on December 11th 1995. When setting the price cap for NGC’s 
activities, the regulator considers the revenues earned from transmission services, 
settlements, ancillary services and interconnectors. These are the activities which 
we also focus on in our productivity analysis.
There are three business units associated with each of the regulated firms. Each 
of these publish annual accounting information.
1. The regulated business which operates under the price cap publishes annual reg­
ulatory accounts. The companies are required to submit these accounts to the 
regulator as part of their licence conditions. The water regulator provides Reg­
ulatory Accounting Guidelines (RAGs), ensuring consistency across the compa­
nies. No guidance has been provided by the electricity regulator, however, and
2 See Robinson (2000) for a discussion of the prospects for competition in the water sector.
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hence there may be some concern about consistency in the accounting method­
ology used by companies - for example with respect to allocating common costs 
across the supply and distribution businesses. Concerns have been expressed by 
the electricity regulator in this regard and work is ongoing to develop a set of 
accounting guidelines for the sector.
2. The Group, which owns the regulated business and is the holder of the monopoly 
licence, is a statutory company which publishes its own annual report and ac­
counts under the Companies Act 1985. This company undertakes activities in 
addition to the running of the regulated business.
3. The Parent company, which owns the Group business and is listed on the Stock 
Exchange (but potentially not in the UK), is also a statutory company which 
publishes its own annual report and accounts. In many instances, the regulated 
business is only a small subsidiary of the parent company.
The Government retained a golden share in the water and regional electricity com­
panies until March 1995. After this date takeover activity began and most of the 
companies in this analysis have been owned by more than one parent company since. 
Tables B .l and B.2 provide details of the regulated companies, outlining the name of 
the licence-holder and all its parent companies. NGC has not been subject to any 
takeover activity and remains the only transmission business in England and Wales. 
Stock market information, and data in the accounts of the Parent and Group com­
panies, relate to businesses which encompass many activities. This information is 
therefore a misleading indicator of the regulated business’s financial position.
We source all financial data from the regulatory accounts which are published using 
the current cost accounting methodology. These accounts provide information on each 
of the service areas in the regulated business. For example, separate accounting data 
is provided for the supply and distribution businesses of the RECs, and separate data 
is available for water services and sewerage services for the WASCs. All non-financial 
(physical) data is taken from documents published by the regulatory agencies or by 
the Centre for Regulated Industries (CRI).
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Table B.l: Ownership of the electricity companies to March 31st 2000
R egulated firm Group Parent
D istribution
Eastern Eastern Group T X U  Europe
T h e Energy Group: 0 2 /9 7 -0 9 /9 8  
Hanson: 09 /95-02-97  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 9 /9 5
E ast M idlands E ast M idlands E lectricity pic PowerGen (f)
D om inion Resources: 0 1 /9 7 -0 7 /9 8  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 1 /9 7
London London E lectricity pic E D F
Entergy Corporation: 0 7 /9 7 -1 2 /9 8  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 7 /9 7
M anweb M anweb pic ScottishPow er (f) 
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -1 0 /9 5
M idlands M idlands E lectricity pic G P U  Power UK
Avon Energy Partners: 0 6 /9 6 -0 6 /9 9  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 6 /9 6
Northern Northern E lectric pic Berkshire H athway Group  
C E  Electric UK: 1 2 /9 6 -0 3 /0 0  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -1 2 /9 6
Norweb Norweb pic U nited  U tilities (f)
North W est W ater pic: 1 1 /9 5 -0 4 /9 6  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -1 1 /9 5
Seeboard SE E B O A R D  pic Am erican Electric Power C o  
Central & Southern: 0 1 /9 6 -1 2 /9 7  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 1 /9 6
Southern Southern E lectric pic Scottish  and Southern Energy  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -1 2 /9 8
Swalec SW ALEC pic W estern Power D istribution  
Hyder: 0 3 /9 6  to  09 /2 0 0 0  
W elsh W ater pic: 0 1 /9 6 -0 3 /9 6  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 1 /9 6
Sweb SW E B  pic W estern Power D istribution  
Southern Company: 0 9 /9 5 -0 1 /9 9  
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 9 /9 5
Yorkshire Yorkshire E lectriciy pic Am erican E lectric 
Group: 0 3 /9 0 -0 4 / 97
Transmission
NG C N ational Grid Group N ational Grid Group (f)
Jointly owned by RECs: 0 3 /9 0 -1 2 /9 5
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Table B.2: Ownership of the water companies to March 31st 2000
Regulated firm Group Parent
A nglian A nglian W ater pic AWG pic (f)
Dwr Cym ru W elsh W ater pic G las Cym ru C yfyngedig  
W PD : 0 9 /0 0 -0 5 /0 1  
Hyder pic: 0 1 /9 0 -0 9 /0 0  
W elsh W ater pic: 12 /8 9 -0 1 /9 6
Northum brian Northum brian W ater Group pic Lyonnaise des E aux  
Group: 12 /8 9 -0 2 /9 6
N orth W est North W est W ater pic U nited  U tilities p ic (f)
Severn Trent Severn Trent pic Severn Trent p ic (f)
South  W est South W est W ater pic Pennon Group pic (f)
Southern Southern W ater pic ScottishPow er pic: 0 7 /9 6 -7 /0 2  
Group: 12 /8 9 -0 7 /9 6
T ham es Tham es W ater pic RW E AG
Group: 12 /8 9 -1 1 /0 0
W essex W essex W ater pic Enron Corp: 0 9 /9 8 -7 /0 2  
Group: 1 2 /8 9 -09 /98
Yorkshire Yorkshire W ater pic K elda Group p ic (f)
A ppendix C
Productivity  variables
To measure productivity we need to define the outputs produced, and the inputs used 
to produce these outputs. We consider the most suitable available measures for each 
of these variables here.
C .l Output
Each regulated business is required to ensure that supply meets customer demand at 
all times1. In addition, the firms are expected to  provide a high quality of supply to 
consumers. As such, there are essentially two distinct but related outputs produced 
- the physical output and the quality of supply provided. We wish to capture both 
outputs in our productivity measures, particularly as the investment programmes un­
dertaken since privatisation have been aimed at improving the quality of supply, rather 
than simply increasing capacity to provide extra volume to customers2.
C.1.1 O utput level
The amount of the physical output produced is, essentially, the volume of the good 
which is transported along the network. The specific measures used for each sector 
are as follows.
1In the water sector, the regulated firm is involved w ith  all stages o f production and th e  final 
product provided is  the delivery o f water and sewerage services to  custom ers. T he electricity distri­
bution  com panies and NGC are responsible for providing network access, and transportation services, 
betw een upstream  and downstream  providers. T he products which are regulated are thus different - 
interm ediate and final services - but th e  form o f  regulation is the sam e across all th e  sectors.
2T his point is also em phasised by Saal and Parker (2001). T hey note th at in the water sector *a 
substantial portion o f  the additional capital input has been concerned w ith  water quality enhancem ent, 
as well as capital m aintenance. Base water and sewerage output, by contrast, has been fairly static*. 
Inputs are therefore used to  produce an increasing quality level rather than an increase in volum es 
delivered.
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•  For NGC we measure the level of output as the volume of electricity sales to 
domestic, commercial, industrial and other customers. The annual data is taken 
from the company’s Seven Year Statement (January 2001).
•  The level of output for the electricity distribution companies is measured as 
the units of electricity distributed in the company’s franchise area. The data 
is taken from the Centre for Regulated Industries’s annual report, UK Electric­
ity Industry Financial and Operating Review, for the years 1991 to 1999. The 
corresponding data for 2000 is taken from the Electricity Association’s report, 
Electricity Industry Review.
•  There are problems using a volume measure as the output variable in the water 
sector. A large proportion of customers receive an unmetered water supply, and 
the amount of water consumed by end-users is estimated by the companies3. 
The data on the volume of sewage collected is also estimated. Measured data is 
available on the volume of water which is put into the distribution system (input), 
but this does not necessarily correspond to the amount that is delivered because 
of leakage4. There is thus no reliable data on volumes delivered. We therefore 
use the number of properties connected to the network as a proxy measure for 
the amount of output produced in the water and sewerage sector5. This variable 
is calculated as the sum of the properties connected to the water system and the 
properties connected to the sewerage system. Data for the period 1993 to 2000 is 
taken from the companies’ July Returns submissions to the regulator. The data 
for 1991 and 1992 is taken from the OFWAT annual report, Report on Levels 
of Service for the water industry in England and Wales (1991 and 1992). Data 
is only available in 1991 for water properties. We therefore estimate the 1991 
values for sewerage propeties by assumming that the company-specific growth 
rate in sewerage properties from 1991 to 1992 was the same as that observed in 
1992 to 1993. .
Figure C .l shows the output index for each of the sectors for the period 1991 to 
2000. Output has increased at a steady rate in all sectors, with higher growth in the
3In 2000 only 16% of all water customers- household and non-household - were metered.
4Leakage from the system has a significant effect on changes in the volume of water put into 
the system. Companies have made large investments to reduce leakage in recent years. This could 
be construed as a reduction in the level o f output, even though the amount consumed may not have 
changed. This was noted by Waddams Price (2000) who emphasised that improvements in the leakage 
record of the firms will lead to a reduction in the volume measure at a time when consumption is 
known to have been increasing.
fiThe number of customers would be an alternative proxy for the output variable. These numbers 
are also estimated by the firms however and show a high degree of variability, particularly for sewerage 
services.
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electricity sector than the water sector.
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Figure C.l: Output Index
C . l . 2 Q u a lity  o f su p p ly
In addition to ensuring that consumer demand is satisfied, the regulated firms are 
required to provide a sufficient quality of supply. From the perspective of productivity 
measurement, this means that the firm’s inputs are used to deliver both increased 
volumes and quality of supply improvements. If the quality element is not captured 
in the productivity growth rate, the firm will be considered to have low productivity 
improvement even when it is producing more with a given set of inputs. This is because 
the additional quality being produced - ‘more output’- is not reflected in the standard 
measure. We attempt to overcome this shortcoming by using a quality-adjusted output 
variable in our calculations.
In the electricity sector quality of supply is primarily focused on the need to ensure 
that customers get a continuous supply of electricity (ie, security of supply). The mea­
sure of interest for electricity distribution is the number of supply interruptions per 100 
connected customers. The data is taken from OFGEM (2001) Report on Distribution 
and Transmission Performance 2001. The quality of supply variable used for NGC is 
Average Transmission System Unavailability. The data for 1992 to 2000 is taken from 
the OFGEM (2001) Report on Distribution and Transmission Performance 2001. The 
data for 1991 is taken from OFGEM (2000b), The Transmission Price Control Review  
of the National Grid Company from 2001: Initial Thoughts Consultation Document.
C. Productivity variables 258
Quality of supply in the water industry is more complicated as there are two 
aspects to quality for each service provided. First, the quality of the service provided 
to customers matters. For water services we use two measures of quality of service 
- the percentage of properties with unplanned supply interruptions greater than 12 
hours, and the percentage of properties with water pressure levels below the reference 
set by the regulator. The quality of service measure used for sewerage services is the 
percentage of properties at risk of flooding from sewers (once in ten years and twice in 
ten years). Data on these measures is taken from the OFWAT annual report, Report 
on Levels of Service for the water industry in England and Wales (various years).
The second aspect of quality of supply which is important in the water industry is 
environmental quality and drinking water quality. The drinking water quality measure 
used is the percentage of tests carried out which comply with the prescribed concentra­
tion value6. This data is taken from the Drinking Water Inspectorate’s annual report, 
Drinking Water Report by the Chief Inspector (various years). For sewerage services, 
the impact of the disposal of sewage on the natural water environment is of most 
importance. This is regulated by providing each company with discharge consents 
which set a limit on the amount of chemicals which can be included in the discharged 
sewage. The quality measure used here is the percentage of sewerage treatment works 
complying with numeric discharge consents. The data is taken from the Government’s 
publication, The Digest of Environmental Statistics (various years)7.
We construct a quality-adjusted output measure using these quality of supply vari­
ables. The measure captures the fact that the firm produces two products - the level of 
output and the level o f quality of supply. Specifically, the combined measure reflects 
the proportion of output which is of ‘good quality’ in each year. An increase in this 
variable indicates that the firm is producing more for consumers and we assume that 
this increase is welfare-improving (ie, desirable).
The quality-adjusted output index is calculated for electricity distribution and 
NGC as:
QVok = Volt x GQt
Volt is an index of the level of output in the sector (1991=100). GQt measures 
the proportion of output which was of good quality in year t. For the distribution 
companies this is the percentage of customers who did not suffer a supply interruption. 
For NGC this is the percentage of the system which was available during the year.
6 T h is is  th e  numerical value assigned to  water quality standards defining the m axim um  legal 
concentration.
7T he D igest o f Environmental S tatistics was published by the D epartm ent o f the Environment 
(1991-1997), the D epartm ent o f Environment, Transport and th e  R egions (1997-2001), and th e D e­
partm ent o f Environm ent, Food and Rural Affairs (2001).
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A similar measure is used for the water sector but it is complicated by the presence 
of numerous quality measures. The quality-adjusted output index is:
QVok =  (R f  x V o lf  x G Q f) +  (flj x Volf x GQ3t )
R f  is the share of total revenue from water services, V o lf  is an index of the 
level of output in the water sector (1991=100) and G Q f is the proportion of output 
which is of good quality. The variables with ‘s’ superscripts provide the corresponding 
information for sewerage services. The weighted measure is intended to represent the 
proportion of water supplied and sewage collected which is of overall ‘good quality’ 
from the customer’s perspective.
Good quality in the water sector, G Q f , is measured as a weighted sum of the water 
quality measures. Equal weights have been applied to each measure given the absence 
of any hard information on willingness to pay for each aspect of quality of supply. This 
gives us:
where:
•  DWt is the proportion of the firm’s tests complying with drinking water quality 
standards in year t;
•  WPt is the proportion of properties which have not had water pressure below 
the reference level in year t; and
• W it is the proportion of the firm’s properties which have not had unplanned 
supply interruptions in year t.
Good quality in the sewerage sector, G Q f, is measured as a weighted sum of the 
sewerage quality measures. Equal weights have again been applied to each measure. 
This gives us:
SFt . DCt
GQf = +2 2 
where:
•  SFt is the proportion of the firm’s properties which are not at risk of sewer 
flooding once or twice in ten years; and
•  DCt is the proportion of the firm’s discharge consents complying with the stan­
dards set
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Figure C.2 shows the quality-adjusted output index for each of the sectors. There 
has been a significant improvement in the proportion of output which is of ‘good 
quality’ since privatisation. This output measure has increased by slightly more than 
the standard output index between 1991 and 2000 and there is more variation in this 
index from one year to the next. For example, NGC’s index declined slightly in 1992 
and increased significantly since then. This reflects the fact that tranmission system 
availability fell from 92% to 91% in 1992 and increased annually from then, reaching 
96% by 1997 and remaining at that level up to 2000.
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Figure C.2: Quality-adjusted Output Index
We could, alternatively, consider the second quality product as being the size o f 
th e  im provem ent in quality of supply over time, and construct a combined measure 
using this variable. This approach was adopted by Saal and Parker (2001) and Hunt 
and Lynk (1995). The index used in this case would be:
QVolt =  Volt x QIt
where:
•  QVolt is the quality-improvement adjusted volume in year t;
•  Volt is an index of the level of output (with 1991=100); and
QIt is a quality improvement index. The quality improvement index is calculated
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where Qt is the individual firm’s level of quality in year t and Qiggj is the average 
level of quality in the sector in 1991. For QIt > 1 we see that the quality of 
supply for the firm is greater than the average quality in 1991 (ie, there has been 
a service improvement). A value of QIt < 1 indicates a deterioration in quality 
relative to the sector average in 1991.
We found that, with our data, the TFP growth rates are biased by outliers 
with this methodology. In addition, the level of quality, rather than the 
size of the improvement in the level of quality, is thought to better reflect 
the actual amount produced using the given inputs in each year. We also 
question whether it is an appropriate measure of ‘desirable output’ as it 
seems to suggest that only increasing rates of improvement are required 
by consumers. In practice we would expect that high quality levels are 
demanded and, once these are achieved, there is limited value from in­
creased improvements. Indeed, it is unlikely that large improvements can 
be continuously delivered in all years.
C . l . 3  V a lu e  o f  o u tp u t
The value of the output produced is the turnover (£m) of the regulated business. 
This data is obtained from the firms’ annual regulatory accounts and converted to 
2000 prices Using the ONS Producer Price Index8. This data was taken from ONS, 
Economic Trends, various years. The firm’s turnover reflects the amount produced 
and the amount charged for each unit of output. It is therefore affected by price cap 
regulation which restrains the level of charges over time.
Figure C.3 shows the level of turnover in each of the sectors since privatisation. 
The trend reflects changes in the price cap allowed (see Table A.16). In particular, the 
price cap has been positive in the water sector (RPI+K) and negative, on average, in 
the electricity distribution sector. NGC’s price cap was non-negative for most of the 
period.
8In NGC’s regulatory accounts data for 1991 to 1994 was classified into the following four categories: 
electricity transmission, ancillary services, interconnectors plus generation and settlements. From 1995 
to 2000 the categories were electricity transmission, ancillary service, interconnectors and settlements. 
The 1995 accounts also presented information on interconnectors only for 1994. This allowed us to  
determine the proportion of interconnectors plus generation activity which was interconnectors only. 
To ensure the time series was consistent we removed data on generation activities from the 1991 to 
1993 data. This was done by applying the proportion of the interconnector plus generation value 
which was interconnector only in 1994 to the aggregate data in the 1991 to 1993 accounts. In this 
way all information relating to generation activities pre-1995 was removed. T h is  a d ju stm en t w as  
m a d e  for a ll financia l d a ta  ta k en  from  N G C ’s  reg u la to ry  accou n ts.
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Figure C.3: Turnover Index
C .2 In p u ts
We assume there are two input categories in the production process - capital and 
non-capital. The data used for each are discussed here.
C.2.1 Capital 
Capital level
The level of capital for the regulated firm, most of which is sunk, is defined as the 
current cost value of gross fixed assets (£m) at the year-end9. This data is taken from 
each firm’s annual regulatory accounts. The data has been subject to a number of 
revaluations over time. These revaluations reflect improvements in information about 
the network (notably MEA revaluations in the water sector), and changes in the way in 
which historical cost data is converted to its current cost counterpart. These changes 
result in a significant degree of variability in the numbers, without there necessarily 
being an underlying change in the level of capital available for the production process. 
We therefore remove the revaluations to create a consistent series for the current cost 
value of the fixed assets. Saal and Parker (2001) use a similar approach. They argue 
that this is consistent with the ‘inventory’ method of calculating capital values as the 
change in gross fixed assets now simply represents the level of net investment. That
9This variable is also used by Tilley and Weyman Jones (1999) in their analysis of total factor 
productivity growth in the electricity distribution sector.
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is:
GAt =  GAt- i  +  It - D t
where GA is gross fixed assets, I is investment (ie, additions to the capital base) 
and D is disposals (ie, reduction in the capital base). All data has been converted to 
2000 prices using the ONS Gross Fixed Capital Formation Price Deflator. This data 
was sourced from the ONS, UK National Accounts (the Blue Book), various years.
Figure C.4 shows the change in the capital level over time for each of the sectors. 
The capital level appears to change cyclically and the cycles coincide with the regu­
latory periods. The capital level in the water and electricity distribution sectors has 
increased between 1991 and 2000. In the electricity transmission sector, however, it 
was close to its 1991 level by the end of the period.
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Figure C.4: Capital Level Index
Capital costs
We calculate the annual capital cost as the sum of the financing cost of capital plus 
the cost of depreciation:
(Rental rate x Capital level)-(-capital charges
The average real discount rate on a treasury bill is used for the rental rate of capi­
tal. This data is taken from ONS, Economic Trends, various Years. In the electricity
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sector the capital charge is simply the annual depreciation charge. In the water sec­
tor, infrastructure assets (those below ground) are financed through an infrastructure 
renewals charge and non-infrastructure assets are financed through a standard depre­
ciation charge. The sum of these annual charges is used here. Data on capital charges 
is taken from the firms’ annual regulatory accounts and converted to 2000 prices using 
the ONS Gross Fixed Capital Formation Price Deflator.
Figure C.5 shows the capital costs for each sector. The capital costs have fallen 
from their 1991 level. In addition, like the capital level, the costs vary cyclically and 
the cycles coincide with changes in the Treasury bill over time .
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Figure C.5: Capital Cost Index
We also consider the level of gross capital expenditure when examining trends in 
unit costs. Gross capital expenditure is equal to the annual additions to fixed assets. 
The data is taken from the notes to the balance sheet in the regulatory accounts. The 
data has been converted to 2000 prices using the ONS Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Price Deflator. Figure C.6 shows the level of capital expenditure in each of the sectors 
since privatisation. The level has decreased in the electricity transmission sector. Tere 
has been an increase in both the water and electricity distribution sectors, although 
expenditure has reduced in the distribution sector and has levelled off in the water 
sector since 1998. There is some cyclical behaviour in the level of gross capital ex­
penditure and, again, this corresponds with the regulatory periods, perhaps with a 
lag.
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Figure C.6: Capital Expenditure Index
C .2 .2  N o n -c a p ita l
The level, and value, of non-capital inputs is measured as the value of the firm’s con­
trollable operating costs (£m). The financial measure is used because there is no clear 
physical measure which accurately encompasses all the non-capital inputs. The data 
is taken from each firm’s annual regulatory accounts10. The definition of controllable 
operating costs varies by sector, reflecting differences in the way in which each com­
pany presents data on operating costs in its accounts. In all cases total operating costs 
is calculated as turnover minus current cost operating profit. Controllable operating 
costs is then calculated as follows.
• For NGC, controllable operating costs is equal to operating costs minus depreci­
ation, rates, transmission services scheme direct costs, research & development 
costs, purchases of electricity and other costs. It is assumed that all the deducted 
costs are not used in the production process directly.
• In the electricity distribution sector, controllable operating costs is calculated as 
operating costs minus depreciation, NGC charges, research & development costs,
10A number o f water companies did not provide a detailed breakdown o f direct operating costs 
in their 1992/93 regulatory accounts. Information on employment costs was provided by Ofwat (by  
email) to  ensure there was no break in the tim e series. This data was consistent w ith that sourced 
from regulatory accounts for all other years and is considered an accurate reflection o f operating costs 
in 1992/93. In addition, a number of companies provided the required breakdown for 1992/93 in their 
1993/94 regulatory accounts and for these companies the data coincided with that provided by Ofwat.
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exceptional costs, auditors remuneration and other costs (including administra­
tive expenses)11. Again, we assume that these deducted costs are not inputs to 
the production process.
•  The water companies provide a more detailed breakdown of their direct operat­
ing costs (ie, those used in production). We are able to calculate controllable 
operating costs as the sum of employment costs, power costs, materials costs and 
the cost of hired and contracted services. There was a significant step-change 
in employment costs for all companies in 1992/1993, resulting in a structural 
change in the level of controllable operating costs at that point.
All the data has been converted to 2000 prices using the ONS Producer Price 
Index. Figure C.7 shows the change in the level of non-capital costs over time. In 
all sectors there has been a reduction in controllable operating costs between 1991 
and 2000. The trend has been steadiest in the electricity distribution sector and most 
marked in the electricity transmission sector. There was a step-change in the water 
sector in 1993, driven by a sharp fall in employment costs, which was followed by small 
annual decreases up to 1998 and small annual increases between 1998 and 2000.
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Figure C.7: Non-capital Costs Index
11 Tilley and Weyman Jones (1999) also use real operating expenditure as an input in the production 
process. They define this variable as ‘revenue minus operating profit, current cost depreciation, and 
exceptional items’.
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N o t e  o n  la b o u r  le v e l
Productivity is usually measured using capital and labour as the main inputs in the 
production process. The labour level might be measured by the number of employ­
ees or by the level of employment costs. There are several problems with using the 
employment level for these regulated firms however.
•  Data on employment costs and number of employees are not available for the 
regulated distribution companies. Any data used would therefore only be a 
proxy for the required information. The most frequently used proxy is the data 
available for the Group business which undertakes several other activities. Trends 
in this data do not reflect changes in the labour input for distribution. For 
example, if a company sold its supply business there would be a drop in the 
labour level of the Group without there being any change in the distribution 
labour level. This information therefore has the potential to be misleading, 
particularly given the amount of restructuring which many of the Groups have 
been though since privatisation.
•  Data on employment costs and number of employees is available for NGC and 
the water companies. The cost data is published in the regulated accounts, and 
information on the number of employees is available from the regulator (water) or 
from the Group accounts (NGC). There is a significant concern, cited by several 
authors, that this data does not accurately reflect the labour input into the 
production process. This is because a large proportion of activities undertaken 
by these businesses are now contracted out. A reduction in direct labour hired 
may therefore be partially offset by an increase in the cost of hiring a contracted 
worker.
•  Other non-capital factors of production (e.g. materials), which are not published 
separately by the electricity firms, would be omitted from the analysis.
For these reasons we argue that controllable operating costs is a more suitable 
measure of the non-capital inputs used in the production process. We recognise that 
the nature by which this variable is calculated, particularly in the electricity sector, 
means that some of these costs may not reflect actual inputs in the production process. 
It is the best available proxy, however, given the data provided in the regulatory 
accounts.
A ppendix D
Production function estim ation
In this appendix we discuss the different econometric techniques which are used to 
estimate the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function in section 4.4.1. 
The merits and problems of each approach are outlined.
We estimate production functions for the electricity distribution and water sectors. 
We do not estimate a separate production function for NGC (electricity transmission) 
because of the small sample size1. We assume that each firm within a sector has the 
same technology. The coefficients of the estimated sectoral production functions are 
then used to calculate firm-specific productivity growth rates in section 4.5.
We estimate a standard production function and a constant returns to scale (CRS) 
production function for each sector. The specific equations which we estimate are:
Vit =  a +  otkit +  (3lu + % + ea  Standard model
Vit =  a  +  a k it +  (1 -  o)lit +  %  +  eit CRS model
=*■ (Vit - k t )  =  a +  a  (ha ~ k t )  + V *  +  £<t
where y is output, k is capital, I is controllable operating expenditure, r) is a firm- 
specific effect, and e  is a random error term. All variables are in logs format.
The functions are estimated using a panel data series for each sector. In the 
electricity distribution sector we have data on twelve regional electricity companies 
(N R =  12) over a ten year period (1990-2000) (TR =  10). In the water sector we have 
data on ten water and sewerage companies (N w  =  10) over the same ten year period 
(T w =  10).
The statistical properties of the panel data estimators are based on the assumption 
that the cross section dimension (N) is large relative to the time series dimension (T).
1Only ten years of data is available for one company.
268
D . Production function estim ation 269
Wooldridge (2002) argues that ‘if N is sufficiently large relative to T, and we can 
assume rough independence in the cross section, then our asymptotic analysis should 
provide suitable approximation’ for finite sample properties. If, however, ‘T is of the 
same order as N...an asymptotic analysis that make explicit assumptions about the 
nature of the time dependence is needed’. In our datasets we have small and finite 
N and T. In addition, N and T are close to each other in both sectors; indeed the 
same in water. We therefore cannot be sure that the properties of the estimators hold 
here. We recognise this at the outset and note that the estimated coefficients may be 
inconsistent and/or inefficient with our datasets.
The estimating techniques used are:
• Ordinary least squares on the levels model (OLS);
•  Ordinary least squares on the first-differenced model (FDOLS);
• Within Group estimation (WG); and
• Anderson-Hsiao estimation (AH).
In each case, the production function is estimated with time dummies. These 
capture aggregate factors that affect output over time in the same way for all firms. The 
year dummies are their own instruments when instruments are used in the estimation 
procedure.
We are seeking the estimation technique which provides the most reasonable es­
timates for the capital and labour coefficients, given our datasets. By reasonable we 
mean that:
•  the estimates are, according to econometric theory, consistent and efficient;
•  the coefficient estimates are consistent with economic theory - ie, they he between 
zero and one, and the values axe neither very low or very high;
•  the estimates are individually and jointly statistically significant - in all tables a 
* indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant,. An estimate is considered 
significant here if the p-value associated with the coefficient is <0.01. Standard 
errors are provided in parentheses; and
•  the estimated model yields a high goodness-of-fit measure.
D .l Data analysis
Before discussing the estimation techniques we take a closer look at the variables in 
the Cobb-Douglas production function.
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D .1 .1  M u lt ic o llin e a r ity
We find that there is relatively low positive correlation, 22.6%, between the capital 
and labour variables in the electricity distribution sector. It is significantly higher, 
71.25%, for the water sector. This suggests that multicollinearity will not be a major 
concern in the electricity distribution model, but it may be a concern in the water 
sector model. In this case the coefficient estimates will be unreliable as they do not 
measure the direct relationship between the individual explanatory variable and the 
dependent variable but also capture the collinearity across variables to some extent. 
W ith only one regressor, multicollinearity is not an issue in the constant returns to 
scale model.
D . l . 2  S ta t io n a r ity
T he standard production function
To determine whether the explanatory variables in the production function are sta­
tionary we estimate the following equations:
ujit =  A“W _ i  +  vft
where =  {y, fc, I} .
The results from the OLS regressions are presented in Table D.l. We find that there 
is a high degree of correlation between each variable and its lagged value, suggesting 
that the variables are non-stationary. That is, the variables are persistent and a shock 
in one period will continue to have an impact because of the relationship between 
current and future values of these variables.
Table D.l: Correlation of variables over time
Electricity Water
Output 1.001* 1.001*
(.0002) (.0002)
Capital 1.001* 1.001*
(.0005) (.0005)
Labour .9895* .9822*
(.0035) (.0056)
The production function with non-stationary regressors becomes:
Vit =  a +  a  ( \ kk it - i  +  +  (3 +  vt*t) +  Vi +  £*t
=  a +  aXkka-1  +  pxllu-i -f ffa +  [eu  +  ot.vkt + (3v\^
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This function is dynamic in nature. The capital and labour variables in period t are 
correlated with the error term in period t-1. They axe also potentially correlated with 
a firm-specific fixed effect. We therefore have a problem with endogenous regressors 
in our model.
T he constant returns to  scale production function
We also consider the variables in the model with constant returns to scale technology. 
We estimate the following dynamic model for each variable:
v it =  + Vit
where u> =  {(y — I), (k — I)} .
The results from the OLS regressions are presented in Table D.2. We again find 
that there is a high degree of correlation between each variable and its lagged value. 
That is, the variables are non-stationary. This means that the constant returns to 
scale production function should also be modelled as a dynamic function with an 
endogenous regressor.
Table D.2: Correlation of CRS variables over time
E lectricity W ater
O u tp ut/L abou r
C apital/L abour
1.011*
(.0033)
1.016*
(.0053)
1.017*
(.0067)
1.014*
(.0053)
Summary
We have shown that, in our production function, the regressors are non-stationary 
(persistent). These variables are therefore correlated with the error term, and we need 
to use estimation techniques which take account of this endogeneity. Where there is a 
firm-specific effect in the model, it may also be correlated with the capital and labour 
coefficient over time. These conclusions are true for both the standard production 
function and the constant returns to scale production function.
D.2 Ordinary least squares
We first estimate the production function using the standard pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation technique. Our pooled OLS estimators allow for the fact 
that observations are independent across firms, but are not necessarily independent
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within a firm over time2. This estimation procedure provides robust standard error 
estimates.
We summarise here the main theoretical properties of the pooled OLS estimates.
1. OLS is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) if:
(a) £n (0, o-2) - ie, there is no autocorrelation and the error term is homoscedastic.
(b) The regressors, kit and In, are strictly exogenous (ie, not correlated with £u 
Vt).
(c) The regressors are linearly independent (ie, no multicollinearity) and, hence, 
there is a unique least square estimator.
These conditions are referred to as the assumptions of the Classical Linear Re­
gression Model.
2. The OLS estimates are consistent if:
(a) the regressors and the error term are contemporaneously uncorrelated3; and
(b) there is perfect linear dependencies among the regressors.
3. If the error term exhibits homoscedasticity and if there is no autocorrelation the 
usual test statistics are valid.
4. If there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the error term, the estimates are 
unbiased and consistent but not efficient. We get biased variance estimators 
and hence standard test statistics are invalid. The problem can be overcome 
by using generalized least squares (GLS) or by adjusting the standard errors for 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. According to Wooldridge (2002) ‘Lately, it 
has become more popular to estimate (3 by OLS even when heteroskedasticity 
is suspected but to adjust the standard errors and test statistics so that they 
are valid in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity’. In line with this, our 
standard error estimates are adjusted so that they are robust to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity.
5. If there is evidence of autocorrelation in the error term, the estimates are un­
biased and consistent but inefficient for all sample sizes. This gives biased 
goodness-of-fit and test statistics.
6. If the variables in the regression are non-stationary, the OLS estimates have 
sampling distributions with unknown properties, and the regression coefficients
2The © S tata  command used is: xi: reg y k 1 i.yr, cluster(firm)
3Regressors in previous periods can be correlated with the error term in period t.
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tend to appear spuriously significant. The OLS estimator is inconsistent, the 
distribution of R2 is nondegenerate, the t-distribution diverges and, hence, there 
is no asymptotically accurate t-values under standard theory (see Wooldridge 
(2002)).
7. Pooled OLS ignores the firmrspecific fixed effect. If the regressors are exogenous 
and uncorrelated with the firm-effect (ie, the random effects model holds), the 
OLS estimates are unbiased and consistent but they are inefficient. The standard 
errors are also biased. If the regressors are correlated with the firm-effect (ie, 
the fixed effect model holds), the OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent.
8. If there is correlation between the error term and the regressors, the parameters 
are not identified using OLS. In particular, if the regressors are endogenous the 
OLS estimate is biased and it is not consistent. We are also unable to carry 
out standard inference as we no longer know that the estimates are normally 
distributed.
D .2 .1  E stim a ted  coefficients
We carry out the pooled OLS estimation for the standard production function and for 
the production function with constant returns to scale. Time dummies are included. 
The results are presented in Table D.3.
In the electricity distribution sector the OLS coefficient on labour is quite low 
and it is also statistically insignificant. The constant returns to scale model provides 
more reasonable results. The OLS coefficients on the water sector production function 
are satisfactory, although we have an unlikely scenario where the labour coefficient 
is higher than the capital coefficient. In the constant returns to scale model the 
coefficients are statistically significant but the coefficient value is quite low.
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Table D.3: OLS Estimates
Electricity Water
Standard model
C onstant 3.255* 2.601*
(.7494) (.4991)
C apital coefficient .7256* .3294*
(.1270) (.0605)
Labour coefficient .1859 .5177*
(.1053) (.1537)
R-squared 0.81 0.91
F -sta tistic n.a. n.a.
O bservations 120 100
CRS model
C onstant 2.748* 1.952*
(.3176) (.2252)
C apital/L abour coefficient .7515* .3087*
(.1101) (.0607)
R-squared 0.86 0.72
F -sta tistic 130.31 n.a.
O bservations 120 100
D .2 .2 T estin g  for h eterosced astic ity
In both sectors the firms are of different sizes and hence we suspect that there may be 
heteroscedasticity in the model. Figures D .l to D.4 plot the squared OLS residuals 
(X-axis) against the fitted value of output (Y-axis) for each of the estimated models. 
We see no evidence of a systematic relationship between these variables. This suggests 
that the error terms are homoscedastic.
We also carry out the White Test on the null hypothesis that the error terms are 
homoscedastic4. The results are presented in Table D.4. We reject the null hypothesis 
for the standard production functions at the 1% significance level and therefore find 
that the error terms may be heteroscedastic. Our robust standard errors take account 
of the potential for heteroscedasticity in the model and provide a reliable basis for 
making inferences. In the constant returns to scale model, the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity is accepted.
4In the W hite Test the squared residuals are regressed on all explanatory variables, their cross- 
products and their squared values. The null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is rejected if nf?2 
from this regression is greater than the chi-squared critical value. This is because the error term is 
heteroscedastic if there is a relationship - i.e. a high R 2 - between the residuals and the explanatory 
variables.
D. Production function estim ation 275
Table D.4: OLS: White Test Results
Electricity 
Statistic Ho
Water 
Statistic Ho
Standard model 
CRS model
37.18 Reject 
27.45 Accept
70.52 Reject 
26.92 Accept
103654
Figure D.l: Electricity and OLS: relationship between the squared residuals and the 
fitted values
Figure D.2: Electricity and OLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values in the CRS model
r 23034
Figure D.3: Water and OLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted values
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f
Figure D.4: Water and OLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted values 
in OLS model
Testing for autocorrelation
We expect to get serial correlation in the errors as we have an omitted time-constant 
variable - the firm-specific effect - in the production function. Figures D.5 to D.8 plot 
the OLS residual (Y-axis) against its lagged value (X-axis) for each of the models. 
There is concern that the error term in the regression is autocorrelated in both the 
electricity distribution and water sectors.
Figure D.5: Electricity and OLS: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
25M13
Figure D.6: Electricity and OLS: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals 
in the CRS model
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Figure D.7: Water and OLS: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
Figure D.8: Water and OLS: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals in 
CRS model
We determine the degree of autocorrelation by estimating the following equation 
for each sector.
Sit =  pSit-l + Vi t
The results are presented in Table D.5 and confirm a high degree of correlation in 
the residuals over time. The degree of autocorrelation, although still very significant, 
is lowest in the model with constant returns to scale.
Tab e D.5: Autocorrelation in the OLS models
p Electricity Water
Standard model .9604* .9341*
(.0305) (.0331)
CRS model .9364* .9180*
(.0369) (.0383)
D.2.3 Analysis
Our main conclusions on the OLS estimates of our production functions are as follows.
1. The constant returns to scale model provides reasonable estimates for the coef­
ficients of the production functions in both sectors. The estimated coefficients 
in the standard production function are less useful.
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2. The estimated residuals appear to be autocorrelated. This means that the OLS 
estimators are unbiased but not efficient. Inferences based on the standard errors 
are unreliable.
3. We have non-stationary regressors and an autocorrelated error term. The re­
gressors are therefore correlated with the error term over time. In this situation, 
the OLS estimates are biased upwards (see Nickell (1981)) and inconsistent.
4. The firm-effect has not been captured by this estimation technique. It is essen­
tially treated as a missing variable in the error term. If it is correlated with
the regressors, the pooled OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. If the
fixed effect is not correlated with the regressors, the estimates are unbiased and 
consistent but they are inefficient relative to generalized least squares (GLS).
D.3 OLS on the first-differenced model
In this section we first-difference the production function and remove the firm-specific 
effect.
(Vit -  2/ft—l) =  a {ku ~  kit- i )  +  p  {la ~  k t-1) +  (e<t ~  £it- i)  FD Model
=> A yit =  aAkit +  j3Alit +  A sit
The first-differenced constant returns to scale production function is:
A {yu -  la) = oiA {kit -  ht) +  Ae*t CRS FD Model
The first-differenced production functions are estimated using pooled OLS and time 
dummies are included in the models. Our estimates allow for the fact that observations 
are independent across firms, but are not necessarily independent within a firm over 
time5. This procedure provides robust estimators of variance.
We first summarise the main theoretical properties of the OLS estimates of the 
coefficients in the first-differenced production function. The properties are the same as 
those discussed in section D.2, except now the discussion relates to the first-differenced 
variables rather than their levels counterparts.
1. The estimates are unbiased and consistent if the first-differenced regressors are 
uncorrelated with the first-differenced error terms (weak exogeneity), and if the 
first-differenced regressors are linearly independent (ie, no multicollinearity).
5 The Stata command used is: xi: reg A y Ak A1 i.yr, cluster (firm)
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2. If there is correlation (contemporaneous or over time) between the first-differenced 
error term and the first-differenced regressors, the estimates are inconsistent.
3. If the error term in the levels model is autocorrelated, first-differencing reduces 
the degree of autocorrelation. If the residual has serial correlation, but the first- 
differenced residuals are serially uncorrelated, these estimates are, according 
to Wooldridge (2002), the ‘most efficient in the class of estimators using the 
strict exogeneity assumption’. The estimates are less efficient than within group 
estimates when the residuals are serially correlated.
4. Differencing eliminates the firm-specific effect. If the firm-effect is correlated with 
the regressors, the estimates are unbiased and consistent. They are less efficient 
than the within group estimates however. If the firm-effect is independent of 
the regressors, the estimates are unbiased and consistent, but they are inefficient 
relative to generalised least squares (GLS).
5. If there is not much variation in the data over time, the first-difference will 
be identically zero, and the regressors will not be linearly independent. The 
estimated coefficients will therefore be ‘imprecise’ (Wooldridge, 2002) if the re­
gressors do not vary much over time.
6. First-differencing induces stationarity in the model which can reduce the prob­
ability of spurious results.
D .3 .1  E stim a ted  coefficients
We estimate the first-differenced standard production function and the first-differenced 
constant returns to scale production function. In both cases time dummies are included 
in the regression. The results are presented in Table D.6.
The estimated coefficients are not very useful. We get negative labour coefficients 
in both sectors for the standard production function. These clearly conflict with 
economic theory. The constant returns to scale production functions have extremely 
high capital coefficients, implying a negligible coefficient on labour. These values are 
considered unrealistic.
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Table D.6: FDOLS Estimates
E lectricity W ater
S tandard  m odel
Capital coefficient .0255 -.0646
(.0298) (.0693)
Labour coefficient -.0139 -.0047
(.0079) (.0062)
R-squared 0.60 0.44
F-statistic 727.34 n.a.
Observations 108 90
CRS m odel
Capital/Labour coefficient .9958* .9818*
(.0115) (.0099)
R-squared 0.98 0.99
F-statistic 3615.04 n.a.
Observations 108 90
D.3.2 Testing for heteroscedasticity
Figures D.9 to D.12 plot the squared OLS residuals (X-axis) against the fitted value 
of output (Y-axis) for each of our models. In all cases there seems to be a relationship 
between the squared residual and the fitted value, suggesting that the variance of the 
residual is not constant. Heteroscedasticity may therefore be present in this model.
— -U. .
Figure D.9: Electricity and FDOLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values
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Figure D.10: Electricity and FDOLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values in the CRS model
Figure D .ll: Water and FDOLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values
w«Wol«wasc»qcra
Figure D.12: Water and FDOLS: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values in CRS model
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We also carry out the White Test on the null hypothesis that the error terms are 
homoscedastic. The results are presented in Table D.7. We accept the null hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity for the electricity distribution and water production functions.
Table D. FDOLS White Test Results
Electricity 
Statistic Ho
Water 
Statistic Ho
Standard model 
CRS model
25.31 Accept 
10.03 Accept
25.19 Accept 
16.50 Accept
D.3.3 Testing for autocorrelation
Autocorrelation appears to be less of a problem in the first-differenced model than in 
the levels model. Figures D.13 to D.16 plot the residual (Y-axis) against its lagged 
value (X-axis) for each of our models. There is no distinct relationship between these 
variables in any of the models.
Figure D.13: Electricity and FDOLS: relationship between residuals and lagged resid­
uals
***
LmMolsraecrst
Figure D.14: Electricity and FDOLS: relationship between residuals and lagged resid­
uals in the CRS model
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Figure D.15: Water and FDOLS: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
105280
Figure D.16: Water and FDOLS: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
in CRS model
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We determine the degree of autocorrelation by estimating the following equation 
for each sector.
A eit ~  p A e u - i  +  Vit
The results are presented in Table D.8. We find that there is not a significant 
degree of correlation between the error term and its lagged value in any of the first- 
differenced models, with the highest correlation in the water constant returns to scale 
model. In most cases the estimate of p is not statistically significant.
Table D.8: FDOLS: autocorrelation
p Electricity W ater
Standard m odel .2498 -.0951
(.1147) (.104)
CRS m odel -.0448 .3339*
(.1037) (.0954)
D .3 .4  A n a lysis
Our main conclusions on the OLS estimates for the first-differenced production func­
tions are as follows.
1. None of the production function models provide reasonable coefficient estimates.
2. The fixed effect is removed when we first-difference the model. The estimates 
are therefore unbiased and consistent if the assumptions of the Classical Linear 
Regression Model apply to the first-differenced variables.
3. Heteroscedasticity does not appear to be a significant issue for the electricity 
distribution or water production functions.
4. There is some evidence of autocorrelation in our models, but it is not as signifi­
cant as in the levels model. There is thus some loss of efficiency.
5. The first-differenced variables in the constant returns to scale model are persis­
tent6. Given the absence of any significant autocorrelation in the error term, we 
conclude that the regressor may be endogenous. W ith endogenous regressors in 
the model the estimates are biased and inconsistent.
This summary suggests that the OLS estimates of the first-differenced models 
should provide us with more reliable estimates than the OLS estimates of the levels
6The first-differenced variables are linear com bination o f  persistent variables.
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model. We find, however, that with our datasets the estimates of the first-differenced 
model are, in the main, unusable. This may suggest that problems are arising from 
the small sample size, as the standard predictions of econometric theory are largely 
based on asymptotic assumptions. It may also reflect the fact that the regressors are 
endogenous in these models.
D.4 Within Group estimation
In this section we treat the firm-effect as an unknown parameter which is to be es­
timated. No assumptions are made about its distribution, or about its relationship 
with the regressors. In particular, the parameter may be non-random, and it may be 
correlated with capital and/or labour. This is referred to  as the fixed effects model.
The assumptions of the fixed effects model are:
•  The error term has zero mean: E  (e#) =  0 Vi, t
•  The error term is not correlated over time: E  (e#, £iS) — 0 Vt ^  s, i
•  The regressors are strictly exogenous (uncorrelated with the error term across 
time and contemporaneously): E (&#, £{3) = E (/**, e^) =  0 Vt, s, i
•  The error term is homoscedastic across individuals and time: E  (£#) = of
Inferences are made conditional on the effects which arise in the sample.
We estimate the parameters of the fixed effects models using the within group 
estimation technique (WG). The fixed effect is eliminated by taking deviations from 
time means and carrying out pooled OLS on the following equation7:
(Pit Vi) =  &(ktf t^) “1“ ft (Jit li) “I- (^ it £*)
where yl = ; fc* =  — ; 7* =  - ; and e* =  ^ ^ £tt.
This regression yields the coefficient estimates a w and (3W. We can estimate the 
constant term, a, by carrying out the following regression:
y = a + awk +  (3w~l +  £
where y =  k = ^ ; I =  and e =  This
regression gives us an estimate aw. The fixed-effect can then be estimated using the 
averages over time. That is:
7The © S tata  command used is xi: xtreg y  k 1 i.yr, fe
D. Production function estim ation 286
yi = a 4- aki +  /% +  % + 1 +  e*
^  V i ~  Vi a w^i fivJ'i
We summarise the main theoretical properties of the within group estimates here.
1. If the firm-specific effect is non-random (ie, the fixed effects model is valid), the 
estimator is BLUE, assuming all other elements of the classical linear regression 
model hold. The assumptions need to hold for the residual term, (ea — £i), and 
the regressors, (ka — ki) and (la —It). Pooled OLS and GLS yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates in this situation.
2. If the firm-specific effect is uncorrelated with the regressors (ie, the random 
effects model holds), the within group estimator is consistent but it is less efficient 
than GLS. If the variation in the variables is across firms, rather than over time 
for a given firm, the loss of efficiency can be large.
3. The within group estimator is efficient if the error term has a constant variance 
across t and if it is serially uncorrelated. The efficiency is reduced if either of 
these conditions don’t hold. In addition, the estimated standard errors will be 
misleading, and inference based on standard tests will not be valid. Consistency 
of the estimate is not affected.
4. The estimator is consistent when the regressors are strictly exogenous (condi­
tional on rji), and N, T or NT tend to infinity. If N is fixed and T tends to 
infinity, the estimator for the coefficients on the regressors are consistent, but 
the estimator for the constant is not consistent.
5. If the regressors are not strictly exogenous the estimator is inconsistent. The 
size of the bias reduces as T increases. According to Wooldridge (2002) the bias 
‘can be sizeable’ if the degree of correlation in the error term over time is close 
to 1 and/or if ‘the process {%u} has very persistent elements’ (where xa  is a 
regressor). The bias will be lower than with pooled OLS on the first-differenced 
equation as N  —*■ oo.
D .4.1 E stim a ted  coefficients
We carry out the within group analysis for the standard production function and for 
the production function with constant returns to scale. In both cases we estimate the 
equations with time dummies. The estimated coefficients are presented in Table D.9.
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The standard production function estimates are not reasonable for the electricity 
distribution or water sectors. In the electricity distribution case we get a negative 
coefficient on labour. In the water sector we get a negative coefficient on capital. The 
water constant returns to scale coefficient is also unreasonable as it is greater than 
one. The coefficient estimate in the electricity constant returns scale model is more 
reasonable, although it is very high. This outcome is similar to that observed when we 
estimated the production functions using pooled OLS on the first-differenced model. 
We note that the F-statistic is higher for the constant returns to scale model in both 
sectors, suggesting that this restriction is appropriate.
Table D.9: Within Group Estimates
E le c tr ic ity W a te r
S ta n d a r d  m o d e l
C apital coefficient .1154 -.0926
(.0553) (.0384)
Labour coefficient -.0134 .0045
(.0141) (.0116)
C onstant 9.006* 8.876*
(.4405) (.3268)
R-squared (overall) 0.45 0.69
F -sta tistic 42.49 39.03
O bservations 120 100
C R S  m o d e l
C apital/L abour coefficient .9558* 1.040*
(.0255) (.0415)
C onstant 2.135* -1.123*
(.0775) (.1751)
R -squared (overall) 0.85 0.51
F -sta tistic 406.75 461.99
O bservations 120 100
D .4 .2  T estin g  for h eterosced astic ity
Figures D.17 to D.20 plot the squared within group residuals (X-axis) against the 
fitted value of output (Y-axis) for each of our models. With this estimation technique 
the fitted value is:
y i t  =  a  +  a k it +  P h t +  Vi
and the residual is:
&it =  Vit ~  Ifit
We see that there is, in most cases, a systematic relationship between the fitted 
value and the squared residual, with low values of the squared residual for all fitted
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values. This suggests that there may be heteroscedasticity in our models, although the 
relationship is less clear in the water sector than in the electricity distribution sector.
rC
k • ►I* •
i f '
Figure D.17: Electricity and WG: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values
mafj
Figure D.18: Electricity and WG: relationship between squared residuals and fitted 
values in the CRS model
I V  .
Figure D.19: Water and WG: relationship between squared residuals and fitted values
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Figure D.20: Water and WG: relationship between squared residuals and fitted values 
in CRS model
D.4.3 Testing for autocorrelation
In all sectors there is concern that the error term in the regression is autocorrelated, 
although the concern is least obvious for the standard water production function. This 
is demonstrated in Figures D.21 to D.24 which plot the residual (Y-axis) against its 
lagged value (X-axis) for each of our models.
Figure D.21: Electricity and WG: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
Figure D.22: Electricity and WG: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
in the CRS model
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Figure D.23: Water and WG: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals
Figure D.24: Water and WG: relationship between residuals and lagged residuals in 
the CRS model
We also test for autocorrelation by running the following regression for each sector:
Sit =  P^it— 1 “I" Vn
The results are presented in Table D.10. We find that there is evidence of autocor­
relation in all the models. The lowest level of autocorrelation is in the water standard 
production function.
Table D.10: Within group: autocorrelation
p Electricity Water
Standard model .9718* .4175*
(.0885) (.0866)
CRS model .7452* .7820*
(.0767) (.0678)
D.4.4 Analysis
Our main conclusions on the within group estimates of our production functions are 
as follows.
1. With our data, the within group approach provides unreasonable coefficient es­
timates for the standard production function and the constant returns to scale 
production function in both sectors.
D. Production function estim ation 291
2. We expect the fixed effect to  be correlated with our non-stationary regressors. 
The fixed effect model is therefore valid, and the within group estimates are 
BLUE if assumptions of the Classical Linear Regression model hold.
3. The error term is potentially autocorrelated and heteroscedastic. The within 
group estimates will therefore be consistent but inefficient, and the standard 
errors will be biased.
4. The variation in our capital and labour data primarily occurs across firms rather 
than over time. We therefore expect a loss of efficiency in the within group 
estimates.
5. The error term is autocorrelated, and the capital and labour variables are gen­
erated from a dynamic process. We therefore have endogenous regressors in the 
model and the within group estimates are biased and inconsistent. With small 
T, and persistent regressors, the bias may be quite large.
D.5 Anderson-Hsiao estimation
We know that the production function model is dynamic in nature. This is because 
the regressors are non-stationary, and there is evidence that the error terms are au­
tocorrelated in the fixed-effect model. The regressors in our estimation are therefore 
endogenous. A similar conclusion was reached by Blundell and Bond (1999) who found 
that, in many cases, capital and non-capital inputs are non-stochastic and, hence, there 
is correlation between the error term and the regressors over time.
In this situation the within group estimator has a negative bias but it is consistent. 
The OLS estimator on the levels model has a positive bias, and the OLS estimator on 
the first-differenced model has a negative bias. Both OLS estimators are inconsistent. 
The size of these biases are estimated by Nickell (1981). Given the problems with these 
estimators, Wooldridge (2002) suggests that the production function with endogenous 
regressors can be estimated by transforming the equation to remove 77j, and using 
instrumental variables to estimate the transformed equation.
The standard transformations considered are first-differencing, within group (tak­
ing deviations from time means) and GLS (taking weighted deviations from time 
means). The first-differencing approach is primarily associated with Anderson and 
Hsiao (1982). Wooldridge (2002) argues that, of all the transformations that can be 
used, ‘first differencing is more attractive’. In line with this, we choose to use the 
Anderson-Hsiao approach to estimate our production functions.
We take first-differences of the production function and eliminate the firm-specific
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fixed effect. The functions are estimated with time dummies. We use values of the re­
gressors lagged two or more periods as instruments in the Anderson-Hsiao estimation8. 
We assume that the error term is serially independent and that:
E (kit-a, A eit) =  0 for T  =  3, ...T, s > 2
E(lit- a, A eit) =  0 for T  =  3,...T, s >  2
E ((k it-a ht—s) ? =  0 for T  — 3, ...T1, 3 >  2
Hsiao (1986) argues that, given the above assumptions, lagged values of the regres­
sors meet the requirements of valid instruments. That is, they are correlated with the 
variables to be instrumented, and they are not correlated with the error term (by the 
assumption of weak exogeneity).
We summarise the main theoretical properties of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator 
here. Many of the properties are common to standard two-stage least squares, or 
instrumental variables, estimation techniques.
1. If the instruments are uncorrelated with the first-differenced disturbances, and 
highly correlated with the first-differenced regressors, the Anderson-Hsiao esti­
mates are biased but consistent.
2. The variance of the estimator is greater than the variance of the within group 
estimator. That is, there is a loss of efficiency. This difference can be minimised 
by getting the maximum correlation between the instruments and the regressors.
3. If the endogenous regressors are only weakly related to the instruments, the 
standard errors may be large and the coefficient estimates will be significantly 
biased. Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that ‘even with large sample sizes, 
instruments that have small partial correlation with an endogenous explanatory 
variable can lead to substantial biases in 2SLS’ (from Wooldridge, pl04).
4. The efficiency of the estimator increases with the number of instruments. Ac­
cording to Wooldridge (2002) ‘asymptotically, we always do better by using as 
many instruments as are available, at least under homoskedasticity’.
5. If there are too many instruments, and if the instruments are weak, there are po­
tentially large biases in the estimates in finite samples. According to Wooldridge 
(2002) the ‘lesson is that, even with a very large sample size and zero correlation 
between the instruments and error, we should not use too many overidentifying 
restrictions’.
8© Stata  Command: xi: xtivreg y  (k,l=instruments) i.yr, fd
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6. The estimator is no longer consistent if the errors are serially correlated.
7. Heteroscedasticity does not affect the consistency of the estimator and is only a 
‘minor nuisance for inference’ (Wooldridge, 2002). If heteroscedasticity is present 
then more efficient estimation is possible. The standard Sargan Test is not valid 
if there is heteroscedasticity in the model.
8. The Anderson-Hsiao estimates will be inconsistent if the instrument is actually 
correlated with the error term. The size of the inconsistency gets larger if the 
instrument is only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor. According 
to Wooldridge (2002, pl02) ‘In such cases is may be better to just use OLS’ as 
it may be ‘less inconsistent’.
D .5 .1  C h oosin g  in stru m en ts
We use values of capital and labour lagged two, three and four periods (various per­
mutations) as instruments when estimating the standard production function. In the 
constant returns to scale model, we use various permutations of the (k — I) variable 
lagged two, three and four periods as instruments. We consider here how one set of 
instruments is chosen over another.
Levels or first-differences
We calculate the Anderson-Hsiao coefficients using lagged values of capital and labour 
levels. We could also have used lagged first-differences of these variables but we argue 
that there is no loss of efficiency in using levels rather than first-differences. This 
is supported by others in the field. Arellano (1989) recommends using levels be­
cause when differences are used instead the estimator can have a very large variance. 
Wooldridge (2002) also notes that there is no loss of efficiency using levels rather than 
first-differences as ‘the latter is a linear combination of the former’.
Num ber o f instrum ents
The efficiency of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator increases with the number of valid 
instruments included in the instrument set. Estimation becomes difficult, however, if 
the instrument set is very large. In addition, as noted by Wooldridge (2002), ‘many 
overidentifying restrictions are known to have poor finite sample properties’. We 
therefore try  to  use more than one instrument for each endogenous variable but we 
limit the number of lags used. This allows us to trade-off the efficiency gains of more 
instruments against the possibility of increased bias in the estimate. This is consistent
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with Wooldridge’s (2002) suggestion that ‘In practice, it may be better to use a couple 
of lags rather than lags back to t = l ’.
Possib ility  o f w eak in s tru m en ts
The most recent lagged values of capital and labour are likely to provide weak in­
struments for the current values of the first-differenced regressors. Blundell and Bond 
(1999) discuss the problem of weak instruments in the context of Generalised Methods 
of Moments (GMM) estimation of the production function. They consider an AR(1) 
model:
Ilit =  +  % +  vit
The lagged value of y is a weak instrument if ‘the value of the autoregressive 
parameter a  increase towards unity; and second, as the variance of the permanent 
effects (77J  increases relative to the variance of the transitory shocks (va)\ Under 
these conditions the ‘first-differenced GMM estimator has been found to have poor 
finite sample properties (bias and imprecision)’. The same argument applies to the 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
Our capital and labour variables are non-stationary, as shown in section D .l. 
Specifically our estimates for A* and X1 are close to 1 in the equations:
kn — A kn -i "4" Vtf 
^it —  A l%t— 1 +  Vit
This implies that the lagged level of each variable has a low correlation with the 
current first-differenced value:
( k i t - * « - i )  =  ( a * - 1 ) ^ - 1 + 4  
{lit lit—1) =  (a 1 1  ^lit—1 4*
The recently lagged levels provide weak instruments in the first-differenced stan­
dard production function. We therefore prefer to use instrument sets which use a 
number of lagged levels going back in time. In the constant returns to scale model, 
the recently lagged levels of (k — I) are also likely to provide weak instruments for 
A (k — I). We therefore again argue that instrument sets which use lagged levels fur­
ther back in time will yield more satisfactory estimates.
S argan  Test fo r in s tru m en t valid ity
The above discussion suggests that we want to use a number of lagged values of 
capital and labour as instruments for the current first-differenced regressors. We limit
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our attention to four period lags to avoid biasing the results significantly by using too 
many instruments.
When we have more instruments than endogenous regressors we can test whether 
the additional instruments are valid (ie, uncorrelated with the residual) using the 
Sargan Test. We let Z  be the full set of instruments and Z ' be a subset of these 
instruments (one option is Z' — Z). Following Wooldridge (2002) we carry out the 
Anderson-Hsiao regression with the instrument set Z ' (which has more instruments 
than endogenous regressors) and calculate the residual, e#, from the regression. We 
then regress this residual onto the full set of instruments, Z, and get the goodness-of- 
fit measure, R2. H R 2 is small, the additional instruments are not correlated with the 
unexplained element of the production function, and we can argue that the instrument 
set Z ' is appropriate.
The Sargan statistic is:
S  = nR 2 ~  xf-g
The test statistic, S, has a Chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of variables in the instrument set Z ’ (I) minus the number of endogenous 
regressors (g). I — g is the number of overidentifying restrictions.
The null hypothesis being tested is that the instrument set Z f is uncorrelated with 
the error term, and hence it is a valid instrument set to use. This hypothesis will be 
rejected if nR? >  Xg-i for the specified degrees of freedom. The hypothesis will be 
accepted if nR 2 < X^-i f°r  the specified degrees of freedom. The evidence in favour 
of the null hypothesis is stronger the higher is the p-value on the Sargan statistic.
If the null hypothesis is accepted when Z  =  Z' it is better to use the instrument set 
which uses all of the relevant variables as this increases the efficiency of the estimates. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected when Z  =  Z ', we need to  determine which alternative 
instrument set - involving fewer variables - should be used. If we have a number of 
instrument sets, with the same number of instruments, which all satisfy the Sargan 
test, we choose the set which has the Sargan statistic with the highest p-value. In this 
case the justification for accepting the instrument set is strongest (ie, the minimum 
significance level at which the null hypothesis could be rejected is very high).
D .5 .2 C oefficient estim ation  
The electricity distribution sector
The Anderson-Hsiao estimates of the electricity distribution production functions are 
provided in Table D .ll. In the standard model we get coefficient estimates which 
are inconsistent with production theory. We have negative labour and/or capital 
coefficients, or capital coefficients which are very high (greater than one in most cases),
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for all instrument options. This estimation technique therefore provides no reasonable 
estimates for this data when the standard production function is considered.
In the constant returns to scale model we also find, in most cases, that the esti­
mated coefficients are inconsistent with economic theory. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient is either very high or greater than 1. We get the most reasonable estimates 
when three-period lags, and two- and three-period lags, are used as instruments. We 
find that the Sargan Test is satisfied when two- and three-periods lags are included 
in the instrument set9. A comparison of the goodness-of-fit measures (R2 and the 
X2 statistic) indicates that it is reasonable to impose the constant returns to scale 
restriction on the model when the two- and three-period lagged values are used as 
instruments.
Table D .ll: Anderson-Hsiao Estimates for electricity distribution
Standard model
Z=(fc,Z) Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag2+3 Lag2+4 Lag3+4 Lag 2+3+4
a .2120 7.734 -.0599 .9600 -.1606 -.0844 -.0324
(1.127) (69.31) (1.072) (2.387) (.7026) (.5671) (.5163)
(3 -.0119 .5193 -.1455 .0677 -.0852 -.0198 -.0209
(.1018) (4.454) (.1489) (.1742) (.0783) (.0524) (.0456)
a .0155* .01639 .0092 .0162* .0142 .0171* .0163*
R2 (overall)
(.0041) (.0471) (.0146) (.0058) (.0085) (.0067) (.0061)
0.76 0.78 0.43 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.67
x2 19.57 0.11 4.93 4.32 9.05 13.86 14.22
s n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.29 1.82 1.12 1.15
S p-value n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.87 0.40 0.57 0.86
Observations 84 72 60 72 60 60 60
CRS model 
Z  — (k — l) Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag2+3 Lag2+4 Lag3+4 Lag 2+3+4
a .9635* .8272* 1.099* .9211* 1.024* .9782* .9734*
(.0968) (.2194) (.1529) (.0880) (.0853) (.0994) (.0751)
a .0168* .0225 -.0039 .0169* .0016 .0050 .0053
R2 (overall)
(.0059) (0.142) (.0125) (.0067) (.0077) (.0086) (.0071)
0.82 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81
x2 321.81 93.64 156.12 254.57 288.5 240.58 310.34
S n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.15 0.42 0.36 0.35
S p-value n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.70 0.52 0.55 0.84
Observations 84 72 60 72 60 60 60
We conclude that, given our dataset, the preferred model for the electricity dis­
tribution sector is the constant returns to scale model. The coefficient on capital is
9The p-value on the Sargan statistic is high (0.7). This indicates that there is sufficient evidence 
in favour of the null hypothesis that the instrument set is valid.
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estimated using the two- and three-period lagged values of (k — I) as instruments. We 
explore the properties of the residual in this model to test for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity.
Figure D.25 plots the squared Anderson-Hsiao residuals (X-axis) against the fitted 
value of output (Y-axis). There seems to be a relationship between the squared residual 
and the fitted value, suggesting that the variance of the residual is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity may therefore be present in this model. This does not affect the 
consistency of the estimates but the Sargan Test results may not be valid.
Figure D.25: Electricity and Anderson-Hsiao estimation: relationship between squared 
residuals and fitted values in the CRS model
Figure D.26 plots the residuals (Y-axis) against their lagged values (X-axis). There 
is no distinct relationship between these variables. We also run the following regression:
A eit =  pA eit- i  +  vit
The estimated coefficient, p =  —0.001, indicates that there is no correlation be­
tween the error term and its lagged value. We therefore conclude that autocorrelation 
is not a problem in this model.
Figure D.26: Electricity and Anderson-Hsiao estimation: relationship between residu­
als and lagged residuals in the CRS model
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T h e w ater sector
The Anderson-Hsiao estimates of the water sector production function are provided 
in Table D.12. W ith the standard production function we, again, get coefficient esti­
mates which are inconsistent with production theory. We get negative labour and/or 
capital coefficients for all instrument options. In addition, the coefficient estimates are 
statistically insignificant. This estimation technique therefore provides no reasonable 
estimates for this data.
In the constant returns to scale model, the results are more favourable. All coeffi­
cients estimates are statistically significant but when four-period, two- and four-period, 
three- and four-period, and two-, three- and four-period lagged levels are used as in­
struments the coefficient estimates are greater than or close to one. W ith all other 
instrument sets we get reasonable estimates for the capital coefficient, and in the case 
of two-period and two- and three-period lagged levels the constant estimate is also 
statistically significant. As noted above, we wish to use the instrument set which 
satisfies the Sargan Test and which has lagged values a number of periods back. We 
find, in this case, that from amongst the instrument sets which yield reasonable co­
efficient estimates, the instrument set comprising two- and three-period lagged levels 
has a Sargan statistic with a reasonably high p-value. This instrument set is therefore 
considered appropriate. We also note that, for this instrument set, the \ 2 statistic is 
significantly higher in the constant returns to scale model than in the standard model. 
This suggests tha t the restriction to the model is appropriate.
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Tab: e D.12: Anderson-Hsaio Estimates for the water sector
Standard model 
Z  — (k, l) Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag2+3 Lag2+4 Lag3-|-4 Lag 2+3+4
a -..2799 -.2657 -.4835 -.2961 -.2387 -.2184 -.1758
(1.385) (.6539) (.6279) (.3599) (.3328) (.3342) (.2709)
(3 -.1422 -.0404 .0325 -.0646 -.0151 -.0189 -.0212
(.3694) (.1617) (.1043) (.1079) (.0672) (.0462) (.0421)
a .0070 .0088* .0130* .0087* .0117* .0116* .0113*
R2 (overall)
(.0072) (.0025) (.0048) (.0022) (.0031) (.0032) (.0029)
0.88 0.83 0.77 0.84 0.81 0.82 0.83
x2 8.40 14.51 12.23 12.5 16.17 16.19 16.23
s n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.64 1.05 0.98 0.82
S p-value n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.73 0.59 0.62 0.94
Observations 70 60 50 60 50 50 50
CRS model 
Z = { k - l ) Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag2+3 Lag2+4 Lag3+4 Lag 2+3+4
a 0.8288* .8772* 1.118* .8642* 1.058* 1.010* .9821*
(.2712) (.1605) (.1633) (.1352) (.1338) (.1072) (.0999)
a .0125* .0120 .0019 .0119* .0015 .0011 .0009
R2 (overall)
(.0038) (.0038) (.0044) (.0039) (.0039) (.0037) (.0037)
0.41 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.44
x2 134.1 171.65 100.81 176.76 128.78 160.75 168.59
s n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.74 0.91 0.93 0.94
S p-value n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.39 0.35 0..34 0.63
Observations 70 60 50 60 50 50 50
We conclude that, given our dataset, the preferred model for the water sector is the 
constant returns to scale model The coefficient on capital is estimated using the two- 
and three-period lagged values of (k — l) as instruments. We explore the properties of 
the residual in this model to test for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
Figure D.27 plots the squared Anderson Hsiao residuals (X-axis) against the fitted 
value of output (Y-axis). There seems to be a relationship between the squared residual 
and the fitted value, suggesting that the variance of the residual is not constant. 
Heteroscedasticity may therefore be present in this model. This does not affect the 
consistency of the estimates but the Sargan Test results may not be valid.
Figure D.28 plots the residuals (Y-axis) against their lagged values (X-axis). There 
is no distinct relationship between these variables. We also run the following regression:
A£it -  p& £it-l +  vit
We find that there is only a small correlation between the error term and its 
lagged value in this model (p = —0.13). Autocorrelation is therefore unlikely to be a 
significant problem.
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Figure D.27: Water and Anderson-Hsiao estimation: relationship between squared 
residuals and fitted values in the CRS model
Figure D.28: Water and Anderson-Hsiao estimation: relationship between residuals 
and lagged residuals in the CRS model
D.5.3 Analysis
Our main conclusions on the Anderson-Hsiao estimates of our production functions 
are as follows.
•  For both the electricity distribution and water sectors our preferred estimator 
arises when we focus on the constant returns to scale model with time dummies. 
In both sectors we use the instrument set comprising two- and three-period 
lagged levels of (k-1).
• The Anderson-Hsiao estimators are consistent if these instruments are uncor­
related with the error term, and if they are correlated with the current first- 
differences of capital and labour. The estimates are, however, potentially biased 
and they are inefficient.
• The capital and labour variables are highly persistent. The lagged levels may 
therefore provide weak instruments for the first-differenced regressors. This can 
result in substantial bias in the estimates. We have attempted to reduce this 
bias by using lagged levels further back in time as instruments.
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•  For both sectors there is evidence of potential heteroscedasticity in the error 
term. There is some loss of efficiency when the residuals are not homoscedastic. 
In addition, the Sargan Test may no longer be valid.
•  There is no evidence of autocorrelation in either model.
D.6 System estimator
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest using a generalized method of moments system  
estimator when weak instruments is a problem with the standard Anderson-Hsiao 
technique. This estimator includes lagged levels as instruments for the equation in 
first-differences, and lagged first-differences as instruments for the equation in levels. 
They assume that the error term (including the fixed-effect) is independent of the 
regressors in the model. The authors also impose first order serial correlation in the 
error term.
This estimator reduces the biases associated with the standard GMM estimator. 
The properties of the estimator axe highly dependent on the panel data having a 
large N and a fixed T. As this does not apply here we do not explore this estimation 
method further. It is unlikely to provide improved results relative to Anderson-Hsiao 
estimation with our small sample size.
A ppendix E
Im pact o f regulation: 
explanatory variables
We estimate, in section 4.6, the impact of different features of the regulatory regime 
on productivity growth in the water and electricity sectors between 1991 and 2000. 
The explanatory variables used in that regression are defined here.
E .l Expected regulatory lag
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the firm’s decision to undertake cost-reducing effort 
is determined by the expected profit which can be earned. The profit level depends on 
the length of time between when the firm makes the cost saving and when that saving 
is shared with consumers via price reductions. The longer this length of time - termed 
the regulatory lag - the higher the level of profit which the firm will earn from each 
unit of effort and, hence, the higher the effort level undertaken. Indeed, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, technical efficiency is maximised if the firm is allowed to retain these 
profits forever.
The rule used to share cost savings made in period t is set at the end of period t. 
The firm’s effort decisions are therefore based on its expectation of what the regulatory 
lag will be. We assume that the firm basis its expectation on the methodology which 
was used at the most recent periodic review, updated for any recent announcements 
by the regulator. Table E .l shows the expected regulatory lag for each sector and 
gives an explanation as to why the lag has changed over time. Our analysis of the 
firm’s expectation is based on a review of the different rules used to share operating 
cost savings with consumers over time. These rules are discussed in more detail in 
section 2.2.1 and Appendix A.
The differences across sectors reflects the decisions made by individual regulators
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on the appropriate length of the lag, and on the preferred way to share savings over 
time. A key factor affecting this difference is whether the regulator used a large price 
cut at the start of the period, or whether savings were shared over the period through 
a glidepath adjustment to the annual X-factor. At privatisation there was no clear 
methodology about how savings would be shared with consumers. In particular, the 
government did not indicate at the start of the first regulatory period the point in time 
at which savings would be shared. We therefore assume that in the early years after 
privatisation, up to the point where the regulator first makes a clear statement on the 
matter, that the firm expects to keep savings made to the end of the next regulatory 
period. That is, if savings are made in the first year of period t, the firm expects that 
they will be shared with consumers in the last year of period t-f-1.
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Table E.l: Expected regulatory lag (no of years)
Lag E xplana tion
D is trib u tio n
1991-92 8 Expect savings to be shared at end of next period: 1990-00
1992-93 7
1993-94 6
1994-95 6 Expect savings to be shared in inital price cut in 2000-01.
1995-96 5
1996-97 4
1997-98 3
1998-99 7 Expect savings to be shared in initial price cut in 2005-06.
1999-00 6
N G C
1991-92 4 Expect savings to be shared at end of next period: 1995-96
1992-93 4 Expect savings to be shared at end of next period: 1996-97
1993-94 7 Expect savings to be shared at end of next period: 2000-01
1994-95 6
1995-96 2 See Po cut for RECs. Expect similar treatment.
1996-97 5
Expect savings to be shared in inital price cut in 1997/98 
Expect savings to be shared in inital price cut in 2001/02
1997-98 4
1998-99 3
1999-00 2
W ater
1991-92 13 Expect savings to shared by end of next period: 2004/05
1992-93 12
1993-94 11
1994-95 10
1995-961 9
1996-971 8
1997-98 3 Expect savings to be shared in initial price cut in 2000/01
1998-99 2
1999-00 5 Expect savings to shared via the five-year rolling adjustment
Note: *In July 1995 the MMC set the price cap for South West Water Services. A five-year 
glidepath was used for sharing savings with customers, in contrast to the ten-year glidepath used by 
Ofwat for all other companies. South West Water’s expected regulatory lag in 1995/96 is therefore 4 
years and in 1996/97 it is 3 years. In all other years, South West Water has the same expected 
regulatory lag as the other WASCs.
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E.2 Commitment
In theory, the contract agreed at the most recent periodic review is fixed for the 
duration of the regulatory period. The regulator is assumed to be committed to the 
contract and to the price-cap setting methodology used at the most recent periodic 
review. In practice, however, the regulator has the discretion to propose changes to 
the contract mid-period and to  change the methodology used to set the price cap, 
including the rule used to share savings. This reduces the expected share of savings. 
It is therefore the interaction of this variable with the expected regulatory lag which 
is expected to affect productivity. The less committed the regulator is expected to 
be, the lower the effective regulatory lag (expected lag x expected commitment) and, 
hence, the lower the incentive to make cost savings.
The firm takes account of the risk that the regulator will change the detail of the 
contract when forming its expectation of the profit which it will earn from each unit 
of cost-reducing effort. As discussed in section 3.1.2, the firm will reduce its effort 
level if it believes that the regulator is less than 100% committed to the regulatory 
contract. This provides the firm with some insurance against the possibility that the 
actual profit earned will be less than expected.
We assume that the firm’s belief is determined by the extent to which the regulator 
demonstrated that he was committed to recent contracts. If the regulator did not 
change the contract, or the ‘rules of the game’, significantly in the past, the firm 
will assume that the regulator remains committed to the contract. If, however, the 
regulator did make significant changes, the firm will assume that future changes are 
more likely and, hence, will expect that the regulator is not fully committed to the 
contract. In this way, the regulator’s prior actions directly impact on the firm’s belief 
about his commitment level and, hence, on the firm’s effort choice. Similarly, if the 
government indicates that it is to  reduce the profits earned from each unit of effort, 
through a ‘windfall tax’, the firm will assume that the contract is not fixed.
To capture this idea we construct a commitment index for each sector. This index 
reflects the firm’s belief about how committed the regulator is to the fixed regulatory 
contract. We assume that the firm expects the regulator to be 100% committed to the 
contract at privatisation - indicated by an index of 1. Any announcements or decisions 
which indicate that the regulator, or the government, will share a higher proportion 
of savings with consumers, or will share them earlier, is taken as a signal that the 
regulator is not committed to the fixed-price contract1. A change which has a major 
impact on share prices is considered a major shock, and is reflected as a 0.25 reduction
l We assume that the firm’s belief about the regulator’s commitment is only affected by decisions 
made by its own regulator. In practice, the firm’s expectation may also be affected by decisions made 
by the Competition Commission and other regulators.
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in the index. A change which has less of an impact on share prices is considered a 
moderate shock, and reduces the index by 0.1. Other minor shocks, which have little, 
if any, impact on share prices, reduce the index by 0.05. Figures E.l to E.3 show share 
price movements since privatisation. These are used to determine which shocks were 
moderate and which were extreme. We assume that there is a two-year lag between 
when an announcement is made and when the firm is able to adjust its cost decisions 
to reflect the new methodology. The commitment index in year t therefore reflects the 
firm’s reaction to events which occurred in years t-2 and earlier.
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Figure E.2: NGC’s share price index
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Figure E.3: WASCs share price index
Table E.2 presents the commitment index for the electricity distribution, electricity 
transmission and water sectors. The main contract changes which have been made by 
the regulators since privatisation are discussed in Appendix A. We show the value of 
the index in each year and provide a brief explanation of why its value has changed in 
particular years. We note that the regulator appears to have remained committed to 
NGC’s regulatory contract in all years since privatisation. In addition, the transmission 
company did not have to pay the Government’s windfall tax in 1997.
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Table E.2: Commitment Index (1—full commitment)
Y e a r I n d e x E x p la n a t io n
D is tr ib u t io n
1991-92 to 1996/97
1997-98
1998-99 & 1999-00
1
0.75
0.65
Full commitment
24/03/95: rereview of price caps announced 
Regulator signals disregard for fixed contract 
02/07/97: windfall tax announced 
Profits arising from efficiency savings removed
N G C
1991-92 to 1999-00 1 Full commitment
W a te r
1991-92 to 199^95 
1995-96 to 1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
1
0.95
0.85
0.60
Full commitment
02/10/92: Price caps adjusted for difference between
actual and expected COPI
02/07/97: windfall tax announced
Profits arising from efficiency savings removed
26/06/97: Initial PR99 proposals stress use of Po cuts.
Change in methodology on sharing of efficiency savings
Move from 10-year to 5-year glidepath
E.3 Years since privatisation
It is assumed that at privatisation there was a step-change in productivity, reflecting 
the impact of the change in ownership. A key issue with any empirical investigation 
in the utility sectors is that regulation and privatisation were introduced at the same 
time. It is therefore difficult to separate the ‘privatisation effect’ from the ‘regulation 
effect’. This variable - the number of years since privatisation - is intended to control 
for the ‘privatisation effect’ to some extent.
If privatisation is the main factor affecting cost savings and productivity, we expect 
the rate of improvement to decline the longer the time period since privatisation. 
In contrast, if regulation has an ongoing and significant impact, cost savings and 
productivity improvement would continue to be strong as the private firm matures. 
The presumption is that productivity growth later in the period would be attributed 
to the impact of regulation rather than privatisation.
The relevant privatisation dates for each of the sectors are as follows:
•  Electricity distribution and NGC: 31/03/90;
•  Water: 31/12/89.
As always, the year of interest is the financial year running from April 1st to March
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31st. For the electricity companies, 1991/92 is considered to be 1 year after privatisa­
tion. For the water companies, it is considered to be 1.33 years after privatisation.
E.4 Corporate activity
A firm’s cost saving potential, and productivity growth rate, are expected to improve 
if the firm is taken-over and/or if it merges with another company. Indeed this is a 
common rational for such corporate activity. In addition, when regulatory approval 
is given for a takeover or merger, the regulator generally requires the firm to deliver 
higher than previously assumed cost savings. We therefore expect that a takeover or 
merger in the previous year will lead to cost reductions in the next year. This is not 
guaranteed, however. Vickers and Yarrow (1988a) analyse the impact of a takeover, 
or a takeover threat, on the firm’s performance. They conclude that the impact is not 
always positive and that it ‘depends heavily upon the precise characteristics of the 
relevant capital markets’. There is therefore a possibility that corporate activity will 
have little impact on productivity.
We examine this issue by constructing a dummy variable which is 0 in year t  if 
there was no corporate activity in year t-1, and 1 if there was a merger or takeover 
in year t-1. In the case of NGC we also consider the flotation of the company on 
the London Stock Exchange in 1995 as a significant change in corporate structure 
which is likely to affect productivity. We note that the corporate activity relates to 
the Group company, and the impact on the regulated business may not be significant. 
In addition, the lag between the corporate activity taking place and productivity 
improvements being delivered may be longer than one year.
E.5 Output and quality of service
Finally, we introduce a scale variable to reflect the fact that the level of output, and 
the quality of supply delivered, will have an impact on the change in productivity. 
The variable used is the quality-adjusted output index, described in Appendix C. We 
expect that, for a given set of inputs, the higher the level of quality-adjusted output 
delivered the higher the rate of change in productivity. Where the outputs and inputs 
both change the impact on TFP growth is not immediately evident as it depends on 
the relative rate of change in these variables.
A ppendix F
Com paring delegation contracts
F .l Properties of the welfare function
The level of welfare, incorporating the transfer restriction, is:
l b  b
L em m a F . l  The level of welfare is increasing in output for a firm, of type 0.
Proof. The impact of a change in output on welfare is measured as:
8W (q,9) ( l-2 A )g  +  A ( o - 6fl) , .
dq b '  ' ’
An extremum of the welfare function exists at the point where this derivative is zero:
(1 — 2 A)<7 +  A (a — bO) = 
b
(2 A -1  )q =  A (a — 60)
q{0) =  ( 2X ^ 1 ) (a “  w )
To determine whether welfare is maximised or minimised at this level of output we 
must check the second-order conditions. We have:
& W {q,B) 1 -2 A
d(? b '  ' '
For a convex welfare function (A < ^) we have:
d2w (e)  
dq2
(a — bO) is a minimum
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For a concave welfare function (A >  we have:
<  o
dq
( j £ 0  (a — bO) is a m aximum
C o n s id e r  f ir s t  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  c o n v e x  w e lfa re  fu n c t io n
The welfare function is minimised at q(6) =  ^ A - i  )  (a ~  •
This im plies that:
dW(0)
dq
dW(9)
<  0 if q(0) < ( 2X ^ 1)  (“ - M )
a ,  >  0 if q(0) >  (a “ be)
q(9) < ( 2a - i )  (a — *s no  ^fusible here as ( 2 A - 1 )  < ® an<^  w e  require q{0) > 0
The only feasible values of q{0) therefore result in:
dW{6) ^ Q 
dq
N e x t  c o n s id e r  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  c o n c a v e  w e lfa r e  fu n c t io n
The welfare function is maximised at q{0) — ^ a - i )  (a “  *
This implies that:
M  >  0 if q{6) <  ( ^ )  (a -  bff)
M  <  O i f g ( ( ? ) > ( ^ r I ) ( a - W )
m  > ( 2a - i )  (° ~  *s not feasible here as ( 2^ 1)  ^   ^ an(f we require q(0) <
a — W .
The only feasible values of q{0) therefore result in:
s v m > 0 
dq
We have thus shown that, for all values of A and for all feasible values of output, 
welfare is increasing with the level of output.
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L em m a F .2  The rate o f change in welfare, arising from a change in output, is in­
creasing in the level o f output i f  the welfare function is convex.
Proof. The impact of the level of output on the rate of change in welfare is 
calculated as:
&W {q,0) 1 — 2A
dq2 b
If the welfare function is convex (A € [0, | ) )  the function is non-negative. The 
rate of change in welfare is therefore increasing with the level of output. ■
Lem m a F .3  The rate of change in welfare, arising from a change in output, is de­
creasing in the level o f output i f  the welfare function is concave.
Proof. The impact of the level of output on the rate of change in welfare is 
calculated as:
cPW(q,6) _  1 — 2A 
dq2 b
If the welfare function is concave (A € (5 , 1]) the function 3~b2A is non-positive. 
The rate of change in welfare is therefore decreasing with the level of output. ■
Lem m a F.4 Welfare is decreasing in type for a given level o f output. The rate of 
decrease is constant for all types.
Proof. The impact of a change in type on the level of welfare is:
Let the output level be constant for all types. We therefore have 
the derivative becomes:
dW (q,e) ,
QQ l<?(0)=g— M
We therefore see that for a given output level an increase in type reduces welfare 
and the rate of decrease is the same for all types. ■
Lem m a F.5 The rate of change in welfare is decreasing in type for a given level of 
output. The rate of decrease is constant for all types.
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P roof. The impact of a change in the firm’s type on the rate of change in welfare
is:
dW (g,9) ( 1 - 2 A ) ( M * ) - 6 A
dqdQ b K ' '
Let the output level be constant for all types. We therefore have [ H 1)  =  0 and 
the derivative becomes:
3W (g,0) _
dqd9
The rate of change in welfare is therefore decreasing in type for a given output level. 
The rate of decrease equal to the weight placed on profits in the welfare function. ■
F.2 Output choices under Contract R2
Under a delegation contract the firm chooses its monopoly level of output, qM(0), if it 
lies within the delegated choice set. If not, the firm chooses the nearest level of output 
as the profit function is concave and symmetric in output.
Say the regulator allows the firm to choose its output level from the restricted two 
interval choice set [<7minj A  +  k] U \Y — k, oo]. The firm’s optimal output choices are 
derived below. The results are summarised in Table F .l.
•  qM{0) <  <7mm : As the monopoly level of output is not available the firm chooses 
the nearest available level of output which is <7^ .
•  <7min < qM{Q) < X  + k :  The monopoly level of output is available and hence it 
is chosen by the firm.
•  X  +  k < qM (0) < Y : As the monopoly level of output is not available the 
firm chooses the nearest available level of output which is X  + k.
•  A±T < qM{0) < Y  — k : As the monopoly level of output is not available the 
firm chooses the nearest available level of output which is Y  — k.
•  Y  — k < qM{9) : The monopoly level of output is available and hence it is chosen 
by the firm.
Table F.2 provides the optimal output choices as a function of the firm’s type. 
The regions are calculated using the fact that qM(0) =  The calculations are as 
follows:
•  <?rni, <  qM(0) < X  + k=> a -b 0 „  < ^  <  X  +  fc =» <  g <
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• X + k < qM(8) < =* x  + k < ^  =» a-(*+y) < 0 < °-2(*+*)
.  I g < < Y - k ^ ^ < ^ < Y - k ^  ?-2<y-k) < e <
• Y - k < q M(8)=t-Y-k<s^ ^ - 8 <  a-3%~1)
Table F.2: Output Choices by Type
T ype region C hoice
8L < 8  < SzMfzhX
o-2( Y - k )  ^  ^ o-(X+y)
b b o-(X+y) ^  n ^ o-2pr+fc) 
b ,  -  p ^ b a—2(X+fe) ^  q . a—2qm\n 
n b — u ^  b
5- ^ mia < 0  < 9 H
qM (6) 
Y - k  
X  + k  
qM (8) 
Qmin
F.3 Restricted delegation with a uniform distribution
We consider here the regulator’s preference between the output floor contract and 
the restricted two-interval contract when the firm’s type is assumed to be distributed 
uniformly on the interval [0£, 9h\ •
Proposition F .l If the firm’s type is distributed uniformly on the interval [9l ,9jj] 
the output floor contract is not best.
Proof. Consider a restricted two-interval contract which allows the firm to choose 
its level of output from the set:
fernn> X + k] U [Y -  k, oo]
When the firm’s type is distributed uniformly on the interval [9l, 9h\ the change 
in expected welfare, arising from a change in k , is:
A =  1 f [ * * ? *  dW(X +  k, 6) 8 W (Y  -  fc, 8) J
9g -  8l [h -V + y) dq{8) J d q ( 9 )  J
Table F .l: Output Choices
M onopoly output level C hoice w ith  choice set Qi
qM(9) < qmin Qmin
qunn<qM( 9 ) < X  + k qM(8)
X  + k < qM{9) < ^ X  +  k
X+Y < qM(9) < Y  k Y - k
Y  — k < qM(9) qM{9)
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Oh  — @l
L -
a 2(f ±ji) (1 —2 \ ) ( X + k ) + \ ( a —b9) | j Q
( * + x > !]
The first integral inside the brackets is calculated as:
a— 2(X+fc)
f  *l a - ( X + Y )
J b
( l -2A)(X + fc)+A(o-60) dO
(l-2A )(X +fcH oA
'(l-2A )(.r+ fc)+ aA j ^y - X - 2 f c ^ 
aJ ^Y -X -2k^ ^2a-3X-y+2fc^
Y  - X  - 2 k \  / X  + k \  ( \ \  ( Y  - X( - 2 k \ f X\ f X - 2 k \
“  (— r— )(— ) + U)(—t — )
Similarly, the second integral is calculated as:
(1-2A) (y- fc)  +  A ( o - W)a -(x+jgf  1yo-2(y-fcl [
b J V b ) \ 2 J  V b
The change in constrained expected welfare is therefore equal to:
A =
Oh  — Ol
(*=*=“ ) (***) + (*) 0 ^ ) :
y - x - 2 f c
Oh
> (  6 
1 \   ^ ( Y - X - 2 k ' 2
= ^ \H  b
Y - X - 2 k
)(S * ) + ( i ) ( -
Y - X -  2fcx2
)"
) - f
Given 0 < A < 1 this function is negative for any  X, Y, k. We therefore conclude 
that as we increase the value of k (reduce the size of the interval of disallowed outputs) 
welfare decreases. The regulator is therefore better off with a more restricted contract 
(smaller k ).
The output floor contract has the maximum k and hence we see that it will always 
yield a lower level of welfare than a restricted two-interval contract. That is, the 
output floor contract is not optimal when the regulator believes that the firm’s type 
is uniformly distributed on the interval [9l , Oh ] . ■
F. Com paring delegation contracts 316
F.4 Optimality of the restricted two-interval contract
N o ta tio n
Sa-(x+Y) “W-Qq(e)k^  f ( 0)de is Integral X
fa— 2(Y—k) — ^ (e r ^ f ( e)de is Integral Y 
is Integrand X 
-^(£(0) ^  f ( e) is Integrand Y
11 is the region of Types
12  is the region of Types
a—2(Y—k) a - ( X + Y )
b ’ b 
a ~ {X + Y )  a - 2(X +fc)
b ’ b
L em m a F.6 (Lemma 5.1) Suppose locally the regulator’s belief function, f  (9), is non­
increasing and concave and the welfare function is concave (Xe Then welfare
from the restricted two-interval choice set increases with the size of the interval of 
disallowed output levels. That is, the more restriction there is in the two-interval 
choice set (ie, the lower is k) the higher is the level of welfare.
P roof. S tep  1: G eneral con d ition s for w elfare to  d ecrease as k increases
Consider the restricted two-interval choice set which allows the firm to choose its 
level of output from the set:
famm, X  4- k] U [Y — k, 00]
The smaller the value of k, the wider is the set of disallowed choices and, hence, 
the more restriction is placed on the firm’s decision.
The rate of change in expected welfare from an increase in k is:
d w ( x  +  k  g) a = i x ± n d w { Y _ k  e}
_L-<x+y> dq(6)  J . -X Y-1) dq(6)
If an increase in k leads to a decrease in welfare for a ll feasib le k (A  <  0), then 
a two-interval choice set with a large interval of disallowed output levels (ie, small k ) 
will yield a higher level of welfare than a two-interval choice set with a smaller interval 
of disallowed output levels (ie, large k ).
W ith a concave welfare function (A > 5) the rate of change in welfare from a 
change in output is decreasing in the level of output for any given type (Lemma F.3). 
We therefore have:
d w ( Y - k , e ) m i  +  m ) ,
M e )  < 9 q(e)  for a » y g v * n 0
=> Integrand Y < Integrand X for any given  0
Given this, the sufficient conditions for A <  0 (Integral Y>Integral X) are as 
follows.
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1. Integral Y starts at a higher value than Integral X.
2. Both Integrands are decreasing in type.
3. Because Integrand X lies above Integrand Y, we require the slope of Integrand 
X in the region I2  to be steeper (ie, more negative) than the slope of Integrand 
Y in the region I \ . This will occur if both functions are concave in type.
We show that the conditions outlined in this lemma are sufficient to ensure that 
these conditions are met. Figure F.l illustrates functions which satisfy these conditions.
Expected
Welfare
Orange
m
ea-2(Y-kyb *-(X+Yyb a-2(X+ kyb
Figure F.l: Welfare change with a decreasing and concave density function
S tep  2: C alcu lating  th e  s ta r tin g  po in t o f th e  integrals
The value of Integrand Y at the left-hand boundary of its interval of integration
d W ( Y - k , a- ^ - k>) ( Y - k \
dq{0) \  b
The value of Integrand X at the left-hand boundary of its interval of integration
8 W ( X  +  fc, _  / ( X  +  fc) +  A ( y - X - 2 f c ) \
d q ( 0 )  V
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Integral Y therefore starts at a higher value than Integral X if:
/ y-fcw a-2(y-fc)  ^ > (^x + fc) + A(y-jr-2fc)^ a-(jr + y)^
~  (X  + k ) + X ( Y - X - 2 k )
That is, the ratio of the proportion of types at the extremes of the region I\ should 
be no greater than the ratio of the rate of change in welfare from the change in output 
at these extremes. Alternatively, we could say that the change in the probability of the 
firm ’s type being at the bounds of the respective regions should be no greater than the 
difference in the welfare change arising from the output change. This implies that the 
regulator’s belief function reinforces the impact of the change in the welfare level in 
each region.
We know that:
Y - k  ^ (X  +  k) +  X(Y -  X  -  2k)
b > b
Y ~ k(X  + k) + X ( Y - X -  2k)
a — ( X + Y )  \
We therefore know that ^ a- 2(y-jo^ <  (x+fc)+A(r-x - 2 fc) be true if
/ (oz 2 ( p l ) < 1
f
a - ( X  + Y ) \  . f a - 2 ( Y - k )
b J
A sufficient condition for Integral Y to start at a higher point than Integral X is 
therefore:
As an aside we note that this condition is always met with a uniform distribution 
since =  0.
Step 3: C alculating th e  slopes
The impact of a change in type on each of the integrands is calculated as:
for s =  Y - k  , X  + h .
W ith >  0, A > 0 and f{9) > 0 a sufficient condition for the integrands to
be decreasing is:
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That is, the density function should be non-increasing with type.
This condition also ensures that < i  and, hence, that Integral Y starts at a 
higher point than Integral X.
S tep  4: C om paring  th e  slopes
W ith the concave welfare function we have
Integrand Y < Integrand X for any  given 9
As Integrand Y lies below Integrand X, for any given type, we need to compare 
the slopes of these functions to ensure that Integral Y is greater than Integral X.
We know that if  we have two decreasing functions, A and B, where the slope of A  
is flatter than the slope of B, the Integral of A starts a higher point than the Integral 
of B, and the interval of integration is the same length for A and B, then the Integral 
of A unll be greater than the Integral of B.
When the belief function is non-increasing in type Integral Y starts at a higher value 
than X, and the rate of change of the integrand is decreasing in type for s =  Y  — k 
and X  +  k . Integral Y is therefore larger than Integral X if the slope of Integrand Y 
over region I\ is less negative than the slope of Integrand X over J2. This is true if the 
functions are concave.
The rate of change in the slope, for s =  Y  — k , X  +  k , is:
*  [Integrand] = ^
dd21 J dq (i9) dO2 99
We know that is non-increasing (Lemma F.4). The derivative with respect
to type must therefore be positive for the function to be concave (ie, with a concave 
non-increasing function the slope becomes ‘more negative’ as the type increases).
Given ^  <  0, A > 0 and >  0 we have ^  (8)m  — ^  w dq(0) — w ffl
> 0
>  0 if:
ae2
This occurs if the non-increasing belief function is concave.
S tep  5: C om paring  th e  in tegrals
If the welfare function is concave, and the regulator’s belief function is non-increasing 
and concave, we have shown that:
1. Integral Y starts at a higher point than Integral X;
2. Both Integrands are decreasing in type; and
3. The slope of Integrand Y in I\ is flatter than the slope of Integrand X in I2
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Combined these conditions allow us to conclude that the change in welfare from a 
change in k is non-positive. That is:
q - ( X + V )f — T - ' d W ( Y - k , 6 ) m . ^  \ r s — i)W(x + k,e)
 d i m  m d B  -  \J±^ LK±xi date) f{e)de9q(6)
q - 2  (X+fc)6 d X 0  
q(9
A < 0
S tep  6: C onclusion
If the conditions of the Lemma hold an increase in k leads to a decrease in welfare 
for any  given X,  Y, k. The more restriction there is in the two-interval choice set (ie, 
the lower is k) the higher is the level of welfare. ■
Lem m a F .7  (Lemma 5.1) Suppose locally the regulator’s belief function, f  (9), is 
non-increasing and the welfare function is convex (Xe ^0, ^ j) .  Then welfare from the 
restricted two-interval choice set increases with the size of the interval of disallowed 
output levels. That is, the more restriction there is in the two-interval choice set (ie, 
the lower is k) the higher is the level of welfare.
P roof. This proof is exactly the same as the proof to Lemma F.6 except that Step 
4 is no longer required.
With a convex welfare function (A < | )  the rate of change in welfare from a 
change in output is increasing in the level of output for any given type (Lemma F.2). 
We therefore have:
d W (Y  -  k, 9) d W (X  +  k , 9) 
dq(6) > dq{6)
=> Integrand Y >  Integrand X for any  given 9
Given this, the sufficient conditions for A < 0 (Integral Y>Integral X) are simply.
1. Integral Y starts at a higher value than Integral X.
2. Both Integrands are decreasing in type.
Steps 2, 3 and 5 in the proof to Lemma F.6 shows that if the regulator’s belief 
function is non-increasing these sufficient conditions will hold. Figure F.2 illustrates 
functions which satisfy these conditions.
We therefore find that if the regulator’s belief function is non-increasing, and the 
welfare function is convex:
q - ( X + V )f — ^ 9 W ( Y - k t6) ^  f — ^ — a w ( x  + k,e)
dote)— f(0)dO -  J - i»+n  date)  f(6)de
q - 2  (X+fc)  d W {X 9  
q(9
=> A < 0
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Expected
Welfare
Change
a-2(Y-k)/b a-(X+Y)/b a-2(X+ kyb e
Figure F.2: Welfare change with decreasing density function
That is, an increase in k leads to a decrease in welfare for any given X , Y, k. The 
more restriction there is in the two-interval choice set (ie, the lower is k) the higher is 
the level of welfare. ■
F.5 Optimality of the output floor contract
Lem m a F.8 (Lemma 5.2) Suppose locally:
(i) the regulator’s belief function, f (0) ,  is increasing and convex;
(ii) the rate of increase is large enough to offset the decreasing rate of change in 
welfare:
(in) the degree of curvature of the belief function is greater than a positive integer:
(iv) the degree of convexity is sufficiently large:
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(v) the welfare function is convex (\e  ^0, ^ j) .
Then welfare from a restricted two-interval choice set decreases with the size of 
the interval of disallowed output levels. That is, the more restriction there is in the 
two-interval choice set (ie, the lower is k) the lower is the level of welfare.
Proof. S tep  1: G enera l conditions for 'welfare to  increase as k increases
Consider the restricted two- interval choice set which allows the firm to choose its 
level of output from the set:
famin, X  +  fc] U [Y -  k, 00]
The smaller the value of k, the larger is the set of disallowed choices and, hence, 
the more restriction is placed on the firm’s decision.
The rate of change in expected welfare from an increase in k is:
dw(x  + k,e) _ dW(Y-k,e)
j* -jx± n  dq(G) j£=2<y=*l dq{0)
If an increase in k leads to a increase in welfare for all feasible k (A >  0), the 
two-interval choice set with a small interval of disallowed output levels (ie, large k) 
will yield a higher level of welfare than a two-interval choice set with a larger interval 
of disallowed output levels (ie, small k).
W ith a convex welfare function (A < | )  the rate of change in welfare from a 
change in output is increasing in the level of output for any given type (Lemma F.2). 
We therefore have:
d w ( Y - k , e )   ^ d w ( x  + k,e)r
— b i W   >  f r f f l ......
=> Integrand Y > Integrand X for any  given 9
Given this, the sufficient conditions for A >  0 (Integral X>Integral Y) are as 
follows.
1. Integral X starts at a higher value than Integral Y.
2. Both Integrands are increasing in type.
3. Because Integrand X lies below Integrand Y, we require the slope of Integrand 
Y in the region I\ to be flatter (ie, less positive) than the slope of Integrand X 
in the region ijg. This will occur if both functions are convex in type.
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Expected
Welfare
Change
ea-2(Y-k)/b a-(X+Y)/b a-2(X+ kyb
Figure F.3: Welfare change with an increasing and convex density function
We show that the conditions outlined in this lemma are sufficient to ensure that 
these conditions are met. Figure F.3 illustrates functions which satisfy these conditions. 
S tep  2: C alculating th e  s ta r tin g  poin t of th e  in tegrals 
The value of Integrand Y at the left-hand boundary of its interval of integration
is:
dW((Y  - fc, <*-2y - * ) ) / Y - k \  f a - 2
dq(0)
The value of Integrand X at the left-hand boundary of its interval of integration
is:
d W ( X  + k, ( ( X  + k) + X ( Y - X -
d q ( 0 )V
Integral X therefore starts at a higher value than Integral Y if:
(^x + fc) + A(y-x-2fc)^ ^ q-(x- + y)  ^ > y^-fc^ q-2(y-fc)j
f ( ^ )
f (a~2(r ~ * >)  _  ( X  +  J f c ) + A ( y - X - 2 * : )
That is, the ratio of the proportion of types at the extremes of the region I\ should 
be no less than the ratio of the rate of change in welfare from the change in output at 
these extremes. Alternatively, we say that the change in the proportion of types over
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the bounds of the regions should be no less than the difference in the welfare change 
arising from the output change.
f , a - { X + Y ) )
A sufficient condition for >  (x+fc)+A(y-*-2fc) is:
m >  l z Jl  w
99 -  (X  + k )+  \ ( Y - X  -  2k)
Talcing account of all feasible values of Ae ^0, ^  we know that:
Y - k  Y - k
>(X +  k) (X +  fc) +  A(Y -  X  -  2k)
The sufficient condition can therefore be restated as:
w  ~  X  +  fc
The right-hand side variable is decreasing in fc . We therefore have:
Y  .  Y - k  w,
X  X  +  fc
This gives us a neater version of the sufficient condition for Integral X to start at 
a higher value than Integral Y:
> 1 R a te  o f increaseOu X
As an aside we note that this condition is never met with a uniform distribution. 
S tep  3: C alcu lating  th e  slop es
The impact of a change in type on each of the integrands is calculated, for s =  Y —k 
, X  +  fc , as:
0  rT dW( s , 0)d f (9 )-  [Integrand] =  ^ (g) m  ~  A/(0)
With > 1, >  0, A > 0 find f(0) > 0 we have an increasing slope if:
9W( s , 9) 9 f (9 )
dq (9) 00 — Xf(6) > 0
>  _ ^ _ > 0  V 99 )  \ f ( 9 ) J  > " U
This condition says that, if the Integrands are to be increasing, the curvature of 
the belief function needs to be larger than the ratio of A to the rate of change in welfare 
arising from a change in output.
The right-hand side of this equation is:
A bX
l ^ T _ ( l - 2 A ) s  +  A ( a - b 9 )
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Given A (a — bO) >  0 we have, for s = Y  — k , X  + k :
bX bX>(1 -  2A) s (1 -  2A) s +  A(a -  bQ)
The condition for the integrands to have an increasing slope can therefore be
reduced to
f d f ( 0 ) \  / 1 \
!) (
As Y  — k > X  -\-k we have
d m \ b\
V ae )  \ m )  (i — 2A)s
bX bX>(1 -  2A) ( X  +  k) (1 -  2A) (Y  -  k) 
Giving us a revised condition of:
( 9 / m \  (  1 \  bX
y 89 ) \ m )  ( 1 - 2 A ) ( X  + k)
Similarly X  + k > X  and hence:
bX bX>(1 -  2A) (X)  (1 -  2A) ( X  +  k)
The condition for a given value of A is therefore:
( d / m  (  1 \  .  b\
V a e  ) \ m )  ( i — 2A) x
When we account for all values of Ae ^0, ^  we have:
1 > r T 2 A > 0
The suflScient condition for the integrands to be increasing then becomes:
( ™ )  ( m )  > i > °  C urvature
Step  4: Com paring th e slopes
Given a convex welfare function we have
Integrand Y > Integrand X for any given 9
As the Integrand X lies below Integrand Y, for any given type, we need to  compare 
the slopes of these functions to ensure that Integral X is greater than Integral Y.
We know that if  we have two increasing functions, A and B, where the slope o f A is 
steeper than the slope of B, the Integral of A starts at a higher point than the Integral 
of B, and the intervals of integration are the same length, then the Integral of A will 
be greater than the Integral o f B.
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Under the conditions derived thus far Integral X starts at a higher value than 
Integral Y, and both integrands are increasing. Integral X will therefore be larger 
than Integral Y if the slope of Integrand Y over the region J3 is flatter than the slope 
of Integrand X over I2 . This will be true if the functions are convex functions.
The rate of change in the slope, for s — Y  — k ,X  k , is:
*  tTntrrrlT1,i SW(s,0)cPf(O) d f (6 )^ [In teg ran d ] =  _  2A—
This derivative must therefore be positive for the function to be convex (ie, with 
a convex increasing function the slope becomes more positive as the type increases).
Given > 0, A > 0 and > 0 we have [Integrand] > 0 if:
a w { t , o ) & f { o )  d f ( e )
dq(e) so"2 ae
( & f ( 6 ) \  /  1 \  2A
\ a f i  )  { s m  I > >  0\  /  \  dd J dq^ O)
The right-hand side of this equation is:
A 2bX
(1 — 2A) s +  A(o — W) 
As before, given A(a — bQ) > 0, we have:
2b\ 2b\>(1 -  2A) s (1 -  2A) s +  A(a -  bQ)
Using a similar approach to Step 3 we find that the sufficient condition for the 
Integrands to be convex reduces to:
( & f { 6 ) \  (  1 \  2bX ^
[ ~ W ~ )  (% < £ ) > ( i - 2 X ) j r  > 0 C hange m  cu rv a tu re
We know that >  0. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the above 
inequality to hold is therefore:
d2/  (0)—7^2— > 0 C onvexity
That is, the increasing density function must be convex.
Step  5: Com paring th e integrals
If the welfare function is convex, the regulator’s belief function is increasing and 
convex, the rate of increase in the belief function is greater than the ratio of the 
maximum extremes of the choice sets, and the degree of convexity of the belief function 
is greater than a positive constant, we have shown that:
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1. Integral X starts at a higher point than Integral Y;
2. Both Integrands are increasing in type; and
3. the slope of Integrand X in I 2  is steeper than the slope of Integrand Y in I \ .
Combined these conditions allow us to  conclude that the change in welfare from a 
change in k is positive. That is:
q - ( X + y )
r - r - *  d W ( Y - k , 9 )  f  ^  d W ( X  + k,6)
J a—2(V—fc) dq(0) m d 0 \ <  (x+y) date) m d e9q(0)
a —2(X+fc)6 9 { 0  
q(0)
A > 0
S tep  6: C onclusion
If the conditions of the Lemma hold an increase in k leads to an increase in welfare 
for any  given X, Y, k. The more restriction there is in the two-interval choice set (ie, 
the lower is k ) the lower is the level of welfare. ■
L em m a F .9  (Lemma 5.2) Suppose locally:
(i) the regulator’s belief function, f{9) ,  is increasing;
(ii) the rate of increase is large enough to offset the decreasing rate of change in 
welfare:
s m > r > 1 .
ae ~ x  '
(Hi) the degree of curvature of the belief function is greater than a positive integer:
C4* ? )  ( m )  > r  “ *
(iv) the welfare function is concave (Xe 1 ^ .
Then welfare from a restricted two-interval choice set decreases with the size of 
the interval of disallowed output levels. That is, the more restriction there is in the 
two-interval choice set (ie, the lower is k ) the lower is the level of welfare.
P roof. This proof is exactly the same as the proof to Lemma F.9 except that Step 
4 is no longer required.
W ith a concave welfare function (A > the rate of change in welfare from a 
change in type is decreasing in the level of output (Lemma F.3). We therefore have:
d W { Y - k , $ )  d W ( X  + k,0) 
dq(0) ~  dq(9)
=> Integrand Y < Integrand X for any  given 9
Given this, the sufficient conditions for A >  0 (Integral X>Integral Y) are simply.
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1. Integral X starts at a higher value than Integral Y.
2. Both Integrands are increasing in type.
Steps 2, 3 and 5 in the proof to Lemma F.9 show that if the regulator’s belief 
function is increasing, and the rate of increase and the curvature of the belief function 
are sufficiently large, these sufficient conditions will hold.
We then have:
=> A > 0
That is, an increase in k leads to an increase in welfare for any  given X, Y, k. 
The more restriction there is in the two-interval choice set (ie, the lower is k ) the lower 
is the level of welfare. ■
r a^ ±kl d W ( X  +
J*-(x +Y) dq{0)
A ppendix G
Explaining the sim ulations
We use M atlab© to simulate the output choices of a firm under the regulator’s dele­
gated contract. The details of the simulations are given below. Section 5.5 describes 
the underlying assumptions of the example used, and considers the main results arising 
from the simulations. Each simulation is repeated three times for A =  0.25,0.5,0.75.
G .l Simulation details
In each simulation we set the feasible output levels to be on the interval (0,95]. Output 
changes in incremental steps of 0.25. This gives the firm a total of 371 outputs to choose 
from.
Each simulation generates 100 random values of the firm’s marginal cost from 
the uniform distribution on the interval [5,95]. We then find the level of profit for 
each cost-output combination giving us a 371x100 profit matrix (100 columns=cost 
types; 371 rows=output levels). The calculation used to find the profit level varies by 
simulation; details are given below.
The programme finds the maximum level of profit for each type by finding the 
highest value of profit along each column. It also identifies the level of output which 
generates that type-specific maximum level of profit - ie, the programme finds a matrix 
element 7Uj which is the maximum level of profit for cost type j, and the profit- 
maximising level of output is the output corresponding to row i.
W ith the firm’s type (marginal cost) and the profit-maximising level of output we 
can calculate the level of welfare for that type. We take the average value of welfare 
over the 100 types to get an estimate for expected welfare under the contract for that 
run of the simulation. We repeat each simulation n  times (the value of n is specified 
below for each contract type), and average the expected welfare from each run to get 
a final estimated value of expected welfare for the contract.
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U nconstrained contract
For the contract with no constraints on the firm’s output choices we simply run the 
programme 500 times (ie, n=500) to get an average level of welfare for a firm faced with 
the unconstrained contract. For every output level profit is calculated as: ir = pq — 6q.
Single interval contract
For the single interval contract we set the output floor equal to 5. This affects the 
profit calculations as follows:
•  q < 5 => ft = —100,0001
•  5<q=>Tr = pq — Oq
We run the programme 500 times (ie, n=500) to get an average level of welfare for 
a firm faced with the single interval contract.
Two interval contract
For the two interval contract we set the output floor equal to 5. In addition the 
programme generates 100 random values for X and Y. The random variables are re­
stricted so that 5 <  X < Y  < 47.5. The last restriction (ie, Y less than the maximum 
monopoly output level) insures that the introduction of the extra interval has an im­
pact on the firm’s choice. The simulation is run 100 times for each (X,Y) combination, 
giving us a total of 10,000 runs.
For this contract profit is calculated as follows:
•  q <  5 =>- 7r =  —100,000
•  5<q<X=>Tr = pq — Oq
•  X < q < Y  => tt — —100,000
•  Y  < q => tt = pq — 6q
We find the level of average welfare for each (X,Y) combination (averaging over 
the 100 runs). This gives us 100 (X,Y) combinations with their associated expected 
welfare levels. We then find the (X,Y) combination which yields the highest level of 
expected welfare and use this as our two interval contract.
1The profit level is chosen to be a sufficiently large negative number to ensure that the disallowed 
output choices never emerge as the profit-maximising choices.
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T hree interval contract
For the three interval contract we take the welfare-maximising two-interval contract 
and introduce an additional interval of disallowed output levels. The programme gen­
erates values for (W, Z) to form this extra interval. Two different types of simulation 
are run.
1. Left-side: 100 random values for W and Z are randomly generated by the pro­
gramme so that:
5 < P F < Z < X < F <  47.5
2. Right-side: 100 random values for W and Z are randomly generated by the 
programme so that:
5 < X < Y < W < Z <  47.5
Each simulation is run 100 times for each (W,Z) combination, giving us 20,000 
simulations in total.
Profit is calculated as follows in the left-side simulations:
•  q < 5 => ir = —100,000
•  5 < q < W = > T T  = pq — Oq
•  W  < q < Z  =>- 7r =  —100,000
•  Z < q < X = ^ T T  — pq — Oq
•  X  < q < Y  =$■ ir =  —100,000
•  Y  < q => tt — pq — 6q
Profit is calculated as follows in the right-side simulations:
•  q < 5 => 7r =  —100,000
•  5 < q < X = > 7 r  = pq — Oq
•  X  < q < Y  => n  = —100,000
•  Y < q < W = > i r  = pq — Oq
•  W < q < Z = > ' K  — —100,000
•  Z<q=>TC = pq — 6q
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For each simulation type we find the average level of welfare for each (W,Z) com­
bination (averaging over the 100 runs). This gives us 100 left-side (W,Z, welfare) com­
binations and 100 right-side (W,Z,welfare) combinations. We find the left-side (W,Z) 
combination and the right-side (W,Z) combination which yields the highest level of 
expected welfare. We then find the highest welfare level from these two choices to give 
us our three interval contract.
Four interval contract
For the four interval contract we take the welfare-maximising three interval contract 
and introduce an additional interval of disallowed output levels. The programme 
generates values for (U,V) to form this interval. Three different types of simulation 
are run.
1. Right-side: 100 random values for U and V are randomly generated by the 
programme so that:
6 < W < Z < X < Y < U < V <  47.5
2. Left-side: 100 random values for U and V are randomly generated by the pro­
gramme so that:
5 < U < V < W < Z < X < Y <  47.5
3. Middle: 100 random values for U and V are randomly generated by the pro­
gramme so that:
5 < W < Z < U < V < X < Y <  47.5
Each simulation type is run 100 times (ie, n=100) for each (U,V) combination, 
giving us 30,000 simulations in total.
Profit is calculated as follows in the right-side simulations:
•  q < 5  => w = —100,000
•  6 < q < W = > 7 r  = pq — Oq
•  W  < q < Z  < ^ i r =  -100,000
•  Z < q < X = > i r  = pq — Oq
•  X  < q < Y  => tt = —100,000
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•  Y < q < U = > 7 T  = pq — Oq
•  U < q < V  =>■ ir =  —100,000
• Y  < V  => ir = pq — 0q
Profit is calculated as follows in the left-side simulations:
•  q < 5 => 7r =  —100,000
•  5<<7<E/=>7r =  pg — 6q
•  U < q < V  <=> 7r =  —100,000
• V < q < W = > T T  = pq — Oq
• W  < q < Z  => tt = —100,000
• Z < q < X = > T V  = pq — 6q
•  X  < q < Y  =>* =  -100,000
•  Y  < q => 7r =  pq — Oq
Profit is calculated as follows in the middle simulations:
•  ? < 5 7r =  —100,000
• 5 < q < W = > 7 r  = pq — 6q
•  W  < q < Z  <=> 7r =  —100,000
•  Z < q < U = $ - %  = pq — Oq
•  U < q < V = > i r  = -100,000
•  V < q < X = > 7 r  = pq — 6q
•  X < q < Y = > 7 r ~  —100,000
• Y < q = > i r  = pq — Oq
For each simulation type we find the average level of welfare for each (U,V) com­
bination (averaging over the 100 runs). This gives us 100 left-side (XJ,V, expected 
welfare) combinations, 100 right-side (U,V, expected welfare) combinations, and 100 
middle (U,V, expected welfare) combinations. We find the left-side (U,V) combina­
tion, right-side (U,V) combination and middle (U,V) combination which yields the 
highest level of expected welfare. The highest value from amongst these three choices 
gives the four interval contract.
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G.2 Optimal intervals and welfare levels
We present the calculated average welfare levels for each of the contract options dis­
cussed above in Tables G .l to G.3. Comparisons of the welfare levels are discussed in 
section 5.5.
Table G .l: Simulated Average Welfare Levels when A is equal to 0.25
N o o f In tervals F loor U V W Z X Y W elfare
No restriction 592.87
One 5 595.54
Two 5 29.88 36.62 600.95
Three
Left 5 9.79 29.74 29.88 36.62 612.89
Right 5 37.10 41.26 29.88 36.62 607.96
Four
Left 5 5.49 7.53 9.79 29.74 29.88 36.62 619.40
M iddle 5 29.75 29.78 9.79 29.74 29.88 36.62 630.85
Right 5 42.81 43.54 9.79 29.74 29.88 36.62 617.20
Table G.2: Simulated Average Welfare Levels when A is equal to 0.5
N o o f In tervals F loor U V W Z X Y W elfare
No restriction 792.22
One 5 795.52
Two 5 10.37 46.81 843.89
Three
Left 5 6.32 7.17 10.37 46.81 859.65
R igh t 5 46.85 46.93 10.37 46.81 859.70
Four
Left 5 5.18 10.26 46.85 46.93 10.37 46.81 865.75
Middle 5 46.82 46.82 46.85 46.93 10.37 46.81 859.68
Right 5 47.20 47.47 46.85 46.93 10.37 46.81 856.29
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Table G.3: Simulated Average Welfare Levels when A is equal to 0.75
No o f In tervals F loor U V w Z X Y W elfare
No restriction 992.54
One 5 995.97
Two 5 17.45 26.37 1002.41
Three
Left 5 10.40 15.69 17.45 26.37 1012.62
R ight 5 30.66 31.18 17.45 26.37 1014.10
Four
Left 5 5.84 6.28 30.66 31.18 17.45 26.37 1019.20
Middle 5 28.40 30.44 30.66 31.18 17.45 26.37 1009.35
Right 5 44.50 46.41 30.66 31.18 17.45 26.37 1009.10
